Proposed SZD-55 EASA AD now out for comment - "Flight Controls – Elevator Control System / Vertical Tail – Inspection"

Comment period ends 5 April. It would require an inspection within 60 days to ensure the elevator control attachment slot on the vertical stab be measured. One which caused a fatal crash in UK last year was found to have been enlarged. If the cut-out has been enlarged, the factory must be informed and it would have to be fixed before the next flight. Details at https://ad..easa.europa.eu/ad/18-038 , including a link for the AD as a PDF.

From a comment on the SZD-55 Yahoo! Group (my group but not my comment):
"From various informal discussions I have had, there seems to be potential for significant variation in the size of the elevator slot on different aircraft. If this is the case, I would expect a large number of owners who are subject to EASA regulations to have to modify their aircraft within 60 days if they are to remain airworthy."

I don't know if the U.S. treats EASA AD's like Canada, but up here, they apply. I know of two 55's which have been informally measured and happily found to be unaltered; they will still require a quick look and logbook entry by our mechanic.

For those that wonder why do positive control checks with automatic hookups..

On Friday, March 23, 2018 at 10:01:15 AM UTC-7, Dan Daly wrote:
Comment period ends 5 April. It would require an inspection within 60 days to ensure the elevator control attachment slot on the vertical stab be measured. One which caused a fatal crash in UK last year was found to have been enlarged. If the cut-out has been enlarged, the factory must be informed and it would have to be fixed before the next flight. Details at https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/18-038 , including a link for the AD as a PDF.

From a comment on the SZD-55 Yahoo! Group (my group but not my comment):
"From various informal discussions I have had, there seems to be potential for significant variation in the size of the elevator slot on different aircraft. If this is the case, I would expect a large number of owners who are subject to EASA regulations to have to modify their aircraft within 60 days if they are to remain airworthy."

I don't know if the U.S. treats EASA AD's like Canada, but up here, they apply. I know of two 55's which have been informally measured and happily found to be unaltered; they will still require a quick look and logbook entry by our mechanic.

On Friday, March 23, 2018 at 1:01:15 PM UTC-4, Dan Daly wrote:
It would require an inspection within 60 days to ensure the elevator control attachment slot on the vertical stab be measured. One which caused a fatal crash in UK last year was found to have been enlarged. If the cut-out has been enlarged, the factory must be informed and it would have to be fixed before the next flight.


I'll rephrase this just in case someone else has trouble understanding statements written in the passive voice.

Somebody cut away FRP material and enlarged a hole in the top of the vertical stabilizer of a SZD-55. This modification makes it possible for the pilot to assemble the glider such that he ends up with an inoperative elevator control linkage.

Why would someone do that? Can a 55 owner provide some context? Is there some rigging difficulty they were trying to resolve?

On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 1:37:36 AM UTC-4, wrote:
Why would someone do that? Can a 55 owner provide some context? Is there some rigging difficulty they were trying to resolve?

The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch published a thorough 22 page report. https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...zd-55-1-g-cklr

On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 9:07:25 AM UTC-4, Dan Daly wrote:

The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch published a thorough 22 page report. https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...zd-55-1-g-cklr

From that report:

"In a photograph taken in July 2006 while this repair was being carried out, the enlarged elevator lever slot in the horizontal rib of the tail fin is clearly visible, indicating that it had been modified prior to this point."

'Accident waiting to happen' for 12 years.

When I bought my SZD glider, I found that the previous owner had removed ~10 lbs of factory installed lead ballast from the nose. The ballast mount location was hidden behind an access panel.

The horizontal stabilizer attachment on the 55 is one of the easiest designs I have seen and I never had a problem installing it. It went on perfectly and easily every time.
I have a totally unsubstantiated theory about what may have happened. I am wondering if material was removed at the 3000 hour inspection for the insertion of a borescope and never replaced?
Tragic none the less.

Bob 7U


On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 10:15:36 AM UTC-4, son_of_flubber wrote:
On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 9:07:25 AM UTC-4, Dan Daly wrote:

The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch published a thorough 22 page report. https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...zd-55-1-g-cklr

From that report:

"In a photograph taken in July 2006 while this repair was being carried out, the enlarged elevator lever slot in the horizontal rib of the tail fin is clearly visible, indicating that it had been modified prior to this point."

'Accident waiting to happen' for 12 years.

When I bought my SZD glider, I found that the previous owner had removed ~10 lbs of factory installed lead ballast from the nose. The ballast mount location was hidden behind an access panel.

On Saturday, March 24, 2018 at 10:15:36 AM UTC-4, son_of_flubber wrote:
When I bought my SZD glider, I found that the previous owner had removed ~10 lbs of factory installed lead ballast from the nose. The ballast mount location was hidden behind an access panel.

- when I bought my Russia it came with 9 pounds of lead shot / epoxy mix permanently mounted in the nose, hidden behind the front bulkhead panel. Thankfully the seller told me about it. (And for me flying it, I had to add even more ballast in another forward location.) Be careful with the W&B!

If memory serves me right, there was a fatal accident with a SZD55 maybe a year or two ago which sounded very similar to what the British accident report summary states:
'During a towed launch, the glider was seen to climb rapidly. After disconnecting from the tow rope with a very high pitch angle, the glider rolled to the right and descended before hitting the ground in a nose-down attitude. The pilot was fatally injured.'
I cannot find the NTSB accident report for the accident in the US but it may be worth looking into it.

Uli
'AS'

On Sunday, March 25, 2018 at 11:14:57 AM UTC-4, AS wrote:
If memory serves me right, there was a fatal accident with a SZD55 maybe a year or two ago which sounded very similar to what the British accident report summary states:
'During a towed launch, the glider was seen to climb rapidly. After disconnecting from the tow rope with a very high pitch angle, the glider rolled to the right and descended before hitting the ground in a nose-down attitude. The pilot was fatally injured.'
I cannot find the NTSB accident report for the accident in the US but it may be worth looking into it.

Uli
'AS'

Uli:

NTSB Identification: CEN16FA308
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, August 06, 2016 in Channahon, IL
Aircraft: PZL-BIELSKO SZD 55-1, registration: N551DR
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
[A BUNCH DELETED FOR BREVITY] QUOTE ...The empennage remained intact and exhibited no damage. The wing and horizontal stabilizer attach points were attached properly and were secure. The flight controls, including the spoilers, were checked for continuity from the flight controls to their respective surfaces. Flight control cables and control tubes were traced and all breaks were consistent with overload. No preimpact flight control continuity anomalies were detected... UNQUOTE