Friendly Fire Notebook

On 23 Apr 2004 01:51:09 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location
within the country criteria.

From my original post I had explained the "hundred or so trucks" were dealing
with vehicles stationed and operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. I have never
wavered on that criteria and have know reiterated it once more.

As early as Rolling Thunder ops in 1966, I encountered large truck
convoys in areas of the panhandle (Pack II and III) consisting of at
least 100 trucks. During one mission when we were allowed into Navy
territory in RP III, we discovered a two mile stretch of road just
along the foothills about forty miles inland--apparently further than
the Navy armed recce missions routinely probed. Our flight of four
dropped 19 mk-83 (1000 lb LDGP) bombs and strafed to Winchester. I
remember it particularly well because I had a bomb hang up on the left
outboard station and had to ask the flight lead to work in a tight
hand wheel for the strafing so I didn't have to keep turning into the
heavy wing. (That's why 19 and not 20 bombs dropped.)

In May of '66 when Dick Hackford was shot down in the Steel Tiger area
of Laos (very much Ho Chi Minh trail country), he reported that during
his 90 minutes on the ground he was forced to cross a wide,
well-graded dirt road--almost three lanes wide and with a white center
stripe of small reflectors, totally shielded from aerial view by an
interlaced canopy of tree branches built overhead. The road was,
according to his on-the-ground description, "wide enough for a pair of
deuce-and-a-halfs, side-by-side."


If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail,
there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment
points.

Define "massive". There were trans-shipment points and troop rest areas every 9
miles. According to Lt. Gen. Harold Moore; "Each camp, which could shelter a
company of troops, consisted of a series of crude bamboo huts dispersed along a
half-mile of trail to make a smaller target for warplanes."

You must always remember that the war was on-going for more than eight
years. During that time the impressions can be correct for the period,
but change drastically one, two or five years later. Hal Moore, of Ia
Drang fame, was on the ground in '65. The NVA presence he encountered
was an intel surprise and much larger than estimated. It increased
drastically in the next year and by '67 was massive. That amount of
manpower consumes a lot more in the field than 100 trucks could
deliver.

So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC

Yes. And their NVA cohorts operating south of the DMZ.

and the three
division offensive had thousands of other trucks?

Yes.

Here's the breakdown--is it a hundred or so, or is it thousands?


Check out this web site: http://www.hdart.com/powmia.html

It gives a very good synopsis, here's just one part; "During the North
Vietnamese spring offensive in 1972, Allied air power was called on to turn the
tide. The U.S. Air Force response to the invasion was immediate as B-52 Arc
Light missions and tactical air attacks intensified during brief respites in
the weather. The invasion was checked, but the lessons learned lead to
Operation Freedom Train against targets south of the 20th Parallel, and later
to Freedom Porch Bravo against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.
The first wave of Freedom Porch Bravo strikes began on April 16,1972, and
achieved respectable success over the highest threat areas within North
Vietnam. The first wave consisted of B-52 strikes supported by Navy and Air
Force tactical air."

OK, I was surprised when I found out about the B-52 raids into NVN in
April of '72. They did, indeed strike near Hiaphong, but that was
about it. It was a short incursion, limited number of sorties and
didn't continue for very long at all. In November, December, they were
striking below 20 North, near Vinh, Quanh Khe and Dong Hoi, but these
areas are hardly "the highest threat areas within NVN."


They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea
that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a
military operation as they could."

Uhh, the Joint Chiefs of Staff *are* military or am I misunderstanding you
here?

No, I'm misunderstanding you. The implication of your earlier
statement was that LB II was lemons out of Washington that the
military (theater commanders and operators) turned into lemonade.


The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left
and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars

On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over
a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed.

Both the standing order on SAM engagements and the undercast made that
possible. I'm confused are you trying to say that we had destroyed *all*
"critical" targets after night #5? If so, you would be helping make my point.

The point I was challenging was not the quality of targets, but your
statement that the "only critical targets remaining were SAMs, radars,
etc." You then cited the day 11 raid on a SAM storage area. I was
saying that defensive reaction throughout RP VI had become minimal by
day 6.


(added for clarity:--moving/replacing SAMs) it was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with
remarkably little visibility.

Not according to Chuck Horner who points out several times in "Every Man a
Tiger" that the construction of SAM sites was nearly always detected, but off
limits to bombing till it was complete. I've heard that dozens of times from
F-105 crews on nearly every documentary on the Vietnam War.

Again you must consider the time of the statement. Horner is talking
about the introduction of the SA-2 into NVN in 1965. At that time, the
first sites were classic Star-of-David installations constructed using
the fixed air defense Soviet doctrine of the time. The dozen or so
sites were clearly visible and the ROE clearly prohibited striking
them so as to avoid killing Soviet technicians which were assume to be
there. By '66, the sites were mobile, random and proliferating at an
incredible rate. Some sites were known and numbered, but whether they
would be occupied or visible on any given day was unknown. SAMs were
much more likely to pop up from new locations than old.

