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#31
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![]() Andy Dingley wrote: If it's OK to ignore the UN now, why so squeamish in '91 ? -- Die Gotterspammerung - Junkmail of the Gods 9-11 happened. The same people who had the infamous "dots" that lead to 9-11 came to Bush and said "We gotta problem, and if it is real it could cause millions to die." Bush said "what's the chance these "dots" are real?" and no matter what percentage they gave him. He had to act and act fast. Failure to act, with the information coming on the heels of 9-11, seems to be too much of a chance to take. If he was wrong, and I'm still on the fence, he was wrong. But given the fact that the people who were telling him of this issue just failed him on 9-11, he had no choice. kwc |
#32
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![]() "Peter Glasų" wrote: Yes,Saddam turned out to be a really nice guy after all.And he is sorely missed,right? It was worth every single of those 20,000+ civilian lives to remove this ex-CIA puppert, right? "Michael Petukhov" skrev i melding om... http://www1.iraqwar.ru/iraq-read_art...=21801&lang=en No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes 05 October 2003 As the first progress report from the Iraq Survey Group is released, Cambridge WMD expert Dr Glen Rangwala finds that even the diluted claims made for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't stand up Last week's progress report by American and British weapons inspectors in Iraq has failed to supply evidence for the vast majority of the claims made on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by their governments before the war. David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), told congressional committees in Washington that no official orders or plans could be found to back up the allegation that a nuclear programme remained active after 1991. Aluminium tubes have not been used for the enrichment of uranium, in contrast to US Secretary of State Colin Powell's lengthy exposition to the UN Security Council in February. No suspicious activities or residues have been found at the seven sites within Iraq described in the Prime Minister's dossier from September 2002. The ISG even casts serious doubt on President Bush's much-trumpeted claim that US forces had found three mobile biological laboratories after the war: "technical limitations" would prevent the trailers from being ideally suited to biological weapons production, it records. In other words, they were for something else. There have certainly been no signs of imported uranium, or even battlefield munitions ready to fire within 45 minutes. Most significantly, the claim to Parliament on the eve of conflict by Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, that "we know that this man [Saddam Hussein] has got ... chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses, bacilli and ... 10,000 litres of anthrax" has yet to find a single piece of supportive evidence. Those who staked their career on the existence in Iraq of at least chemical and biological weapons programmes have latched on to three claims in the progress report. First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced". Mr Straw claimed the morning after the report's release that this agent was "15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX". That is wrong: botulinum type A is one of the most poisonous substances known, and was developed in weaponised form by Iraq before 1991. However, type B - the form found at the biologist's home - is less lethal. Even then, it would require an extensive process of fermentation, the growing of the bug, the extraction of the toxin and the weaponisation of the toxin before it could cause harm. That process would take weeks, if not longer, but the ISG reported no sign of any of these activities. Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them "seed banks". Second, a large part of the ISG report is taken up with assertions that Iraq had been acquiring designs and under- taking research programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of 150km. The evidence here is more detailed than in the rest of the report. However, it does not demonstrate that Iraq was violating the terms of any Security Council resolution. The prohibition on Iraq acquiring technology relating to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was absolute: no agents, no sub-systems and no research or support facilities. By contrast, Iraq was simply prohibited from actually having longer-range missiles, together with "major parts, and repair and production facilities". The ISG does not claim proof that Iraq had any such missiles or facilities, just the knowledge to produce them in future. Indeed, it would have been entirely lawful for Iraq to develop such systems if the restrictions implemented in 1991 were lifted, while it would never have been legitimate for it to re-develop WMD. Third, one sentence within the report has been much quoted: Iraq had "a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within the Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research". Note what that sentence does not say: these facilities were suitable for chemical and biological weapons research (as almost any modern lab would be), not that they had engaged in such research. The reference to UN monitoring is also spurious: under the terms of UN resolutions, all of Iraq's chemical and biological facilities are subject to monitoring. So all this tells us is that Iraq had modern laboratories. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...p?story=450121 Source: Dr Glen Rangwala The Independent |
