VX-4 phantom loads

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 06:41:38 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 13 Mar 2005 02:32:12 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

snip

I just looked at my form 5 and found that I flew 498 one time in my
year at Korat--what are the odds of that, not hitting a tail number in
9 months of single-squadron operation?

How early on did you fly it? Perhaps it was shot down or severely damaged before you could fly
it again?

I flew it in November of '72. That means it survived through
Linebacker and it wasn't lost during Linebacker II either.

Luck of the draw then, I guess.

snip

We all get taller, smarter, braver and better looking as the years
pass. I'm just a bit skeptical of the M1.6 estimate. Starting with
three tanks and wall-to-wall missiles from 420 KIAS in the escort role
and then being able to configure to clean, accelerate and hit that
kind so speed at the typical altitude would be very unlikely.

To get
M1.6 with the missiles, the pods and the altitude under FL 400 just
doesn't seem within the realm of capability of the airplane.

You may be right. Coe says they were cruising at 450 knots @ 20kft with the strike flight at
350-400, and the escorts were weaving to stay with the strike. If those speeds are KIAS or
KCAS, the escorts would be cruising at something upwards of .9. Those speeds seem kind of low
to me to be TAS for F-4s, even fully loaded.

They would be indicated, not true. Typically at that point in a
mission the bomb droppers would be trying to maintain 480 ground speed
which translates to 8 miles/minute.

In that case, 350-400 KIAS for the strikers would be about right. At 20 kft ISA 350 KCAS works out
to 480 kt., or 465 kt. after taking compressibility error into account. Given the typical hotter
than ISA conditions, 350KCAS (which I think is what the ASI actually gave you in the F-4) @ 20kft.
would be right around 480 kt.

That would be tempered by
time-to-go to TOT and distance read out on the INS. The escorts would
be trying to keep 420 indicated which was an approximation of corner
velocity.

Wouldn't they want some extra E over corner, because they'd be bound to **** it off quickly with any
hard maneuvering?

Anyway, after one of the strikers called MiGs and broke, he says he jettisoned his tanks and
went burner, while beginning a descending turn. He says he made about two turns, ending up at
about 15kft with the strike flight out in front of him (they'd been turning too), when he saw a
pair of 21s out in front and above at about 20kft. He'd loosened up the turns as no Migs had
appeared immediately, so would have gained considerable speed, although perhaps not to1.6, which
does seem a bit fast for 15kft. What do you think -- could he have gotten that fast relatively
clean, in a diving, non-windup turn? I don't have a -1-1 for the F-4, so can't do a ballpark
estimate of the accel.

No way to get to that speed at that altitude. I'd readily accept 1.2M,
but can't imagine getting to 1.6 and would really find it tactically a
mistake to get going that fast even if you could.

Okay, although since he was rear aspect on the MiGs who seem to have been doing their usual
supersonic (or at least, high transonic) missile pass and blow through, being well above transonic
would seem to be necessary if he was going to catch them. It would certainly give his AIM-7 a better
chance of overhauling them. Do you ever see him at Rats reunions? If so, maybe you could ask him
about it.

Well, as much as I respect the considerable research that Jenkins did
on the F-105, as we've often discussed, the use of pods by Iron Hand
flights was much more the exception than the rule.

Use of, yes, but mandated carriage of, no. 7th AF required pod carriage by all a/c going into
NVN, even the Weasels, despite their protests that this limited them to a single Shrike and they
were rarely turned on in any case, as the jammers interfered with reception by the Weasel gear.
I've got shots of 105Fs carrying single ALQ-101s in '68 or so. The dual Shrike launcher also
seems to have been developed in response to this silly mandate, but the pilots disliked the
vibration and drag.

The order for Weasels to carry a pod led to the requirement for an internal jammer for the 105F
to recover a weapon station, which became the ALQ-105 scab mount on the 105G, essentially an
ALQ-101 split in half lengthwise. They still rarely turned it on, but could once again carry
Shrikes on both O/Bs.

Well, we had been talking about the F-4E portion of the Hunter/Killer
team and the carriage of dual pods. My original point was that some
equipment like ECM pods and AIM-7s were standard throughout the
squadron and not adjusted for the particular role of a tail number on
a particularl day--hence, H/Ks carried a pod even if we weren't going
to use it.

No argument there. I still don't know how I easily managed to find shots of two different 34th TFS
a/c (as well as one from the 421st) carrying two pods in that era, if it was as unusual as you state.
Just one more minor mystery that's unlikely to be solved.

