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#1
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Dudley, a few comments...
I doubt that the current discussion of 'good' versus 'bad' pilot is really about an arena where a half a second controls life or death... The vast majority of us GA pilots will never fly in that arena... I don't know the chain of events for Mr. Stricklin... Military flying is fast and dangerous... They are mostly flown at high angles of attack, pulling significant G loads... These machines have the glide ratio of a pregnant rock when the arabic incense burner flames out... They have unstable flight characteristics and complicated control systems with computer interfaces, etc., that generally makes them uncontrollable when anything goes wrong... They are often stuffed with high explosives and rocket fuel... Their only purpose is to snuff the life of an opposing pilot, tank commander, etc... So flying them in a normal fashion for them is a dangerous maneuver under the best of circumstances... Doing low level aerobatics for the thrills of the unwashed masses multiplies the risk exponentially, as proven by the follow the leaders controlled flight into the ground that wiped out a team... Next, the discussion of low level civilian aerobatics for crowd thrills is a hot button for me... There simply is no reason for LOW LEVEL aerobatics to exist in general aviation... Its' only purpose is to draw a paying crowd of drooling, mouth breathers, who hope to see carnage and death... In a rational world the inverted ribbon cut would be flown directly over the heads of the crowd so that the risks taken by the pilot are shared equally by Billy Bob on the ground... Darwins law at it's finest... And, in the original discussion of "no excuse", I specifically exempted the mechanical failure that cannot be predicted or prevented... Yes, there are true accidents - the magnetos crap out, a fuel leak in flight, a control cable breaks, the crank breaks, a jug fails, electrical fire behind the panel, etc... You are to be commended for discussing with your students the necessity for preparing and preplanning for these problems... I suspect that your students do very well when taking their check rides and later on... but we need to get back to basics here... The vast majority of GA accidents happening today are not 'accidents'... They are chains of cause and effect that could have and should have been prevented... They would not have happened for the most part in military aviation... They would not have happened for the most part in the aerobatic community... They would not have happened for the most part in the airlines.. These are basic issues... Do you have enough fuel for the flight? Are you cross checking your fuel consumption versus time and distance left to go at regular intervals during flight? There is simply no excuse for running out of fuel - yet in GA it is almost a daily occurence... Military pilots routinely go to bingo fuel, but it is not a cause of a significant percentage of military crashes... Why not? Because it is carefully planned for, every flight, every time.. Did you get a weather briefing and are you making good judgements - versus the old, 'well, let's go take a look'... Continued VFR into IMC followed by a crash is almost daily in GA... Weather is not as controllable as fuel load, yet simply doing the basics would decrease VFR into IMC accidents dramatically... It is an insignificant percentage of the crashes in the airlines, military, and aerobatic community... Therefore it is imminently preventable... CFIT - flying a functioning airplane into the ground because you don't know where you are in relation to the terrrain... What can I say about this... jeez... Running off the runway during takeoff or landing... A local at my field just last week on takeoff, no less, ran his plane off the runway at an angle, across the grass, across another runway, into the weeds and put it on it's back... He said the sun blinded him... This is his 6th airplane crash that I know of, there are probably more... Does a solution suggest itself here? I could go on, but this should be enough to get foam at the mouth crowd nicely lathered up... denny |
#2
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I doubt that the current discussion of 'good' versus 'bad' pilot is
really about an arena where a half a second controls life or death... The vast majority of us GA pilots will never fly in that arena. I think he's talking about an "attitude of safety", which applies in every arena. But (for me) the discussion is not about how to be safe, or how safe to be. It is about us "good pilots" sitting back in our easy chair judging others as "bad pilots" (a term with predicitive value) based on the outcome of one error. Of course =we= would never be so dumb as to do =that=. There simply is no reason for LOW LEVEL aerobatics to exist in general aviation. There is no reason for =any= risky activity to exist. What is special about low level aerobatics? But people do take risks in exchange for benefits. You may not appreciate the benefits of low level aerobatics any more than my aunt appreciates the benefits of flying little airplanes in the first place. But it is up to each of us to make our own determination of risk and benefit, and to respect the choices others make. I specifically exempted the mechanical failure that cannot be predicted or prevented... But most mechanical failures =can= be predicted or prevented (by good maintanance, and the choice of shop or FBO) or at least mitigated (by altitude, fuel reserve, backup devices, etc). Why not call somebody a "bad pilot" because he chose to trust an FBO who was not worthy of such trust, and did not bring a handheld navigation unit as backup, when the battery catches fire on an instrument approach? Did you get a weather briefing and are you making good judgements - versus the old, 'well, let's go take a look'... "Taking a look" is not in itself a bad thing. Given a weather briefing, and weather that is not quite as forecast, sometimes it's worth taking a look anyway, so long as you have sufficient outs should the look not be so inviting. Although I think you meant flying without a briefing at all, you cast aspersions on the entire concept of "taking a look". There is no excuse for most pilot error. But there are reasons. Jose -- Money: what you need when you run out of brains. for Email, make the obvious change in the address. |
#3
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On Sat, 18 Feb 2006 13:56:11 GMT, Jose wrote:
