Stryker/C-130 Pics

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)

Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.

How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.

The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV
mounted
army viable.

Huh? Why is this required to make it "viable"? The USMC has found
their LAV's to be very much "viable" in places like Panama,
Afghanistan, and Iraq--ISTR that the Army folks were quite jealous
of
the LAV in Panama.

And the Marines augmented their LAVs with what? As an adjunct to a
heavy armor core, LAVs have great mobility and reliability (a lot more
than the LVTP7s which had serious electronics reliability problems for
lack of water cooling on the hull).


If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or
LTA
kind of solutions.

That would presumably be "A400" which you are referring to. I
believe
you are ignoring the fact that we currently have *no* airborne armor
deployment capability to speak of, and the Stryker will provide
additional versatility to an Army that is currently capable of
either
light or heavy operations, but lacks the ability to deploy *more*
survivable, and lethal, assets into an AO by air to fill that large
void that exists between "light" and "heavy". Not to mention that
the
ever improved ISR and attendant targeting capabilities make the
LAV-based force more lethal than you give them credit for.

Take a simple scenario where an early entry ground force is tasked
to
provide an urban cordon/containment/evac element to support a SOF
raid
(sounds a bit like Mogadishu, huh?). What method would you
prefer--travel by HMMWV or foot, or travel and support from
Strykers?
Kind of a no-brainer.

The Army and the Marines have gamed light and medium forces augmented
by sophisticated communications and fire support significantly in
advance of the Stryker brigades fought conventional mech opponents.
What got found was that if _everything_went right, the US forces did
OK. If_anything_went wrong, the US forces lacked the resilience to
recover and prevail. In particular, the Marine games found that if the
opponents targeted communications and fire support nodes that
defeating the US forces was pretty easy.

As far as deployability is concerned, as usual people forget
logistics. The Stryker brigades have a smaller logistics footprint
than a heavy mech brigade because of reduced POL requirements but the
remaining beans and bullets have to come by boat. If that's the case,
then send the heavy mech units the same way

"Paul Austin" wrote in message . ..
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)

Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.

How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.

The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV
mounted
army viable.

Huh? Why is this required to make it "viable"? The USMC has found
their LAV's to be very much "viable" in places like Panama,
Afghanistan, and Iraq--ISTR that the Army folks were quite jealous
of
the LAV in Panama.

And the Marines augmented their LAVs with what? As an adjunct to a
heavy armor core, LAVs have great mobility and reliability (a lot more
than the LVTP7s which had serious electronics reliability problems for
lack of water cooling on the hull).

Calling the LVTP 7 "heavy armor" is quite a stretch if you are
considering the survivability/protection issue. Fact is that the LAV
affords Army early entry forces with a level of protection and ground
mobility, not to mention firepower, that they do not now enjoy;
therefore its use on an interim basis is of benefit to those forces.



If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or
LTA
kind of solutions.

That would presumably be "A400" which you are referring to. I
believe
you are ignoring the fact that we currently have *no* airborne armor
deployment capability to speak of, and the Stryker will provide
additional versatility to an Army that is currently capable of
either
light or heavy operations, but lacks the ability to deploy *more*
survivable, and lethal, assets into an AO by air to fill that large
void that exists between "light" and "heavy". Not to mention that
the
ever improved ISR and attendant targeting capabilities make the
LAV-based force more lethal than you give them credit for.

Take a simple scenario where an early entry ground force is tasked
to
provide an urban cordon/containment/evac element to support a SOF
raid
(sounds a bit like Mogadishu, huh?). What method would you
prefer--travel by HMMWV or foot, or travel and support from
Strykers?
Kind of a no-brainer.

The Army and the Marines have gamed light and medium forces augmented
by sophisticated communications and fire support significantly in
advance of the Stryker brigades fought conventional mech opponents.
What got found was that if _everything_went right, the US forces did
OK. If_anything_went wrong, the US forces lacked the resilience to
recover and prevail. In particular, the Marine games found that if the
opponents targeted communications and fire support nodes that
defeating the US forces was pretty easy.