I pointed out the minor error in Jenkin's quote that you offered
regarding emphasis on a pod for Iron Hand applications.

snip

I think we're talking past each other here. My point was that the higher commanders/people who wrote
the requirement for the ALQ-101 very likely* did so for exactly the reasons Jenkins claimed, i.e. to
provide better protection for a/c that weren't able to benefit from mutual jamming. Subsequent
priority deployment of the ALQ-101 to those a/c tasked with such detached missions, i.e. Iron
Hand/MiGCAP/Recon, indicates that Jenkins' comments about the perceived need for the development of
the 101, _regardless of whether it was actually turned on by the crews_, is correct.

*I say "very likely" because I don't have Jenkins here, and don't know what his sources were for this
statement, if he gave them.

Offhand, I don't recall seeing photos of a/c other than F-105WW or MiGCAPs carrying ALQ-101s from
1968-1973, although it may have happened. But even if there are some shots of same, the vast
majority of photos I have of strikers/chaffers/escorts during LB I/II show them carrying pure noise
jamming pods, and not ALQ-101s. I don't think I have a single photo of a 388th F-4E carrying an
ALQ-101 during the bombing halt and LB periods. I know that the 388th had them when they were still
equipped with Thuds, because there's a photo in Larry Davis' "Wild Weasel", taken at Korat, of a
whole rack of ALQ-101s waiting to be loaded on a/c, with Thud tails visible above the revetments in
the background. Presumably there were only limited numbers of -101s available in the theater, so if
those pods weren't at the 388th in 1972 they must have been somewhere else. From photo evidence it
appears that "somewhere else" was the 432nd at Udorn, the unit tasked with MiGCAP and Recon over the
north, which is right in line with the intended deployment of the -101 described by Jenkins (the
F-105Gs had their own " -101s" by this time, the ALQ-105).

Along that line, I could only find a single shot of a 67th TFS F-4CWW carrying a pod, and it's an
-87. The sample size is way too small to reach any definite conclusions, but I'd guess that there
may not have been enough 101s to go around. The 67th was apparently tasked to do a lot of pre-emptive
Shrike firings, which would have kept them out of the worst threats. Alternatively, Davis has
illustrations showing them carrying ALQ-119s, which may have been just entering service at the time.
The F-4Cs at Spangdahlem carried -119s a few years later, but I don't know when they became
available.

Guy

On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 06:30:15 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

That would be tempered by
time-to-go to TOT and distance read out on the INS. The escorts would
be trying to keep 420 indicated which was an approximation of corner
velocity.

Wouldn't they want some extra E over corner, because they'd be bound to **** it off quickly with any
hard maneuvering?

It's always going to be a compromise between what you want and what
you can have. In any A/A mission I always like to be very fast at
entry--in those days you could bleed off airspeed a lot easier than
gain it (not so for most aircraft today!)

In the escort role, the constraint was to maintain station on the
escorted force. So, with a bit of maneuver you could hold near corner
and plan on having a minute or two to accelerate upon getting a Disco
call or hearing of a MiG spotting somewhere in the package. Worst case
would be as the intercept target with no warning. C/L tanks would be
gone as soon as they got empty, so first move would be a slice into
the attack with full reheat, then a conversion of the fight into a
vertical rather than horizontal engagment.

MiGCAP suprisingly orbited slower than escorts usually depending upon
GCI vectoring to give them acceleration and configuration time (tank
jettison). Sweep missions would be faster than corner from the time
they hit the Red River flatlands.

No way to get to that speed at that altitude. I'd readily accept 1.2M,
but can't imagine getting to 1.6 and would really find it tactically a
mistake to get going that fast even if you could.

Okay, although since he was rear aspect on the MiGs who seem to have been doing their usual
supersonic (or at least, high transonic) missile pass and blow through, being well above transonic
would seem to be necessary if he was going to catch them. It would certainly give his AIM-7 a better
chance of overhauling them. Do you ever see him at Rats reunions? If so, maybe you could ask him
about it.

Attendance at Rat reunions seems, at least to me, to be more weighted
toward earlier participants and definitely toward multiple tour guys.
I don't see that many from the Korat Linebacker days. Haven't seen
either of these guys since 1973.

Well, we had been talking about the F-4E portion of the Hunter/Killer
team and the carriage of dual pods. My original point was that some
equipment like ECM pods and AIM-7s were standard throughout the
squadron and not adjusted for the particular role of a tail number on
a particularl day--hence, H/Ks carried a pod even if we weren't going
to use it.

