No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes

http://www1.iraqwar.ru/iraq-read_art...=21801&lang=en

No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes

05 October 2003

As the first progress report from the Iraq Survey Group is released,
Cambridge WMD expert Dr Glen Rangwala finds that even the diluted
claims made for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't stand up


Last week's progress report by American and British weapons inspectors
in Iraq has failed to supply evidence for the vast majority of the
claims made on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by their governments
before the war.

David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), told congressional
committees in Washington that no official orders or plans could be
found to back up the allegation that a nuclear programme remained
active after 1991. Aluminium tubes have not been used for the
enrichment of uranium, in contrast to US Secretary of State Colin
Powell's lengthy exposition to the UN Security Council in February. No
suspicious activities or residues have been found at the seven sites
within Iraq described in the Prime Minister's dossier from September
2002.

The ISG even casts serious doubt on President Bush's much-trumpeted
claim that US forces had found three mobile biological laboratories
after the war: "technical limitations" would prevent the trailers from
being ideally suited to biological weapons production, it records. In
other words, they were for something else.

There have certainly been no signs of imported uranium, or even
battlefield munitions ready to fire within 45 minutes. Most
significantly, the claim to Parliament on the eve of conflict by Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, that "we know that this man [Saddam
Hussein] has got ... chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses,
bacilli and ... 10,000 litres of anthrax" has yet to find a single
piece of supportive evidence.

Those who staked their career on the existence in Iraq of at least
chemical and biological weapons programmes have latched on to three
claims in the progress report.

First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of
reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum
Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced". Mr Straw
claimed the morning after the report's release that this agent was
"15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX". That is wrong:
botulinum type A is one of the most poisonous substances known, and
was developed in weaponised form by Iraq before 1991. However, type B
- the form found at the biologist's home - is less lethal.

Even then, it would require an extensive process of fermentation, the
growing of the bug, the extraction of the toxin and the weaponisation
of the toxin before it could cause harm. That process would take
weeks, if not longer, but the ISG reported no sign of any of these
activities.

Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common
botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military
laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum
Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them
"seed banks".

Second, a large part of the ISG report is taken up with assertions
that Iraq had been acquiring designs and under- taking research
programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of
150km. The evidence here is more detailed than in the rest of the
report. However, it does not demonstrate that Iraq was violating the
terms of any Security Council resolution. The prohibition on Iraq
acquiring technology relating to chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons was absolute: no agents, no sub-systems and no research or
support facilities.

By contrast, Iraq was simply prohibited from actually having
longer-range missiles, together with "major parts, and repair and
production facilities". The ISG does not claim proof that Iraq had any
such missiles or facilities, just the knowledge to produce them in
future. Indeed, it would have been entirely lawful for Iraq to develop
such systems if the restrictions implemented in 1991 were lifted,
while it would never have been legitimate for it to re-develop WMD.

Third, one sentence within the report has been much quoted: Iraq had
"a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within the
Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment subject to UN
monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research". Note what that
sentence does not say: these facilities were suitable for chemical and
biological weapons research (as almost any modern lab would be), not
that they had engaged in such research. The reference to UN monitoring
is also spurious: under the terms of UN resolutions, all of Iraq's
chemical and biological facilities are subject to monitoring. So all
this tells us is that Iraq had modern laboratories.

http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...p?story=450121

Source: Dr Glen Rangwala The Independent

they have found tons of munitions.

"Michael Petukhov" wrote in message
om...
http://www1.iraqwar.ru/iraq-read_art...=21801&lang=en

No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes

05 October 2003

As the first progress report from the Iraq Survey Group is released,
Cambridge WMD expert Dr Glen Rangwala finds that even the diluted
claims made for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't stand up


Last week's progress report by American and British weapons inspectors
in Iraq has failed to supply evidence for the vast majority of the
claims made on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by their governments
before the war.

