Friendly Fire Notebook

You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.

Well, not just me but several prominant authors..

I have read several prominent authors, too, and some of their "facts" were
point blank wrong. The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts. The coal fired
electrical plant we took out with LGBs in the daylight on Day #3 after the
bombers two nights in a row is one that stands out in my mind. The post strike
photos in the textbook clearly shows the damage we left behind. Don't believe
all you read unless the author was there himself.

Hereis an interesting read for you from aother author

http://www.sftt.org/303VINq.pdf



You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian
and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22

These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail?

Yes they were. We also used to escort Specter on the trails at night, in
F-4Ds. We usually carried CBU-58 and MK 82 with daisy cutters. Specter would
"mark" the lead and tail trucks and stop the convoys with 20 mm API then we
would drop in the line between the two truck fires. According to the Specter
guys the convoys were often in the miltiple hundreds of trucks. I seem to
recall that the record number of Specter truck kills in one night was 500+. I
got credit for a total of 400+ over a period of four months according to
Specter BDA for whatever that was worth. I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.



Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed? Must have made sense to somebady
and we all worked for the politicians. Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.



we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon

Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3.
Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing
in
a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor)
were
having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough,
18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and
Kuwait.

SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a crosswind
or wind shear in other words? We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
equipped
A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s. An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch steering
from his offset aimpoint to his target, similar to that incident where the
B-52 cell hit Neak Long in Cambodia.



My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Vietnamized.

Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch.

The NVN didn't recover until 1975.

True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that
than
LB I.

Maybe for the bombers but I would have to disagree for the fighters.

On Day 8 for example, Korat was fragged against a rail LOC, first daytime
strike for the AF A-7Ds. Unfortunately that one was a fiasco as the #2 -105
Weasel punched off his load on the runway on TO roll after an engine problem
and shut the runway down for 45 min. We finally did get off and over the
target but it was 100% unercast, the Pathfinder couldn't get a Loran lock and
so we all went home. It is described in the ACSC thesis that Karl Eschmann
wrote that became the book you refer to. I'd have to get it out to see exactly
what the target was but I am almost certain it was a rail yard. Karl and I are
friends and as I was a contributor and proofreader, he gave me a couple copies
of the manuscript. I loaned my book out and never got it back. The book
leaves out some information in places that is in the manuscript.

The accounts of LBII are a sore subject with me as there seems to have been an
element in the AF that was determined to show SAC in the best light possible.
That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental. Particularly when I
see BDA attributed to the bombers when I know for a fact that the fighters were
responsible. I am in no way tryng to downplay the bravery of the SAC crews - I
wouldn't have wanted their jobs for twice the pay - but I don't believe the
bombing was all that effective.. What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more effective.
They were running out of missiles and fuel as their supply lines had been
pretty well cut off as early as Day 3. I guess you could call that political
but I see it as more of a tactical solution. Had the supplie lines stayed open,
the bombong might have gone on a lot longer. I don't think it wold have
happened as it did if NVN had more missiles. I sat in an orbit over downtown
for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing - in fact I still have some
pictures I took with a little camera I carried with me.

Regards.

Steve Mellenthin






BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts.

Which include "documented facts" on how 8th Air Force won WW in Europe. See my
earlier posts for my opinion of AF PME.

Don't believe
all you read unless the author was there himself.

That's ridiculous. Using that logic there is only one "believeable" book on the
Peloponnesian War. Conversely, according to you I could right a definitive work
on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which wouldn't be worth the cost of the paper
because I was so deeply buried in B-52 stuff (flying and mission planning),
that the "big picture" blew right by me.

I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.

Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.

Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed?

Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.

Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a
crosswind
or wind shear in other words?

Nope. The BUFF OAS calculates a release using the winds at altitude, should
those winds change drastically on the way down, it could have a significant
impact on accuracy. It happened in LB II, then again in DS. It was fixed after
DS.

We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
equipped
A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s.

Not sure about the F-4s, but neither the F-111 or A-6 was dropping from inside
or above the jet stream. If the F-4 has that capability great, its too bad they
didn't give it to the BUFF following Vietnam, we could have used over
Iraq/Kuwait.

An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch
steering
from his offset aimpoint to his target

A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
30,000+' AGL.

That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.

I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.

but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..

Depends what effect you were looking for...

What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
effective.

What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.