No argument there. I still don't know how I easily managed to find shots of two different 34th TFS
a/c (as well as one from the 421st) carrying two pods in that era, if it was as unusual as you state.
Just one more minor mystery that's unlikely to be solved.

421st F-4s were never (at least to my knowledge) at Korat. The war
lasted a long time and the only consistency was constant change. I can
only report on what I encountered from July of '72 to July of '73 at
Korat.

I pointed out the minor error in Jenkin's quote that you offered
regarding emphasis on a pod for Iron Hand applications.

snip

I think we're talking past each other here. My point was that the higher commanders/people who wrote
the requirement for the ALQ-101 very likely* did so for exactly the reasons Jenkins claimed, i.e. to
provide better protection for a/c that weren't able to benefit from mutual jamming. Subsequent
priority deployment of the ALQ-101 to those a/c tasked with such detached missions, i.e. Iron
Hand/MiGCAP/Recon, indicates that Jenkins' comments about the perceived need for the development of
the 101, _regardless of whether it was actually turned on by the crews_, is correct.

*I say "very likely" because I don't have Jenkins here, and don't know what his sources were for this
statement, if he gave them.

Offhand, I don't recall seeing photos of a/c other than F-105WW or MiGCAPs carrying ALQ-101s from
1968-1973, although it may have happened. But even if there are some shots of same, the vast
majority of photos I have of strikers/chaffers/escorts during LB I/II show them carrying pure noise
jamming pods, and not ALQ-101s. I don't think I have a single photo of a 388th F-4E carrying an
ALQ-101 during the bombing halt and LB periods.

Whew, what a load of my senile mind! That's consistent with my
recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg. We carried
them for about 2 years and then began getting a few of the ALQ-119
pods.



I know that the 388th had them when they were still
equipped with Thuds, because there's a photo in Larry Davis' "Wild Weasel", taken at Korat, of a
whole rack of ALQ-101s waiting to be loaded on a/c, with Thud tails visible above the revetments in
the background.

Davis book is hard to reference since it isn't indexed, but I did find
the section you refer to. The pods are noted as arriving in July of
'68 (which is about the time of cessation of NVN bombing and the end
of Rolling Thunder.)

Tony Thornborough in "Iron Hand" notes the 7AF demand for carriage of
pods and the Weasel's resistance because of both interference with
RHAW equipment and loss of a Shrike station.

It should be noted as well that not all two-seat aircraft at Korat by
1968 were Weasels. There were Ryan's Raider aircraft, Combat Nail,
T-Stick II, etc. Some of these might have had good applications of the
-101 pod, if they were going to SAM country.

Presumably there were only limited numbers of -101s available in the theater, so if
those pods weren't at the 388th in 1972 they must have been somewhere else. From photo evidence it
appears that "somewhere else" was the 432nd at Udorn, the unit tasked with MiGCAP and Recon over the
north, which is right in line with the intended deployment of the -101 described by Jenkins (the
F-105Gs had their own " -101s" by this time, the ALQ-105).

Along that line, I could only find a single shot of a 67th TFS F-4CWW carrying a pod, and it's an
-87. The sample size is way too small to reach any definite conclusions, but I'd guess that there
may not have been enough 101s to go around. The 67th was apparently tasked to do a lot of pre-emptive
Shrike firings, which would have kept them out of the worst threats. Alternatively, Davis has
illustrations showing them carrying ALQ-119s, which may have been just entering service at the time.
The F-4Cs at Spangdahlem carried -119s a few years later, but I don't know when they became
available.

When the 67th deployed to Korat for Linebacker II, they were barely
operational. Only the need for additional 24-hour/day Weaseling made
it necessary to deploy them to the war. Higher priority missions in
SEA would have kept the Kadena guys from getting the latest equipment.

I don't know about pre-emptive Shrike firings. I never heard of it
during a lot of Weasel supporting. The first I recall consideration of
the tactic was several years later (around '75-'76) when Shrike supply
levels had stabilized and there were sufficient numbers to expand in
that manner.

Unless you had a very tight, single-thrust, strike package on a very
explicit timeline, I think it would be pretty hard to safely
coordinate a pre-emption program.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 06:30:15 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

That would be tempered by
time-to-go to TOT and distance read out on the INS. The escorts would
be trying to keep 420 indicated which was an approximation of corner
velocity.

Wouldn't they want some extra E over corner, because they'd be bound to **** it off quickly with any
hard maneuvering?