David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), told congressional
committees in Washington that no official orders or plans could be
found to back up the allegation that a nuclear programme remained
active after 1991. Aluminium tubes have not been used for the
enrichment of uranium, in contrast to US Secretary of State Colin
Powell's lengthy exposition to the UN Security Council in February. No
suspicious activities or residues have been found at the seven sites
within Iraq described in the Prime Minister's dossier from September
2002.

The ISG even casts serious doubt on President Bush's much-trumpeted
claim that US forces had found three mobile biological laboratories
after the war: "technical limitations" would prevent the trailers from
being ideally suited to biological weapons production, it records. In
other words, they were for something else.

There have certainly been no signs of imported uranium, or even
battlefield munitions ready to fire within 45 minutes. Most
significantly, the claim to Parliament on the eve of conflict by Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, that "we know that this man [Saddam
Hussein] has got ... chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses,
bacilli and ... 10,000 litres of anthrax" has yet to find a single
piece of supportive evidence.

Those who staked their career on the existence in Iraq of at least
chemical and biological weapons programmes have latched on to three
claims in the progress report.

First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of
reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum
Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced". Mr Straw
claimed the morning after the report's release that this agent was
"15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX". That is wrong:
botulinum type A is one of the most poisonous substances known, and
was developed in weaponised form by Iraq before 1991. However, type B
- the form found at the biologist's home - is less lethal.

Even then, it would require an extensive process of fermentation, the
growing of the bug, the extraction of the toxin and the weaponisation
of the toxin before it could cause harm. That process would take
weeks, if not longer, but the ISG reported no sign of any of these
activities.

Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common
botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military
laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum
Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them
"seed banks".

Second, a large part of the ISG report is taken up with assertions
that Iraq had been acquiring designs and under- taking research
programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of
150km. The evidence here is more detailed than in the rest of the
report. However, it does not demonstrate that Iraq was violating the
terms of any Security Council resolution. The prohibition on Iraq
acquiring technology relating to chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons was absolute: no agents, no sub-systems and no research or
support facilities.

By contrast, Iraq was simply prohibited from actually having
longer-range missiles, together with "major parts, and repair and
production facilities". The ISG does not claim proof that Iraq had any
such missiles or facilities, just the knowledge to produce them in
future. Indeed, it would have been entirely lawful for Iraq to develop
such systems if the restrictions implemented in 1991 were lifted,
while it would never have been legitimate for it to re-develop WMD.

Third, one sentence within the report has been much quoted: Iraq had
"a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within the
Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment subject to UN
monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research". Note what that
sentence does not say: these facilities were suitable for chemical and
biological weapons research (as almost any modern lab would be), not
that they had engaged in such research. The reference to UN monitoring
is also spurious: under the terms of UN resolutions, all of Iraq's
chemical and biological facilities are subject to monitoring. So all
this tells us is that Iraq had modern laboratories.

http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...p?story=450121

Source: Dr Glen Rangwala The Independent

(Michael Petukhov) wrote:

:First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of
:reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum
:Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced".

:Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common
:botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military
:laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum
:Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them
:"seed banks".

But when the US CDC sends such things to Iraq, your ilk trumpet the
claim that we're sending them biological weapons stocks....

From: (Michael Petukhov)
m

No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes
05 October 2003

Also from the AP on 10-05-03

Kay Says Iraq Weapons May Still Be Found

By DAVID HO--The Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) - Weapons hunters in Iraq are pursuing tips that point to the
possible presence of anthrax and Scud missiles still hidden in the country, the
chief searcher said Sunday.

David Kay told Congress last week that his survey team had not found nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons so far. But he argued against drawing
conclusions, saying he expects to provide a full picture on Iraq's weapons
programs in six months to nine months.

While lacking physical evidence for the presence anthrax or Scuds, Kay said
tips from Iraqis are motivating the search for them.

