America's Army Sucks, Fact

In message , Alan Minyard
writes
On 31 May 2004 16:01:19 GMT, Alistair Gunn wrote:
[1] Though I believe they was a successful engagement with Sea Dart
against a target at 50 feet?
[2] Though, IRIC, the Type 42s (and HMS Bristol) where never deployed
into San Carlos Water.

I have often wondered why the Brits did not use manpads. Were they unavailable?

Blowpipe was used in respectable numbers, though it was more effective
against Pucaras than fast-movers. The SAS had some Stingers, which were
also used.

--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
...
On 31 May 2004 16:01:19 GMT, Alistair Gunn wrote:



I have often wondered why the Brits did not use manpads. Were they
unavailable?


They did, the Short Blowpipe to be precise, there were not as good as the
current generation of manpad's but still managed to shoot down a
number of the Argentine aircraft, mainly the Pucara's operating in
the CAS role IRC.

Keith.

WalterM140 wrote:

Reduce that dud rate to
zero and the whole Brit expeditionary force becomes POWs.

You could equally say reduce the dud rate to zero and the odds are good the
FAA
doesn't have any a/c left, because most of them have been shot down. The
reason so
few bombs detonated is because the FAA pilots had the normal instinct for
self-preservation, and usually flew as low and fast as they could to make the
job
of the defenses much harder. But this meant that bombs were often dropped
from
altitudes too low to allow sufficient time for fuse operation, so many of the
bombs
dudded, or the fuse delays were so long (to allow time for the wingmen to
clear the
target before the bombs exploded) that bombs which weren't stopped by
structure
inside the ship passed on through and out the other side before exploding.
The
whole reason for the defenses was to make the pilots more worried about
survival
than destroying their targets, thus increasing the incident of duds. CTG
317.0
(the amphibious shipping), Commodore Clapp, was very glad that the Argentine
pilots
were chosing to make level bomb runs instead of pop-up dive attacks, for just
that
reason.


Well, that's interesting, but it seems to indicate that the Brits were gambling
they could induce the Argintines to attack incorrectly. Not very prudent.

It wasn't a gamble at all, it was planned that way. Clapp had been a Buccaneer
observer and squadron commander, and he chose San Carlos Water for the landings and
set up the ships and land defenses to provide the Argentine pilots with just that
dilemma. The layout of the defenses was optimised to hit pilots making pop-up dive
attacks; British missiles would have been more effective as well, not being
bothered as much by ground clutter, and there would have been less worry about
having to check fire to avoid shooting up friendly troops/ships on the other side
of the water. As it was, the Argentine pilots chose to come in very low and fast,
limiting their acquisition time and the effectiveness of their attacks, but
improving their survival rate. Looked at objectively, they should have accepted
the higher losses of dive attacks for the potentially higher gains, but then that's
easy to say from the comfort of my chair.

You seem to agree that if -all- the bombs had detonated the Brit supporting
force would have been reduced below a level where the invasion could have been
supported.

Doubtful. Most of the bombs hit the escorts outside of San Carlos Water; some were
effectively knocked out of the war in any case, even though they weren't sunk.
Only two LSLs were hit by bombs in SCW, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad, and the
amount of damage caused if they'd gone off would have depended on where they hit
and what they were carrying at the time. If all the bombs had gone off then it's
possible that the British government might have decided that the cost was too high,
and it would almost certainly have delayed the ground forces. But they had lots of
reinforcing ships on the way, most of which arrived when the war was over or nearly
so, so their stores/equipment weren't needed. Argentina had no such second wave
capability. And Fuerza Aerea target priorities on D-Day sucked, which was
ultimately a far bigger problem than the dud bombs. Hitting the escorts didn't
delay the land campaign; hitting more of the supply ships before they could unload
would have.

Assuming that they'd ever been hit, the loss of Fearless would have caused a major
delay as she was the amphibious command ship, but her sister Intrepid could have
taken over, albeit at lower efficiency. Other than that, the Brits would have had
to lose a carrier; everything else (other than lives) was replaceable. As an
example, losing Atlantic Conveyor and the Chinook/Wessex helos she was bringing
down was the single most important blow to the campaign that the British suffered,
but her sister Atlantic Causeway arrived less than a week later, bringing another
28 or so helos with her (Wessex/Sea King). Another two ships were coming south
bringing more Chinooks and other helos, and arrived right about the time of the
surrender.

Guy

Well, that's interesting, but it seems to indicate that the Brits were
gambling
they could induce the Argintines to attack incorrectly. Not very prudent.

It wasn't a gamble at all, it was planned that way. Clapp had been a
Buccaneer
observer and squadron commander, and he chose San Carlos Water for the
landings and
set up the ships and land defenses to provide the Argentine pilots with just
that
dilemma. The layout of the defenses was optimised to hit pilots making
pop-up dive
attacks; British missiles would have been more effective as well, not being
bothered as much by ground clutter, and there would have been less worry
about
having to check fire to avoid shooting up friendly troops/ships on the other
side
of the water. As it was, the Argentine pilots chose to come in very low and
fast,
limiting their acquisition time and the effectiveness of their attacks, but
improving their survival rate. Looked at objectively, they should have
accepted
the higher losses of dive attacks for the potentially higher gains, but then
that's
easy to say from the comfort of my chair.

You seem to agree that if -all- the bombs had detonated the Brit supporting
force would have been reduced below a level where the invasion could have
been
supported.

Doubtful. Most of the bombs hit the escorts outside of San Carlos Water;
some were
effectively knocked out of the war in any case, even though they weren't
sunk.
Only two LSLs were hit by bombs in SCW, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad, and the
amount of damage caused if they'd gone off would have depended on where they
hit
and what they were carrying at the time. If all the bombs had gone off then
it's
possible that the British government might have decided that the cost was too
high,
and it would almost certainly have delayed the ground forces. But they had
lots of
reinforcing ships on the way, most of which arrived when the war was over or
nearly
so, so their stores/equipment weren't needed. Argentina had no such second
wave
capability. And Fuerza Aerea target priorities on D-Day sucked, which was
ultimately a far bigger problem than the dud bombs. Hitting the escorts
didn't
delay the land campaign; hitting more of the supply ships before they could
unload
would have.

Assuming that they'd ever been hit, the loss of Fearless would have caused a
major
delay as she was the amphibious command ship, but her sister Intrepid could
have
taken over, albeit at lower efficiency. Other than that, the Brits would have
had
to lose a carrier; everything else (other than lives) was replaceable. As an
example, losing Atlantic Conveyor and the Chinook/Wessex helos she was
bringing
down was the single most important blow to the campaign that the British
suffered,
but her sister Atlantic Causeway arrived less than a week later, bringing
another
28 or so helos with her (Wessex/Sea King). Another two ships were coming
south
bringing more Chinooks and other helos, and arrived right about the time of
the
surrender.

Guy


Sounds like good info. Thanks,

Walt