SAM battalions relocated regularly and
were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with
missiles throughout.

I'd imagine resupplying Guideline Missiles in the middle of the jungle is much
easier than in more suburban areas. In Michel's book the SA-2 commander spelled
it out pretty clearly. I guess you don't believe him. What reason would he have
to lie?

Resupply might be easier in the jungle because of concealment by the
canopy, but it is considerably more difficult because of lack of
navigable roads. The SA-2 is a large missile and the TEL is a big
piece of equipment for a jungle trail.

The difficulty in moving the missile battalion into remote areas is a
reason why Thud Ridge remained a sanctuary and why the mountainous
region along the Laos border and into RP V was not SAM country.

If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was
constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the
destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc.

Not according to the guys commanding and operating the SAM sites.

Keep in mind that even today the folks that Marsh was talking to in
Hanoi are living in a strictly regimented Communist society. While
they can provide insight, they must also consider the "company line"
in their responses.

As I previously mentioned, Michel replied to my request for a picture
of the SAM site on the lake in downtown Hanoi with the denial by the
NVN that a SAM site was ever in that location.

And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical
varients (sic)"?

Guideline would be a Strategic SAM, so would a Goa or a Gammon. A Gainful or
Gecco would be tactical SAMs. Was this not common lexicon in the 70s and 80s?

A Guideline is a Guideline. The Goa never showed up, although we
thought it arrived in '73 at Khe Sanh. We saw an unusual "black SAM"
in the summer of '72, but 7th AF intel denied that it could be an
SA-4, claiming rather that is was either a Chinese produced Guideline
or a defective missile.

Your phrase "Guideline and tactical variants" led me to understand you
were referring to some type of variation of the SA-2.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

The road was,
according to his on-the-ground description, "wide enough for a pair of
deuce-and-a-halfs, side-by-side."

I fail to see how this refutes the position that only 100 (or so) trucks were
stationed and operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail?

It increased
drastically in the next year and by '67 was massive. That amount of
manpower consumes a lot more in the field than 100 trucks could
deliver.

Nope. I realize you're not a Clodfelter fan, but throughout Rolling Thunder the
supply requirement in SVN remained consistant and Clodefelter's data comes from
Vietnamese sources including captured documents as well as NSC estimates. On
page 134-135 in his book Clodefelter states; "Hanoi had only 55,000 North
Vietnamese Army troops in the South by August 1967; the remaining 245,000
Communist soliders were Viet Cong. None of these forces engaged in frequent
combat, and the Viet Cong intermingled with the southern populace. As a
result, Communist supply needs were minimal. Enemy battalions fought an
average of one day in thirty and had a total daily supply requirement of
roughly 380 tons. Of this amount, the Communists needed only 34 tons a day
from sources outside the South. Seven 2 1/2 ton trucks could transport the
requirement, which was less than 1 percent of the daily tonnage imported into
North Vietnam."

Here's the breakdown--is it a hundred or so, or is it thousands?

Are you intentionally doing this? OK...lets call it 1,100 trucks. 1,000 trucks
operating north of the 20th parallel and 100 trucks working the Ho Chi Mihn
Trail. By the way, I have no friggin' idea how many truck were working north of
20-degrees, I only offer it to make my point as clear as I can!

The implication of your earlier
statement was that LB II was lemons out of Washington that the
military (theater commanders and operators) turned into lemonade.

Well, I wouldn't call Nixon's order a Lemon, just vague on details. The JCS
took the vague order and put it into a militarily executeable plan.

You then cited the day 11 raid on a SAM storage area. I was
saying that defensive reaction throughout RP VI had become minimal by
day 6.

Minimal for whom? When BUFFs returned to Hanoi on night 8, two were hit by
SA-2's and 4 more would be shot down or damage by the time the whole thing
ended three nights later. I hardly call that minimal.

Resupply might be easier in the jungle because of concealment by the
canopy, but it is considerably more difficult because of lack of
navigable roads.

I agree, but we're not taking about speedy transportation of Guidelines from
Haiphong, we're talking about resupply operations at the site. Much more
visable near Hanoi then points south.

The SA-2 is a large missile and the TEL is a big
piece of equipment for a jungle trail.

I'm sure it was a bitch to get it out there, but I bet those guys had far less
attacks on them then the guys working Hanoi in DEC '72.

Keep in mind that even today the folks that Marsh was talking to in
Hanoi are living in a strictly regimented Communist society.

He was allowed access to records as well. Doesn't sound to me like they were
hiding anything.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"