Critics, including many in Congress, say Kay's findings do not support most of
the Bush administration's prewar assertions that the United States faced an
imminent, serious threat from Iraq's Saddam Hussein because of widespread and
advanced Iraqi weapons programs.

President Bush has said the U.S.-led war on Iraq was justified despite the
failure to find weapons.

Kay reported that searchers found a vial of live botulinum bacteria that had
been stored since 1993 in an Iraqi scientist's refrigerator. The bacteria make
botulinum toxin, which can be used as a biological weapon, but Kay has offered
no evidence that the bacteria had been used in a weapons program.

The live bacteria was among a collection of ``reference strains'' of biological
organisms that could not be used to produce biological warfare agents.

Kay said Sunday the same scientist told investigators that he was asked to hide
another much larger cache of strains, but ``after a couple of days he turned
them back because he said they were too dangerous. He has small children in the
house.''

Kay said the cache ``contains anthrax and that's one reason we're actively
interested in getting it.'' Kay, speaking on ``Fox News Sunday,'' did not say
whether the anthrax was live or a strain used only for anthrax research.

Before the war, Iraqis said they had destroyed their supply of anthrax.
Inspectors haven't found any and Iraqis haven't been able to provide evidence
to satisfy investigators that they did destroy it. Experts note that old
supplies of anthrax would have degraded by now.

While the Bush administration argued before taking the country to war that
Iraq's arsenal posed an imminent threat, much of what Kay discovered is that
Iraq had interest in such weapons and was researching some agents.

Sen. Joe Lieberman, D-Conn., said Kay's report shows Saddam's clear intent to
develop chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. He
said, however, that the administration didn't tell the public the whole truth.

``There is some evidence that the Bush administration exaggerated
unnecessarily,'' he told ``Fox News Sunday.'' Lieberman, a presidential
candidate, said the exaggeration ``did discredit what was otherwise a very just
cause of fighting tyranny and terrorism.''

Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have contended the vial of botulinum
bacteria that Kay's team found is one strong piece of evidence of Saddam's
weapons intent.

Searches have been unsuccessful for the kind of long-range Scud missiles the
Iraqis fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel in 1991. Many were destroyed during and
after the Persian Gulf War, but the Bush administration had accused Iraq of
continuing to hide Scuds.

Kay said there are indications there may still be Scuds even though Iraq
declared it got rid of them in the early 1990s.

``We have Iraqis now telling us that they continued until 2001, early 2002, to
be capable of mixing and preparing Scud missile fuel. Scud missile fuel is only
useful in Scud missiles,'' he said. ``Why would you continue to produce Scud
missile fuel if you didn't have Scuds? We're looking for the Scuds.''

Kay's report to Congress said the information on fuel production came from
Iraqi sources and has not been confirmed with documents or physical evidence.

Weapons hunters still are looking for chemical weapons at scores of large
ammunition storage sites throughout Iraq. Because of the size of the depots,
searchers have examined only 10 of 130 sites so far, Kay said.

``These are sites that contain - the best estimate is between 600,000 and
650,000 tons of arms,'' he said. ``That's about one-third of the entire
ammunition stockpile of the much larger U.S. military.''

The Iraqis stored chemical weapons, often unmarked, among conventional
munitions, so ``you really have to examine each one,'' Kay said. He said 26
sites are on a critical list to be examined quickly.

On the Net:
David Kay's report to members of Congress: http://www.cia.gov

10/05/03 20:26 EDT

Dav1936531 wrote:
From: (Michael Petukhov)


No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes
05 October 2003

Also from the AP on 10-05-03

Kay Says Iraq Weapons May Still Be Found

Similarly, if pigs grew wings, they might be able to fly.

Yes,Saddam turned out to be a really nice guy after all.And he is sorely
missed,right?


