What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam

Scott Peterson wrote in message ...
(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam, or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

You're absolutely correct. I would not. I have the utmost respect
for those people.

Then why make the comment in this forum? It has to be either safety
through remoteness, or a case of a really bad
slip-of-the-tongue(typing finger)--I'd hope it was the latter.


Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
in Jan, 1977.

Dates vary. The 57th FIS did indeed not give their last Deuces up
until July 73--meaning that by *any* definition they were in "first
line" service until then. The actual last use by the ANG is a bit more
murky from what I have read--the 77 date is floated, but at least one
source I ran into indicated that the HIANG actually conducted its last
operational Deuce flight in October 76.


FWIW, someone just posted a series of nice pictures of the 195th
planes just before they converted on alt.binaries.pictures.military.


Since you did not even have a ghostly
idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
believe your assessment of their operational status? As to even the
definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
alert on a routine basis.

You got me on the Viet Nam part. I'd completely forgotten about that.
And yes, I have an idea of what the forces were like and what second
echelon means. They were second-line units with older, less capable
or even obsolete equipment.

And the 57th FIS would presumably not meet that criteria.



You had no idea that the TU-95 was armed?! Or that Bears routinely
trolled down the eastern seaboard, and into the Gulf? That the USSR
used Cuba as a refueling point for those Bears (even into the 90's
IIRC)?

Yes, I am aware of that. The problem is that you're so anxious to find
fault that you are misquoting me. I said " I'm not aware of any
'threats' that shot back". Operative word being shot, not armed.

Oh....so combat is not a realistic possibility unless it has already
occurred? I believe you were insinuating that US interceptors of that
period faced no real danger, right? I am having a bit of a problem
here, since the previous statements have been snipped.


I believe that in the sixties and seventies, the units were much more
tightly tied to the state than they are now.

Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.

It's sneering to say they were tied to a state?

No, the sneering bit was your snide little "Guard as a haven for
draftdodgers" crap in the earlier paragraph.

The rest of what you
say doesn't really make sense. which number what?

That you are one of the number who have never served in a Guard
unit--the meaning is rather clear if you actually read the wording.


Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
it did work.

Nice try, but nope, that is not what I said. I seem to recall that you
were mumbling about the Guard being much more firmly state controlled
during the Vietnam era (hard to get your wording right, as it has been
snipped and I lack the resolve to dig back into the old posts). I
believe that is a much exaggerated claim--please show me what area(s)
the state exerted real control over? In fact, the states really have
their "control" limited to administrative matters (and then only IAW
federal guidelines and significant federal supervision). I am sure you
are harkening back to the sinister "GWB got appointed unfairly..."
stance, and envision this as being another example of Guard good ol'
boy operations (like we never saw good ol' boy action in the regular
services, right?). But the fact is that the federal side controlled
the appointment of officers--no officer could be appointed, or
promoted, without approval of a federal board.


Also since they were
flying aircraft that were not in first-line service, and fairly
high-maintenance, moving them to other bases not equipped to handle
them would have been a major logistical move that would be difficult
to justify.

Uhmmm...take a gander at when the F-102 retired from active service,
and recall that two NATO allies continued to fly them even after they
left ANG service--and you can't see where they might have been used?

What is your point? The real question seems to be when the Air Force
no longer considered the 102 to be a first line aircraft.I can't give
you a date for that. Although, it might be when they started giving
them to ANG units. But it's a fact that within 3 years of the time
we're talking about (1970) you could count the number of units still
flying F-102's on one hand and in 3 more, they were all gone except
for targets...and, of course, the Greeks and Turks.

That the demise was quick after it began is immaterial. That the AC
was replacing the F-102 with F-106's as quickly as possible is true,
and understandable. But from an operational standpoint, there is no
way you can claim that the F-102 was out-to-pasture while it was still
being flown by active duty squadrons (especially the 57th in Iceland,
where they ran a pretty regular Bear greeting service IIRC). The fact
is that while GWB was training and beginning his squadron service the
Deuce was not some has-been/never-going-nowhere player as you would
have us believe, but was still serving with both frontline units on
the AC side and was standing alert at various CONUS stations as well.


Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
me you were not "attacking".

I remember those years very well, and I knew a lot of people who were
able to get into the National Guard as an alternative to the draft. It
was a very popular option and every National Guard unit had waiting
lists with hundreds or even thousands of names. Joining those units
was not a crime or a black mark. The ones I have no respect for are
the ones who used their influence or their family's influence to get
into these units ahead of other people who were in line. I guess my
question is why you would want to defend people who would do that?

Because while I am sure it may have happened (just as I am equally
sure that Senator Shmedlap could have influenced the Army's decision
to have his son serve as a clerk on a rather short tour--or maybe
Senator Gore?), I am reluctant to smear folks without darned good
evidence (which apparently in the case of GWB has never been given,
even after journalists from such anti-GWB forums as the Boston Herald
and the Washington Post (or Washington Pravda as we used to refer to
it) spent considerable effort trying to do just that), for one.
Second, when you take that tack, you run the risk of smearing a lot of
other good folks, especially when you use wording such as that that
you chose in your earlier post--there were a lot of folks serving in
the Guard before the war ever began, for example, and more than a few
vets joined Guard units upon their return. Not to mention the fact
that, despite LBJ/McNamara's stupid mistake of not using Guard and
Reserve forces earlier, there were a significant number of both ANG
and ARNG folks mobilized during the conflict, and a number of other
ANG crews and personnel performed support missions as well (to include
transport runs into the RVN, IIRC). And BTW, are you sure that ALL of
the Guard units had those waiting lists? Rather definitive and
inclusive statement you are making there...

Brooks


Scott Peterson

(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

Then why make the comment in this forum? It has to be either safety
through remoteness, or a case of a really bad
slip-of-the-tongue(typing finger)--I'd hope it was the latter.


Becaue it's not what I said. It's your incorrect intrepretation that
I'm responding to.


Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
in Jan, 1977.

Dates vary. The 57th FIS did indeed not give their last Deuces up
until July 73--meaning that by *any* definition they were in "first
line" service until then.

Fine, then what is "any" definition. To me, the fact that they were
still in use by an Air Force unit does not mean it was a first-line
unit. Cynically, I'd think that there was a good reason that unit was
chosen to be last, but I don't know what it was in this case.

The actual last use by the ANG is a bit more
murky from what I have read--the 77 date is floated, but at least one
source I ran into indicated that the HIANG actually conducted its last
operational Deuce flight in October 76.

They claim 1/77, but who knows.


Oh....so combat is not a realistic possibility unless it has already
occurred? I believe you were insinuating that US interceptors of that
period faced no real danger, right? I am having a bit of a problem
here, since the previous statements have been snipped.

Again, you are misquoting me me for your own benefit. This was a very
touchy situation. There's always the possibility of accidents on both
sides. But neither side ever did shoot at each other.

I've always wondered what the orders given to the intercepting
aircraft were in these cases. Given the very serous consequences of
an incident, did they have permission to fire if fired on or would
they have had to wait for a decision by their superiors.

It's sneering to say they were tied to a state?

No, the sneering bit was your snide little "Guard as a haven for
draftdodgers" crap in the earlier paragraph.

Well, as stated elsewhere, that's the way I remember it, but I really
don't have time to look up why people joined back then.

That you are one of the number who have never served in a Guard
unit--the meaning is rather clear if you actually read the wording.


I did read it several times. ....and no, I never served in a Guard
unit.


Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
it did work.

