Date of effect now 1 April 2004 for revised IGC-approval for certain legacy types of GNSS flight recorder

Robert Danewid wrote:
And with the history in mind, I have asked you several times to put
forward the real arguments, not all that computer stuff, for increasing
security.

The relevant increase in security took place in 1997. Prior to that
point, every thing I know suggests that the security requirements were
ambiguous, at best. All that happened is that flight recorders that
could not have been approved under 1997 specifications have been
downgraded to the next lower level. Perhaps they should have been
downgraded in 1997, perhaps the specifications shouldn't have been
changed in 1997. I don't know, because I wasn't involved.

If you think the 1997 security requirements were too strict, I think the
onus is on you to propose and justify a set of requirements that you
would consider to be more appropriate.

Marc

Sorry for the subject line, but did I overlook the effective, public
notice that IGC was even considering this change? In any real sense,
the relevant change takes place in 1April2004. Unless, that is,
popular opinion causes the IGC to reverse itself. That is when most
loggers in the world will be disqualified for world records. The
relevant increase in security did not take place in 1997, because
anyone trying to cheat presumably used one of the "not secure enough"
models from that time forward.

If you feel that adequate official observer oversight makes these
"legacy" loggers adequate for world records, please call/write/mail
your IGC representative!

Jonathan Gere

Robert Danewid wrote:
And with the history in mind, I have asked you several times to put
forward the real arguments, not all that computer stuff, for increasing
security.

The relevant increase in security took place in 1997. Prior to that
point, every thing I know suggests that the security requirements were
ambiguous, at best. All that happened is that flight recorders that
could not have been approved under 1997 specifications have been
downgraded to the next lower level. Perhaps they should have been
downgraded in 1997, perhaps the specifications shouldn't have been
changed in 1997. I don't know, because I wasn't involved.

If you think the 1997 security requirements were too strict, I think the
onus is on you to propose and justify a set of requirements that you
would consider to be more appropriate.

Marc