"Michael Petukhov" skrev i melding
om...
http://www1.iraqwar.ru/iraq-read_art...=21801&lang=en

No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes

05 October 2003

As the first progress report from the Iraq Survey Group is released,
Cambridge WMD expert Dr Glen Rangwala finds that even the diluted
claims made for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't stand up


Last week's progress report by American and British weapons inspectors
in Iraq has failed to supply evidence for the vast majority of the
claims made on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by their governments
before the war.

David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), told congressional
committees in Washington that no official orders or plans could be
found to back up the allegation that a nuclear programme remained
active after 1991. Aluminium tubes have not been used for the
enrichment of uranium, in contrast to US Secretary of State Colin
Powell's lengthy exposition to the UN Security Council in February. No
suspicious activities or residues have been found at the seven sites
within Iraq described in the Prime Minister's dossier from September
2002.

The ISG even casts serious doubt on President Bush's much-trumpeted
claim that US forces had found three mobile biological laboratories
after the war: "technical limitations" would prevent the trailers from
being ideally suited to biological weapons production, it records. In
other words, they were for something else.

There have certainly been no signs of imported uranium, or even
battlefield munitions ready to fire within 45 minutes. Most
significantly, the claim to Parliament on the eve of conflict by Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, that "we know that this man [Saddam
Hussein] has got ... chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses,
bacilli and ... 10,000 litres of anthrax" has yet to find a single
piece of supportive evidence.

Those who staked their career on the existence in Iraq of at least
chemical and biological weapons programmes have latched on to three
claims in the progress report.

First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of
reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum
Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced". Mr Straw
claimed the morning after the report's release that this agent was
"15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX". That is wrong:
botulinum type A is one of the most poisonous substances known, and
was developed in weaponised form by Iraq before 1991. However, type B
- the form found at the biologist's home - is less lethal.

Even then, it would require an extensive process of fermentation, the
growing of the bug, the extraction of the toxin and the weaponisation
of the toxin before it could cause harm. That process would take
weeks, if not longer, but the ISG reported no sign of any of these
activities.

Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common
botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military
laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum
Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them
"seed banks".

Second, a large part of the ISG report is taken up with assertions
that Iraq had been acquiring designs and under- taking research
programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of
150km. The evidence here is more detailed than in the rest of the
report. However, it does not demonstrate that Iraq was violating the
terms of any Security Council resolution. The prohibition on Iraq
acquiring technology relating to chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons was absolute: no agents, no sub-systems and no research or
support facilities.

By contrast, Iraq was simply prohibited from actually having
longer-range missiles, together with "major parts, and repair and
production facilities". The ISG does not claim proof that Iraq had any
such missiles or facilities, just the knowledge to produce them in
future. Indeed, it would have been entirely lawful for Iraq to develop
such systems if the restrictions implemented in 1991 were lifted,
while it would never have been legitimate for it to re-develop WMD.

Third, one sentence within the report has been much quoted: Iraq had
"a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within the
Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment subject to UN
monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research". Note what that
sentence does not say: these facilities were suitable for chemical and
biological weapons research (as almost any modern lab would be), not
that they had engaged in such research. The reference to UN monitoring
is also spurious: under the terms of UN resolutions, all of Iraq's
chemical and biological facilities are subject to monitoring. So all
this tells us is that Iraq had modern laboratories.

http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...p?story=450121

Source: Dr Glen Rangwala The Independent

On Mon, 6 Oct 2003 08:42:34 +0200, "Peter Glasø" pgglaso @
broadpark.no wrote:

Yes,Saddam turned out to be a really nice guy after all.And he is sorely
missed,right?

The thing that really ****es me off about the whole situation is not
the result on Iraq, but the effect on Western democracy (and I include
Russia here).

SH was a total *******, We should have chased his sorry ass all the
way to Baghdad in '91. I rejoice in his downfall and the impending day
when he is torn limb from limb down the streets of Tikrit.

But if this was a long-overdue war to depose SH, then why couldn't we
be _honest_ about it and call it that ?