They were running out of missiles

Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting them
out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in Hanoi
decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
operators job much more difficult with varied routing.

and fuel

They had been low on fuel since May due to LB I. LBII had little to no impact
on NV POL stores.

I don't think it wold have
happened as it did if NVN had more missiles.

See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
includes very little about you fighter guys.

I sat in an orbit over downtown
for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing

The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.

Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.

I don't disagree with you relative to overstating numbers . My body, truck,
and tonnage of enemy supplies destroyed counts were ridiculous at times. I am
trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect to
my own personal observations. I've enough pre/post strike recce photos of
truck parks and convoys to know that there were a lot of trucks, numbering int
he hundreds, certainly more than the hundred you mentioned unless you want to
tell me those photos wre faked.

I wasn't impressed one way or the other by the accounts of LB I and II when I
went through SOS and ACSC. The AWC readings were shown to me by an 0-4 and an
0-5 who were taking AWC by correspondence. I understand they upset a few folks
when they pointed out the errors in the photos to the staff.



Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed?

Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.

Possibly for some but not all the daytime targets that were struck. If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the first
place? You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they hit
anything or not, scaring the government back to the table and i don't quite
hold that view. My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the TAC
guys had learned the hard way, and then the collective actions of both forces
convinced the NVN there was no future in their current strategy once they
started losing assets..


Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.




A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
30,000+' AGL.

The pathfinders usually operated above 15,000' to stay out of small arms and
lighter AAA.like 23 and 37 mm.




That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.

I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.


Certainly did in the ACSC reading I referred to above.

You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity. Same
difference. Several who have challenged that viewpoint have become pariahs,
Dana Drenkowski for one.




but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?




What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
effective.

What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.

They were running out of missiles

Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting
them
out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in
Hanoi
decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
operators job much more difficult with varied routing.

and fuel

I read that too but I don't agree. The missile firings dropped off after Day
3.


They were low on everything which also explains why the daytime AAA was so
light. I was over Hanoi and saw the sky go from absolutelyclear to totally
undercast from AAA. I never saw that in the daytime sorties I flew in LBII.
You are making my point about why their follow-on warfighiing capability was
set back by the fighter strikes. Whether the changed B-52 tactics or lack of
operation missiles reduced bomber losses is almost a moot point but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II


See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
includes very little about you fighter guys.


I have the book and have read it a couple of times. I agree with nearly all he
has written. I guess we just see the accounts he describes differently. He
does quote a squadron mate, Rex Rivolo, in several places.but there isn't a
vast amount written about the daytime fighter sorties.




the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing

The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.


There must have been quite a few SAM shooters getting disciplined that night
then. . One crew in our squadron had one fired at them, dodged it, then took
it down again for another. The backseater saw the altimeter unwind to zero as
they bottomed out in the pullup, but the SAM missed. It was the backseater's
first mission in country.

The F-111s operated far too low to be targeted once they were out onto the Red
River delta and in SAM country.

I am
trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect
to
my own personal observations.

Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes
from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my
copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm
paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your
personal experience?

If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the
first
place?

Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes
ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a small
building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi
without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost.

You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they
hit
anything or not

As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian casulties
were kept to a minimum.

My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the
TAC
guys had learned the hard way

True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw
no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.

That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I.

You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity.

And you are making half of mine.

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?

No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get hits
tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN government
gets a personal, up close viewing.

but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II

Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the
accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping them
and you and I will be in agreement.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes
from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my
copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm
paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your
personal experience?

I frankly don't care what he states, he and/or his sources are wrong. I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own 2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I. I am pretty sure tht in most cases
the trucks came south in convoys of less than 100 but not always. Dependedoin
where they were, under the junglecanopy or in the open where the trails were
exposed. Specter could "see" through the jungle foliage and that is why it
became a great truck killer. Evidence that the truck convoys moved a lot of
supplies is the passes through hills west of the DMZ, such as Ban Karai and Mu
Gia, and river fords were heavily attacked and defended throughout the war.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south. My flight got targeted
by a slow FAC (c/s Nail IIRC) against a SAM transporter with two missiles on
the trailer that apparently had gotten stuck in a river crossing near the DMZ.
Apparently was real as there were some impressive secondaries. There were
hulks of tanks in that area as well though I never caught any in the open. An
offensive of this scale needed lots and lots of trucks to haul fuel, ammo, and
parts, not to mention halling the tanks themselves..