It's always going to be a compromise between what you want and what
you can have. In any A/A mission I always like to be very fast at
entry--in those days you could bleed off airspeed a lot easier than
gain it (not so for most aircraft today!)

In the escort role, the constraint was to maintain station on the
escorted force. So, with a bit of maneuver you could hold near corner
and plan on having a minute or two to accelerate upon getting a Disco
call or hearing of a MiG spotting somewhere in the package. Worst case
would be as the intercept target with no warning. C/L tanks would be
gone as soon as they got empty, so first move would be a slice into
the attack with full reheat, then a conversion of the fight into a
vertical rather than horizontal engagment.

In that case, his claim of maintaining 450 while weaving is at least possible.

No way to get to that speed at that altitude. I'd readily accept 1.2M,
but can't imagine getting to 1.6 and would really find it tactically a
mistake to get going that fast even if you could.

Okay, although since he was rear aspect on the MiGs who seem to have been doing their usual
supersonic (or at least, high transonic) missile pass and blow through, being well above transonic
would seem to be necessary if he was going to catch them. It would certainly give his AIM-7 a better
chance of overhauling them. Do you ever see him at Rats reunions? If so, maybe you could ask him
about it.

Attendance at Rat reunions seems, at least to me, to be more weighted
toward earlier participants and definitely toward multiple tour guys.
I don't see that many from the Korat Linebacker days. Haven't seen
either of these guys since 1973.

Well, we had been talking about the F-4E portion of the Hunter/Killer
team and the carriage of dual pods. My original point was that some
equipment like ECM pods and AIM-7s were standard throughout the
squadron and not adjusted for the particular role of a tail number on
a particularl day--hence, H/Ks carried a pod even if we weren't going
to use it.

No argument there. I still don't know how I easily managed to find shots of two different 34th TFS
a/c (as well as one from the 421st) carrying two pods in that era, if it was as unusual as you state.
Just one more minor mystery that's unlikely to be solved.

421st F-4s were never (at least to my knowledge) at Korat.

No, thea/c in question was at Takhli, after the 421st moved from Danang (and the 366th was closed down).
My point was that dual pod carriage was not limited to the 388th; I've got photos of 421st, 388th, and
432nd a/c so equipped, i.e. those from 3 different bases, all with escort or MiGCAP tasking.

The war
lasted a long time and the only consistency was constant change. I can
only report on what I encountered from July of '72 to July of '73 at
Korat.

Sure.

I pointed out the minor error in Jenkin's quote that you offered
regarding emphasis on a pod for Iron Hand applications.

snip

I think we're talking past each other here. My point was that the higher commanders/people who wrote
the requirement for the ALQ-101 very likely* did so for exactly the reasons Jenkins claimed, i.e. to
provide better protection for a/c that weren't able to benefit from mutual jamming. Subsequent
priority deployment of the ALQ-101 to those a/c tasked with such detached missions, i.e. Iron
Hand/MiGCAP/Recon, indicates that Jenkins' comments about the perceived need for the development of
the 101, _regardless of whether it was actually turned on by the crews_, is correct.

*I say "very likely" because I don't have Jenkins here, and don't know what his sources were for this
statement, if he gave them.

Offhand, I don't recall seeing photos of a/c other than F-105WW or MiGCAPs carrying ALQ-101s from
1968-1973, although it may have happened. But even if there are some shots of same, the vast
majority of photos I have of strikers/chaffers/escorts during LB I/II show them carrying pure noise
jamming pods, and not ALQ-101s. I don't think I have a single photo of a 388th F-4E carrying an
ALQ-101 during the bombing halt and LB periods.

Whew, what a load of my senile mind! That's consistent with my
recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.

Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

We carried
them for about 2 years and then began getting a few of the ALQ-119
pods.

I know that the 388th had them when they were still
equipped with Thuds, because there's a photo in Larry Davis' "Wild Weasel", taken at Korat, of a
whole rack of ALQ-101s waiting to be loaded on a/c, with Thud tails visible above the revetments in
the background.

Davis book is hard to reference since it isn't indexed, but I did find
the section you refer to. The pods are noted as arriving in July of
'68 (which is about the time of cessation of NVN bombing and the end
of Rolling Thunder.)

Yes, which is probably why there are so few photos showing them being carried by Thuds (or any other a/c).

Tony Thornborough in "Iron Hand" notes the 7AF demand for carriage of
pods and the Weasel's resistance because of both interference with
RHAW equipment and loss of a Shrike station.

Uh Huh.