Instead we've seen the unedifying spectacle of Bush blaming SH for the
WTC attacks, and the majority of America believing it. Or Blair
claiming that we're only 45 minutes from an Iraqi attack on the Tube.
Now Bush isn't my prez, so I'll let someone else rant about him. But
Blair has lied and cheated all around this issue, and has misled and
twisted the parliament of _my_ country in a way that hasn't been seen
since Charles I.

There are no WMD. There were once, he wanted some more, but the fine
work of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC kept his greedy little hands out of the
cookie jar (despite some shameful behaviour by some European
manufacturers and conniving governments). If any last remnant of these
programs had survived, or some final struggle went on like
Heisenberg's atomkeller, then it was by and large irrelevant. It was
certainly no justification for this war.

We (the larger coallition of Western states) should have waited. There
was scope for ongoing inspection, if we really were concerned about an
international risk of WMD attack. Against the argument of "We had to
move in before the Summer heat", I'd ask why such moves couldn't have
been put in train 6 months earlier, and also point out that it's now
October and ground troops are still in there, after the worst of
Summer.

Waiting, and continuing the inspections, would have probably brought
Germany on board as a supporter, if there was any real justification,
and would have reduced the basis on which France and Russia could have
continued to refuse.

I think Blair probably does sincerely believe in the threat of Iraqi
WMD. He is, after all, the Hughie Green of British sound-bite
politics. But this has more to with him being so far up his own spin
that he convinces himself to truly believe it. A UK president with
such a capacity for genuine doublethink is truly frightening.

--
Smert' spamionam

"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...
(Michael Petukhov) wrote:

:First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of
:reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum
:Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced".

:Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common
:botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military
:laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum
:Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them
:"seed banks".

But when the US CDC sends such things to Iraq, your ilk trumpet the
claim that we're sending them biological weapons stocks....


There's an interesting article the BBC published yesterday
about David Kay The man spearheading the US hunt for
banned weapons in Iraq. He said he is surprised attention
has focused on what his Iraq Survey Group has not found,
rather than on the things it has uncovered.

He says his Iraq Survey Group has uncovered evidence of
banned activities which the United Nations and pre-war
intelligence had not known about, including 24 clandestine
laboratories and four unreported missile programmes.

He also insisted his report last week to US Congress was interim.
"I know we're going to find remarkable things about Iraq's
weapons programmes," he said.

Keith

Not hardly, but that's not a good enough reason to go to war with every no-good
murderous ****head in the world. Imminent danger from Saddam would have been,
but we can't even prove imminent, having spent over 6 months and billions of
dollars looking. How long and how much will it take for you and your apologist
buddies to admit that there was nothing there and stop making excuses for
picking a fight? We behaved like international bullies, we've lost most of our
allies and their respect, and we have precious little to show for our efforts
other than growing casualty lists and an Iraqi oil infrastructure that's going
to drain us dry trying to repair it. Even worse, it's going to make Halliburton
rich because they're the ones who are going to end up with all that money we're
going to be spending on it, and they didn't even have to bid on their contract,
a little something that has its own distinctive outhouse type smell to it.

George Z.

Peter Glasø wrote:
Yes,Saddam turned out to be a really nice guy after all.And he is sorely
missed,right?


"Michael Petukhov" skrev i melding
om...
http://www1.iraqwar.ru/iraq-read_art...=21801&lang=en

No uranium, no munitions, no missiles, no programmes

05 October 2003

As the first progress report from the Iraq Survey Group is released,
Cambridge WMD expert Dr Glen Rangwala finds that even the diluted
claims made for Saddam Hussein's arsenal don't stand up


Last week's progress report by American and British weapons inspectors
in Iraq has failed to supply evidence for the vast majority of the
claims made on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by their governments
before the war.

