Naval Air Refueling Needs Deferred in Air Force Tanker Plan

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message
...
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0...042804,00.html
Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
refueling capability and, if so, when?

Henry, you need to be a bit more careful in your citations (nothing
new
about that...). Note that the article indicates: "Naval air forces,
including the Marine Corps' 72 F/A-18D fighters, require tankers to
refuel
more than one fighter jet at a time with the hose reel system."
Hogwash.
"Require"? How many USN tanker aircraft can feed two receivers at
once?
The
S-3 in tanking mode? Nope. The F/A-18E in tanker mode? Nope.

Are the Marines still part of the Navy Department?

What does *that* matter? If it was freakin' *required*, then why all of
the
fuss to get the F/A-18E into the tanking game? Why is it possible for
the
USAF to do quite well with single-point tanking, while the USN 9despite
its
own loooong history of also using single point tanking) would find it so
distatsteful (if, that is, you take the author's words as true--which
they
ain't, in this case)?

Kevin, while it's highly unusual for me to support anything that HJC puts
forward, I find the article in question pretty accurately reflects the
issues.
A boom typically has double (or more) the transfer rate of a
drogue/fighter-sized probe.

Yep.

That's why the USAF decided to adopt them in the
first place, for SAC's bombers, so that refueling took much less time.
Single
point drogues are better than nothing, but just as the article says, they
limit
the size of the strike flight (or require far more tankers), because the
first
a/c to refuel has used up most of the fuel it has received by the time
that the
last guy is done.

Yep.

From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
with
large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least dual-point,
but
they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
preferred,
before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
tanker is
about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or F-18E/Fs
exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of their
strikes
when they do so.

Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the USN,
with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't have
that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
situation for the USN.


Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
planned
to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.

Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards to
the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to upgrade
them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they have to
get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly. That last part (quickly)
seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service ASAP
with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so critical.

It's clearly an
inter-service budget issue, but single point drogues just don't cut it for
big
strikes; if they did, we wouldn't have fit out those KC-10As and KC-135Rs
for
wing drogues (Flight Refueling MK.32s IIRC). It's a simple matter of fuel
throughput per unit time.

Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add. Correct
me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to replace,
the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
they?

Large, land-based drogue tankers should have at least
two drogue stations, with three preferred (see the Victor K.2; there was
even a
USN Convair seaplane with FOUR drogues):

http://www.aviation-history.com/convair/tradewind.html

Less than two drogue stations is not making use of a large a/c's wingspan.
Naturally, they don't all have to be fitted with them all the time, as
there is
a weight, drag and maintenance penalty, but they sure as hell should be
capable
of fitting them. Hell, Boeing is even talking about a BWB tanker with two
_booms_.

So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further than
it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the USN
strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of support...that
they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does the
USAF, apparently).


That the RAF Tristars don't have wing pods has been a minor scandal for
almost
20 years now. They were supposed to get them, and initial cursory
engineering
evaluations indicated that the wing structure could take them, but when it
came
time to get serious they found out there were issues that were going to
require
very expensive modifications (splitting the ailerons or maybe it was the
flaps
was part of it, IIRR), so they've been stuck with a pair of centerline
drogues
ever since. That provides redundancy, but doesn't increase the receiver
servicing rate.

And the KC-767 will be able to carry at least a little more fuel than
a
Superhornet, or a KC-130J even.

So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.

For most of the deeper missions, including most of the combat missions
that have
been flown from DS on, they do. If they aren't going very far, and/or are
using
small strike packages at fairly wide intervals, they don't. Neither has
been
typical of USN combat ops for the last 14 years.

Then maybe they need to fork over some bucks for some additional multi-point
pods for the KC-135R's... In actuality, that would probably be the best
solution anyway--they would get their improved support capability a lot more
quickly that way (versus waiting for the 767's to come on line). So is the
USN really concerned about the level of tanking support they can count on,
or are they just posturing for the purpose of budget fighting? Another
thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not, because
that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?


snip

But you also are missing another
factor...if the land-based tankers are so ctitical to USN aviation
capabilities, why do you need the CVN's in the first place? If you
can
get
land based tanker support into the fray to support the USN strikers,
you
are
also within range of getting the USAF strikers into the fight,
especially
the heavies...

Sea basing still needs work on delivering fuel, cargo and people to an
OMFTS force.

You are getting more dense every day... Now, if the USN is so dependent
upon
land-based tanking, why is the CVN of such tremendous value, given that
we
could just as well be deploying B-1's, B-52's, and even F-15E's from the
same base (or other bases in that area) that the tankers are operating
from
to perform the missions instead of having a CVN (and attendant
resources)
lurching around dependent upon land-based air support?

There are obviously ramp space and arrival time/support issues.

Sometimes. Believe it or not, I am not in favor of junking the CVN
fleet--but neither is the USN making a great case for the CVN's value when
they whine about the USAF not optimizing *all* of its tankers to support
their needs--especially when at the same time they have proven rather
unwilling to resource their own part of the joint package (the EA-6 jammer
force) to support all of the USAF's needs (note that the USAF is making
serious noises about going back into the jamming business, likely with the
B-52 as the initial platform). The USN might want to be careful how far they
go in pointing fingers in regards to the 'They are not supporting us like
they are supposed to" manner, lest the fickle-finger end up pointing back in
their direction.

Clearly you can
get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of tankers
PLUS a
force of fighters and all their support.

Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you some
good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available, at
that operating location. How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability of
a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from extended
range itself)? Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that. OEF
demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty long
range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and back
again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring). Worried
about an enemy air threat? Then you have your standoff attack systems, along
with B-2's. Yes, there are other issues (hauling in the bombs, etc.), but
they are not insurmountable (i.e., we still have a surface transport
capability, augmented by air transport assets).

Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to operate
a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without HAVING to
have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Brooks

The CVWs are already on station with
everything but the tanking (and maybe some E-3s/JSTARS).

Guy

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip


Kevin, while it's highly unusual for me to support anything that HJC puts
forward, I find the article in question pretty accurately reflects the
issues.
A boom typically has double (or more) the transfer rate of a
drogue/fighter-sized probe.

Yep.

That's why the USAF decided to adopt them in the
first place, for SAC's bombers, so that refueling took much less time.
Single
point drogues are better than nothing, but just as the article says, they
limit
the size of the strike flight (or require far more tankers), because the
first
a/c to refuel has used up most of the fuel it has received by the time
that the
last guy is done.

Yep.

From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
with
large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least dual-point,
but
they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
preferred,
before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
tanker is
about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or F-18E/Fs
exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of their
strikes
when they do so.

Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the USN,
with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't have
that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
situation for the USN.

But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and it's
definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the USN? In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets, plus the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_ multi-point
tankers on occasion.

Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
planned
to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.

Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards to
the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to upgrade
them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they have to
get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.

The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable. Only a few
years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40 years,
although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's face it,
the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767 line open
and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer tankers?
Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart? That's
arguable.

That last part (quickly)
seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service ASAP
with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so critical.

I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've already got
going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the KC-767
lease rather than buy in the first place.

It's clearly an
inter-service budget issue, but single point drogues just don't cut it for
big
strikes; if they did, we wouldn't have fit out those KC-10As and KC-135Rs
for
wing drogues (Flight Refueling MK.32s IIRC). It's a simple matter of fuel
throughput per unit time.

Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add. Correct
me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to replace,
the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
they?

No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both types of
refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue rather
than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're also buying
fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC rates
obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of refueling
drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's silly to have
to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.

Large, land-based drogue tankers should have at least
two drogue stations, with three preferred (see the Victor K.2; there was
even a
USN Convair seaplane with FOUR drogues):

http://www.aviation-history.com/convair/tradewind.html

Less than two drogue stations is not making use of a large a/c's wingspan.
Naturally, they don't all have to be fitted with them all the time, as
there is
a weight, drag and maintenance penalty, but they sure as hell should be
capable
of fitting them. Hell, Boeing is even talking about a BWB tanker with two
_booms_.

So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further than
it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the USN
strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of support...that
they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does the
USAF, apparently).

I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up front that
we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work is largely
being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when we know
it's going to be more expensive to do so. If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good. We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we can do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's arguments against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were concerned with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point capability is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See below.

snip

So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.

For most of the deeper missions, including most of the combat missions
that have
been flown from DS on, they do. If they aren't going very far, and/or are
using
small strike packages at fairly wide intervals, they don't. Neither has
been
typical of USN combat ops for the last 14 years.

Then maybe they need to fork over some bucks for some additional multi-point
pods for the KC-135R's... In actuality, that would probably be the best
solution anyway--they would get their improved support capability a lot more
quickly that way (versus waiting for the 767's to come on line).

I completely agree.

So is the
USN really concerned about the level of tanking support they can count on,
or are they just posturing for the purpose of budget fighting?

As I said, there's a question of interservice budgeting, and who pays for what.

Another
thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not, because
that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?

I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any such
proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying their
own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect said
"over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around that;
after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.

I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point (to me, at
least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be provided.

snip area of general agreement

Clearly you can
get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of tankers
PLUS a
force of fighters and all their support.

Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you some
good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available, at
that operating location.

The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of missiles on
thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads with them, or
fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter, although PGMs
help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but in one of
Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their A/G
ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is relatively
available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from. Maybe you
need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers themselves should
be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.

How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability of
a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from extended
range itself)?

If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but crises often
don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our wars in the
past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead time to
get ready.

Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.

And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the start of the
war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.

OEF
demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty long
range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and back
again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).

Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the transfer rate.
And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern Watch
sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some presence in
the 'Stans, IIRC.

Worried
about an enemy air threat? Then you have your standoff attack systems, along
with B-2's. Yes, there are other issues (hauling in the bombs, etc.), but
they are not insurmountable (i.e., we still have a surface transport
capability, augmented by air transport assets).

Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to operate
a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without HAVING to
have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater, fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no big deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the ride.

Guy

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip


Kevin, while it's highly unusual for me to support anything that HJC
puts
forward, I find the article in question pretty accurately reflects the
issues.
A boom typically has double (or more) the transfer rate of a
drogue/fighter-sized probe.

Yep.

That's why the USAF decided to adopt them in the
first place, for SAC's bombers, so that refueling took much less time.
Single
point drogues are better than nothing, but just as the article says,
they
limit
the size of the strike flight (or require far more tankers), because
the
first
a/c to refuel has used up most of the fuel it has received by the time
that the
last guy is done.

Yep.

From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
with
large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least
dual-point,
but
they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
preferred,
before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
tanker is
about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or
F-18E/Fs
exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of
their
strikes
when they do so.

Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the
USN,
with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't
have
that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
situation for the USN.

But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and it's
definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the USN?
In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets, plus
the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
multi-point
tankers on occasion.

And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that we
have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
right *now*.


Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
planned
to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.

Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards
to
the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to
upgrade
them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they
have to
get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.

The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable. Only a
few
years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40 years,
although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's face
it,
the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767 line
open
and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer tankers?
Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart?
That's
arguable.

Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge tanker
support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
(operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than they
were pre-9/11). Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment (witness
the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also not
undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to do
the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes to
MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based upon
GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the R
standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and I'd
think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion maintenace is
another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we try
to stretch out the E model's lifespan. Oddly, even the GAO noted that they
recommended that the USAF start paying serious attention to replacing the
KC-135 fleet as early as 1996 (of course, in typical GAO style, they have
managed to cover their bases in all eventualities, so they can always say,
"Told ya so!" regardless of how we proceed...).


That last part (quickly)
seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service
ASAP
with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so
critical.

I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've already
got
going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the
KC-767
lease rather than buy in the first place.

The lease came about because it (a) allowed the USAF to recapitalize the
oldest portion of the tanker fleet in the most rapid fashion, and (b)
because it was also beneficial to Boeing in terms of keeping the 767 line
open. Don't act as if the latter is a "bad" thing--we have paced procurement
programs to keep assembly operations going for decades, be it the C-130 or
the M-1 tank. Consider how much MORE it would cost to *buy* the 767's if we
drag this out through the usual (overly long) procurement cycle, and the
line has in the meanwhile shut down; restarting a line is not going to be
cheap. Some folks cry that this is a "help out Boeing" deal--I don't agree,
at least completely, as it also helps out the USAF in getting timely
replacements for the aging KC-135 fleet; and to be honest, even if it *were*
more of a "help out Boeing" deal it would not concern me greatly, as I see a
necessity in our keeping alive the kind of combined commercial/military
transport production capability that we NEED to have, unless you are willing
to be 100% reliant upon a foreign provider for our future tanking and heavy
transport needs (I for one would hate to see the French government in a
position to slow down or stop delivery of such a critical asset merely
because they would want to show us they could do it).


It's clearly an
inter-service budget issue, but single point drogues just don't cut it
for
big
strikes; if they did, we wouldn't have fit out those KC-10As and
KC-135Rs
for
wing drogues (Flight Refueling MK.32s IIRC). It's a simple matter of
fuel
throughput per unit time.

Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add.
Correct
me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to
replace,
the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
they?

No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both types
of
refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue
rather
than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're also
buying
fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC
rates
obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of refueling
drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's silly
to have
to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.

That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case, you
send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other aircraft
(i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge su[pport
operations into the theater. So what you really seem to be saying is that
the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an improvement
to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?


Large, land-based drogue tankers should have at least
two drogue stations, with three preferred (see the Victor K.2; there
was
even a
USN Convair seaplane with FOUR drogues):

http://www.aviation-history.com/convair/tradewind.html

Less than two drogue stations is not making use of a large a/c's
wingspan.
Naturally, they don't all have to be fitted with them all the time, as
there is
a weight, drag and maintenance penalty, but they sure as hell should
be
capable
of fitting them. Hell, Boeing is even talking about a BWB tanker with
two
_booms_.

So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further
than
it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the
USN
strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of
support...that
they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does
the
USAF, apparently).

I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up front
that
we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work is
largely
being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when we
know
it's going to be more expensive to do so.


Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away because we
dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort is
still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good.

Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we can
do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's arguments
against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were concerned
with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point capability
is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
below.

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even further
than it already has been slowed?


snip

So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.

For most of the deeper missions, including most of the combat missions
that have
been flown from DS on, they do. If they aren't going very far, and/or
are
using
small strike packages at fairly wide intervals, they don't. Neither
has
been
typical of USN combat ops for the last 14 years.