Nice try, but nope, that is not what I said. I seem to recall that you
were mumbling about the Guard being much more firmly state controlled
during the Vietnam era (hard to get your wording right, as it has been
snipped and I lack the resolve to dig back into the old posts). I
believe that is a much exaggerated claim--please show me what area(s)
the state exerted real control over? In fact, the states really have
their "control" limited to administrative matters (and then only IAW
federal guidelines and significant federal supervision).

Discussed in another post. And yes, the guard did report to and take
orders from the governor of the state, unless the unit was
federalized.

I am sure you
are harkening back to the sinister "GWB got appointed unfairly..."
stance,

Among others.....

That the demise was quick after it began is immaterial. That the AC
was replacing the F-102 with F-106's as quickly as possible is true,
and understandable. But from an operational standpoint, there is no
way you can claim that the F-102 was out-to-pasture while it was still
being flown by active duty squadrons (especially the 57th in Iceland,
where they ran a pretty regular Bear greeting service IIRC). The fact
is that while GWB was training and beginning his squadron service the
Deuce was not some has-been/never-going-nowhere player as you would
have us believe, but was still serving with both frontline units on
the AC side and was standing alert at various CONUS stations as well.


I disagree. The fact that it was still being flown by Air Force
squadrons does not mean that it's regarded as a first-line aircraft.
The Air Force bought 1,000 of the things and they were still a usable
aircraft, just not the best.

As far as the 57th continuing to fly them. I would speculate that that
the 102 was a adequate aircraft for that location and that role even
into the Seventies. The only hostile aircraft they would be expecting
there would be the subsonic Bears....which are exactly what they were
designed to intercept.

Because while I am sure it may have happened (just as I am equally
sure that Senator Shmedlap could have influenced the Army's decision
to have his son serve as a clerk on a rather short tour--or maybe
Senator Gore?), I am reluctant to smear folks without darned good
evidence (which apparently in the case of GWB has never been given,
even after journalists from such anti-GWB forums as the Boston Herald
and the Washington Post (or Washington Pravda as we used to refer to
it) spent considerable effort trying to do just that), for one.

I would suggest that you do a web search on GWB and National Guard. A
number of sites have his entire military history on line. Give this
an honest look to sites reporting all POV's and see if you still want
to discuss it.

Second, when you take that tack, you run the risk of smearing a lot of
other good folks, especially when you use wording such as that that
you chose in your earlier post--there were a lot of folks serving in
the Guard before the war ever began, for example, and more than a few
vets joined Guard units upon their return.

I never said all. But I think that suggesting that the NG's
popularity during the Viet Nam years was not due to the draft borders
on ridiculous.

Not to mention the fact
that, despite LBJ/McNamara's stupid mistake of not using Guard and
Reserve forces earlier, there were a significant number of both ANG
and ARNG folks mobilized during the conflict, and a number of other
ANG crews and personnel performed support missions as well (to include
transport runs into the RVN, IIRC). And BTW, are you sure that ALL of
the Guard units had those waiting lists? Rather definitive and
inclusive statement you are making there...

Individuals, not units.

You're right, though. ALL is very inclusive. What guard units did
not have long waiting lists at this time? It would be intersting to
try to figure out why.....


Scott Peterson

Scott Peterson wrote in message ...
(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

Then why make the comment in this forum? It has to be either safety
through remoteness, or a case of a really bad
slip-of-the-tongue(typing finger)--I'd hope it was the latter.


Becaue it's not what I said.

Are you saying you did NOT say, "Guard units were regarded as draft
dodgers refuges. Specifically, the TxANG 147th fighter group was
considered a "champagne" unit"?

It's your incorrect intrepretation that
I'm responding to.

It is not that hard to interpret that quote.



Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
in Jan, 1977.

Dates vary. The 57th FIS did indeed not give their last Deuces up
until July 73--meaning that by *any* definition they were in "first
line" service until then.

Fine, then what is "any" definition. To me, the fact that they were
still in use by an Air Force unit does not mean it was a first-line
unit. Cynically, I'd think that there was a good reason that unit was
chosen to be last, but I don't know what it was in this case.

