"Afghan war has lessons for U.S. pilots in Iraq"

On 22 Feb 2007 19:59:00 -0800, "Mike" wrote:

Afghan war has lessons for U.S. pilots in Iraq
By Timothy Gusinov

The U.S. military command in Iraq has confirmed that the Sea Knight
helicopter that crashed last week was shot down by a missile. The
growing losses of American helicopters in Iraq indicate that
insurgents have obtained shoulder-launched portable missiles and
improved their anti-aircraft tactics.
Gee - I wonder where they got those from???
Regards,

Development of anti-helicopter warfare capability is the logical
step for insurgents after their improvised explosive devices turned
Iraq's roads into killing zones for American convoys and patrols. U.S.
troops now depend heavily on helicopters for transportation, supply
and support.
Soviet pilots faced the same challenge in Afghanistan. Having
served 4½ years in Afghanistan as a military linguist and area
specialist, I had to fly many helicopter assault missions with the
Spetsnaz special forces, and with Soviet and Afghan government
troops.
I witnessed how mujahedeen fighters developed their anti-aircraft
tactics, which allowed them to bring down 118 airplanes and 333
helicopters by the end of the conflict in 1989.
The mujahedeen's anti-aircraft tactics and Soviet countermeasures
could provide lessons to help reduce losses and save American lives in
Iraq.
Stinger's sting
During the first years of the Afghanistan war, the Soviet air
force enjoyed unchallenged dominance of the skies. The main tactic of
the mujahedeen was "dive and hide," using caves to survive Soviet air
strikes. Their anti-aircraft weapons consisted of Soviet-, Chinese-
and Egyptian-made machine guns and a limited number of older Soviet-
and Egyptian-made surface-to-air missiles.
All this changed with the introduction of Stinger missiles in
1986. The mujahedeen used Stingers to bring down Soviet planes and
helicopters, and Soviet air losses climbed rapidly.
The mujahedeen developed sophisticated tactics for engaging Soviet
aircraft and helicopters.
Teams usually consisted of one or two missile operators with two
to four missiles and 10 to 15 fighters to protect the operators and
capture or kill downed Soviet pilots.
Under cover of darkness, such teams approached an air base, took
cover using terrain features or camouflage nets, and waited for
aircraft or helicopters to take off or land. After firing their
missiles, they would disappear into a green vegetation zone, foothills
or a village.
Evidence links Iran with weapons supplies to insurgents in Iraq.
Portable shoulder-fired missiles would be a logical addition to the
supply list because of the death toll and press coverage for every
helicopter downed.
Surface-to-air missiles stolen from loosely controlled stockpiles
can bring a good price on the black market. During the Soviet war in
Afghanistan, weapons supplied by the United States to Afghan fighters
found their way to black markets in Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province.
The first Stinger missiles were captured by a Soviet special
forces team south of Kandahar. Agents from KHAD, the Afghan communist
government's counterpart to the KGB, later bought "surplus" Stingers
at a well-known weapons market in Helmand province.
During the war in Chechnya, multiple Russian helicopters were
brought down by SA-18 GRAU and SA-16 Gimlet missiles stolen from
Russian military units and sold to Chechen separatists.
Since 1994, these shoulder-launched missiles have been exported to
nearly 30 countries, including Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland,
India, Malaysia, Poland, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, Syria and
Turkey.
Machine-gun tactics
Insurgents in Iraq also have improved their use of anti-aircraft
machine guns.
Afghan warriors developed amazing skills in fighting helicopters
with these low-tech weapons, which played a major role in defending
mujahedeen bases from Soviet air raids. With an effective range of up
to 6,000 feet, machine guns such as the 12.7 mm DShK and 14.5 mm ZGU
caused up to 70 percent of helicopter losses, even after the
introduction of Stinger missiles.
Anti-aircraft gunner crews were tough: When the gunner was killed,
another crew member would replace him immediately.
Soviet pilots nicknamed these weapons "welding machines" because
of how their flashes appeared from the air. Deployed in numbers,
Afghan fighters concentrated fire on a single helicopter from
different directions, making it hard for the Soviet pilot to escape.
Afghan snipers and machine gunners often would organize an ambush
at the crash site during Soviet attempts to investigate and retrieve
the bodies. Sometimes they moved the body and parachute of a slain
pilot to a more visible site.
Soviet search-and-rescue teams developed their own tactics. While
one helicopter was landing to investigate a crash site or pick up
bodies, others fired at potential ambush sites.
Pilot tricks
Iraqi insurgents likely are using the same surveillance tactics as
Afghans, keeping air force bases under constant observance and
reporting the launch of every helicopter or aircraft, as well as their
direction. Taking a deceptive course until the helicopter striking
force is beyond observation distance from base would serve as a
countermeasure.
Afghan fighters would warn of approaching helicopters using a net
of observation posts with small radios three to six miles around their
strongholds. U.S. pilots in Iraq should expect that the enemy has been
warned about their arrival.
Soviet helicopter pilots developed tricks to counter the Afghan
early-warning system. One of the most effective was flying low to
avoid early detection and deny targeting time to the enemy.
One day during an operation in Paktia province, a pair of
"crocodiles" -- Soviet Hind Mi-24 aircraft so nicknamed for their
reptilian appearance -- seemed to come out of nowhere and flew
directly over our unit, hitting us with rotor wash and sending our map
airborne.
Low flight also keeps the noise of the helicopter from traveling.
The roar is heard only a moment before the helicopters are overhead.
Soviet attack helicopters were able to approach targets with short
warning.
Such low-altitude flight requires superb training and puts
enormous stress on the pilot and machine, raising attrition.
Soviet pilots also would attack from the direction of the sun to
blind the enemy. After the attack, they would make a sharp turn while
firing flares and engaging all anti-missile equipment.
Returning pilots used a tight, corkscrew descent to a protected
air base. The so-called "dry leaf-in-the wind" maneuver, in which the
helicopter wagged from side to side while keeping the same general
flight direction, made it difficult for the enemy to target.
Two or four helicopters used as an air-defense suppression group
can throw off enemy air defense before the main strike.
Starting in 1985, many Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan were
fitted with a device called Lastochka (swallow), which dispersed
exhaust gases to reduce the heat signature.

