Greatest Strategic Air Missions

Keith Willshaw wrote:

That just whacked a huge number of civilians.



Well no.

Are you saying that a large number of civilians was not killed in that
bombing?


Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.
There were large numbers of troops based there. At
least 3 divisions IRC

The bombing did not target any specific military facilities. According
to the Japanese figures, military casualties from the attack accounted
for less than 3% of the overall casualties. Thus, for every Japanese
soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.

Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
strategic as it gets.

The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
were even considering a surrender. They figured maybe Stalin won't stop
with the Kurils. Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
to the Americans and nobody nuked them.

--
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Venik

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Venik wrote:

Thus, for every Japanese
soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.

The judgement on whether a mission was a strategic success is not based on
collateral damage. In *most* circumstances high collateral damage will usually
translate to a strategic failure....but not in this case.

The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
were even considering a surrender.

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
to the Americans and nobody nuked them.

Uhh..the first successful nuclear bomb testing wasn't done until 16 July
1945....two months after Germany was defeated.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR wrote:

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

I am sure the answers would have been different if these interviews were
conducted by the Soviets. In addition to trying to appease their
conquerors, these Japanese leaders probably also felt more comfortable
with the idea that their surrender was precipitated by a super weapon
and not but by their desire to salvage as much as possible out of a
hopeless situation.

As you know, during the Yalta conference Stalin promised to attack Japan
ninety days from the surrender of Germany. In return the USSR got the
Allied blessing to grab some territory back from Japan. It's hard to
imagine that the Japanese were not aware of the details of this deal.
Even before the Germany's surrender, the Japanese sent a diplomatic
delegation to the USSR to work out some sort of a surrender deal that
would allow Japan to keep the Emperor. By that time the US diplomats
have already got themselves into a bottle by pronouncing the policy of
Unconditional Surrender. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no
particular problem with the Emperor.

Germans surrendered on May 8, which meant that Stalin was obligated to
attack Japan no later than August 8. US plans called for a limited
invasion of the Ryuku Islands in November and the invasion of the
mainland Japan was to take place in January of 1946 at the earliest. So
there definitely was a big gap between the timing of the Soviet invasion
of Japan and the US invasion. If the negotiations between Japan and the
USSR produced results (and there was no reason why they shouldn't have,
since both countries were not even at war with each other), the Soviet
"attack" on Japan could have been a very brief and victorious affair for
Stalin.

The US delayed the Potsdam conference for two weeks, during which the
first nuke was tested. And Truman authorized the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki just two days before the Soviet attack against Japan.
Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur. And the public
reaction in the US to the use of the A-bomb was split close to the
middle. At the time, the significance of timing of these events was
quite obvious to anyone reading newspapers.

Japanese negotiated with both the US and the USSR and in both cases
their primary and only real condition was to retain the Emperor. They
would have preferred to surrender to the Americans for obvious reasons:
USSR had territorial claims against Japan and nobody in Japan was
looking forward to living under Kremlin's control. On the other hand,
negotiating with the USSR was less problematic because the two countries
were not at war and because the Soviets, unlike the US, did not demand
unconditional surrender.

In the end, the US changed its policy of Unconditional Surrender and
that's what prompted the Japanese surrender. And the use of the nukes
allowed the US to obscure this rather embarrassing policy change from
public scrutiny, as well as to give Stalin something to think about.
It's also important to remember that Truman counted on a much bigger
impact of the A-bomb on the Soviets, because, of course, he had no idea
that the Soviets have already taken from Los Alamos everything they
needed for their own bomb. During the Potsdam conference Truman even
attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
his failure to grasp the significance of the event., since Truman,
obviously, expected some sort of an emotional response from uncle Joe.
If Truman knew how quickly the USSR would build its own A-bomb, perhaps
he would have listened to his military commanders on this matter.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
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"Venik" wrote in message
...
BUFDRVR wrote:

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and
military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey.

I am sure the answers would have been different if these interviews were
conducted by the Soviets.

Well yes Beria had a way of getting the answers Stalin wanted to hear.

