A-10 gear fairing

On 24 Sep 2003 08:29:47 -0700, (Kirk Stant)
wrote:

Cub Driver wrote in message news

There was a feeling that the A-10s were painted olive drab because the
Air Force was piqued at being forced to acquire an aircraft that did
Army work. Any truth to that?

all the best -- Dan Ford
No truth at all. The color is a logical choice because the airplane is
designed to work low against the earth tones. You also see some of the
A-10s have been painted in grays. Does that mean they were expected to
do Navy work?

Dan,

One hears (and reads about) the supposed dislike of the A-10 by the
"Air Force". I wonder where it all started - I never heard anyone
badmouth the Hog during my 20 years in, and everybody who flew it
loved it. The bull**** about "the brass hates it because it isn't
supersonic" is really an insult to the professionalism of the Air
Force. Anyway, the AF wanted the A-10 to get a big piece of stopping
the WP in the Fulda Gap, as well as do CAS (which has always been an
AF mission). In no way was it "forced" on the AF. Now, as a single
role airplane, it is naturally more at risk whenever budget cuts are
in the air, but there is really no way around that - when you are
limited on numbers, your airplane have to be able to do multiple
tasks, and as great as the Hog is for CAS and BAI, it still really
can't do OCA or DCA (well, maybe, against some of the Air Forces out
there!!!).

Couldn't have said it better myself. In fact, I think in the past I
have said it myself. The idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" or that there
is some sort of elitist panache to supersonic is flat wrong.

I think the late Jeff Ethell had a lot to do with some of the bogus
rumors about military aviation. He was great when talking about his
experiences flying WW2 warbirds, but a lot of what he said about
current combat aircraft was often wrong - I cringe when I hear some of
the things he says on Discovery Wings!

While Jeff did some pretty good historical research ("One Day in a
Long War" is excellent), I've often wondered how an aficionado becomes
an expert without actually military experience. Regardless of the
sincerity and conscientiousness of the research, it's simply a fact
that someone in the civilian world is going to be "out of the loop"
when it comes to tactics development and classified widgetry.

Couldn't have said it better myself. In fact, I think in the past I
have said it myself. The idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" or that there
is some sort of elitist panache to supersonic is flat wrong.



Perhaps. But I remember reading in the Myrtle Beach newspaper that the
commander of MBAFB was in hot water because he had been publicly discussing his
desires to replace the A-10 with F-16's. The reason given in the newspaper IIRC
was that the A-10 was too slow for the assignment.


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~

Keeper of the Humour List at http://members.aol.com/PirateJohn/pirate1.html

"Mother, mother ocean... I have heard your call" - Jimmy Buffett, A Pirate
Looks At Forty.

On 24 Sep 2003 18:04:47 GMT, OSPAM (PirateJohn)
wrote:

Couldn't have said it better myself. In fact, I think in the past I
have said it myself. The idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" or that there
is some sort of elitist panache to supersonic is flat wrong.



Perhaps. But I remember reading in the Myrtle Beach newspaper that the
commander of MBAFB was in hot water because he had been publicly discussing his
desires to replace the A-10 with F-16's. The reason given in the newspaper IIRC
was that the A-10 was too slow for the assignment.


Duh? Lemme see, would I like to keep driving my Yugo or get upgraded
to a Porsche Carrera S?

Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an
inherited dislike of the electric jet.) And, it isn't much of a
stretch to suggest that the A-10 over the years with improvements in
air defenses could be considered to be too slow for some tasking. I
don't see a conflict in any of that.

But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.
CAS changes. Weapons change. Tactics change. CAS isn't necessarily
always "enemy in the wire", nape and strafe at 50 feet, "danger
close." It can be stand-off with precision munitions. It can be lased
or GPS'd. It can be anti-armor or anti-personnel. But, it's always
about US guys needing help from other US guys and the AF has never
been reluctant to do that.

And, the idea that the airplane isn't supersonic doesn't mean squat.
Which is more important--the top speed of a Corvette is 163 MPH or the
0-60 time is less than 6 seconds? The ability to have adequate power
to accelerate, to regain altitude, to sustain G is what's important.

There must assuredly has been and still is, a "fighter pilot mafia".
It's a collection of guys that fight hard to get the best equipment to
do the job, whatever it might be. But, don't attribute some sort of
elitism to them and don't suggest that they are anti-CAS.

Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an

Evidently this is not true of Hog drivers. (And anyhow, aren't *all"
fighter pilots strange?)

But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.

