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#31
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"Bjørnar Bolsøy" wrote in message ...
steve gallacci wrote in : Ian wrote: "Dweezil Dwarftosser" wrote in message ... George wrote: Cool... if (and only if): - the laser has the same optical path as the video- aiming device. (May be slaved to radar aim point, but it is essential the trigger-puller be able to SEE the effectiveness of the aim/shot). - all battles are over a sunny, clear desert. - there is no smoke from previous targets, ground or air. - There is no "Interlocks out" switch in the cockpit, so the pilot cannot short-cuircuit the mandatory charge time. (prevents him from firing "blanks"...) From what I've read, I'd say it is viable to do this, but questions have been asked about the "recharge" time for the laser? While lasers could be cool, I have doubts about effectiveness, especially once they become operational, as ablatives and other protections/countermeasures could reduce them to little more than over-built flashlights. What about the heat generated by it? A 100KW laser means many times that in generated electrical power. Where do you put it? Regards... So far the way I've seen is to use water-cooling internally which radiates through air cooled fins, using ram-air from the slipstream to insure rapid air movement. How well this works, I don't know. For the electrical power and placing, Lockheed has suggested using the STOVL model and taking out the lift fan, using the large amount of shaft horsepower to run a generator for power and the space for the laser and generator. |
#32
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Tony Williams wrote:
Guy Alcala wrote in message ... snip And I am essentially agnostic on the matter, perhaps leaning slightly towards the gun pod solution for those "short of hot war" situations. This is my comment on gunpods: "Podded guns have the advantage that they don't need to be lugged around unless the planes are in circumstances in which a gun is likely to be needed. Like any other piece of hardware, they can be fitted according to requirements. The downside of this is that you first have to make sure that the gunpods are available when required, you have to be psychic to determine when they might be useful, they use up a hardpoint which would otherwise be available for fuel or other weapons, they take some time to harmonise – and keep harmonised – when fitted, and even then are less accurate than integral guns. Gunpods generate more drag, usually affect handling and are also much less "stealthy" than integral guns; a factor likely to be increasingly important as stealth measures are leading to the internal carriage of all weapons. This solution is therefore very much second best, but it is better than nothing. The installation of weapons in purpose-designed conformal pods fitted directly to the fuselage and intended to be more or less permanent fixtures does reduce or avoid some of the above problems." No argument with any of the above, with the exception of the "use up a hardpoint otherwise available for fuel," as that's design dependent (you sort of cover that when mentioning the conformal pods). And, on the flip side, you can always use the internal space that would otherwise have a gun in it for fuel or electronics, meaning it's low drag and you won't be jettisoning any of it to maximise performance. In a peacetime "identify and escort" role, the extra drag and loss of stealth of the gun pod is pretty irrelevant, and in wartime you can do without. of course, if you want to have a convertible internal space, fuel/guns/what have you, that's one option, but then you're guaranteeing that the airframe will be larger than it would otherwise need to be. Guy |
#33
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"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
In message , Tony Williams writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... "Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free. No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance. I'm still unconvinced that a gun (in its current incarnation) is the best option, if that's a key driver. Now here, Tony raises an interesting point. Talking with a serving IAF pilot some years back, he mentioned that all their tactical a/c have their guns loaded on every flight, including training, just so they'll have something to fire if they get diverted to an interception. He said that an IAF Brigadier General had shot down a foreign recon drone while on a training flight in his (IIRR) F-15 . Of course, lasers or cheap missiles may do the job as well, and high-performance UAVs are never going to be _that_ cheap. snip How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest? Irrelevant - the point I am making is that missiles run out very fast. A few examples where this has befallen Western pilots would be handy. It was a problem in Vietnam for the USAF, for example, where they were plagued by poor reliability of the weapons and by doctrinal guidance to volley every selected weapon at a target (so a F-4 Phantom effectively had one Sidewinder shot and one Sparrow shot); the USN used different doctrine based on single firings and got much better results. A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills, one a C-130 finished off with gunfire after Sidewinder hits and one Pucara: though on several occasions the SHars emptied their guns at Argentine aircraft without results (LCdrs Mike Blissett and 'Fred' Frederiksen, and Lt. Clive Morell, all had this experience on the 21st May, for instance: Sharkey Ward recalls firing on and missing a Turbo-Mentor, as well as three SHars taking five firing passes to down a single Pucara; Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan scored two kills with two Sidewinders on 8th June, and shot his guns dry to no effect before his wingman got a third kill with another Sidewinder...) Having the guns along when the missiles were exhausted was no guarantee of being able to get into range, let alone score disabling damage: with hindsight, trading the gun pods for more fuel and twin-rail Sidewinder launchers (giving four rather than two shots) would have been much more effective. snip Yup. Of course, the lack of IR decoys in most of the Argentine a/c also played a part, but we're now in the age of IIR seekers, and decoying _them_ is going to be very difficult if not impossible. They may require damage or destruction to make them miss. And if the SHARs had had RH missiles and PD radar (and AEW), then chances are they would have shot down many of the Argentine aircraft long before they'd even have closed to visual range, even if they were using older generation missiles. Guy |