Well gee, I guess the USAF routinely placed incapable aircraft at a
location that saw a significant chunk of the active intercepts of that
period? ISTR that the 57th FIS was frequently out and about
intercepting Soviet Bears, Bisons, etc.?


The actual last use by the ANG is a bit more
murky from what I have read--the 77 date is floated, but at least one
source I ran into indicated that the HIANG actually conducted its last
operational Deuce flight in October 76.

They claim 1/77, but who knows.

I believe that was the official date that they began operating the
F-4C (IIRC), but they had ceased being an operational F-102 element
back in October of 76 according to what I read at one of the various
websites; sounds reasonable to me.



Oh....so combat is not a realistic possibility unless it has already
occurred? I believe you were insinuating that US interceptors of that
period faced no real danger, right? I am having a bit of a problem
here, since the previous statements have been snipped.

Again, you are misquoting me me for your own benefit.

No, because there is no "quote" there; I ammerely trying to define
your position based upon your statements. It appeared to me (again,
the snippage makes it a bit difficult...) that you were saying that
because they saw no combat action in their CONUS ADC role, the
likelihood of their seeing combat in that role was not a realistic
possibility. A bit of a logic fault in that approach if you ask me.

This was a very
touchy situation. There's always the possibility of accidents on both
sides. But neither side ever did shoot at each other.

Along the CONUS border, you are correct. But that does not mean that
we should have, or could have, dismantled our air defenses at that
point in time. The F-102 was a significant player in that air defense
network up through the early 70's.


I've always wondered what the orders given to the intercepting
aircraft were in these cases. Given the very serous consequences of
an incident, did they have permission to fire if fired on or would
they have had to wait for a decision by their superiors.

I believe a former F-102 pilot (Walt?) lurks hereabouts and could
answer that question.


It's sneering to say they were tied to a state?

No, the sneering bit was your snide little "Guard as a haven for
draftdodgers" crap in the earlier paragraph.

Well, as stated elsewhere, that's the way I remember it, but I really
don't have time to look up why people joined back then.

You don't have to. Answer one question--do you think that all of the
Guardsmen who were already serving before the war heated up just
pulled pitch and left the Guard in 1965-68? How does your "draft
dodger" moniker fit them?


That you are one of the number who have never served in a Guard
unit--the meaning is rather clear if you actually read the wording.


I did read it several times. ....and no, I never served in a Guard
unit.

I have, and in the company of a fair number of Vietnam veterans who
did not dodge diddly.



Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
it did work.

Nice try, but nope, that is not what I said. I seem to recall that you
were mumbling about the Guard being much more firmly state controlled
during the Vietnam era (hard to get your wording right, as it has been
snipped and I lack the resolve to dig back into the old posts). I
believe that is a much exaggerated claim--please show me what area(s)
the state exerted real control over? In fact, the states really have
their "control" limited to administrative matters (and then only IAW
federal guidelines and significant federal supervision).

Discussed in another post. And yes, the guard did report to and take
orders from the governor of the state, unless the unit was
federalized.

OFCS, then please tell us what that Governor actually controlled?
Training plans and inspections? Nope. Officer appointments? Not
without federal approval of each and every one. Equipment? Nope.
Organization? Nope again. Logistical support? No. Funding? Heck no. So
what was this tremendous control they exerted over their state Guard
units?


I am sure you
are harkening back to the sinister "GWB got appointed unfairly..."
stance,

Among others.....

Gee, you cover your political sentiments so well...


That the demise was quick after it began is immaterial. That the AC
was replacing the F-102 with F-106's as quickly as possible is true,
and understandable. But from an operational standpoint, there is no
way you can claim that the F-102 was out-to-pasture while it was still
being flown by active duty squadrons (especially the 57th in Iceland,
where they ran a pretty regular Bear greeting service IIRC). The fact
is that while GWB was training and beginning his squadron service the
Deuce was not some has-been/never-going-nowhere player as you would
have us believe, but was still serving with both frontline units on
the AC side and was standing alert at various CONUS stations as well.