Kind of hard to target mobile fire support assets. How easy would it
be for an enemy lacking even air parity to target HIMARS? But the real
question is, how would those same games have played out if it was our
*current* early entry force (i.e, light infantry only) that had to
deal with that same threat? Much worse, that's how.

And you never answered the question--do you want those air deployable
LAV's in this scenario, or do you want depend upon bootleather and a
few HMMWV's? How about during the urban fight in general--do you want
to be solely dependent upon helos and unarmored vehicles, or do you
want that added capability that the moderate protection afforded by
the LAV gives your assaulting infantry force? These appear to be
no-brainers to me.



As far as deployability is concerned, as usual people forget
logistics. The Stryker brigades have a smaller logistics footprint
than a heavy mech brigade because of reduced POL requirements but the
remaining beans and bullets have to come by boat. If that's the case,
then send the heavy mech units the same way

No, they don't *have* to come by boat, especially in the early stages,
which is after all when the SBCT's are going to be most valuable. The
Marines deployed LAV's into Afghanistan--how many boat docks in Afghan
land? Just how would you have sent those heavy mech units into that
country? Roll through Pakistan first? I don't think so... And even
when port facilities can be seized, there is no assurance that they
will be usable in the short term--witness the time required to open
that Iraqi port to friendly shipping? The SBCT fills a niche; no, it
can't do everything, but by golly it is better than having to depend
upon the poor bloody light infantry for *everything* during the early
entry phase, too. The Stryker is an interim vehicle, to be fielded to
no more than what, three to five brigades in the total force? Sounds
like it has a lot to offer to the current mix of available forces,
which are either too heavy for rapid deployment, or too light to
survive in higher intensity scenarios.

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
. ..
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with
the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)

Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.

How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an
option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a
bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to
the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.

The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV
mounted
army viable.

Huh? Why is this required to make it "viable"? The USMC has
found
their LAV's to be very much "viable" in places like Panama,
Afghanistan, and Iraq--ISTR that the Army folks were quite
jealous
of
the LAV in Panama.

And the Marines augmented their LAVs with what? As an adjunct to a
heavy armor core, LAVs have great mobility and reliability (a lot
more
than the LVTP7s which had serious electronics reliability problems
for
lack of water cooling on the hull).

Calling the LVTP 7 "heavy armor" is quite a stretch if you are
considering the survivability/protection issue. Fact is that the LAV
affords Army early entry forces with a level of protection and
ground
mobility, not to mention firepower, that they do not now enjoy;
therefore its use on an interim basis is of benefit to those forces.

Read a little closer. The Marine combat teams had M1A1s to provide the
heavy armor I was refereing to. With that backup (which will be
missing with the Stryker units), the Marines could manuever
aggressively when faced with enemy armor. Without that backup, doing
so would be suicide.

I mentioned the LVTP 7 only as a comparison to the Marines' LAVs. The
LAVs showed much higher reliability than the LVTPs especially in
reliability areas. LVTPs have much of their electronics in the bilge,
in direct contact with the belly, assuming (most of the time) water
cooling of the skin. Because of the prolonged operation away from
water, the LVTPs suffered a lot of reliability failures in their
mission electronics. The GDLS factory in Tallahassee is full of boxen
back in the shop for repair.

Your enthusiasm for Strykers is misplaced. While usually, I'll take
good enough and now over better in the indefinite future, I can't in
this case. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are too heavy to deploy and
too light to fight.

According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with 3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out of
gas.

What do you get with your rapid deployment force? You get very little
organic anti-armor, good mobility and vehicles proof against 14.5mm
fire. I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.







If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more
capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only
marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican
or
LTA
kind of solutions.

