Buffalo Q400 crash

wrote:

Standard practice is to wait until you have a positive rate of climb
before raising the flaps. Raising the flaps if the airplane was on
the verge of a stall would be a big mistake. Lowering the nose and
applying full power would be the best course of action, and once a
positive rate of climb could be achieved, then the flaps could be
raised.

There is some debate about that. For a wing stall, you are correct,
however, some have pointed out that the PIC's experience was recently on
Saabs, which can see tail stalls in icing conditions - the Q400 isn't
subject to tail stalls. A tail stall is most often first seen when the
flaps are extended, and the effect is for the nose to drop. The reaction
to a tail stall is to retract the flaps, and pull the nose up. Was that
what the captain was reacting to?

On May 12, 2:57*pm, James Robinson wrote:
wrote:

Standard practice is to wait until you have a positive rate of climb
before raising the flaps. *Raising the flaps if the airplane was on
the verge of a stall would be a big mistake. *Lowering the nose and
applying full power would be the best course of action, and once a
positive rate of climb could be achieved, then the flaps could be
raised.

There is some debate about that. *For a wing stall, you are correct,
however, some have pointed out that the PIC's experience was recently on
Saabs, which can see tail stalls in icing conditions - the Q400 isn't
subject to tail stalls. *A tail stall is most often first seen when the
flaps are extended, and the effect is for the nose to drop. *The reaction
to a tail stall is to retract the flaps, and pull the nose up. *Was that
what the captain was reacting to?

If that is the case, he had no business flying the Q400 because he
lacked sufficient training in type.

wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

*For a wing stall, you are correct, however, some have pointed out
that the PIC's experience was recently on Saabs, which can see tail
stalls in icing conditions - the Q400 isn't subject to tail stalls.
*A tail stall is most often first seen when the flaps are extended,
and the effect is for the nose to drop. *The reaction to a tail stall
is to retract the flaps, and pull the nose up. *Was that what the
captain was reacting to?

If that is the case, he had no business flying the Q400 because he
lacked sufficient training in type.

Listening to the NTSB hearings today, the Colgan chief pilots went to
great pains to say that they meet all FAA minimum training requirements.
They admitted that their training for the stick pusher was only in the
classroom prior to the accident, and that they never ran simulator
exercises to demonstrate how it worked. That seems like they missed the
mark with something that important. They changed their training after the
accident to include stick pusher simulations.

The Bombardier reps said that the aircraft isn't subject to tail stalls
in icing, but that it really isn't written anywhere in their flight
manuals. In fact, there was an error in one manual, where they recommend
training in tail stalls.

However, reading the cockpit transcripts suggests that the crew was less
than confident about flying in icing conditions. The first officer in
fact said that prior to her recent assignment to the northeast, all of
her flying had been out of Phoenix, and she had never flown when there
was ice buildup. She anticipated being upgraded to Saabs within six
months.

Overall, the crew was pretty lackadasical about procedures, and the first
officer seemed right out of her depth. Certainly not a seasoned
professional. The drop in airspeed was unnoticed, and the stall seemed to
catch them completely by surprise. One of the board asked each of the
Colgan check pilots to define "situational awareness", then made a speech
about how the crew was missing that important concept.

James Robinson wrote
The drop in airspeed was unnoticed, and the stall seemed
to catch them completely by surprise.

I wonder what the stall warning was doing all of this time?

Bob Moore

On 13 May, 12:57, Robert Moore wrote:
James Robinson *wrote

The drop in airspeed was unnoticed, and the stall seemed
to catch them completely by surprise.

I wonder what the stall warning was doing all of this time?

Bob Moore

It appears that it was the stall warning (stick shaker) that the
captain (pilot flying) reacted to.

The reaction was to immediately pull back pretty hard
quickly precipitating an actual stall. 80% power was also
selected immediately. The stick was held back pretty much
until impact.

There is a simulated video on the NTSB web site. Web site
seems a bit busy at the moment.

They appear to have been decelerating towards 119 knots
in preparation for final approach when the stick shaker went off
unexpectedly at 139 knots. They may have forgotten that the
stall warning was set to trigger at a higher than normal
airspeed due to the aircraft being configured
partly for icing conditions.

If the reaction to the stick shaker had been to merely
stop the deceleration there would it seems have been no crash.

In article
,
bod43 wrote:

On 13 May, 12:57, Robert Moore wrote:
James Robinson *wrote

The drop in airspeed was unnoticed, and the stall seemed
to catch them completely by surprise.

I wonder what the stall warning was doing all of this time?

Bob Moore

It appears that it was the stall warning (stick shaker) that the
captain (pilot flying) reacted to.

The reaction was to immediately pull back pretty hard
quickly precipitating an actual stall. 80% power was also
selected immediately. The stick was held back pretty much
until impact.

This boggles my mind. I'm just a PP but throughout my training I've had
it drilled in to me to lower the nose on an impending stall. How can
any pilot not know that, let alone one who is getting paid to fly
passengers?

rg

In article ,
Ron Garret wrote:

In article
,
bod43 wrote:

On 13 May, 12:57, Robert Moore wrote:
James Robinson *wrote

The drop in airspeed was unnoticed, and the stall seemed
to catch them completely by surprise.