If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the
first
place?

Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes
ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a
small
building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi
without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost.

Yeah, the nearest bomb missed by 800'. We got it the next day with four LGBs.
I'grant you this one. I always wondered why the bombers even bothered with
that one.



You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they
hit
anything or not

As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian
casulties
were kept to a minimum.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level! There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit critical
targets. I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not. That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces. My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs. That may have been the situation in Cambodia near the bombing
halt, but not in LB.



My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the
TAC
guys had learned the hard way

True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw
no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.

That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I.

You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years. The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly. You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II. The bridges had been partially reopened and the intell was
that they had built up in the interim to greater than LB i levels. Damage from
LB had destroyed much of the LOC infrastructure in the Panhandle but not in the
Red River Delta area. It got hit again and you stated that was the reason why
fewer and fewer missiles were fired on later LB II nights. I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.



You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity.

And you are making half of mine.

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?

No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get
hits
tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN
government
gets a personal, up close viewing.

but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II

Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the
accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping
them
and you and I will be in agreement.


You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets. However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot. I find your statement very startling. I can see how you
can say that the bomber raids were purely political if you in fact feel that
way. It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets. You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did the
real work.





BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own
2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I.

Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the Ho
Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.

Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in SVN.
The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an easy
target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!

Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really care
what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.

There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
critical
targets.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
debateable.

I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not.

Then tell me, what critical targets were hit and what problems was it causing
for the NVN that forced them to return to Paris (to sign an agreement they were
ready to sign in OCT 72)?

That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces.

I'm sorry, but testimony from nearly all major players on both sides attest to
the fact that; the NVN were not experiencing any drastic effects (not already
experienced from LB I) of *any* bombing and that Nixon ordered LBII, not to
disrupt any specific NVN infrastructure, but to show resolve and convince the
NVN that the U.S. was capable of unrestricted bombing.

My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs.

Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
military.

You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years.

Yes, keep going with that thought and you'll realize that the damage inflicted
during LB II caused little additional hardships on the NVN government or
people. The B-52 bombings were quite a psychological shock (as POWs and NVN
attest to), but never to such a degree that anyone in Hanoi pressured the
government to go back to Paris.

The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly.

What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in regards
to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.

You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II.

It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline missiles
is a fairly slow and highly visable process.

I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.

The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM storage
areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship of
B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt. According
to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca got
hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued the
bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.

You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets.

First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
missiles.

However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot.

I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.

It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets.

Sure it does, the military took purely political objectives (actually not
transmitted to the forces, but they took the vague Presidential guidance)
converted them to military objectives and executed the mission. You can argue
against this all you want, but all you have to do is pick up Nixon's memoirs
and read for yourself.

You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did the
real work.

The bombers were a bold political statement, used to make the strongest point
Nixon could, the fighters were also a political statement, allowing 24 hour ops
and debilitating the NVN efforts to defend themselves after the sun went down.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 21 Apr 2004 22:20:34 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own
2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I.

Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the Ho
Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.

We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location
within the country criteria. A truck delivering war material in the
PRC buffer isn't a truck? Or it isn't war material? Or they had to
unload it and then put it on a different truck for the rest of the
trip? If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail,
there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment
points.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.

Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in SVN.
The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an easy
target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.

So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC, and the three
division offensive had thousands of other trucks? Or, they three
divisions carried their logistic goodies in their rice bags?

And, I just Googled Freedom Porch, since I'd never heard of it. No
hits. I then checked Hobson's "Vietnam Air Losses" where he has a list
of names of operations. No hit. Then I pulled Thompson's "To Hanoi and
Back". No hit. Got Freedom Train, but no Porch.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!

Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really care
what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.

Throughout the war, targets in Route Pack VI weren't selected in
theater. They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea
that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a
military operation as they could." Since SAC wasn't chopped to 7th AF,
where below the JCS did this selection of critical targets get done?

There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
critical
targets.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
debateable.

On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over
a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed.

My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs.

Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
military.

Ahh, at last, grounds for agreement. All military operations have
political strategic objectives. They also have military tactical
objectives.

What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in regards
to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.

You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II.

It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline missiles
is a fairly slow and highly visable process.

It was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with
remarkably little visibility. SAM battalions relocated regularly and
were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with
missiles throughout.