c Timothy Gusinov served 41/2 years in Afghanistan as a military
linguist for the Soviet army. He retired in 1992, emigrated to the
United States and became a U.S. citizen. He currently works as a
linguist in support of multinational exercises overseas organized by
the U.S. military.

On Feb 23, 10:05 am, Charlie Wolf wrote:
On 22 Feb 2007 19:59:00 -0800, "Mike" wrote:

Afghan war has lessons for U.S. pilots in Iraq
By Timothy Gusinov

The U.S. military command in Iraq has confirmed that the Sea Knight
helicopter that crashed last week was shot down by a missile. The
growing losses of American helicopters in Iraq indicate that
insurgents have obtained shoulder-launched portable missiles and
improved their anti-aircraft tactics.

Gee - I wonder where they got those from???
Regards,




from America?







Development of anti-helicopter warfare capability is the logical
step for insurgents after their improvised explosive devices turned
Iraq's roads into killing zones for American convoys and patrols. U.S.
troops now depend heavily on helicopters for transportation, supply
and support.
Soviet pilots faced the same challenge in Afghanistan. Having
served 4½ years in Afghanistan as a military linguist and area
specialist, I had to fly many helicopter assault missions with the
Spetsnaz special forces, and with Soviet and Afghan government
troops.
I witnessed how mujahedeen fighters developed their anti-aircraft
tactics, which allowed them to bring down 118 airplanes and 333
helicopters by the end of the conflict in 1989.
The mujahedeen's anti-aircraft tactics and Soviet countermeasures
could provide lessons to help reduce losses and save American lives in
Iraq.
Stinger's sting
During the first years of the Afghanistan war, the Soviet air
force enjoyed unchallenged dominance of the skies. The main tactic of
the mujahedeen was "dive and hide," using caves to survive Soviet air
strikes. Their anti-aircraft weapons consisted of Soviet-, Chinese-
and Egyptian-made machine guns and a limited number of older Soviet-
and Egyptian-made surface-to-air missiles.
All this changed with the introduction of Stinger missiles in
1986. The mujahedeen used Stingers to bring down Soviet planes and
helicopters, and Soviet air losses climbed rapidly.
The mujahedeen developed sophisticated tactics for engaging Soviet
aircraft and helicopters.
Teams usually consisted of one or two missile operators with two
to four missiles and 10 to 15 fighters to protect the operators and
capture or kill downed Soviet pilots.
Under cover of darkness, such teams approached an air base, took
cover using terrain features or camouflage nets, and waited for
aircraft or helicopters to take off or land. After firing their
missiles, they would disappear into a green vegetation zone, foothills
or a village.
Evidence links Iran with weapons supplies to insurgents in Iraq.
Portable shoulder-fired missiles would be a logical addition to the
supply list because of the death toll and press coverage for every
helicopter downed.
Surface-to-air missiles stolen from loosely controlled stockpiles
can bring a good price on the black market. During the Soviet war in
Afghanistan, weapons supplied by the United States to Afghan fighters
found their way to black markets in Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province.
The first Stinger missiles were captured by a Soviet special
forces team south of Kandahar. Agents from KHAD, the Afghan communist
government's counterpart to the KGB, later bought "surplus" Stingers
at a well-known weapons market in Helmand province.
During the war in Chechnya, multiple Russian helicopters were
brought down by SA-18 GRAU and SA-16 Gimlet missiles stolen from
Russian military units and sold to Chechen separatists.
Since 1994, these shoulder-launched missiles have been exported to
nearly 30 countries, including Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland,