That would presumably be "A400" which you are referring to. I
believe
you are ignoring the fact that we currently have *no* airborne
armor
deployment capability to speak of, and the Stryker will provide
additional versatility to an Army that is currently capable of
either
light or heavy operations, but lacks the ability to deploy
*more*
survivable, and lethal, assets into an AO by air to fill that
large
void that exists between "light" and "heavy". Not to mention
that
the
ever improved ISR and attendant targeting capabilities make the
LAV-based force more lethal than you give them credit for.

Take a simple scenario where an early entry ground force is
tasked
to
provide an urban cordon/containment/evac element to support a
SOF
raid
(sounds a bit like Mogadishu, huh?). What method would you
prefer--travel by HMMWV or foot, or travel and support from
Strykers?
Kind of a no-brainer.

The Army and the Marines have gamed light and medium forces
augmented
by sophisticated communications and fire support significantly in
advance of the Stryker brigades fought conventional mech
opponents.
What got found was that if _everything_went right, the US forces
did
OK. If_anything_went wrong, the US forces lacked the resilience to
recover and prevail. In particular, the Marine games found that if
the
opponents targeted communications and fire support nodes that
defeating the US forces was pretty easy.

Kind of hard to target mobile fire support assets. How easy would it
be for an enemy lacking even air parity to target HIMARS? But the
real
question is, how would those same games have played out if it was
our
*current* early entry force (i.e, light infantry only) that had to
deal with that same threat? Much worse, that's how.

Light infantry is just about useless today and Stryker units not a lot
better. How many rounds are available for the HIMARS? As far as
targeting those assets, the Red force managed as the real enemy will,
given the incentives. How would I do it today? With a MEU or if
necessary, a MEB. What's needed if the ability to move_much_greater
tonnage by air to give the equivalent capability for land locked
locations.


And you never answered the question--do you want those air
deployable
LAV's in this scenario, or do you want depend upon bootleather and a
few HMMWV's? How about during the urban fight in general--do you
want
to be solely dependent upon helos and unarmored vehicles, or do you
want that added capability that the moderate protection afforded by
the LAV gives your assaulting infantry force? These appear to be
no-brainers to me.



As far as deployability is concerned, as usual people forget
logistics. The Stryker brigades have a smaller logistics footprint
than a heavy mech brigade because of reduced POL requirements but
the
remaining beans and bullets have to come by boat. If that's the
case,
then send the heavy mech units the same way

No, they don't *have* to come by boat, especially in the early
stages,
which is after all when the SBCT's are going to be most valuable.
The
Marines deployed LAV's into Afghanistan--how many boat docks in
Afghan
land? Just how would you have sent those heavy mech units into that
country? Roll through Pakistan first? I don't think so... And even
when port facilities can be seized, there is no assurance that they
will be usable in the short term--witness the time required to open
that Iraqi port to friendly shipping? The SBCT fills a niche; no, it
can't do everything, but by golly it is better than having to depend
upon the poor bloody light infantry for *everything* during the
early
entry phase, too. The Stryker is an interim vehicle, to be fielded
to
no more than what, three to five brigades in the total force? Sounds
like it has a lot to offer to the current mix of available forces,
which are either too heavy for rapid deployment, or too light to
survive in higher intensity scenarios.

Take a look at the logistical requirements for a single SBCT, just to
get it in place. The lift doesn't exist to get the consumables there
for intense combat. You should be unwilling to insert troops that we
can't support unless we end up being limited to constabulary
operations.

"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
. ..
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with
the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)

Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.

How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an
option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a
bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to
the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.

The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV
mounted
army viable.

Huh? Why is this required to make it "viable"? The USMC has
found
their LAV's to be very much "viable" in places like Panama,
Afghanistan, and Iraq--ISTR that the Army folks were quite
jealous
of
the LAV in Panama.

And the Marines augmented their LAVs with what? As an adjunct to a
heavy armor core, LAVs have great mobility and reliability (a lot
more
than the LVTP7s which had serious electronics reliability problems
for
lack of water cooling on the hull).