It should be noted as well that not all two-seat aircraft at Korat by
1968 were Weasels. There were Ryan's Raider aircraft, Combat Nail,
T-Stick II, etc. Some of these might have had good applications of the
-101 pod, if they were going to SAM country.

I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

Presumably there were only limited numbers of -101s available in the theater, so if
those pods weren't at the 388th in 1972 they must have been somewhere else. From photo evidence it
appears that "somewhere else" was the 432nd at Udorn, the unit tasked with MiGCAP and Recon over the
north, which is right in line with the intended deployment of the -101 described by Jenkins (the
F-105Gs had their own " -101s" by this time, the ALQ-105).

Along that line, I could only find a single shot of a 67th TFS F-4CWW carrying a pod, and it's an
-87. The sample size is way too small to reach any definite conclusions, but I'd guess that there
may not have been enough 101s to go around. The 67th was apparently tasked to do a lot of pre-emptive
Shrike firings, which would have kept them out of the worst threats. Alternatively, Davis has
illustrations showing them carrying ALQ-119s, which may have been just entering service at the time.
The F-4Cs at Spangdahlem carried -119s a few years later, but I don't know when they became
available.

When the 67th deployed to Korat for Linebacker II, they were barely
operational. Only the need for additional 24-hour/day Weaseling made
it necessary to deploy them to the war. Higher priority missions in
SEA would have kept the Kadena guys from getting the latest equipment.

I don't know about pre-emptive Shrike firings. I never heard of it
during a lot of Weasel supporting. The first I recall consideration of
the tactic was several years later (around '75-'76) when Shrike supply
levels had stabilized and there were sufficient numbers to expand in
that manner.

Unless you had a very tight, single-thrust, strike package on a very
explicit timeline, I think it would be pretty hard to safely
coordinate a pre-emption program.

Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

Guy

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th,
and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a
statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild
Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings
beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type,
number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678
Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257,
and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the
USAF started to use it.

Guy

Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 .

Regards,

Tex Houston

Tex Houston wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th,
and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a
statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild
Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings
beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type,
number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678
Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257,
and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the
USAF started to use it.

Guy

Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 .

Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.

Guy

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Tex Houston wrote:

Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 .

Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.

Guy

I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago
at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in
the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC
business.

For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look
around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every
Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission.

Ed Rock was an instructor of mine at Nellis in '65-66 and arrived at
Korat in June of '66 as one of the first contingent of F-105F Wild
Weasels. (He wasn't on that mission that is excerpted for the book.)
He flew his 100 mission tour in the summer and fall of '66 and became
one of the first Weasels to survive the experience.

Ed was back at Korat in '72 when I returned in the F-4. At that time
he was commander of the 17th Wild Weasel Squadron (combined with the
561st WWS). He flew in both Linebacker I and II and we shared the
experience on a couple of trips North together.

He is probably one of the most unlikely looking fighter pilots you
would ever meet.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Tex Houston wrote:

Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 .

Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.

Guy

I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago
at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in
the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC
business.

For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look
around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every
Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission.

Yeah, now that you mention it, I remember reading that.

snip

Guy

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:48:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:


Whew, what a load off my senile mind! That's consistent with my
recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.

Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

By "big" I mean relative to the much shorter ALQ-87. The 101 was
almost twice as long.

I'm not familiar with that book, but hope that it has good
documentation regarding dates and conditions to accompany the
pictures. While descriptions of block numbers, munition loads, etc.
are helpful, it's also necessary to relate it to time and place. If
you haven't had the chance, take a look at Don Logan's book on the
388th TFW. He managed to get pix of nearly all the aircraft at Korat
during his time there, both on the ground and inflight. He couples it
with some good descriptive text and, since he did the picture taking
it pretty well aligns with some fixed dates.


I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

Whether or not a pod would be on for a mission would be a tactical
choice. If single-ship, the pods of the period would be a good means
of waking up the bad guys that you were inbound. OTOH, if in a
formation, the pods could be used to mask the number as well as to
deny range/azimuth info to the defenses.

If low-level on ingress, it would be a good plan to run silent, but
you might want to light up the pods for the target area, particularly
if popping up fdor weapon delivery.

By "one 'Vark pilot from that era" are you talking about the first
deployment in '68 or the second deployment in '72? Coming in under
the radar certainly wouldn't mean all radars--there were simply too
many. But, it most assuredly could mean avoiding Fan Song radars,
denying SA-2 guidance, breaking lock, creating intermittent returns,
etc.