#34
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phil hunt wrote:
On Sun, 15 Feb 2004 22:52:39 -0000, James Hart wrote: As we (the Brits) don't seem to go to war with anyone now on our own then it would appear to be a good cost saving idea at a first glance, if we can't do the job then someone else in the alliance will take up the slack in that role. If at a later date it turns out to be a mistake then with the rest of the Eurofighter client nations taking up the gun then posibly there would be a route for us reinstating it. Following that logic we could scrap the entire armed forces! That would be the logical progression of the cost saving plans. It would make us an incredibly weak country though, virtually anyone could sail in and cause us some major damage, or try to nibble away at our outlying territories like the Falklands. Wasn't there a big round of cost cutting implemented just before the Argies invaded? I recall seeing a docu that seemed to imply if the full cutbacks had been implemented we'd never of had the capability to go to war that far away. -- James... www.jameshart.co.uk |
#35
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George wrote:
So far the way I've seen is to use water-cooling internally which radiates through air cooled fins, using ram-air from the slipstream to insure rapid air movement. How well this works, I don't know. I've seen mention of fuel cooling. Use the fuel tanks as a heat sink, then burn the heated fuel. There's a slight efficiency loss in the engine, I think. -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
#36
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"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Tony Williams writes A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills, one a C-130 finished off with gunfire after Sidewinder hits and one Pucara: though on several occasions the SHars emptied their guns at Argentine aircraft without results (LCdrs Mike Blissett and 'Fred' Frederiksen, and Lt. Clive Morell, all had this experience on the 21st May, for instance: Sharkey Ward recalls firing on and missing a Turbo-Mentor, as well as three SHars taking five firing passes to down a single Pucara; Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan scored two kills with two Sidewinders on 8th June, and shot his guns dry to no effect before his wingman got a third kill with another Sidewinder...) Fair points. However, the 30mm Aden is an old gun with poor ballistics by modern standards and there are now much better guns available for air combat. The critical factor is of course the quality of the gun fire control system. I don't know how good it was in the SHARs, but what I have read about modern fighters is that once they've got a radar lock there is a strong probability of a gun kill, with only a short burst normally being required. In some cases, the FCS actually takes over control of some elements of the flight controls to ensure that the gun is correctly aimed. The Iranian F-14s made good use of their Phoenix missiles, and Sparrows, but still ended up in gunfights on occasions and even scored kills with the gun. The Iranians also used human wave attacks against prepared defensive positions, using unarmed schoolboys carrying plastic "keys to heaven" in the first wave (they were expendable, available, and revealed the locations of minefields and concealed bunkers for the armed fighters following). I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved. There's loads of detail available in Cooper and Bishop's 'Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988' (Schiffer Military History, 2000). The Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS, orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However, tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns. Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of the story than might actually exist. The Sea Harriers have, what - two or three more years? They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the chances of a 'danger close'? I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to use. Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#37
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Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
"Paul J. Adam" wrote: In message , Tony Williams writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... "Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free. No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance. I'm still unconvinced that a gun (in its current incarnation) is the best option, if that's a key driver. Now here, Tony raises an interesting point. Talking with a serving IAF pilot some years back, he mentioned that all their tactical a/c have their guns loaded on every flight, including training, just so they'll have something to fire if they get diverted to an interception. He said that an IAF Brigadier General had shot down a foreign recon drone while on a training flight in his (IIRR) F-15 . Of course, lasers or cheap missiles may do the job as well, and high-performance UAVs are never going to be _that_ cheap. The reason for the MiG-31 (a specialised, long-range interceptor if ever there was one) carrying the GSh-6-23 gun is reportedly specifically to deal with recon drones etc. Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#38
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In message , Tony