Then maybe they need to fork over some bucks for some additional
multi-point
pods for the KC-135R's... In actuality, that would probably be the best
solution anyway--they would get their improved support capability a lot
more
quickly that way (versus waiting for the 767's to come on line).

I completely agree.

So is the
USN really concerned about the level of tanking support they can count
on,
or are they just posturing for the purpose of budget fighting?

As I said, there's a question of interservice budgeting, and who pays for
what.

Another
thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not,
because
that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?

I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any
such
proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying
their
own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect
said
"over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around
that;
after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.

I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point (to
me, at
least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be
provided.

But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to augment
their current tanker fleet. Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming capability.


snip area of general agreement

Clearly you can
get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of
tankers
PLUS a
force of fighters and all their support.

Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you
some
good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available,
at
that operating location.

The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of missiles
on
thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads with
them, or
fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter, although
PGMs
help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but in
one of
Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their A/G
ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is
relatively
available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from. Maybe
you
need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers themselves
should
be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.

As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of the
JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it in
ourselves. Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
pieces of ordnance, right? If you are tied to getting basic resources into
the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes, the
use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of ordnance
that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during OEF
we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during ODS,
with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso the
SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
further.


How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability
of
a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from
extended
range itself)?

If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but crises
often
don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our wars
in the
past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead
time to
get ready.

I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam, Diego
Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this pretty
much anywhere in the world *now*.


Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.

And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the start
of the
war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.

I was playing devils advocate a bit here, but if you areally want to get
down to details, yeah, they could still provide a reasonable option. Use of
ALCM's to target IADS nodes/assets during the initial phase, with the
pending "electric" B-52 providing standoff jamming support, B-2's doing
their thing, and then as we start taking down the defenses, we can move a
bit closer and start using the other standoff systems (i.e., JASSM). Given
the range we saw the F-16's operate at during OEF, it would not be beyond
the realm of possibility for the F-15C's and E's to get into the ballgame at
long range, either (if they had to). As I have said a couple of times, I do
see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support the
argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?


OEF
demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty
long
range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and
back
again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).

Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the transfer
rate.
And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern
Watch
sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some presence
in
the 'Stans, IIRC.

And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we have
Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in the -stans
you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the past.


Worried
about an enemy air threat? Then you have your standoff attack systems,
along
with B-2's. Yes, there are other issues (hauling in the bombs, etc.),
but
they are not insurmountable (i.e., we still have a surface transport
capability, augmented by air transport assets).

Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to
operate
a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without
HAVING to
have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no big
deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the ride.

That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker tracks
a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific version,
depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major contributor
without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how long
we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in service
now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop, which
is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come out
in pretty good shape. Do we have the time available to dally around with
optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.

Brooks


Guy

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message:

is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come out
in pretty good shape. Do we have the time available to dally around with
optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.

Brooks
Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

With the DSB report out the point is pretty much moot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/bu...partner=GOOGLE

With no civil orders forthcoming, Boeing isn't likely to keep the 76
line open beyond whats been ordered. Already marginalized in the
budget process, that does not bode well for the E-10 either.
Its time to move from the concepts of the last century anyway. As the
report says...
A page of the report, for example, calls for the Air Force to "work
with major airframe manufacturers to develop new tanker options" that
would have "more modern airframes" than the "20-year-old 767 design."
Instead of sinking money into old, orphaned airframes, it would be
much better to invest in something like the "MACK" or BWB that could
be optimized to operate and survive in tomorrow's ari threat
environment.
Potential adversaries are realizing that we are concentrating a very
signifcant part our ability to mount offensive operations into
rehashed airliners...even if the august members of this board don't
see it. They are doing something about it too...

http://www.indiadefence.com/collab.htm
Designed to fulfill the BVR (beyond visual range) role for "outer-air
battles", an aircraft usually of Sukhoi-27/30/35/37 "Flanker/Super
Flanker" family, equipped with KS-172 (also referred to as Article
172) would be able to engage ultra-high-value airborne platforms like
AWACS (airborne warning and control system), IFR (in-flight
refuelling) and LRMP (long range maritime patrol) platforms, without
necessarily having first to deal with their fighter escorts.

http://www.ainonline.com/Publication...1agatpg85.html
If used on a long-range missile airframe, the ARGS-PD could give an
opposing air force the ability to take out strategic targets at
distances outside of the normal interception envelopes of U.S. or
other NATO fighters. Boeing E-3 AWACS or E-8 JSTARS aircraft–platforms
that U.S. forces depend heavily upon in time of conflict–would be
vulnerable as never before.

http://arms.ashst.com/missiles/s400.htm
The S-400 system is intended to engage current and future air threats
such as tactical and strategic aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other type missiles, including precision-guided ones, as well as AWACS
aircraft, at ranges of up to 400 km.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/031020/43/28nkk.html
"The FT-2000 surface-to-air missile (SAM), commonly known as the
'AWACS killer', designed by Chinese experts are considered to be the
most appropriate option if the U.S. refuses to provide the same kind
of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Pakistan being sold
to India by Israel," The News said.

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...

in pretty good shape. Do we have the time available to dally around with
optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.

Brooks
Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

With the DSB report out the point is pretty much moot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/bu...partner=GOOGLE

With no civil orders forthcoming, Boeing isn't likely to keep the 76
line open beyond whats been ordered. Already marginalized in the
budget process, that does not bode well for the E-10 either.
Its time to move from the concepts of the last century anyway. As the
report says...
A page of the report, for example, calls for the Air Force to "work
with major airframe manufacturers to develop new tanker options" that
would have "more modern airframes" than the "20-year-old 767 design."
Instead of sinking money into old, orphaned airframes, it would be
much better to invest in something like the "MACK" or BWB that could
be optimized to operate and survive in tomorrow's ari threat
environment.
Potential adversaries are realizing that we are concentrating a very
signifcant part our ability to mount offensive operations into
rehashed airliners...even if the august members of this board don't
see it. They are doing something about it too...

http://www.indiadefence.com/collab.htm
Designed to fulfill the BVR (beyond visual range) role for "outer-air
battles", an aircraft usually of Sukhoi-27/30/35/37 "Flanker/Super
Flanker" family, equipped with KS-172 (also referred to as Article
172) would be able to engage ultra-high-value airborne platforms like
AWACS (airborne warning and control system), IFR (in-flight
refuelling) and LRMP (long range maritime patrol) platforms, without
necessarily having first to deal with their fighter escorts.

http://www.ainonline.com/Publication...1agatpg85.html
If used on a long-range missile airframe, the ARGS-PD could give an
opposing air force the ability to take out strategic targets at
distances outside of the normal interception envelopes of U.S. or
other NATO fighters. Boeing E-3 AWACS or E-8 JSTARS aircraft–platforms
that U.S. forces depend heavily upon in time of conflict–would be
vulnerable as never before.

http://arms.ashst.com/missiles/s400.htm
The S-400 system is intended to engage current and future air threats
such as tactical and strategic aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other type missiles, including precision-guided ones, as well as AWACS
aircraft, at ranges of up to 400 km.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/031020/43/28nkk.html
"The FT-2000 surface-to-air missile (SAM), commonly known as the
'AWACS killer', designed by Chinese experts are considered to be the
most appropriate option if the U.S. refuses to provide the same kind
of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Pakistan being sold
to India by Israel," The News said.

Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip

From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
with
large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least
dual-point,
but
they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
preferred,
before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
tanker is
about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or
F-18E/Fs
exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of
their
strikes
when they do so.

Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the
USN,
with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't
have
that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
situation for the USN.

But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and it's
definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the USN?
In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets, plus
the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
multi-point
tankers on occasion.

And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that we
have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
right *now*.

I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see no reason
not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for drogue
tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).

Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
planned
to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.

Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards
to
the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to
upgrade
them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they
have to
get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.

The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable. Only a
few
years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40 years,
although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's face
it,
the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767 line
open
and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer tankers?
Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart?
That's
arguable.

Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge tanker
support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
(operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than they
were pre-9/11).

Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435 hrs/year.
Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82 years (36,000
hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over halfway
through that.

Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment (witness
the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also not
undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to do
the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment. Indeed, the
Defense Science Board just came out (see

http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.p...25-2904714.php

with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer Crag Rs may
well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of years to do
a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the one we
started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run from 2004 -
2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently replace the
Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news and search

defense science board tanker

you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail. The
actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently because it
hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.

It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes to
MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based upon
GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the R
standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and I'd
think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion maintenace is
another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we try
to stretch out the E model's lifespan.

The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above. From
what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was averaging $4.6
million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

Oddly, even the GAO noted that they
recommended that the USAF start paying serious attention to replacing the
KC-135 fleet as early as 1996 (of course, in typical GAO style, they have
managed to cover their bases in all eventualities, so they can always say,
"Told ya so!" regardless of how we proceed...).


That last part (quickly)
seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service
ASAP
with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so
critical.

I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've already
got
going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the
KC-767
lease rather than buy in the first place.

The lease came about because it (a) allowed the USAF to recapitalize the
oldest portion of the tanker fleet in the most rapid fashion, and (b)
because it was also beneficial to Boeing in terms of keeping the 767 line
open. Don't act as if the latter is a "bad" thing--we have paced procurement
programs to keep assembly operations going for decades, be it the C-130 or
the M-1 tank. Consider how much MORE it would cost to *buy* the 767's if we
drag this out through the usual (overly long) procurement cycle, and the
line has in the meanwhile shut down; restarting a line is not going to be
cheap. Some folks cry that this is a "help out Boeing" deal--I don't agree,
at least completely, as it also helps out the USAF in getting timely
replacements for the aging KC-135 fleet; and to be honest, even if it *were*
more of a "help out Boeing" deal it would not concern me greatly, as I see a
necessity in our keeping alive the kind of combined commercial/military
transport production capability that we NEED to have, unless you are willing
to be 100% reliant upon a foreign provider for our future tanking and heavy
transport needs (I for one would hate to see the French government in a
position to slow down or stop delivery of such a critical asset merely
because they would want to show us they could do it).

One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis, that the
767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't), or that it's the most
cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries me about
rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is essentially out of
production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the opposite
extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares are going
to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are already
starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a problem,
because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits so they'll
be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the USAF is
talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.

When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only in-production (US)
a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no longer the
case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a commercial a/c, and
unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost the
company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at the
_start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs. Which
is better suited for the role? Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?
Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion issues
down the road? How about the 20% better fuel efficiency? Respective runway and
ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

snip

Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add.
Correct
me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to
replace,
the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
they?

No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both types
of
refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue
rather
than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're also
buying
fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC
rates
obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of refueling
drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's silly
to have
to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.

That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case, you
send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other aircraft
(i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge su[pport
operations into the theater.

I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a conflict to
use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them for,
precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if we were
refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good terms with
Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us than ever.
Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than 135s or
767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its deployment options.

So what you really seem to be saying is that
the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an improvement
to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?

Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded Es and
later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers need to
do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for tankers and the
type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be properly
studied.

snip

So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further
than
it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the
USN
strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of
support...that
they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does
the
USAF, apparently).

I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up front
that
we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work is
largely
being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when we
know
it's going to be more expensive to do so.

Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away because we
dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort is
still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the materiel costs,
which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's just buy
it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated prices later.

If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good.

Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of reports,
including theirs, before making a decision.

We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we can
do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's arguments
against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were concerned
with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point capability
is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
below.

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even further
than it already has been slowed?

According to the DSB, we have the time.

snip

Another
thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not,
because
that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?

I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any
such
proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying
their
own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect
said
"over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around
that;
after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.

I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point (to
me, at
least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be
provided.

But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to augment
their current tanker fleet.

Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a replacement for a
jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can also
refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s it's a
relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's certainly
better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively inefficient
tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and offload
capability.

Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming capability.

There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a tanker mod for
their C-40s, with all their other needs.

snip area of general agreement

Clearly you can
get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of
tankers
PLUS a
force of fighters and all their support.

Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you
some
good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available,
at
that operating location.

The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of missiles
on
thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads with
them, or
fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter, although
PGMs
help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but in
one of
Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their A/G
ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is
relatively
available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from. Maybe
you
need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers themselves
should
be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.

As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of the
JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it in
ourselves.

JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from CVs. At
least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people here can
comment.

Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
pieces of ordnance, right?

Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines); moving
ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.

If you are tied to getting basic resources into
the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes, the
use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of ordnance
that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during OEF
we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during ODS,
with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso the
SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
further.

PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance that may be
required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even with PGMs
there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.

How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability
of
a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from
extended
range itself)?

If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but crises
often
don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our wars
in the
past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead
time to
get ready.

I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam, Diego
Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this pretty
much anywhere in the world *now*.

In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)

Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.

And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the start
of the
war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.

I was playing devils advocate a bit here, but if you areally want to get
down to details, yeah, they could still provide a reasonable option. Use of
ALCM's to target IADS nodes/assets during the initial phase, with the
pending "electric" B-52 providing standoff jamming support, B-2's doing
their thing, and then as we start taking down the defenses, we can move a
bit closer and start using the other standoff systems (i.e., JASSM). Given
the range we saw the F-16's operate at during OEF, it would not be beyond
the realm of possibility for the F-15C's and E's to get into the ballgame at
long range, either (if they had to). As I have said a couple of times, I do
see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support the
argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?

No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker has to be
available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required. IIRR, the
GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large percentage
of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best only 40
KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the tanker
requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the study needs
to be _done_.

OEF
demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty
long
range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and
back
again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).

Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the transfer
rate.
And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern
Watch
sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some presence
in
the 'Stans, IIRC.

And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we have
Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in the -stans
you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the past.

The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available to us when
we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with regimes that
are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the muslim world,
I don't think we should count on such bases being available.

snip

Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to
operate
a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without
HAVING to
have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no big
deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the ride.

That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker tracks
a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific version,
depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major contributor
without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how long
we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in service
now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop, which
is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come out
in pretty good shape.

Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read one quote
somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767 buy -- AIR
it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But that all
needs to be studied so we know.

Do we have the time available to dally around with
optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.

As I've pointed out above, I think an even more fundamental question is should
we be buying the 767 at all, rather than some other option. The 767 lease is
looking more and more like roadkill, so it may be moot. However, even if we
decided to go the 767 route, there's no reason why we couldn't buy 35 of them
(or whatever the $ work out to) with wing drogues, rather than 40 without.

Guy

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
.. .
Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip

From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far
inland
with
large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least
dual-point,
but
they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
preferred,
before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point
boom
tanker is
about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or
F-18E/Fs
exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of
their
strikes
when they do so.

Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting
the
USN,
with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767
won't
have
that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a
critical
situation for the USN.

But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and
it's
definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the
USN?
In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets,
plus
the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
multi-point
tankers on occasion.

And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that
we
have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
right *now*.

I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see no
reason
not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for
drogue
tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).

That reason would be (another) delay in delivery. Why do you think it will
be such a major fiasco if the first forty 767's delivered come in without
the multi-point capability? IIRC the first contract is projected to cover
that number of delivereies. Letting a spiral handle the multi-point
capability in the subsequent 60 aircraft is not acceptable?


Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767
isn't
planned
to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.

Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in
regards
to
the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to
upgrade
them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they
have to
get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.

The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable.
Only a
few
years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40
years,
although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's
face
it,
the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767
line
open
and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer
tankers?
Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart?
That's
arguable.

Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge
tanker
support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
(operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than
they
were pre-9/11).

Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435
hrs/year.
Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82 years
(36,000
hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over halfway
through that.

You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion tends
to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
classes... It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural components
(meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).


Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment
(witness
the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also
not
undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to
do
the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment. Indeed,
the
Defense Science Board just came out (see

http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.p...25-2904714.php

with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer Crag
Rs may
well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of years
to do
a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the one
we
started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run from
2004 -
2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently
replace the
Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news and
search

defense science board tanker

you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail. Th
e
actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently because
it
hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.

Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
*another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's? That sounds
like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the 1990's
that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the replacement
of the KC-135E fleet. Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the USAF
has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly than
if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course, you
could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that new
study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around what...2015
at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft of
that class--sounds like a good plan to me.


It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes
to
MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based
upon
GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the
R
standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and
I'd
think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion
maintenace is
another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we
try
to stretch out the E model's lifespan.

The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
From
what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was averaging
$4.6
million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost (not
exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What would
be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more frequent)
inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the cost
is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment plan,
IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you
would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car, and
one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to modify
the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise requirements
the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially completely
rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be compatible
with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan (I
made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little Nissan
pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that was
*not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
down and buy a new vehicle).

As to corrosion, in March 2003 the USAF's Deputy C/S for
Installations/Logistics testified before Congress: "Within the air refueling
fleet, the KC-135E-models have experienced the most maintenance and
corrosion problems and are more costly to maintain. With an average
aircraft age of 43 years, the KC-135E fleet is the oldest combat weapon
system in the Air Force inventory. It is also the oldest large fleet of
heavy jet aircraft in aviation history...The second critical measurement
that defines aircraft life is physical age. In this fleet, corrosion is a
function of age. Accurately predicting the extent of corrosion is difficult
and this lack of predictability severely limits the ability to efficiently
sustain aging fleets...the KC-135 is particularly challenging since its
1950s design, materials, and construction did not consider corrosion
prevention measures...The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and the
most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of these
problems have been solved since that date?


Oddly, even the GAO noted that they
recommended that the USAF start paying serious attention to replacing
the
KC-135 fleet as early as 1996 (of course, in typical GAO style, they
have
managed to cover their bases in all eventualities, so they can always
say,
"Told ya so!" regardless of how we proceed...).


That last part (quickly)
seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into
service
ASAP
with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's
in
service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about
bringing
them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so
critical.

I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've
already
got
going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the
KC-767
lease rather than buy in the first place.

The lease came about because it (a) allowed the USAF to recapitalize the
oldest portion of the tanker fleet in the most rapid fashion, and (b)
because it was also beneficial to Boeing in terms of keeping the 767
line
open. Don't act as if the latter is a "bad" thing--we have paced
procurement
programs to keep assembly operations going for decades, be it the C-130
or
the M-1 tank. Consider how much MORE it would cost to *buy* the 767's if
we
drag this out through the usual (overly long) procurement cycle, and the
line has in the meanwhile shut down; restarting a line is not going to
be
cheap. Some folks cry that this is a "help out Boeing" deal--I don't
agree,
at least completely, as it also helps out the USAF in getting timely
replacements for the aging KC-135 fleet; and to be honest, even if it
*were*
more of a "help out Boeing" deal it would not concern me greatly, as I
see a
necessity in our keeping alive the kind of combined commercial/military
transport production capability that we NEED to have, unless you are
willing
to be 100% reliant upon a foreign provider for our future tanking and
heavy
transport needs (I for one would hate to see the French government in a
position to slow down or stop delivery of such a critical asset merely
because they would want to show us they could do it).

One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
that the
767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),

Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
discount, and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be great
for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
"spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we should
take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And yes,
we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)

or that it's the most
cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries me
about
rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is essentially
out of
production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the opposite
extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares are
going
to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are
already
starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a problem,
because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits so
they'll
be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the USAF
is
talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.

The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which are
more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in the
end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't see
this as a deal-breaker.


When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only in-production
(US)
a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no
longer the
case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a commercial
a/c, and
unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost
the
company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at
the
_start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs.
Which
is better suited for the role?

Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?

Not likely.

Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
issues
down the road?

Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated into
the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.

How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?

Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK) 7E7
tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before the
first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in extra
operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...

Respective runway and
ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.


snip

Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add.
Correct
me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to
replace,
the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability,
either, do
they?

No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both
types
of
refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue
rather
than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're
also
buying
fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC
rates
obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of
refueling
drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's
silly
to have
to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.

That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case,
you
send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other
aircraft
(i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge
su[pport
operations into the theater.

I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a
conflict to
use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them for,
precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if we
were
refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good terms
with
Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us than
ever.
Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than
135s or
767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its deployment
options.

I said, "If the requirement to provide hose/drogue capability in-theater is
*that* important". We have the capability of providing substantial
hose/drogue capability if we have to--if we really need more, then buy more
kits for the existing R's. No matter how you cut it, the decision to not
initially provide multi-point capability in the first forty 767's is not
going to be a critical, or even serious, failure in terms of our operational
capability.


So what you really seem to be saying is that
the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an
improvement
to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?

Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded Es
and
later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
need to
do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for tankers
and the
type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
properly
studied.

Again with the neverending studies? :-)


snip

So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even
further
than
it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force
(the
USN
strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of
support...that
they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining
in
service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither
does
the
USAF, apparently).

I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up
front
that
we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work
is
largely
being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when
we
know
it's going to be more expensive to do so.

Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away
because we
dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort
is
still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the materiel
costs,
which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's just
buy
it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated prices
later.

Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?


If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good.

Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of
reports,
including theirs, before making a decision.

I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to fly
the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).


We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we
can
do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's
arguments
against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no
more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were
concerned
with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point
capability
is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
below.

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
further
than it already has been slowed?

According to the DSB, we have the time.

The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year, that
the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...? And thinks out-sourcing tanker
requirements is a fine idea? I am not buying into either, at this point.


snip

Another
thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so
keenly
worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think
about
including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class
of
aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not,
because
that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?

I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against
any
such
proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered
buying
their
own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect
said
"over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around
that;
after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.