I wonder what the stall warning was doing all of this time?

Bob Moore

It appears that it was the stall warning (stick shaker) that the
captain (pilot flying) reacted to.

The reaction was to immediately pull back pretty hard
quickly precipitating an actual stall. 80% power was also
selected immediately. The stick was held back pretty much
until impact.

This boggles my mind. I'm just a PP but throughout my training I've had
it drilled in to me to lower the nose on an impending stall. How can
any pilot not know that, let alone one who is getting paid to fly
passengers?

Seconded. Stall warning, stick goes forward! Forward! Or whatever you
do, it does not go *back*! How can you get into the position of carrying
a bunch of passengers around for hire without knowing this?

I imagine the explanation not as simple as it appears. (The simple
explanation being "they were morons".) I'll be really interested to hear
just how their training got them to this point.

--
Mike Ash
Radio Free Earth
Broadcasting from our climate-controlled studios deep inside the Moon

On May 13, 2:14*pm, Ron Garret wrote:
In article
,



*bod43 wrote:
On 13 May, 12:57, Robert Moore wrote:
James Robinson *wrote

The drop in airspeed was unnoticed, and the stall seemed
to catch them completely by surprise.

I wonder what the stall warning was doing all of this time?

Bob Moore

It appears that it was the stall warning (stick shaker) that the
captain (pilot flying) reacted to.

The reaction was to immediately pull back pretty hard
quickly precipitating an actual stall. 80% power was also
selected immediately. The stick was held back pretty much
until impact.

This boggles my mind. *I'm just a PP but throughout my training I've had
it drilled in to me to lower the nose on an impending stall. *How can
any pilot not know that, let alone one who is getting paid to fly
passengers?

It may boggle the mind of a PP like you (or me for that matter) who
seldom or never flies in icing conditions. However in icing
conditions a tail stall is possible, and the recovery from that is
exactly what this flight crew did. Yes, I know the Q400 is alleged
not to be suspectible to this but the captain had just come from a
type that is, and the FO spent a good part of the five minutes before
the crash chatting about how she feared icing, had never experienced
it before, and how would she handle it, etc. So then after chatting
and worrying about icing, they got something that felt/looked like it
could be an ice-induced tail stall and since it was on their minds
they did the recovery from that. They acted on instinct and it was
the wrong instinct. IMO.

This crew has come in for lots of criticism and I think a lot of it,
especially on their attentiveness and lack of discipline, appears to
be well-deserved, but there comes a point where it just becomes piling
on.

bod43 wrote:

On 13 May, 12:57, Robert Moore wrote:
James Robinson *wrote

The drop in airspeed was unnoticed, and the stall seemed
to catch them completely by surprise.

I wonder what the stall warning was doing all of this time?

Bob Moore

It appears that it was the stall warning (stick shaker) that the
captain (pilot flying) reacted to.

The reaction was to immediately pull back pretty hard
quickly precipitating an actual stall. 80% power was also
selected immediately. The stick was held back pretty much
until impact.

There was a theory on one of the other pilot forums that the captain
might have done all of his stall training when the aircraft was under
manual control, untrimmed, with the throttles cut until the speed dropped
below stall speed. He might have gotten used to having some backpressure
on the control column to avoid altitude loss under those conditions.

He might never have experienced stall training where the AP had ratcheted
the pitch trim toward its maximum, and was caught by surprise with the
sudden pitch up when the AP kicked off.

The FDR shows his immediate reaction to the stick shaker was to apply 20
lbs backpressure, which he immediately let go of as the aircraft pitched
up. He never pushed on the control column, however the wild
left/right/left/right rolls pretty well made controlling pitch a moot
point.

One curious thing about the FDR data is that it shows 20/25 lbs
backpressure on the control columns on both sides immediately after the
stick shaker fired, with the force on the #2 side the higher of the two.
Did both the captain and FO react by pulling up? Did the FO yank on the
control column at the worst time to steady herself because her seat moved
on the track? Very strange.

Not sure I buy it, but an interesting theory about stall training.

On May 14, 8:12 am, James Robinson wrote:

There was a theory on one of the other pilot forums that the captain
might have done all of his stall training when the aircraft was under
manual control, untrimmed, with the throttles cut until the speed dropped
below stall speed. He might have gotten used to having some backpressure
on the control column to avoid altitude loss under those conditions.

He might never have experienced stall training where the AP had ratcheted
the pitch trim toward its maximum, and was caught by surprise with the
sudden pitch up when the AP kicked off.

The FDR shows his immediate reaction to the stick shaker was to apply 20
lbs backpressure, which he immediately let go of as the aircraft pitched
up. He never pushed on the control column, however the wild
left/right/left/right rolls pretty well made controlling pitch a moot
point.

Those rolls were made harder to get out of by the fact that the
captain let
the aircraft get all the way down to 80 kts at one point, and at such
low
airspeeds, the ailerons have much less effect, which he would have
known
if he had simply paid attention to his flight instructor.