Keith




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"Keith Willshaw" wrote:

"Venik" wrote in message
...
BUFDRVR wrote:

Not according to interviews conducted with
Japanese civilian and
military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at
the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey.

I am sure the answers would have been different
if these interviews were
conducted by the Soviets.

Well yes Beria had a way of getting the answers
Stalin wanted to hear.

Keith




----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure
Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service
in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups
---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers
- Total Privacy via Encryption =---
You've got that right: supposedly Stalin was displeased with Beria's predecessor
Yezhov about not getting a confession out of Bukharin-Beria told Stalin "Let
me have him. I'll have him confessing he's the King of England." Stalin got
the confession, Beria got promoted, and both Bukharin and Yezhov were liquidated....

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

Venik wrote:

Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
advisers

That's not correct. There were descenting voices but they were the minority.

including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur

Only 1 of 3. Eisenhower was the only one of the above who opposed it.
MacArthur, after the war, admitted he was upset when told of the decsion, but
he made no protest. LeMay fully supported it.

And the public
reaction in the US to the use of the A-bomb was split close to the
middle.

Wrong. The U.S. public didn't care what device was used, just that it ended the
war. There was no public descent outside of scientific circles.

In the end, the US changed its policy of Unconditional Surrender

Wrong. The U.S. chose to allow the Emporer to stay because they felt it would
allow for a more secure occupation.

And the use of the nukes
allowed the US to obscure this rather embarrassing policy change from
public scrutiny, as well as to give Stalin something to think about.

Wrong. No reputable historian would agree with that statement.

Truman even
attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
his failure to grasp the significance of the event.

What history books are you reading? Truman never briefed Stalin on the results.
He briefed Churchill, but never told Stalin a thing.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR wrote:

Wrong. The U.S. chose to allow the Emporer to stay because they felt
it would
allow for a more secure occupation.

Of course they did, that why the US changed its policy of unconditional
surrender. They knew that if the Emperor is not allowed to stay, no
amount of nukes will solve the problem. In the end the Japanese got what
they wanted in a surrender deal.

Wrong. No reputable historian would agree with that statement.

Since you are not one of them, your opinion, while appreciated, makes
little impression on me.

What history books are you reading? Truman never briefed Stalin on the results.
He briefed Churchill, but never told Stalin a thing.

Apparently not the same books you were reading in school :-) Would
Truman's own memoirs satisfy you?

"On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of
unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special
interest. All he said was he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make
"good use of it against the Japanese." Harry S. Truman, Year of
Decisions , 1955, p. 416

How about Churchill's memoirs?

""I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest
attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do.
What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as
if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted. A new bomb! Of
extraordinary power! Probably decisive on the whole Japanese war! What a
bit of luck! This was my impression at the moment, and I was sure that
he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told. " Winston
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , 1953, p. 669

I can give you several dozen other references or you can visit your
local library and lookup interviews and memoirs of James Byrnes, Charles
Bohlen, Anthony Eden, or Georgii Zhukov.

--
Regards,

Venik

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If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
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"Venik" wrote in message
...
BUFDRVR wrote:

snip


I can give you several dozen other references or you can visit your
local library and lookup interviews and memoirs of James Byrnes, Charles
Bohlen, Anthony Eden, or Georgii Zhukov.


Great, but unfortuantely now a bit outdated, since we know the reason Stalin
was not overtly impressed by the mention of the bomb (not really a "brief",
now was it?) was actually because he already knew about it courtesy of folks
like Greenglass and the Rosenbergs.

Brooks

--
Regards,

Venik

Kevin Brooks wrote:

Great, but unfortuantely now a bit outdated...

What is outdated?

, since we know the reason Stalin
was not overtly impressed by the mention of the bomb (not really a "brief",
now was it?)

Who said "brief"?

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
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Venik wrote;

They knew that if the Emperor is not allowed to stay, no
amount of nukes will solve the problem.

Actually they *thought* even if Japan capitulated that many in the Army (and
there were well over 2 million soldiers still in uniform) would continue to
fight unless the Emporer was still in power and commanded them to surrender.

"On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of
unusual destructive force.

Which hardy means he briefed Stalin on the results of the Mahatten Project as
you insinuated.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"