I disagree. The fact that it was still being flown by Air Force
squadrons does not mean that it's regarded as a first-line aircraft.
The Air Force bought 1,000 of the things and they were still a usable
aircraft, just not the best.

As far as the 57th continuing to fly them. I would speculate that that
the 102 was a adequate aircraft for that location and that role even
into the Seventies. The only hostile aircraft they would be expecting
there would be the subsonic Bears....which are exactly what they were
designed to intercept.

And just what the heck do you think your "first line" F-106's and
F-4C's would have been facing in CONUS? Reallly looong range high
performance Migs? le tme get this straight--since the Bear was the
primary threat, it was OK to have the F-102 serve in Iceland, but
those same F-102's were somehow outclassed when facing the *same*
threat here in CONUS??


Because while I am sure it may have happened (just as I am equally
sure that Senator Shmedlap could have influenced the Army's decision
to have his son serve as a clerk on a rather short tour--or maybe
Senator Gore?), I am reluctant to smear folks without darned good
evidence (which apparently in the case of GWB has never been given,
even after journalists from such anti-GWB forums as the Boston Herald
and the Washington Post (or Washington Pravda as we used to refer to
it) spent considerable effort trying to do just that), for one.

I would suggest that you do a web search on GWB and National Guard. A
number of sites have his entire military history on line. Give this
an honest look to sites reporting all POV's and see if you still want
to discuss it.

You are trolling without bait. GWB joined, he trained, and he flew.
Condemn that if you waqnt, but it ain't gonna carry much water with
most of us. Ever notice how the military, down at the
rubber-hits-the-road-level, responds to GWB when he appears with them?
Compare that to how they conducted themselves when his predecessor was
in office (you do recall the incident where that predecessor flew out
to a CVN (without the media whining that accompanied GWB's similar
trip) and was actually booed by his audience?). Case closed.


Second, when you take that tack, you run the risk of smearing a lot of
other good folks, especially when you use wording such as that that
you chose in your earlier post--there were a lot of folks serving in
the Guard before the war ever began, for example, and more than a few
vets joined Guard units upon their return.

I never said all. But I think that suggesting that the NG's
popularity during the Viet Nam years was not due to the draft borders
on ridiculous.

And volunteering for service in another military branch or component
does not equate to "draft dodger". Or are you gonna fling that
accusation at all of those folks who joined the Navy, Coast Guard, or
Air Force because they preferred that to serving in the Army? My, what
a long list of "draft dodgers" you have created there...

Brooks


Not to mention the fact
that, despite LBJ/McNamara's stupid mistake of not using Guard and
Reserve forces earlier, there were a significant number of both ANG
and ARNG folks mobilized during the conflict, and a number of other
ANG crews and personnel performed support missions as well (to include
transport runs into the RVN, IIRC). And BTW, are you sure that ALL of
the Guard units had those waiting lists? Rather definitive and
inclusive statement you are making there...

Individuals, not units.



You're right, though. ALL is very inclusive. What guard units did
not have long waiting lists at this time? It would be intersting to
try to figure out why.....