Calling the LVTP 7 "heavy armor" is quite a stretch if you are
considering the survivability/protection issue. Fact is that the LAV
affords Army early entry forces with a level of protection and
ground
mobility, not to mention firepower, that they do not now enjoy;
therefore its use on an interim basis is of benefit to those forces.

Read a little closer. The Marine combat teams had M1A1s to provide the
heavy armor I was refereing to.

I was discussing the use in Panama; care to guess how many M1A1's the
USMC had there?

With that backup (which will be
missing with the Stryker units), the Marines could manuever
aggressively when faced with enemy armor. Without that backup, doing
so would be suicide.

They maneuvered rather aggressively in Panama, and in Afghanistan,
without them. How many M1A1's were deployed into Afghanistan?
Again--zero. As to facing enemy armor, which would you rather have in
hand during the early entry phase if facing an enemy armored threat--a
bunch of crunchies with no protected mobility, as we now have, or a
SBCT with its (albeit limited) armor protection for the crunchies,
some TOW launchers mounted, and those 105mm versions?


I mentioned the LVTP 7 only as a comparison to the Marines' LAVs. The
LAVs showed much higher reliability than the LVTPs especially in
reliability areas.

???

LVTPs have much of their electronics in the bilge,
in direct contact with the belly, assuming (most of the time) water
cooling of the skin. Because of the prolonged operation away from
water, the LVTPs suffered a lot of reliability failures in their
mission electronics. The GDLS factory in Tallahassee is full of boxen
back in the shop for repair.

Your enthusiasm for Strykers is misplaced. While usually, I'll take
good enough and now over better in the indefinite future, I can't in
this case. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are too heavy to deploy and
too light to fight.

They are much easier to deploy than their counterpart heavy force
assets by air--there is no way you can argue otherwise. How much heavy
armor was CENTCOM able to get into northern Iraq during OIF by air? As
to being too light to fight, one can only imagine that you prefer the
status quo for the early entry forces, which is even lighter--seems a
bit illogical to me.


According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with 3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out of
gas.

Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's
see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all
of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and
even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways in
the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN BDE
assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space at
the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to an
aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing the
short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an
airstrip is not even required).


What do you get with your rapid deployment force? You get very little
organic anti-armor,

But much better than what we have now, which is a few HMMWV's with
TOW.

good mobility and vehicles proof against 14.5mm
fire.

Let's see, how does that compare to the current alternative?
Footmobility and proof against 7.62x39mm (as long as it hits one of
those kevlar plates)? Looks like the SBCT is significantly better in
both regards.

I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.

You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to
aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win, but
in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more
capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not
do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't
cover between the light and heavy spectrum.


If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more
capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only
marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican
or
LTA
kind of solutions.

That would presumably be "A400" which you are referring to. I
believe
you are ignoring the fact that we currently have *no* airborne
armor
deployment capability to speak of, and the Stryker will provide
additional versatility to an Army that is currently capable of
either
light or heavy operations, but lacks the ability to deploy
*more*
survivable, and lethal, assets into an AO by air to fill that
large
void that exists between "light" and "heavy". Not to mention
that
the
ever improved ISR and attendant targeting capabilities make the
LAV-based force more lethal than you give them credit for.

Take a simple scenario where an early entry ground force is
tasked
to
provide an urban cordon/containment/evac element to support a
SOF
raid
(sounds a bit like Mogadishu, huh?). What method would you
prefer--travel by HMMWV or foot, or travel and support from
Strykers?
Kind of a no-brainer.

The Army and the Marines have gamed light and medium forces
augmented
by sophisticated communications and fire support significantly in
advance of the Stryker brigades fought conventional mech
opponents.
What got found was that if _everything_went right, the US forces
did
OK. If_anything_went wrong, the US forces lacked the resilience to
recover and prevail. In particular, the Marine games found that if
the
opponents targeted communications and fire support nodes that
defeating the US forces was pretty easy.