#33
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Paul J. Adam wrote:
In message , Michael Williamson writes Also, in some cases there is still reason to believe that the weapons existed up until at least just prior to the war. Kay reportedly has received testimony that Iraq was still producing Scud fuel, which is not used by any Iraqi equipment except Scuds (none that we know of, anyway). I could be wrong, but aren't Scuds powered by a mix of hydrazine and nitric acid? Which, again subject to error, powers the booster for the SA-2 missile in widespread use in Iraq? (I'm sure both use red fuming nitric acid as oxidiser - kerosene is hardly a classified agent and hydrazine is widely used too) As Kay asked in one interview, what do you need to produce rocket fuel for if you don't have a rocket to use it in? The Iraqis were still allowed to use rocket-powered weapons, just with limitations. I'm not familiar with the fuel used by either the Scud or the SA-2, so I can't comment on whether the fuel is common to both types or not. Kay did state in his report, however, that the fuel is usable only by the Scud. He could possibly be mistaken, or the source for his information could be wrong, but I've not seen a definitive refutation. His report may be found at the following link (by the way, this was the only CIA search result from the search string "Scud fuel." Later in the report he details the claims that Scud fuel and oxidizer was manufactured in a factory in or near Al Tariq, which apparently was their main production source for concentrated Nitric Acid, along with other conventional explosives and munitions. The reports of this production have not been confirmed yet, being currently based solely on witness testimony. http://www.cia.gov/search?NS-search-...S-doc-number=1 Boy, that's a long URL. It might be easier to just go to www.cia.gov and do the search yourself. The portion dealing with the fuel production is located alongside the 'supporting images.' Nearby are a few tidbits about Korea and technology transfers as well. Most of the report is classified, so there likely isn't going to be a lot of 'meat' in the unclassified report. Hope this was at least somewhat helpful Paul. Take care Mike |
#34
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kirill wrote in message ...
"Peter Glasų" wrote: Yes,Saddam turned out to be a really nice guy after all.And he is sorely missed,right? It was worth every single of those 20,000+ civilian lives to remove this ex-CIA puppert, right? We don't know. Since Hussein was a CIA puppet only in the sense that some New Yorkers look like CIA. But in New York, some New Yorkers look like Martians, and some New Yorkers look like Julius Caesar. Some New Yorkers look like Jesus Christ, and some New Yorkers even look like Hitler. But no New Yorkers look like oil drillers. |
#35
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![]() kirill wrote: "Peter Glasų" wrote: Yes,Saddam turned out to be a really nice guy after all.And he is sorely missed,right? It was worth every single of those 20,000+ civilian lives to remove this ex-CIA puppert, right? "Michael Petukhov" skrev i melding om... http://www1.iraqwar.ru/iraq-read_art...=21801&lang=en No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes 05 October 2003 As the first progress report from the Iraq Survey Group is released, Cambridge WMD expert Dr Glen Rangwala finds that even the diluted claims made for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't stand up Last week's progress report by American and British weapons inspectors in Iraq has failed to supply evidence for the vast majority of the claims made on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by their governments before the war. David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), told congressional committees in Washington that no official orders or plans could be found to back up the allegation that a nuclear programme remained active after 1991. Aluminium tubes have not been used for the enrichment of uranium, in contrast to US Secretary of State Colin Powell's lengthy exposition to the UN Security Council in February. No suspicious activities or residues have been found at the seven sites within Iraq described in the Prime Minister's dossier from September 2002. The ISG even casts serious doubt on President Bush's much-trumpeted claim that US forces had found three mobile biological laboratories after the war: "technical limitations" would prevent the trailers from being ideally suited to biological weapons production, it records. In other words, they were for something else. There have certainly been no signs of imported uranium, or even battlefield munitions ready to fire within 45 minutes. Most significantly, the claim to Parliament on the eve of conflict by Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, that "we know that this man [Saddam Hussein] has got ... chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses, bacilli and ... 10,000 litres of anthrax" has yet to find a single piece of supportive evidence. Those who staked their career on the existence in Iraq of at least chemical and biological weapons programmes have latched on to three claims in the progress report. First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced". Mr Straw claimed the morning after the report's release that this agent was "15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX". That is wrong: botulinum type A is one of the most poisonous substances known, and was developed in weaponised form by Iraq before 1991. However, type B - the form found at the biologist's home - is less lethal. Even then, it would require an extensive process of fermentation, the growing of the bug, the extraction of the toxin and the weaponisation of the toxin before it could cause harm. That process would take weeks, if not longer, but the ISG reported no sign of any of these activities. Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them "seed banks". Second, a large part of the ISG report is taken up with assertions that Iraq had been acquiring designs and under- taking research programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of 150km. The evidence here is more detailed than in the rest of the report. However, it does not demonstrate that Iraq was violating the terms of any Security Council resolution. The prohibition on Iraq acquiring technology relating to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was absolute: no agents, no sub-systems and no research or support facilities. By contrast, Iraq was simply prohibited from actually having longer-range missiles, together with "major parts, and repair and production facilities". The ISG does not claim proof that Iraq had any such missiles or facilities, just the knowledge to produce them in future. Indeed, it would have been entirely lawful for Iraq to develop such systems if the restrictions implemented in 1991 were lifted, while it would never have been legitimate for it to re-develop WMD. Third, one sentence within the report has been much quoted: Iraq had "a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within the Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research". Note what that sentence does not say: these facilities were suitable for chemical and biological weapons research (as almost any modern lab would be), not that they had engaged in such research. The reference to UN monitoring is also spurious: under the terms of UN resolutions, all of Iraq's chemical and biological facilities are subject to monitoring. So all this tells us is that Iraq had modern laboratories. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...p?story=450121 Source: Dr Glen Rangwala The Independent Saddam was no CIA puppet-his thugs hanged as many "CIA Spies" as they did "Israeli Spies", or spies for somebody. Sure we helped him out in the 80s back when Iran was considered Public Enemy #1 by the US, but alliances in the Mideast shift with the sands. I hope you're not some rabble-rouser who thinks the mass graves and torture chambers found after the invasion are hoaxes or "wildly exaggerated." as some apologists for the Butcher of Baghdad claim. Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access! |
#36
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In message , Michael Williamson
writes Paul J. Adam wrote: I could be wrong, but aren't Scuds powered by a mix of hydrazine and nitric acid? Which, again subject to error, powers the booster for the SA-2 missile in widespread use in Iraq? (I'm sure both use red fuming nitric acid as oxidiser - kerosene is hardly a classified agent and hydrazine is widely used too) The Iraqis were still allowed to use rocket-powered weapons, just with limitations. I'm not familiar with the fuel used by either the Scud or the SA-2, so I can't comment on whether the fuel is common to both types or not. Kay did state in his report, however, that the fuel is usable only by the Scud. Reading his report, he refers only to red fuming nitric acid in the unclassified public part. A search for "hydrazine" (the fuel, as opposed to the oxidiser, for the Scud family) came up blank. So he's got Scud _oxidiser_. (A small technical quibble, but us engineers are pedantic) RFNA is indeed usable to power Scuds and derivatives... but it's also used as oxidiser in Styx/Silkworm antiship missiles, which Iraq was allowed to retain, and for SA-2 Guideline SAMs which again were permitted - both use kerosene fuel with RFNA oxidiser. (Easy to forget that Iraq wasn't being completely disarmed, just stripped of long-range offensive weapons) RFNA is one of those awkward "precursor" chemicals, like ammonium nitrate; it's useful for a lot of tasks, one of which is powering Scuds; but it can be used in other missiles, and it's necessary for a lot of manufacturing tasks too. If you find a stash of ammonium nitrate, the owner might intend to use it to fertilise his fields. Or he might be quarrying for gravel. Or he might be a terrorist about to build a huge truck bomb. All are _possible_, only one is blatantly illegal. RFNA is crudely similar. Doesn't prove Saddam was an angel of sweetness and light, but it's not convincing that he was busy building ICBMs either. He'd need RFNA just to make Kalashnikov ammunition, and he was allowed _that_ (and needed it... Iraq still has hostile neighbours) Hope this was at least somewhat helpful Paul. Take care You too. -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
#37
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#39
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You forgot "no Saddam".
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#40
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"George Z. Bush" wrote in message ...
Not hardly, but that's not a good enough reason to go to war with every no-good murderous ****head in the world. There is a reason to go to war with the murderous ****head. Since it's only Los Angelos bank robbers who are really murderous ****heads. since they use SUVs to kill. But Hussein uses toxic gas. And we use cruise missles that can take any random assortment of 100 or so Middle East Palaces that has ever been built. |
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