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was
definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted. That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

Hewitt may be using "pre-emptive" as meaning firing at an emitter
before the emitter has had an opportunity to launch its own weapon.
That would be a common application of the Shrike. (But, if that is the
definition, it doesn't account for the Standard numbers--Standard
required some in-flight programming for most launches and would be a
poor choice for pre-emption by my definition.)

Ed
Wild Weasel #2488


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:48:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:


Whew, what a load off my senile mind! That's consistent with my
recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.

Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

By "big" I mean relative to the much shorter ALQ-87. The 101 was
almost twice as long.

The original one wasn't; it was the (V)-3 et. seq. that were the size you describe.

I'm not familiar with that book, but hope that it has good
documentation regarding dates and conditions to accompany the
pictures.

It does, with photos from first arrival at Korat up through1972, as well as shots of other units over the
years. But there are more of the 388th in that era than any other unit or time.

While descriptions of block numbers, munition loads, etc.
are helpful, it's also necessary to relate it to time and place. If
you haven't had the chance, take a look at Don Logan's book on the
388th TFW. He managed to get pix of nearly all the aircraft at Korat
during his time there, both on the ground and inflight. He couples it
with some good descriptive text and, since he did the picture taking
it pretty well aligns with some fixed dates.

I'll try and find a copy.

I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

Whether or not a pod would be on for a mission would be a tactical
choice. If single-ship, the pods of the period would be a good means
of waking up the bad guys that you were inbound. OTOH, if in a
formation, the pods could be used to mask the number as well as to
deny range/azimuth info to the defenses.

If low-level on ingress, it would be a good plan to run silent, but
you might want to light up the pods for the target area, particularly
if popping up fdor weapon delivery.

That's when they were most vulnerable, all right. They especially hated carrying Mk.84s, as they weren't
available with Snakeye fins and the ballute was at most a gleam in the eye of the designers. So they had to
pop to 2,500 feet or so for the delivery owing to the frag envelope, making them the sole attraction and star
of the show.

By "one 'Vark pilot from that era" are you talking about the first
deployment in '68 or the second deployment in '72?

'72 IIRR. Thornborough's F-111 book (the first, small one, not the later big one, although it's probably in
there also) has the comments by some of the crews, including that particular one. He also talked to some of the
'68 crews so I could be confusing things, but I think not.

Coming in under
the radar certainly wouldn't mean all radars--there were simply too
many. But, it most assuredly could mean avoiding Fan Song radars,
denying SA-2 guidance, breaking lock, creating intermittent returns,
etc.

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.


Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was

definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.


Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

Hewitt may be using "pre-emptive" as meaning firing at an emitter
before the emitter has had an opportunity to launch its own weapon.
That would be a common application of the Shrike. (But, if that is the
definition, it doesn't account for the Standard numbers--Standard
required some in-flight programming for most launches and would be a
poor choice for pre-emption by my definition.)

No, your first definition was the correct one. Lofting them into an area where SAMs were known to be (or had
been), to keep the Fan Songsoff the air.

Guy

On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.

The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with
weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting
below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid
between the airplane and the defender.

Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone
pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from
the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks
would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so.



Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was
definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.

Just looked at Hobson. He reports six F-111s lost during Linebacker
I/II.

28 Sept 72--Major AC and 1/Lt WSO
16 Oct --Capt AC and 1/Lt WSO
7 Nov-- Maj AC and Maj WSO
20 Nov-- Capt and Capt
18 Dec-- Lt Col and Major
22 Dec--Capt and 1/Lt

So, we've got at least three first-timers and three more probable (the
Captains.)

Certainly at Korat in the F-105 community, the force was split 50/50
with experience and FNGs. In the F-4 side of the house we had probably
25% with previous tours and the rest were first timers (including,
unbelievably, a couple of Majors with as much as 9 years experience in
the F-4 and no previous combat!)

Consider also that only BTDT crews who had participated in Rolling
Thunder would be SAM and radar-guided defense experienced. Lots of
previous tour guys had flown in S. Vietnam or during protracted
bombing pauses and had never seen a real-world RWR indication.

We actually had a half-dozen brand new 1/Lt arrivals both front and
back cockpit, straight out of training in the F-4 going to RP VI on
their first combat missions. Mike Stevens, squadron Ops Officer in the
34th went to Pack VI as a R/C/P flight lead/instructor pilot for some
of the Linebacker II sorties. (That was something I flat refused to
do!)

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

"Iron Hand"

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
group.)

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com