Kind of hard to target mobile fire support assets. How easy would it
be for an enemy lacking even air parity to target HIMARS? But the
real
question is, how would those same games have played out if it was
our
*current* early entry force (i.e, light infantry only) that had to
deal with that same threat? Much worse, that's how.

Light infantry is just about useless today and Stryker units not a lot
better.

Sounds like you are dodging the question. Which would you prefer, an
all light early entry force, or one that also includes the SBCT? Not a
hard choice to make IMO.

How many rounds are available for the HIMARS?

Probably the same UBL as what they would carry when accompanying the
XVIII ABN Corps light assets into the theater. So what is the drawback
to their support of the SBCT...?

As far as
targeting those assets, the Red force managed as the real enemy will,
given the incentives. How would I do it today? With a MEU or if
necessary, a MEB. What's needed if the ability to move_much_greater
tonnage by air to give the equivalent capability for land locked
locations.

So, you seem to think that the answer lies solely in drastically
increasing air transport capability? And this would take how long??
Not to mention that you, or more accurately Rand, has claimed that
ramp space is the limiting factor--how are you making that problem go
away, or are you now saying that it was never the severe problem that
your earlier quote was based upon?



And you never answered the question--do you want those air
deployable
LAV's in this scenario, or do you want depend upon bootleather and a
few HMMWV's? How about during the urban fight in general--do you
want
to be solely dependent upon helos and unarmored vehicles, or do you
want that added capability that the moderate protection afforded by
the LAV gives your assaulting infantry force? These appear to be
no-brainers to me.

Your failure to answer this one again leaves me wondering if you have
thought this all the way through.




As far as deployability is concerned, as usual people forget
logistics. The Stryker brigades have a smaller logistics footprint
than a heavy mech brigade because of reduced POL requirements but
the
remaining beans and bullets have to come by boat. If that's the
case,
then send the heavy mech units the same way

No, they don't *have* to come by boat, especially in the early
stages,
which is after all when the SBCT's are going to be most valuable.
The
Marines deployed LAV's into Afghanistan--how many boat docks in
Afghan
land? Just how would you have sent those heavy mech units into that
country? Roll through Pakistan first? I don't think so... And even
when port facilities can be seized, there is no assurance that they
will be usable in the short term--witness the time required to open
that Iraqi port to friendly shipping? The SBCT fills a niche; no, it
can't do everything, but by golly it is better than having to depend
upon the poor bloody light infantry for *everything* during the
early
entry phase, too. The Stryker is an interim vehicle, to be fielded
to
no more than what, three to five brigades in the total force? Sounds
like it has a lot to offer to the current mix of available forces,
which are either too heavy for rapid deployment, or too light to
survive in higher intensity scenarios.

Take a look at the logistical requirements for a single SBCT, just to
get it in place. The lift doesn't exist to get the consumables there
for intense combat.

Yes it does. We have a heck of a lot more than 60 C-17's making up our
air transport capability.

You should be unwilling to insert troops that we
can't support unless we end up being limited to constabulary
operations.

So your answer is, "sorry, Mr. president, but we can't go"? I don't
think that alternative is acceptable to *either* side in this debate.

FYI, I published an article a couple of years ago decrying the lack of
emphasis on keeping our heavy force viable until the FCS does (if it
ever does) enter full scale service, so I am no screaming Stryker
fanatic. But it does indeed fill a niche that is completely unfilled
without it, and all of the money you care to drop into airmobility is
not going to change that in the near term--and the near-term is what
Stryker is all about. Add in the fact that these "interim" vehicles
will have a very long life serving with RC units even after they have
been supplanted by FCS, and I see Stryker as a rather smart move on
the part of the Army.

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
.. .


According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT
is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT
using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with
3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to
Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the
lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out
of
gas.

Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's
see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all
of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and
even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways
in
the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN
BDE
assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space
at
the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to
an
aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing
the
short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an
airstrip is not even required).

You might want to read what RAND had to say
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/. They are after all
professional analysts.