India, Malaysia, Poland, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, Syria and
Turkey.
Machine-gun tactics
Insurgents in Iraq also have improved their use of anti-aircraft
machine guns.
Afghan warriors developed amazing skills in fighting helicopters
with these low-tech weapons, which played a major role in defending
mujahedeen bases from Soviet air raids. With an effective range of up
to 6,000 feet, machine guns such as the 12.7 mm DShK and 14.5 mm ZGU
caused up to 70 percent of helicopter losses, even after the
introduction of Stinger missiles.
Anti-aircraft gunner crews were tough: When the gunner was killed,
another crew member would replace him immediately.
Soviet pilots nicknamed these weapons "welding machines" because
of how their flashes appeared from the air. Deployed in numbers,
Afghan fighters concentrated fire on a single helicopter from
different directions, making it hard for the Soviet pilot to escape.
Afghan snipers and machine gunners often would organize an ambush
at the crash site during Soviet attempts to investigate and retrieve
the bodies. Sometimes they moved the body and parachute of a slain
pilot to a more visible site.
Soviet search-and-rescue teams developed their own tactics. While
one helicopter was landing to investigate a crash site or pick up
bodies, others fired at potential ambush sites.
Pilot tricks
Iraqi insurgents likely are using the same surveillance tactics as
Afghans, keeping air force bases under constant observance and
reporting the launch of every helicopter or aircraft, as well as their
direction. Taking a deceptive course until the helicopter striking
force is beyond observation distance from base would serve as a
countermeasure.
Afghan fighters would warn of approaching helicopters using a net
of observation posts with small radios three to six miles around their
strongholds. U.S. pilots in Iraq should expect that the enemy has been
warned about their arrival.
Soviet helicopter pilots developed tricks to counter the Afghan
early-warning system. One of the most effective was flying low to
avoid early detection and deny targeting time to the enemy.
One day during an operation in Paktia province, a pair of
"crocodiles" -- Soviet Hind Mi-24 aircraft so nicknamed for their
reptilian appearance -- seemed to come out of nowhere and flew
directly over our unit, hitting us with rotor wash and sending our map
airborne.
Low flight also keeps the noise of the helicopter from traveling.
The roar is heard only a moment before the helicopters are overhead.
Soviet attack helicopters were able to approach targets with short
warning.
Such low-altitude flight requires superb training and puts
enormous stress on the pilot and machine, raising attrition.
Soviet pilots also would attack from the direction of the sun to
blind the enemy. After the attack, they would make a sharp turn while
firing flares and engaging all anti-missile equipment.
Returning pilots used a tight, corkscrew descent to a protected
air base. The so-called "dry leaf-in-the wind" maneuver, in which the
helicopter wagged from side to side while keeping the same general
flight direction, made it difficult for the enemy to target.
Two or four helicopters used as an air-defense suppression group
can throw off enemy air defense before the main strike.
Starting in 1985, many Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan were
fitted with a device called Lastochka (swallow), which dispersed
exhaust gases to reduce the heat signature.

c Timothy Gusinov served 41/2 years in Afghanistan as a military
linguist for the Soviet army. He retired in 1992, emigrated to the
United States and became a U.S. citizen. He currently works as a
linguist in support of multinational exercises overseas organized by
the U.S. military.- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -