Florida Mil Comms Loggings - Mon, 17 May 2004

In article , fudog50
wrote:

I suppose that my distress at following OPSEC apparently only
applies to us military folks.

There is a school of thought that says OPSEC means never say anything
about anything. This is particularly true at the tactical level. At the
operational and strategic levels, the say-nothing policy neither works
in a democratic society, nor even necessarily helps military operations.

I can point to any number of military fiascoes -- Pearl Harbor, Desert
One -- where overemphasis on security inside the military led to
disaster, because people who needed a full picture didn't have it. Even
with properly classified data, the balance between overclassification
and real security is a constant juggling act.

Realistically, to make substantial use of open source material, one has
to have a significant analytic capability. Esepcially when dealing with
a free society, the amount of data often provides its own security -- it
overwhelms the analysts. fUSSR intelligence personnel have stated quite
often that one of the reason the fUSSR depended on spies rather than
open-source is that there was too much open source, and also they never
knew when open source might be disinformation or cover.

In a previous post, I gave some examples of what a competent analyst
would do variously if he were considering using this data, and, indeed,
whether an analyst might re-task collection guidance to provide the data
through different means. I would be interested in your specific
responses to these specific points on the value of the data in question,
rather than lectures on patriotism.

I guess it is ok for civilians to violate "OPSEC' during time
of war?
(whether you agree or not, we are at war, where is your patriotism?
Why make it any easier for any potential enemy?)
Wouldn't it be horrible if the enemy used even a miniscule
part of your military A/C comms to add into a tactical strike?

By that logic, no information about anything, including the behavior of
national leaders, should ever be made available. As I say, there is a
balance.

It's your conscience now, can you live with it if even a
minute piece of your posting of CONOPS is used to plan an attack?

EVERYTHING in counterintelligence planning is a balancing act. In
military operational planning, there has to be a good deal of staff
support, and willingness to listen to the intelligence people, before
lots of open source becomes relevant. I don't think EVERYONE in Iraqi
intelligence was incompetent, but Saddam wanted to hear what fit his
preconceptions. I would seriously question how much open source
intelligence is done by terrorists. I would especially doubt they are
likely to have the kind of analyst that stays concerned with following
US air operational technique over a long period.

The US and USSR did, as did some other powers -- but when resources are
limited, he who tries to track everything quickly becomes overwhelmed.
Traditionally, the glory jobs in intelligence are in collection, not
analysis, which led to situations such as an audit during Viet Nam,
showing that DIA was about 400 file drawers behind in looking at
collection reports, and it still kept coming.

I'll give it rest,,,,just think twice about posting military
CONOPS during time of war,,,again,,you are 100% in violation of
current "OPSEC" guidelines.