Ed, you'd better read Campbell's book and then report back. He quotes
page after page of Air Force argument that your experience in Vietnam
was an anomaly that would never be repeated, that interdiction and not
CAS was what we needed, and that the A-1 and the A-10 would only get
in the way when the Russian tanks came through the Fulda Gap.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 04:57:52 -0400, Cub Driver
wrote:



Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an

Evidently this is not true of Hog drivers. (And anyhow, aren't *all"
fighter pilots strange?)

Humans all tend to make the best of a bad situation. Take someone
before an assignment and ask them to list their preferences. Not many
folks will put the A-10 ahead of the Viper, Eagle or now, Raptor. Once
assigned and wrapped up in the mission, you then get the syndrom of
"mine is better" regardless of the airplane. Certainly some Hog
drivers love their airplane, but if told the unit was transitioning to
something a little more "swoopy" they'd eat it up.

And, while there may be a commonality of "strangeness", let me
reiterate my oft-stated position that not all folks assigned to fly
tactical aircraft are "fighter pilots."

But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.

Ed, you'd better read Campbell's book and then report back. He quotes
page after page of Air Force argument that your experience in Vietnam
was an anomaly that would never be repeated, that interdiction and not
CAS was what we needed, and that the A-1 and the A-10 would only get
in the way when the Russian tanks came through the Fulda Gap.

I'll try to get to Campbell's book, but having checked the summary on
Amazon, I can almost predict what it says. There was great debate at
the time of acquisition regarding whether we were "reliving the last
war" with the A-10. It would have been a great in-country airplane for
SEA. The real concern was whether the plain-vanilla airplane was going
to be survivable in Europe in a more intense conflict.

Question two, was the definitions of CAS and interdiction. There was
even a transition mission defined, BAI (battlefield area
interdiction)--neither CAS nor true interdiction, but systematic
attacking of the second and third echelon of the advancing horde. If
you did a good BAI job, the requirement for true CAS was minimized.

Issue three, the development of the Army aviation component to better
provide supplemental firepower to artillery. If you got good gunships,
not just gun on Hueys, but Cobras and Apaches optimized for ground
attack and survivability, you lessened the need for "fast movers."

And, problem four, the difficulty in a fluid tactical environment with
deconflicting airspace. You can't be lobbing artillery in where
airplanes are operating. You can't be zooming around willy-nilly at
low altitude of rotary wings are transiting. You must have close
control of the airspace and delivery designations to effectively
employ "danger close." And, for a variety of reasons (economic,
political, practical--pick one,) we simultaneously add the demise of
the airborne FAC in a slow-mover fixed wing.

Did I get the high points? Do I still have to buy the book?

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 13:24:11 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

[stuff snipped]

Issue three, the development of the Army aviation component to better
provide supplemental firepower to artillery. If you got good gunships,
not just gun on Hueys, but Cobras and Apaches optimized for ground
attack and survivability, you lessened the need for "fast movers."

And, problem four, the difficulty in a fluid tactical environment with
deconflicting airspace. You can't be lobbing artillery in where
airplanes are operating. You can't be zooming around willy-nilly at
low altitude of rotary wings are transiting. You must have close
control of the airspace and delivery designations to effectively
employ "danger close." And, for a variety of reasons (economic,
political, practical--pick one,) we simultaneously add the demise of
the airborne FAC in a slow-mover fixed wing.

Ed,

Didn't you work as an ALO with a division in Germany at one point?
I'd like to hear about your experiences working with ground-pounders,
and your opinions on Army aviation, if any.

John Hairell )

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 11:25:25 -0400, John Hairell
wrote:

Ed,

Didn't you work as an ALO with a division in Germany at one point?
I'd like to hear about your experiences working with ground-pounders,
and your opinions on Army aviation, if any.

John Hairell )

No, emphatically no. Anyone who spends more than one tour (penance) in
the TACS (Tactical Air Control System--i.e., FACs and ALOs) is of
minimal value. Sorry in advance to those career FAC/ALOs that I've
offended.

I was an ALO in the 4th ID, Fort Carson Colorado from '85-'87. This
was after being passed over seven times for O-5 and with an extension
in service for two years. Assignment taken to get a move from Holloman
AFB (great place to fly, lousy place to retire) to Colorado Springs.
Nuff said.

I liked, and more importantly respected, everyone that I ever
encountered in Army Aviation. Mas grande cojones, en todos.

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 04:57:52 -0400, Cub Driver
wrote:



Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an

Evidently this is not true of Hog drivers. (And anyhow, aren't *all"
fighter pilots strange?)

Humans all tend to make the best of a bad situation. Take someone
before an assignment and ask them to list their preferences. Not many
folks will put the A-10 ahead of the Viper, Eagle or now, Raptor. Once
assigned and wrapped up in the mission, you then get the syndrom of
"mine is better" regardless of the airplane. Certainly some Hog
drivers love their airplane, but if told the unit was transitioning to
something a little more "swoopy" they'd eat it up.