Scott Peterson

Sheesh! What a bunch of wasted electrons over a hasty ill-considered
remark.
'Nuf said on that.
ROE - to make it sweet and simple we were cleared to fire without
seeking permission on 'a hostile aircraft committing a hostile act'.
Both were defined but it boiled down to any 'not clearly marked or
recognized friendly aircraft'
doing a bad thing - firing on the interceptor, releasing weapons,
paratroops, attacking a vessel not marked as an enemy (I am
paraphrasing here as I forgot the exact wording), that sort of thing.
So we had some latitude - more than in SEA!
FWIW anybody who straps on a single seat jet and takes off has guts. I
well remember my first solo in the T33 after learning how to fly in
props up to the T28 (270 knots in a dive was red line - 505 level in
the T-bird) I ran it up, looked down the runway, asked myself 'do I
really want to do this?' The answer was 'hell, yes!' and off I went.
That was (gulp) 49 years ago.
FWIW here goes on the Deuce. Even now - at night, mind you - the Deuce
would be a serious opponent. It had excellent radar, excellent IR,
missiles that worked if you fired all 6 at once ( I actually killed a
Firebee with a single obsolete radar Falcon despite its warhead being
dearmed) and was a very accurate - as accurate as strafing!) rocket
launcher in air to ground. Of course 24 later 12 2.75s won't do much
but we blew an old Navy destroyer (Patricia target) to pieces with
live (!) 2.75s. 40 sorties with 12 RX apiece left the poor thing very
much the worse for wear - bridge and deck houses flattened.
As for range a Deuce with two tanks is equal to an F4 with 3 and a lot
better handling and faster cruise for 1300 nautical with IFR reserves
(approach plus 20 minutes). You start at 35,000 and .87. Clean, you go
to 42-45+ and .92, and you can go 900 miles and still have IFR reserve
fuel. When the Deuce was new it was good for 1.3M at 35-38000
(tropopause). Then the engines got tired and 1.2 was about it. But it
could fly level at 59000 in AB - subsonic. It could snap-up and launch
on a U2 above 60. (Never did let us do it for real).
But in daylight - that 60 degree blind cone behind one made dayight
air to air dicey and something like a Thach weave mandatory - which of
course ADC never trained in. No RHAW gear. No armor at all. Wet wings,
a candidate for battle damage. No (sob!) gun. It did have an air to
air rocket sight supposed to be good up to 3G - I never got to try it
on a rag, though. That was incorporated for a radar-inop curve of
pursuit shot at a bomber. I guess you could say that beats ramming him
which was the last option we had.
Very sweet handling, very difficult to depart (coarse rudder at 95
KIAS will get you in a spin - recovery is standard, simple, quick),
fully controllable down to 110-115 KIAS, capable of one great bat turn
and then no more energy.
Flown delicately it would out maneuver a navy F4D Skyray at altitude
quite nicely. But, like I said, at night . . . it could lurk and
listen to GCI "bogey dope" (range and bearing to target, target
heading altitude and actions) and never say a word, never turn the
radar on, intercept a bogey using IRSTS and close to missile range and
then 3 seconds before fire 'radar on, lock on, shoot' 6 fully guided
missiles from a low six. How did we range in IR? get level, drop 3000
feet, close to a 30 angle-up on the bogie, you're a mile behind and in
range, get set and shoot. But it was a bomber-killer and with a
GAR11/AIM26 a good bomb-killer. (The bomber was collateral damage.)
Nice airplane. A couple serious design goofs: vision, no fuselage fuel
tank to feed the engine from a central point, no Sidewinder mounts,
wrong engine (it was supposed to get a 30K engine, Gyron or Olympus,
but design problems with them resulted in the J57 at 16K). One other
point - it was made of 7075ST which was NOT alclad hence they had to
be painted - more weight and drag, and airframe problems from
intergranular corrosion late in life. Case in point - I have heard the
Okinawa 102s were scrapped there rather than brought back to the
States because of the results of the vicious sea-salt environment
there...any body know about this?
Cheers - Walt BJ

"Walt BJ" wrote in message
om...

intergranular corrosion late in life. Case in point - I have heard the
Okinawa 102s were scrapped there rather than brought back to the
States because of the results of the vicious sea-salt environment
there...any body know about this?

Anecdotal only, a guy I worked with on Guam was on Okinawa when the Deuce
came off alert, if I remember the story correctly, they had put all the jets
on alert for some big international emergency(USS Pueblo?), when the order
came to download, the planes were downloaded and cut up.