David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), told congressional
committees in Washington that no official orders or plans could be
found to back up the allegation that a nuclear programme remained
active after 1991. Aluminium tubes have not been used for the
enrichment of uranium, in contrast to US Secretary of State Colin
Powell's lengthy exposition to the UN Security Council in February. No
suspicious activities or residues have been found at the seven sites
within Iraq described in the Prime Minister's dossier from September
2002.

The ISG even casts serious doubt on President Bush's much-trumpeted
claim that US forces had found three mobile biological laboratories
after the war: "technical limitations" would prevent the trailers from
being ideally suited to biological weapons production, it records. In
other words, they were for something else.

There have certainly been no signs of imported uranium, or even
battlefield munitions ready to fire within 45 minutes. Most
significantly, the claim to Parliament on the eve of conflict by Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, that "we know that this man [Saddam
Hussein] has got ... chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses,
bacilli and ... 10,000 litres of anthrax" has yet to find a single
piece of supportive evidence.

Those who staked their career on the existence in Iraq of at least
chemical and biological weapons programmes have latched on to three
claims in the progress report.

First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of
reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum
Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced". Mr Straw
claimed the morning after the report's release that this agent was
"15,000 times more toxic than the nerve agent VX". That is wrong:
botulinum type A is one of the most poisonous substances known, and
was developed in weaponised form by Iraq before 1991. However, type B
- the form found at the biologist's home - is less lethal.

Even then, it would require an extensive process of fermentation, the
growing of the bug, the extraction of the toxin and the weaponisation
of the toxin before it could cause harm. That process would take
weeks, if not longer, but the ISG reported no sign of any of these
activities.

Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common
botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military
laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum
Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them
"seed banks".

Second, a large part of the ISG report is taken up with assertions
that Iraq had been acquiring designs and under- taking research
programmes for missiles with a range that exceeded the UN limit of
150km. The evidence here is more detailed than in the rest of the
report. However, it does not demonstrate that Iraq was violating the
terms of any Security Council resolution. The prohibition on Iraq
acquiring technology relating to chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons was absolute: no agents, no sub-systems and no research or
support facilities.

By contrast, Iraq was simply prohibited from actually having
longer-range missiles, together with "major parts, and repair and
production facilities". The ISG does not claim proof that Iraq had any
such missiles or facilities, just the knowledge to produce them in
future. Indeed, it would have been entirely lawful for Iraq to develop
such systems if the restrictions implemented in 1991 were lifted,
while it would never have been legitimate for it to re-develop WMD.

Third, one sentence within the report has been much quoted: Iraq had
"a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within the
Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment subject to UN
monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research". Note what that
sentence does not say: these facilities were suitable for chemical and
biological weapons research (as almost any modern lab would be), not
that they had engaged in such research. The reference to UN monitoring
is also spurious: under the terms of UN resolutions, all of Iraq's
chemical and biological facilities are subject to monitoring. So all
this tells us is that Iraq had modern laboratories.

http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...p?story=450121

Source: Dr Glen Rangwala The Independent

Keith Willshaw wrote:
"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...
(Michael Petukhov) wrote:

First, there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of
reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum
Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced".

Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common
botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military
laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum
Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them :"seed
banks".

But when the US CDC sends such things to Iraq, your ilk trumpet the
claim that we're sending them biological weapons stocks....


There's an interesting article the BBC published yesterday
about David Kay The man spearheading the US hunt for
banned weapons in Iraq. He said he is surprised attention
has focused on what his Iraq Survey Group has not found,
rather than on the things it has uncovered.

He says his Iraq Survey Group has uncovered evidence of
banned activities which the United Nations and pre-war
intelligence had not known about, including 24 clandestine
laboratories and four unreported missile programmes.

He also insisted his report last week to US Congress was interim.
"I know we're going to find remarkable things about Iraq's
weapons programmes," he said.

But, without the weapons that they're probably not going to find because they
don't exist, how badly could those programs have injured anybody? Is that going
to be the next empty rationale for assaulting a despicable government?

George Z.

Keith