Staging and transhipping material from C17s to C130s was analysed and
rejected since the time consumed in off-loading, breaking down and
reloading payloads made the C130s. RAND analysed the entire chain of
deployment and determined that established airport with supporting
road networks would move more material than could ad hoc airfields.
Can you prove different?

As for the size of the force, RAND selected 60 C17s because the USAF
(remember them?) consumes a large number of transport sortees itself.
In addition, there are and will be other commitments besides this one.



....

I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force
that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.

You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to
aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win,
but
in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more
capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not
do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't
cover between the light and heavy spectrum.

And you seem to say that if it's an improvement over current light
forces deployments then it's worth having. My position is that the
spectrum of opponents that a SBCT can face that e.g. the 82nd Airborne
cannot is too small to be worth while. It doesn't take much in the way
of armor and artillery to defeat a SBCT. Panama and Afghanistan could
not but there are_lots_of places that could.

I believe that concentrating on an "interim" SBCT which under a more
dovish administration could easily become permanent displaces programs
to develop enough lift so that forces with real puissance can be
inserted. That said, the logistics challenge of battle at the end of
such a slender thread hasn't been addressed. Traditionally, the
tonnage of POL, ammunition and other kit dwarfs the TOE tonnage. Given
that SBCT's only chance of success in more than constabulary
operations is to substitute fires for force size, that's unlikely to
change.

You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from litterals.
Can you support that?

"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
.. .


According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT
is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT
using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with
3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to
Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the
lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out
of
gas.

Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's
see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all
of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and
even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways
in
the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN
BDE
assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space
at
the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to
an
aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing
the
short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an
airstrip is not even required).

You might want to read what RAND had to say
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/. They are after all
professional analysts.

And frequently on-target; but sometimes not.


Staging and transhipping material from C17s to C130s was analysed and
rejected since the time consumed in off-loading, breaking down and
reloading payloads made the C130s.

"made the C-130's" what?

RAND analysed the entire chain of
deployment and determined that established airport with supporting
road networks would move more material than could ad hoc airfields.
Can you prove different?

Whoah. You just told me that the ramp space was the limiting factor,
and when presented with an option that overcomes that problem, all of
a sudden the "ad hoc airfields" are worthless? While cross loading the
cargo to the C-130's would be less efficient than direct throughput,
if the limiting factor really *is* ramp space, then the loss of
efficiency involved in the crossload would be more than made up for by
the increased in total tonnage delivered to the destination. And BTW,
crossloading might not even be required--note that the C-17 is also
capable of using austere FLS's (neat picture out there somewhere of
one landing on Bicycle Lake at Ft Irwin.


As for the size of the force, RAND selected 60 C17s because the USAF
(remember them?) consumes a large number of transport sortees itself.
In addition, there are and will be other commitments besides this one.

Sorry, but when a contingency operation that requires major airlift of
this nature arises, the airframes are diverted from lower priority
missions. Take that as gospel from a guy who saw his milk-run C-141
flight from Charleston to Honduras cancelled when Golden Pheasant went
down in '88. And yes, I remember the USAF; they are the guys fielding
the 210 or so C-17's, of which you and Rand apparently think only
about 20% of which would be tasked to support a high priority
contingency op (not to mention that there are also quite a few
C-5A/B's still out there...). I just see that as another manner of
weighting the data to suit a desired outcome--it does not make it
accurate.



I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force
that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.

You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to
aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win,
but
in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more
capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not
do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't
cover between the light and heavy spectrum.

And you seem to say that if it's an improvement over current light
forces deployments then it's worth having. My position is that the
spectrum of opponents that a SBCT can face that e.g. the 82nd Airborne
cannot is too small to be worth while. It doesn't take much in the way
of armor and artillery to defeat a SBCT. Panama and Afghanistan could
not but there are_lots_of places that could.