There is no excuse for most pilot error. But there are reasons. I'd have to disagree with the first sentence. Making a decision based on facts known at the time of launch can substantially change after the wheels go up. An example of one of my errors was before I got my IFR ticket, I decided to launch on a forecast of broken 4000 foot ceilings and tops at 6000. Forecast was to improve by the time I got to my destination. I did flight following at 8000 so I could be VFR over the top and be in the clear smooth air. You can guess what happened. Forecast was a bust. Did I make an error on launch. Hardly. VFR conditions predicted. By the time I got to the destination, field was IFR with 800 foot ceilings. End result, no biggie, 'fess up to center, went to another field that had VFR. Does the above make me a bad pilot for getting caught VFR on top. I made a launch decision based on the best information at hand. If you make a judgment on the surface, one would think how could a pilot get stuck on top. Things happen. To make a blanket statement there is no excuse for most pilot errors is wrong. I have made many errors in my short piloting days (536 hours). The trick is to learn from those errors, not repeat them. We are human. While the margin for error is narrower when flying the plane, there is some room for error, albeit very little wiggle room, but there is. An example of this is landing above the stall speed. Procedurally speaking, you want the plane to stop flying when you land. Would you call it an error on the pilot to land at 10 knots above stall speed? Not likely, as that is the margin of error I am talking about. I am my own worst critic on my flying. Oversight on preflight is inexcusable, but any distraction can detract from the quality of a preflight. One night flight, somebody came up to me and was talking to me, I got distracted, and forgot the untie the tail tie down. I did check the control surfaces. Found out real quick after startup needless to say. I felt like kicking myself for such stupidity. Does this make me a bad pilot for inadvertently forgetting to untie the plane? I do my preflight like it's the first time I ever flew the plane, and I own my plane. Errors happen and can be excusable since we are human. I had an engine failure once, and declared an emergency. I forgot to open the door on landing. Does this make me a bad pilot. Procedure says to use the emergency checklist. Well, guess what, my first priority was to fly the plane. I didn't have time to pull out a checklist. Does this make me a bad pilot because I didn't use the checklist or I didn't open the cabin door on landing? Lets talk about fuel exhaustion. How can a pilot run out of gas? Yes, it's inexcusable to launch on a four hour leg with 3 hours of fuel. But, what's to say the pilot launches with 4 hours of fuel for three hour flight. Gasket leaks, slowly depleting your fuel. Head winds were higher then expected. Fan stops, and now the pilot makes an off airport landing. Media comes out, oh my, pilot ran out of gas. First thought, and last impression is pilot was stupid for running out of gas. Guarantee you, the outcome of the gasket leak won't come out in the media one year later after the NTSB comes out with the final ruling. All we will remember is that the pilot ran out of gas. I think the point I am trying to make is to err is human. First impressions are last impressions To err is excusable depending on circumstances. Please note, I am talking about normal everyday errors that pilots make, not stupid ones like reckless acts of operating an airplane. Allen |
#4
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An example of one of my errors was before I got my IFR ticket, I decided to
launch on a forecast of broken 4000 foot ceilings and tops at 6000. Forecast was to improve by the time I got to my destination. I did flight following at 8000 so I could be VFR over the top and be in the clear smooth air. You can guess what happened. Forecast was a bust. Where was the error? If you had outs the whole way and didn't get yourself up a (figurative) box canyon, you were fine. You were not "Caught VFR on top", since VFR fields were in range. Needing to divert is not a sign of error. You were more vulnerable, as the fan could have quit leaving you to descend through cloud. But you have a similar vulnerability flying over water. Flying is risky; we accept the risk for the benefit. Does the above make me a bad pilot for... In my book, being a bad (or good) pilot requires a consistant pattern of bad (or good) decisions. A single instance does not have predicitive value. To err is human, and we must accept that even good pilots err, and that an occasional mistake does not make them bad pilots (a phrase with predicitive value). "Excusable" means "it's ok". This is why I say there is no excuse, but there are reasons. Jose -- Money: what you need when you run out of brains. for Email, make the obvious change in the address. |
#5
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Jose wrote:
An example of one of my errors was before I got my IFR ticket, I decided to launch on a forecast of broken 4000 foot ceilings and tops at 6000. Forecast was to improve by the time I got to my destination. I did flight following at 8000 so I could be VFR over the top and be in the clear smooth air. You can guess what happened. Forecast was a bust. Where was the error? If you had outs the whole way and didn't get yourself up a (figurative) box canyon, you were fine. You were not "Caught VFR on top", since VFR fields were in range. Needing to divert is not a sign of error. You were more vulnerable, as the fan could have quit leaving you to descend through cloud. But you have a similar vulnerability flying over water. Flying is risky; we accept the risk for the benefit. Does the above make me a bad pilot for... In my book, being a bad (or good) pilot requires a consistant pattern of bad (or good) decisions. A single instance does not have predicitive value. Do you mean predictive value? If that is the case, then you really can't predict much based on a pilots style or behavior. I've know lots of pilots who are very risk oriented and have never had an accident or incident and I know a few who are very conservative and safety conscious who have. I stand by my earlier assertion that it is results that count, not intent, style, good living, whatever. Matt |
#6
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Do you mean predictive value?