Williams writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills Fair points. However, the 30mm Aden is an old gun with poor ballistics by modern standards and there are now much better guns available for air combat. The critical factor is of course the quality of the gun fire control system. I don't know how good it was in the SHARs, but what I have read about modern fighters is that once they've got a radar lock there is a strong probability of a gun kill, with only a short burst normally being required. In some cases, the FCS actually takes over control of some elements of the flight controls to ensure that the gun is correctly aimed. Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed Tony, you get picked on because you're a reasonable man advancing good arguments and so I can have a civil debate with you. It's not your fault that others have advanced some rather poor arguments... you just get hit with defending them sometimes as well as arguing your own position. I appreciate your forbearance. I'd personally like to keep the gun a little longer, especially in cases like EF2000 where the fitting costs are paid already: but there _is_ the problem that training costs are significant, and the UK defence budget _is_ so straightened that "deleting maintenance and training for Eurofighter guns" is operationally significant and funds more urgent requirements, and seems to be less bad than the alternatives. It sucks but there it is. I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved. There's loads of detail available in Cooper and Bishop's 'Iran-Iraq War in the Air 1980-1988' (Schiffer Military History, 2000). Thanks for the cue. Tom Cooper posts on occasion and comes across well: another author found via Usenet, it seems. The Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS, orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However, tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns. Out of interest, how many Iranian Tomcats were lost in air combat? They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the chances of a 'danger close'? I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to use. True to a point, but the SHars are at least multi-role and could even be swing-role with the right loadout (what does the A in FA.2 stand for, after all?) and there wasn't a noticeable fixed-wing air threat in Sierra Leone that would require a CAP or DLI presence. Also, can't the RAF Harriers use the 30mm gun packs? I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say "that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!" than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance shortcomings. I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why. For that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?) Who knows, if I can find the time I may follow your example and write a book with this as a chapter [1] Based on sound analysis for the expected wars, is the worst thing. Fighter-versus-fighter shootouts at low level in Southeast Asia were not a high priority compared to keeping nuclear missile-armed bombers from hitting USN carrier groups or US cities, back when design decisions were being made... -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
#39
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"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Tony Williams writes Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed True. I do include this statement in the book: "The percentage of shots which hit the target in air-to-air firing exercises varies greatly depending on the circumstances. Modern fire control systems can calculate the correct aiming point, taking into account such variables as the effects of gravity (if the gun is fired when the aircraft is banking) and of relative wind (if the aircraft is manoeuvring so that its gun is pointing away from the direction of flight). If the radar is locked on to the target, a high percentage of hits can be achieved; if not, then the scores drop down to optical gunsight levels. If a pilot knows he is under gun attack, he can make a radar lock virtually impossible by constantly making small changes in direction every couple of seconds. The number of hits required to destroy a modern aircraft is estimated at four to six hits of 30 mm fire and perhaps three times as many with a 20 mm gun." However, it obviously takes an aware and skilled pilot to stop his attacker from getting a radar lock. Tony, you get picked on because you're a reasonable man advancing good arguments and so I can have a civil debate with you. It's not your fault that others have advanced some rather poor arguments... you just get hit with defending them sometimes as well as arguing your own position. I appreciate your forbearance. No problem - I enjoy a good debate and learn from it; it's only the idiots who occasionally irritate me! I sometimes have to remind myself of the sound advice someone once used as a signatu "Never argue with an idiot. He'll drag you down to his level and beat you with experience." The Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS, orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However, tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns. Out of interest, how many Iranian Tomcats were lost in air combat? Umm. I don't know off hand. The major failing of the book is that it doesn't have an index. However, Tom Cooper helps to manage the acig.org site which collects and posts shoot-down stats for post-WW2 conflicts. I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to use. True to a point, but the SHars are at least multi-role and could even be swing-role with the right loadout (what does the A in FA.2 stand for, after all?) and there wasn't a noticeable fixed-wing air threat in Sierra Leone that would require a CAP or DLI presence. Well, I presume that the GR.7s were specifically sent along to do the job; the RN doesn't normally carry them unless they're needed, AFAIK. Also, can't the RAF Harriers use the 30mm gun packs? I doubt that very much. Apart from the fact that their 'gunpods' are now stuffed with electronics which are presumably a part of their system, they almost certainly don't have the gun programme