And if it is a theater that the SBCT is outguned in, then other TTP,
forces, etc., will have to be used, granted. But yes, I do think that
it would be darned nice of us to give our early entry forces another
tool for their bag. Rapidly deployable light armor can greatly enhance
the joint force commander's options, and can mean the difference
between sustaining higher casualties to accomplish the mission. I
think those are *good* things.


I believe that concentrating on an "interim" SBCT which under a more
dovish administration could easily become permanent displaces programs
to develop enough lift so that forces with real puissance can be
inserted. That said, the logistics challenge of battle at the end of
such a slender thread hasn't been addressed.

And just how the hell do you think FCS is going to magically address
that logistics concern? Snap your fingers and have FCS fielded
*today*, and it faces the same logistical challenges. Not to mention
that our *current* early entry force faces the same challenegs--in the
ansence of Stryker, the only way you are going to acheive decent
ground mobility for those guys is to either bring in a bunch of trucks
(which use about the same fuel as Stryker, take up a goodly portion of
the haul assets that Stryker would, and don't offer 8any* degree of
protection or enhanced firepower), or haul helos in to allow air
assault operations--do you *really* think that either of those options
results in a significantly reduced log chain in comparison to the
SBCT?


Traditionally, the
tonnage of POL, ammunition and other kit dwarfs the TOE tonnage.

See above.

Given
that SBCT's only chance of success in more than constabulary
operations is to substitute fires for force size, that's unlikely to
change.

Never heard of substituting greater mobility for fires *and* force
size? Stryker can, in comparison to current capabilities, do that for
the grunts in the early entry force.


You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from litterals.
Can you support that?

No, I have not. But, unlike you, I realize that the SBCT is not the
*only* force structure design that requires log support. In order for
the current LI force to acheive the same mobility on/over the ground
that Stryker offers, you have to either send in a boatload of soft,
less useful trucks to haul them around in, or helos--care to guess how
much POL those helos will burn? The difference between the two forces,
if you force both to acheive significant ground mobility, will be
insignificant in terms of log requirements. The *only* way the current
force wins in this regard is if you send them in with *no* transport
capability--in which case congrats, you just forced us back to the
same rate of movement that we enjoyed during the Civil War (if that
much, since those poor grunts are going to be carrying about five
times the load that their 1860's counterparts were burdened with).

Now, one more time--given that urban combat scenario that you snipped,
do you want to go in as a naked grunt, or with light armor support?
You *really* don't want to answer that question, do you???

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
"Paul Austin" wrote

You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from
litterals.
Can you support that?

No, I have not. But, unlike you, I realize that the SBCT is not the
*only* force structure design that requires log support. In order
for
the current LI force to acheive the same mobility on/over the ground
that Stryker offers, you have to either send in a boatload of soft,
less useful trucks to haul them around in, or helos--care to guess
how
much POL those helos will burn? The difference between the two
forces,
if you force both to acheive significant ground mobility, will be
insignificant in terms of log requirements. The *only* way the
current
force wins in this regard is if you send them in with *no* transport
capability--in which case congrats, you just forced us back to the
same rate of movement that we enjoyed during the Civil War (if that
much, since those poor grunts are going to be carrying about five
times the load that their 1860's counterparts were burdened with).

Now, one more time--given that urban combat scenario that you
snipped,
do you want to go in as a naked grunt, or with light armor support?
You *really* don't want to answer that question, do you???

I agree that light infantry needs heavier support. My dislike of the
Stryker concept comes from the concept's origins: Clintonian notions
that the primary use for US arms in the future would be constabulary
operations and peace keeping. The only force that combines strategic
manueverability and enough weight to operate against enemy mech
formations right now is the Marines and if you get too far from the
water's edge, they have to leave a lot of equipment on the boat. We
need strategic airlift that can insert and support forces with
something like the tonnage of a MEU a thousand miles for water and we
have no count them none under development to do that. The SBCT is in
fact better than nothing but does not serve our needs. We need
something heavier than SFOR. We_know_what happens when you use forces
too light for the mission. Just look at (former) Yugoslavia.