Yes. If that is the case, then you really can't predict much based on a pilots style or behavior. I've know lots of pilots who are very risk oriented and have never had an accident or incident and I know a few who are very conservative and safety conscious who have. I stand by my earlier assertion that it is results that count, not intent, style, good living, whatever. The race isn't alwasy to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, but that's the way to bet. Jose -- Money: what you need when you run out of brains. for Email, make the obvious change in the address. |
#7
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![]() "Jose" wrote in message ... snip To err is human, and we must accept that even good pilots err, and that an occasional mistake does not make them bad pilots but it may make them dead pilots. |
#8
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Private wrote:
"Jose" wrote in message ... snip To err is human, and we must accept that even good pilots err, and that an occasional mistake does not make them bad pilots but it may make them dead pilots. Which is bad. :-) Matt |
#9
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![]() "A Lieberman" wrote in message ... On Sat, 18 Feb 2006 13:56:11 GMT, Jose wrote: There is no excuse for most pilot error. But there are reasons. I'd have to disagree with the first sentence. Making a decision based on facts known at the time of launch can substantially change after the wheels go up. Pilot error is an extremely complicated issue. It's existence is clear in some instances but in some accidents, it's vague and clouded with individual interpretation. On several accident investigation teams where I've been involved in some way, I've been present at meetings where the issue of pilot error was being resolved. Of course,the situation involved those making this call not having been there at the moment of decision being decided upon. It's an interesting process, and it usually boils down to the handling of the changing dynamic you are addressing after wheels up. There is the level of preparedness that has to be judged, and even that is arbitrary. Then comes the action taken or not taken under the changing dynamic during the flight and it's ramification to the accident. In all too many decisions on probable cause, it comes down to someone who wasn't there mentally imaging what THEY would have done in the same circumstance. This is why we have "probable cause" in our accidentreports...that and the legal ramifications of a more positive statement. Positive statements in accident reports immediately become subject to attack legally. I hate to venture a guess as to how many dead pilots were simply victims of overtask in a developing situation that exceeded their ability to cope, and would have exceed as well the ability to cope for those who determined that pilot error was the probable cause. When you start thinking about things from this perspective, it becomes clear that even the very best among us can be bitten. There is risk in flying. All we can do is prepare to meet this risk through practice, training, and attitude from day one. We learn and adjust every day we are in aviation to cut down the odds in our favor when those "moments of decision" arrive after the wheels hit the wells or we don't. The plain fact is that there is no such thing as perfect flight safety, only pilots who practice, prepare, train, and develop an attitude about flight safety that bends the odds in their favor. Dudley Henriques |
#10
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A Lieberman wrote:
On Sat, 18 Feb 2006 13:56:11 GMT, Jose wrote: There is no excuse for most pilot error. But there are reasons. I'd have to disagree with the first sentence. Making a decision based on facts known at the time of launch can substantially change after the wheels go up. An example of one of my errors was before I got my IFR ticket, I decided to launch on a forecast of broken 4000 foot ceilings and tops at 6000. Forecast was to improve by the time I got to my destination. I did flight following at 8000 so I could be VFR over the top and be in the clear smooth air. You can guess what happened. Forecast was a bust. Did I make an error on launch. Hardly. VFR conditions predicted. By the time I got to the destination, field was IFR with 800 foot ceilings. End result, no biggie, 'fess up to center, went to another field that had VFR. You absolutely made an error. You launched based only one a weather forecast (which we all know are inherently inaccurate) and with no good plan B. What if there had been no VFR weather within your fuel range? These are exactly the bad pilot decisions that we are talking about. Does the above make me a bad pilot for getting caught VFR on top. I made a launch decision based on the best information at hand. If you make a judgment on the surface, one would think how could a pilot get stuck on top. Things happen. To make a blanket statement there is no excuse for most pilot errors is wrong. Not having a plan B (and even a plan C if the conditions are marginal) is a sign of a bad pilot. Matt |
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