I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point
(to
me, at
least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be
provided.

But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to
augment
their current tanker fleet.

Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a replacement
for a
jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can also
refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s it's
a
relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's
certainly
better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively
inefficient
tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and offload
capability.

I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted to
include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.


Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent
over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
capability.

There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a tanker
mod for
their C-40s, with all their other needs.

Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a critical
one, eh?


snip area of general agreement

Clearly you can
get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of
tankers
PLUS a
force of fighters and all their support.

Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially
since
getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do
you
some
good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily
available,
at
that operating location.

The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of
missiles
on
thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads
with
them, or
fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter,
although
PGMs
help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but
in
one of
Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their
A/G
ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is
relatively
available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from.
Maybe
you
need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers
themselves
should
be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.

As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of
the
JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it
in
ourselves.

JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from
CVs. At
least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people here
can
comment.

I thought we had standardized on JP-8 across the force--ISTR this came up
before, but I can't remember the final outcome. Regardless, be it JP-5 or
JP-8, you can't count on it being available in a remote operating location,
in the volume required, unless you plan on being able to haul it in
yourself.


Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
pieces of ordnance, right?

Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines);
moving
ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.

Lots of trucks available for lease out there in the world, even in a lot of
"remote" areas (any remote are having a pipeline capability likely has a
decent truck inventory available in the general area)--or you could use a
transportation company (60 line haul tractors and 120 40-ton trailers) from
the Army (one of our TC companies that was attached to my old BN HHD did
exactly that to support B-52 operations out of Saudi Arabia during ODS). If
none of this is doable in your opinion, then IMO you have just shot your
"gotta have multi-point capability" in the foot as well, since it would mean
that we can't plan on being able to operate the tankers within range of the
receivers in the first place.


If you are tied to getting basic resources into
the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes,
the
use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of
ordnance
that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during
OEF
we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during
ODS,
with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso
the
SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
further.

PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance that
may be
required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even
with PGMs
there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.

I'd think if we have the ability to provide both categories of support
within the confines of a CVN and supporting TAKO (isn't that the acronym?)
for the assualt predicated, we also have the ability of transporting the
same quantity of fuel and ammo to an airfield on dry land. The increasing
use of PGM's even makes it a realistic option to deliver ordnance to the
base by air--something that was unrealistic in the dumb-bomb age (witness
the poor ability to do so over The Hump for the B-29's trying to operate out
of China during WWII).



How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage
capability
of
a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from
extended
range itself)?

If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but
crises
often
don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our
wars
in the
past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead
time to
get ready.

I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam,
Diego
Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this
pretty
much anywhere in the world *now*.

In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)

No, but consider maybe the option of letting the CVN provide only the
fighter and EW support (both requiring less tanking support than if they had
to provide the complete strike package), and you acheive even greater
tonnage of ordnance delivered per strike, and reduce that hose/drogue
requirement to boot... :-)


Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.

And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the
start
of the
war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.

I was playing devils advocate a bit here, but if you areally want to get
down to details, yeah, they could still provide a reasonable option. Use
of
ALCM's to target IADS nodes/assets during the initial phase, with the
pending "electric" B-52 providing standoff jamming support, B-2's doing
their thing, and then as we start taking down the defenses, we can move
a
bit closer and start using the other standoff systems (i.e., JASSM).
Given
the range we saw the F-16's operate at during OEF, it would not be
beyond
the realm of possibility for the F-15C's and E's to get into the
ballgame at
long range, either (if they had to). As I have said a couple of times, I
do
see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support
the
argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?

No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker has to
be
available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required. IIRR,
the
GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large
percentage
of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best
only 40
KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the
tanker
requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the study
needs
to be _done_.

Then your cheapest, and quickest, solution goes back to merely buying more
multi-point kits for use by additional 135R's.


OEF
demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty
long
range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan
and
back
again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).

Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the
transfer
rate.
And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern
Watch
sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some
presence
in
the 'Stans, IIRC.

And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we
have
Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in
the -stans
you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the
past.

The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available to us
when
we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with
regimes that
are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the muslim
world,
I don't think we should count on such bases being available.

Then we adjust, and we have the CVN's as insurance--with those additional
modified R models, if needed.


snip

Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to
operate
a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without
HAVING to
have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no
big
deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the
ride.

That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker
tracks
a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific
version,
depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major
contributor
without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how
long
we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in
service
now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop,
which
is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come
out
in pretty good shape.

Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read one
quote
somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767 buy --
AIR
it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But that
all
needs to be studied so we know.

Argh! More study? Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty years--unless
wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that has
not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I don't
see that as the best option.

Brooks


Do we have the time available to dally around with
optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take
the
money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF
has
tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the
former.

As I've pointed out above, I think an even more fundamental question is
should
we be buying the 767 at all, rather than some other option. The 767 lease
is
looking more and more like roadkill, so it may be moot. However, even if
we
decided to go the 767 route, there's no reason why we couldn't buy 35 of
them
(or whatever the $ work out to) with wing drogues, rather than 40 without.

Guy

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...

Argh! More study? Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty years--unless
wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that has
not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I don't
see that as the best option.

Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

With the DSB report out the point is pretty much moot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/bu...partner=GOOGLE

With no civil orders forthcoming, Boeing isn't likely to keep the 76
line open beyond whats been ordered. Already marginalized in the
budget process anyway, that does not bode well for the E-10 either.
Its time to move from the concepts of the last century anyway. As the
report says...
A page of the report, for example, calls for the Air Force to "work
with major airframe manufacturers to develop new tanker options" that
would have "more modern airframes" than the "20-year-old 767 design."
Instead of sinking money into old, orphaned airframes, it would be
much better to invest in something like the "MACK" or BWB that could
be optimized to operate and survive in tomorrow's ari threat
environment.
Potential adversaries are realizing that we are concentrating a very
signifcant part our ability to mount offensive operations into
rehashed airliners...even if the august members of this board don't
see it. They are doing something about it too...

http://www.indiadefence.com/collab.htm
Designed to fulfill the BVR (beyond visual range) role for "outer-air
battles", an aircraft usually of Sukhoi-27/30/35/37 "Flanker/Super
Flanker" family, equipped with KS-172 (also referred to as Article
172) would be able to engage ultra-high-value airborne platforms like
AWACS (airborne warning and control system), IFR (in-flight
refuelling) and LRMP (long range maritime patrol) platforms, without
necessarily having first to deal with their fighter escorts.

http://www.ainonline.com/Publication...1agatpg85.html
If used on a long-range missile airframe, the ARGS-PD could give an
opposing air force the ability to take out strategic targets at
distances outside of the normal interception envelopes of U.S. or
other NATO fighters. Boeing E-3 AWACS or E-8 JSTARS aircraft–platforms
that U.S. forces depend heavily upon in time of conflict–would be
vulnerable as never before.

http://arms.ashst.com/missiles/s400.htm
The S-400 system is intended to engage current and future air threats
such as tactical and strategic aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other type missiles, including precision-guided ones, as well as AWACS
aircraft, at ranges of up to 400 km.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/031020/43/28nkk.html
"The FT-2000 surface-to-air missile (SAM), commonly known as the
'AWACS killer', designed by Chinese experts are considered to be the
most appropriate option if the U.S. refuses to provide the same kind
of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Pakistan being sold
to India by Israel," The News said.

"sameolesid" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...

Argh! More study? Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make
them
all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty
years--unless
wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that
has
not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I
don't
see that as the best option.

Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

Well, you seem to be changing--your ID, that is. You still get plonked,
though.

Brooks

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
.. .
Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message

snip, trying to keep the length down to a reasonable level)

In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets,
plus
the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
multi-point
tankers on occasion.

And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that
we
have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
right *now*.

I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see no
reason
not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for
drogue
tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).

That reason would be (another) delay in delivery. Why do you think it will
be such a major fiasco if the first forty 767's delivered come in without
the multi-point capability? IIRC the first contract is projected to cover
that number of delivereies. Letting a spiral handle the multi-point
capability in the subsequent 60 aircraft is not acceptable?

This assumes we need 767s at all, so I'll try and consolidate the discussion
below instead of handling everything piecemeal.

snip lead-in re 135 age versus 767

Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge
tanker
support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
(operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than
they
were pre-9/11).

Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435
hrs/year.
Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82 years
(36,000
hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over halfway
through that.

You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion tends
to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
classes...

Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as well, which
(after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.

It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural components
(meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).

Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more serious than the
Rs, when they all started out as 135As?


Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment
(witness
the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also
not
undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to
do
the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment. Indeed,
the
Defense Science Board just came out (see

http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.p...25-2904714.php

with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer Crag
Rs may
well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of years
to do
a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the one
we
started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run from
2004 -
2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently
replace the
Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news and
search

defense science board tanker

you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail. Th
e
actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently because
it
hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.

Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
*another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?

What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly well how to
upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with the R&D all
paid for.

That sounds
like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the 1990's
that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the replacement
of the KC-135E fleet.

Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.

Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the USAF
has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly than
if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course, you
could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that new
study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around what...2015
at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft of
that class--sounds like a good plan to me.

Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree, buying more pods
and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the short term to
the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best solution
for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be, butsince the USAF
never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.

It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes
to
MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based
upon
GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the
R
standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and
I'd
think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion
maintenace is
another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we
try
to stretch out the E model's lifespan.

The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
From
what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was averaging
$4.6
million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost (not
exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What would
be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more frequent)
inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the cost
is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment plan,
IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you

would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car, and
one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to modify
the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise requirements
the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially completely
rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be compatible
with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan (I
made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little Nissan
pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that was
*not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
down and buy a new vehicle).

If most people maintained their cars the way that the military does its tankers,
and only drove them 1/10th as much as the average 'driver', then upgading
themwith new componenets might well be the most cost effective solution for the
long-term. The numbers I have seen quoted for the E to R (plus Pacer Crag)
conversion vs. new 767 comparison imply that the conversion is indeed the most
cost-effective option, but without knowing every assumption made I'll withhold
judgement.

As to corrosion, in March 2003 the USAF's Deputy C/S for
Installations/Logistics testified before Congress: "Within the air refueling
fleet, the KC-135E-models have experienced the most maintenance and
corrosion problems and are more costly to maintain. With an average
aircraft age of 43 years, the KC-135E fleet is the oldest combat weapon
system in the Air Force inventory. It is also the oldest large fleet of
heavy jet aircraft in aviation history...The second critical measurement
that defines aircraft life is physical age. In this fleet, corrosion is a
function of age. Accurately predicting the extent of corrosion is difficult
and this lack of predictability severely limits the ability to efficiently
sustain aging fleets...the KC-135 is particularly challenging since its
1950s design, materials, and construction did not consider corrosion
prevention measures...The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and the
most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of these
problems have been solved since that date?

Apparently they've been ameliorated to a considerable extent, so that this is no
longer a driving factor. And again, why is the E's corrosion problem supposedly
so much worse than the Rs, when they started from exactly the same airframe?

snip old ground

One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
that the
767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),

Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
discount,

Actually, I believe what they said was that the facility responsible for dealing
with it has learned to handle it so well that they are able to do the work much
quicker and cheaper than expected. I can't find the quote, unfortunately, but
I'm still looking.

and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be great
for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
"spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we should
take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And yes,
we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)

They've said that it _may_ be the way to go, and:

"The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air Force
claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and several
options exist to refurbish the fleet.

If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you can
defer major near-term . . . investments" to replace the tanker fleet, the
report said.

"There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a
replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of
alternatives and other studies, the report said. "

[Quoted from the Oregonian's Web page, May 13th. Sure will be nice when we get
access to the actual report, rather than summaries of it flitered through the
news media]

or that it's the most
cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries me
about
rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is essentially
out of
production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the opposite
extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares are
going
to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are
already
starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a problem,
because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits so
they'll
be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the USAF
is
talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.

The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which are
more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in the
end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't see
this as a deal-breaker.

Given that airlines are already looking to replace their 767s ( a 20-year old
design, let's remember) with the next generation, and given that world oil
production is predicted to peak sometime in the 2007 (the pessimists) -- 2040
(the optimists) period, considerably improved fuel consumption may well drive
the mass replacement of older a/c, just as the post 9/11 slump did. It's
definitely an issue.


When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only in-production
(US)
a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no
longer the
case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a commercial
a/c, and
unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost
the
company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at
the
_start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs.
Which
is better suited for the role?

Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?

Not likely.

Depends on the specific mission, and more importantly, what percentage of the
mission spectrum does that particular mission occupy. There are missions now
where the faster KC-135 is better suited than a KC-767 would be, and others
where the latter comes out ahead.

Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
issues
down the road?

Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated into
the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.

And will be even more incorporated into the 7E7, especally since (AFAIK) there
is no corrosion of composites yet known.

How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?

Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK) 7E7
tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before the
first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in extra
operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...

Check out how much the KC-767 tankers cost.



Respective runway and
ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.

Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Air bridge and training tanking doesn't require
military crewing. It's certainly an option worth looking at for at least some
tanking requirements, if not all.

snip lead-in, about fewer a/c to provide the same number of drogues

That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case,
you
send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other
aircraft
(i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge
su[pport
operations into the theater.

I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a
conflict to
use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them for,
precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if we
were
refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good terms
with
Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us than
ever.
Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than
135s or
767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its deployment
options.

I said, "If the requirement to provide hose/drogue capability in-theater is
*that* important". We have the capability of providing substantial
hose/drogue capability if we have to--if we really need more, then buy more
kits for the existing R's. No matter how you cut it, the decision to not
initially provide multi-point capability in the first forty 767's is not
going to be a critical, or even serious, failure in terms of our operational
capability.

We agree that buying more kits for the Rs and/or modifying more than 45 Rs to
use them is probably the best idea in the short-term.

So what you really seem to be saying is that
the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an
improvement
to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?

Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded Es
and
later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
need to
do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for tankers
and the
type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
properly
studied.

Again with the neverending studies? :-)

What never-ending study? The USAF failed to do such a study in the first place,
especially an AoA. The latter was predicted to take about 18 months, but the
head of AQ&L (Wynne) says they'll probably push it and complete it by December
or so.

snip lead-in about buying multidrogue capability up front rather than adding it
later

Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away
because we
dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort
is
still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the materiel
costs,
which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's just
buy
it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated prices
later.

Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?