in their FCS. I remember some years ago there was a series on DERA which incidentally included some footage of a GR.7 testing the unfortunate 25mm Aden installation (the test had to be aborted as one of the guns broke...). They were having great difficulty adjusting the system to get the guns firing accurately - they were missing the targets by scores of metres. There's more to installing a gun than just bolting it on. I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say "that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!" than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance shortcomings. I also include the following in the book, which illustrates your point rather better than Vietnam: "The growing importance of missiles is graphically demonstrated by the experience of the Israeli Air Force, which has experienced more air-to-air combat in this period than any other. In the Six Day War of 1967, guns scored 100% of the Israeli fighter kills. Between then and 1973, the figure dropped to 70%. In the Yom Kippur War there was a further drop to 30%, between 1973 and 1979 it was 20%, from 1979 to 1982 it was 10%, in the Lebanon campaign of 1982 it was 7%, and since then 0%." I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why. For that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?) I presume that the F-14 installation, along with the F-15, was part of the 'backlash' against the gunless planes (for the initially lower-capability, general-purpose F-16 the gun was more understandable). The F-111B could carry a gun - another quote: "The F 111 had an internal weapons bay in the front fuselage and one of the loads that could be accommodated was a M61A1 with a generous 2,048 rounds, with the gun in the left half of the bay. The only version that regularly carried this weapon was the F 111D, and although it was carried in Vietnam the weapon saw no use there. It was soon decided to carry AIM 9 missiles for self-defence instead." Who knows, if I can find the time I may follow your example and write a book with this as a chapter Join the club - but be prepared to give up your social life and get a pittance in return! Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#40
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Tony Williams wrote:
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... In message , Tony Williams writes Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed True. I do include this statement in the book: "The percentage of shots which hit the target in air-to-air firing exercises varies greatly depending on the circumstances. Modern fire control systems can calculate the correct aiming point, taking into account such variables as the effects of gravity (if the gun is fired when the aircraft is banking) and of relative wind (if the aircraft is manoeuvring so that its gun is pointing away from the direction of flight). If the radar is locked on to the target, a high percentage of hits can be achieved; if not, then the scores drop down to optical gunsight levels. If a pilot knows he is under gun attack, he can make a radar lock virtually impossible by constantly making small changes in direction every couple of seconds. The number of hits required to destroy a modern aircraft is estimated at four to six hits of 30 mm fire and perhaps three times as many with a 20 mm gun." However, it obviously takes an aware and skilled pilot to stop his attacker from getting a radar lock. ISTM we're ignoring Laser/IRSTS here, but many of the same comments apply. However, if you're locking someone up then you're almost certainly setting off his radar/laser warning systems (assuming he's so fitted). snip I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say "that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!" than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance shortcomings. I also include the following in the book, which illustrates your point rather better than Vietnam: "The growing importance of missiles is graphically demonstrated by the experience of the Israeli Air Force, which has experienced more air-to-air combat in this period than any other. In the Six Day War of 1967, guns scored 100% of the Israeli fighter kills. Between then and 1973, the figure dropped to 70%. In the Yom Kippur War there was a further drop to 30%, between 1973 and 1979 it was 20%, from 1979 to 1982 it was 10%, in the Lebanon campaign of 1982 it was 7%, and since then 0%." Someone else has a copy of "Fighters over Israel" ;-) I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why. For that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?) I presume that the F-14 installation, along with the F-15, was part of the 'backlash' against the gunless planes (for the initially lower-capability, general-purpose F-16 the gun was more understandable). The F-111B could carry a gun - another quote: "The F 111 had an internal weapons bay in the front fuselage and one of the loads that could be accommodated was a M61A1 with a generous 2,048 rounds, with the gun in the left half of the bay. The only version that regularly carried this weapon was the F 111D, and although it was carried in Vietnam the weapon saw no use there. It was soon decided to carry AIM 9 missiles for self-defence instead." snip FWIW, Tony Thornborough's first book on the 'Vark (and probably the bigger one, which I haven't read) contains interviews with a fair number of F-111A crews who flew in Vietnam. Their comment was that they were ordered to carry the loaded gun on every mission and did so, but absolutely no one ever used it or intended to do so, and they considered it and its ammo unnecessary weight. It made no sense to use it, given their mission (night/all-weather, Lo-Lo-Lo-Hi, single-ship laydown attacks). The last thing they were going to do was to come around and make strafing passes on an alerted target -- they figured if a full load of Slicks/Snakes/CBUs didn't do the job the cannon wasn't going to, and it's not as if there were any MiGs flying around in the conditions they operated in. Guy |
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