If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was
constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the
destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc. It
was because any time they emitted, we slapped them down again. It was
because the intensity of the air campaign was so great that the
deliveries couldn't be made safely through the no longer proscribed
port facilities.

I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.

The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM storage
areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship of
B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt. According
to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca got
hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued the
bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.

Michel's account of the night 11 attack on Trai Ca is different than
you list here. He mentions the target and states that the A/C reported
eight SAMs fired, but doesn't indicate damage. As the mission was
going on, it had already been announced that operations would end at
dawn. If the crew provided Michel a detailed enough recounting that
there were 8 missiles fired at them, how could he have failed to
report the "hundreds" of missiles destroyed? Seems like a crucial and
significant fact.

And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical
varients (sic)"?

You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets.

First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
missiles.

However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot.

I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.

Let's keep in mind that the tactical crews (and after the first three
nights with 9 BUFFs lost the SAC crews as well) had several hundred
associates on the ground in captivity. Locations of damage wasn't
random and precise targeting was essential if we weren't going to kill
the POWs as well.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

I have always respected your inputs to this group but it seems you are You are
putting a lot of energy into trying to convince me of something and I am not
sure of exactly what. You made earlier statements that I challenged that NVN
only had 100 old French trucks left over from WW II. You also stated that the
BUFFS were sent north for political reasons. You have contradicted yourself
several times on that 100 truck statement including below. Most of the rest of
what you wrote is telling me about how the BUFFS went after military targets,
not politcal targets, once they figured out how to operate in a tactical
environment. Your logic seems very circular to me and has totally lost me.

Dikes and dams are legit military targets but with political implications.
Hospitals are not, just to differentiate between what is legit and what is not.
We certainly did enough dam busting in WWII and Korea. They were not struck in
NVN because of those political implications..

I am trying not to be emotional here but it seems to me that under your logic,
every flight in VN was ultimately for political reasons starting long before
Rolling Thunder. Jphnson and Kennedy sent planes out with ordnance to impress
on the NVN and VC that they were serious. I just can't separate out the BUFFS
in my own mind as going north for different reasons other than the same ones
we are all going north for as you are implying.

Relative to the "experts" I guess people like Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw and Peter
Jennings are experts with the true facts because they have interviewed people
like Saddam Hussain. You;ve quoted many people who have synthesized first and
second hand information into "facts" that many participants don't agree with.
I am not sure that leaves much of a basis for discussion.


..

Subject: Friendly Fire Notebook
From: (BUFDRVR)
Date: 4/21/2004 6:20 PM Eastern Daylight Time
Message-id:

I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our
own
2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I.

Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the
Ho
Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.

Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in
SVN.
The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an
easy
target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!

Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really
care
what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.

There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
critical
targets.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
debateable.

I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not.

Then tell me, what critical targets were hit and what problems was it causing
for the NVN that forced them to return to Paris (to sign an agreement they
were
ready to sign in OCT 72)?

That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces.

I'm sorry, but testimony from nearly all major players on both sides attest
to
the fact that; the NVN were not experiencing any drastic effects (not already
experienced from LB I) of *any* bombing and that Nixon ordered LBII, not to
disrupt any specific NVN infrastructure, but to show resolve and convince the
NVN that the U.S. was capable of unrestricted bombing.

My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just
to
scatter bombs.

Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
military.

You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years.

Yes, keep going with that thought and you'll realize that the damage
inflicted
during LB II caused little additional hardships on the NVN government or
people. The B-52 bombings were quite a psychological shock (as POWs and NVN
attest to), but never to such a degree that anyone in Hanoi pressured the
government to go back to Paris.

The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly.

What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in
regards
to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.

You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and
hit
again in LB II.

It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline
missiles
is a fairly slow and highly visable process.

I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.

The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM
storage
areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship
of
B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt.
According
to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca
got
hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued
the
bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.

You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets.

First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
missiles.

However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot.

I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.

It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets.

Sure it does, the military took purely political objectives (actually not
transmitted to the forces, but they took the vague Presidential guidance)
converted them to military objectives and executed the mission. You can argue
against this all you want, but all you have to do is pick up Nixon's memoirs
and read for yourself.

You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did
the
real work.

The bombers were a bold political statement, used to make the strongest point
Nixon could, the fighters were also a political statement, allowing 24 hour
ops
and debilitating the NVN efforts to defend themselves after the sun went
down.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"