If that allows us to make a better decision for the long term, sure. We can get
upgraded Es (Pacer Crag Rs) into service faster than we can get 767s.

If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good.

Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of
reports,
including theirs, before making a decision.

I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to fly
the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).

Seeing as how the DSB works for the Pentagon, and Rumsfeld is the guy who tasked
them to do the study back in February, I put a bit more weight on their advice
than you do. Especially since opponents of the 767 deal (McCain to thefront)
believed that the DSB was much too cosy with the military and Boeing (the DSB
Chairman had to recuse himself because he was also a paid Boeing consultant and
had been mentioned in internal company e-mails back in Dec.2002/Jan. 2003 as
willing to help push the deal), and fully expected them to support it. I
believe McCain's words were something along the lines of a "fox guarding the
chickens." So yeah, when even they come out and say they that we've got time to
do the study and the corrosion is manageable, I'm inclined to believe them.

We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we
can
do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's
arguments
against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no
more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were
concerned
with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point
capability
is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
below.

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
further
than it already has been slowed?

According to the DSB, we have the time.

The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year, that
the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...?

the DSB's claim is based on the USAF unit doing the corrosion controls data,
let's remember. The situation isn't static, and they've gotten better at it
since last year.

And thinks out-sourcing tanker
requirements is a fine idea?

They're saying it's a viable option, it should be looked at in an AoA, and we've
got the time to do so. No more, no less.

I am not buying into either, at this point.

Until the AoA is actually done, we have nothing to base a decision on other than
"because I think so," which IMO is a pretty poor way to spend billions of
dollars.

snip

But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to
augment
their current tanker fleet.

Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a replacement
for a
jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can also
refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s it's
a
relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's
certainly
better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively
inefficient
tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and offload
capability.

I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted to
include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.

More likely, they'd suffer a rupture from laughing at the USN devoting such a
large proportion of its budget to paying the NRE for so few a/c of such limited
performance (as tankers).

Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent
over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
capability.

There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a tanker
mod for
their C-40s, with all their other needs.

Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a critical
one, eh?

Since no one else is even considering buying 737s as tankers, and the navy is
only buying a few (somewhere between 5 and 8, as best I can tell), the navy
would have to be nuts to make that kind of investment for so few a/c, even
assuming that they would be reasonable tankers. Given their limited
payload/range and performance, I have my doubts they would be, but it's moot.

fuel to forward bases

As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of
the
JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it
in
ourselves.

JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from
CVs. At
least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people here
can
comment.

I thought we had standardized on JP-8 across the force--ISTR this came up
before, but I can't remember the final outcome.

I believe either here or on s.m.n. someone stated that a/c couldn't be struck
below if they;d beenfueledwith JP-8, until they had been refueled several times
with JP-5. For land ops (training) the navy has gone to JP-8.

Regardless, be it JP-5 or
JP-8, you can't count on it being available in a remote operating location,
in the volume required, unless you plan on being able to haul it in
yourself.

Sure, which is why you'll need a tanker (the ship variety).

Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
pieces of ordnance, right?

Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines);
moving
ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.

Lots of trucks available for lease out there in the world, even in a lot of
"remote" areas (any remote are having a pipeline capability likely has a
decent truck inventory available in the general area)--or you could use a
transportation company (60 line haul tractors and 120 40-ton trailers) from
the Army (one of our TC companies that was attached to my old BN HHD did
exactly that to support B-52 operations out of Saudi Arabia during ODS). If
none of this is doable in your opinion, then IMO you have just shot your
"gotta have multi-point capability" in the foot as well, since it would mean
that we can't plan on being able to operate the tankers within range of the
receivers in the first place.

Moving ordnance by truck requires offload from ships and lots of handling
equipment (Ro-Ro helps here), whereas every airfield of adequate size to handle
a jet tanker will already have a fuel delivery system in place. We'd only need
(assuming it's not a military field) to supply the fuel, not the delivery
system. Even assuming that the logistic infrastructure exists to move the
ordnance, it's still relatively slow, and requires a lot more organizational
effort to get things going than just pulling a tanker up to a pipeline terminal
and starting to pump.

If you are tied to getting basic resources into
the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes,
the
use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of
ordnance
that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during
OEF
we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during
ODS,
with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso
the
SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
further.

PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance that
may be
required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even
with PGMs
there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.

I'd think if we have the ability to provide both categories of support
within the confines of a CVN and supporting TAKO (isn't that the acronym?)

for the assualt predicated, we also have the ability of transporting the
same quantity of fuel and ammo to an airfield on dry land.

In what time frame, and why would you want to move them again, when the CV
already has the infrastructure in place, lacking only sufficient tankers to
reach the targets? Down the road, sure we can start to bring in ordnance for
land-based air, but early in a conflict we've usually got the navy plus long
range USAF assets.

The increasing
use of PGM's even makes it a realistic option to deliver ordnance to the
base by air--something that was unrealistic in the dumb-bomb age (witness
the poor ability to do so over The Hump for the B-29's trying to operate out
of China during WWII).

They certainly allow us to start some level of sustained ops sooner, but we'll
need ship-transported ordnance quantities if we're having to deal with major
attacks.

snip

I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam,
Diego
Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this
pretty
much anywhere in the world *now*.

In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)

No, but consider maybe the option of letting the CVN provide only the
fighter and EW support (both requiring less tanking support than if they had
to provide the complete strike package), and you acheive even greater
tonnage of ordnance delivered per strike, and reduce that hose/drogue
requirement to boot... :-)

Certainly worth looking at, although the navy might object to having to convert
all their shiny new F-18Fs to F-18Gs already;-)

snip

As I have said a couple of times, I
do
see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support
the
argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?

No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker has to
be
available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required. IIRR,
the
GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large
percentage
of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best
only 40
KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the
tanker
requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the study
needs
to be _done_.

Then your cheapest, and quickest, solution goes back to merely buying more
multi-point kits for use by additional 135R's.

And I've already said that I'm in agreement with this, especially so we can look
at if we even need the KC-767 vs. some other option. We apparently have 33
drogue kits for 45 KC-135Rs, so upping the number of kits to more closely
approximate the KC-135R MC rate, rather than the .73 rate indicated by the
above, should certainly be looked at for starters. Converting some Es to Rs and
adding the drogue kits at the same time won't take any Rs out of service.

snip

And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we
have
Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in
the -stans
you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the
past.

The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available to us
when
we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with
regimes that
are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the muslim
world,
I don't think we should count on such bases being available.

Then we adjust, and we have the CVN's as insurance--with those additional
modified R models, if needed.

Agreed that more Rs is likely the best answer in the short run.

snip

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no
big
deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the
ride.

That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker
tracks
a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific
version,
depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major
contributor
without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how
long
we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in
service
now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop,
which
is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come
out
in pretty good shape.

Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read one
quote
somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767 buy --
AIR
it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But that
all
needs to be studied so we know.

Argh! More study?

No, the same one that the USAF shoud have done back in 2001, but didn't.

Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty years--unless
wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that has
not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I don't
see that as the best option.

I'm sure the operating cost will be higher, but then the purchase cost is a hell
of a lot lower. Fuel burn between a 135R and a KC-767's probably a wash;
CFM-56s in one and CF6s in the other, with the total thrust higher in the case
of the CF6s.

Guy