And, while there may be a commonality of "strangeness", let me
reiterate my oft-stated position that not all folks assigned to fly
tactical aircraft are "fighter pilots."

But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.

Ed, you'd better read Campbell's book and then report back. He quotes
page after page of Air Force argument that your experience in Vietnam
was an anomaly that would never be repeated, that interdiction and not
CAS was what we needed, and that the A-1 and the A-10 would only get
in the way when the Russian tanks came through the Fulda Gap.

I'll try to get to Campbell's book, but having checked the summary on
Amazon, I can almost predict what it says. There was great debate at
the time of acquisition regarding whether we were "reliving the last
war" with the A-10. It would have been a great in-country airplane for
SEA. The real concern was whether the plain-vanilla airplane was going
to be survivable in Europe in a more intense conflict.

Question two, was the definitions of CAS and interdiction. There was
even a transition mission defined, BAI (battlefield area
interdiction)--neither CAS nor true interdiction, but systematic
attacking of the second and third echelon of the advancing horde. If
you did a good BAI job, the requirement for true CAS was minimized.

Defining where CAS ends and BAI or AI begins seems to be a bit murky.
If the definitions as stated by the US Army CGSC are used (CAS being
"in close proximity" to friendly ground units and requiring "detailed
integration" with friendly fire and maneuver, and AI being "at such a
distance...that integration of each air mission with fire and
movement..." is not required), there seems to be a bit of confusion
possible. For example, what do you call a mission against the second
echelon, fifteen or twenty klicks from the nearest friendlies, but
still within the FSCL boundary? It is not in close proximity, but IIRC
all air missions in front of the FSCL require pretty close
integration, lest you conflict with those arty rounds you mention.


Issue three, the development of the Army aviation component to better
provide supplemental firepower to artillery. If you got good gunships,
not just gun on Hueys, but Cobras and Apaches optimized for ground
attack and survivability, you lessened the need for "fast movers."

But the development of Army aviation, while initially aimed at
supplementing artillery, changed quite a bit with the development of
the divisional aviation brigade, which instead became a fourth
maneuver element, as opposed to a fire support element. If your attack
aviation assets are tied up with a deep mission, or with a continuous
attack mission along some axis, then the need for CAS on the part of
the ground maneuver brigades has not really been lessened. I never
thought of the aviation assets as so much substituting for CAS as much
as they *complement* it (JAAT being an example of the latter).


And, problem four, the difficulty in a fluid tactical environment with
deconflicting airspace. You can't be lobbing artillery in where
airplanes are operating. You can't be zooming around willy-nilly at
low altitude of rotary wings are transiting.

That sounds like the now-infamous "where to locate the FSCL" debate
during ODS; haven't heard much about it reappearing during the latest
conflict.

You must have close
control of the airspace and delivery designations to effectively
employ "danger close." And, for a variety of reasons (economic,
political, practical--pick one,) we simultaneously add the demise of
the airborne FAC in a slow-mover fixed wing.

I believe the use of PGM's in the CAS role is making this a bit easier
in terms of operating CAS in "danger close".

Brooks


Did I get the high points? Do I still have to buy the book?

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om

But the development of Army aviation, while initially aimed at
supplementing artillery, changed quite a bit with the development of
the divisional aviation brigade, which instead became a fourth
maneuver element, as opposed to a fire support element. If your attack
aviation assets are tied up with a deep mission, or with a continuous
attack mission along some axis, then the need for CAS on the part of
the ground maneuver brigades has not really been lessened. I never
thought of the aviation assets as so much substituting for CAS as much
as they *complement* it (JAAT being an example of the latter).

But are JAAT and JAWS even *practiced* any more?

--
http://www.delversdungeon.dragonsfoot.org
Remove the X's in my email address to respond.
"Damn you Silvey, and your endless fortunes." - Stephen Weir
I hate furries.

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 13:24:11 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

Did I get the high points? Do I still have to buy the book?

Yes, you did, but you still have to get the book. (You don't have to
buy it. A big-time author like you can write NIP and get a review
copy, I betcha.)

What you left out was the continuing USAF dislike of the A-10. It
wasn't just the acquisition; it has lasted for a generation.

Campbell does go to great lengths to define air support, even unto
BAI, but to me this is meaningless. You know it when you need it, and
you need it when the bad guys are swaming over the ridge and there's
no artillery sighted in on your position.

(Under my definition, of course, the A-10 has never been used for air
support. 15,000 feet! That was its minimum altitude over Yugoslavia!
Did Art Kramer ever bomb from that high?)



all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com