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#11
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"Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 16:01:14 +0200, "Tamas Feher" wrote: A home-made armored Caterpillar turns Colorado into Palestine? Palestine has dead. The authorities ended this one without public deaths. Pure chance. They had no absolutely contact with the madman whatsoever . If he decided to target a chemical plant and cause a Bhopal-scale industrial disaster, the cops simply couldn't stop him. In the end an entire county could get killed. Do you know enough about the local geography and plants to say that this sort of thing is possible? I worked fifteen years in the CPI and rubber industries. It would not be possible in any plant I was involved with. Three of them had the potential to make Bhopal look trivial. To get a major disaster out of a modern process plant, you pretty much have to be in the control room. Bhopal and Chernobyl (sp?) are examples. Tear open a line in the wrong place and you have the potential for a major accident. For example at the outlet from the furnaces of a cracking unit the gas is above its self ignition temperature, a fracture here would be VERY bad news. In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units. Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose. Keith ----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups ---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =--- |
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Keith Willshaw wrote: " To get a major disaster out of a modern process plant, you pretty much have to be in the control room. Bhopal and Chernobyl (sp?) are examples. Tear open a line in the wrong place and you have the potential for a major accident. For example at the outlet from the furnaces of a cracking unit the gas is above its self ignition temperature, a fracture here would be VERY bad news. In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units. Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose. However the idea of targeting the intruder with an air strike is simply ludicrous. almost any facility vulnerable to damage by a bulldozer causing a disaster would be much more vulnerable to stray rounds from an air strike. Vince |
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"Aardvark J. Bandersnatch, MP" wrote in message
news:mP_wc.12741$HG.7059@attbi_s53... "Tamas Feher" wrote in message ... Posse Comitatus Act and such ..do not affect the ANG (Air National Guard), of course. You didn't read the very post you replied to! Indeed it *does* affect the Air National Guard. Internal law enforcement is left to the civil authorities. The national guard would not be involved unless the governor of the state orders units to respond. Very small nit: In the event of a *total* breakdown of law and order and the *total* inability of *all* local law-enforcement agencies to do their jobs, the Governor *may* declare Martial Law. At that time, he hands over total control of everything within his State to the State Commander of the National Guard (the ANG Commander answers to him). The situation in Granby didn't even equal a pimple on the ass of that size a monster, so it didn't happen. -- The One-and-only Holy Moses™ |
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"Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 15:33:05 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: For the plant it might be, and there might be casualties there, but, because the gas is over its ignition temperature, it can't BLEVE. You get a fire burning the material in the pipe. There wouldn't be effect beyond the fence. If the plant systems functioned properly, the outage might be less than two weeks. BTW, how would you go about breaking this line? A buldozer isn't going to get there. These lines are fairly robust and plant's just in case defenses against leaks are considerable. Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard to contain. Go and look at the report on what happened at Flixborough (I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator or maintenance error compounded by control room error.) In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units. Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose. Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC, they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed. Gee I just said that There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not centrally controlled. Quite so , not that it would have helped much The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless No part of the plant met modern standards. There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants still out there and the best control system in the world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of Cyclohexane into the environment. The causes of the event were internal to the plant. The process affected was obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such. A bulldozer tearing open a line would have had the same effect. The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would be one hell of a whoosh. You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened by that flame and what happens when they fail. It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve. Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere BANG Keith ----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups ---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =--- |
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On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote: "Peter Skelton" wrote in message .. . On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 15:33:05 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: For the plant it might be, and there might be casualties there, but, because the gas is over its ignition temperature, it can't BLEVE. You get a fire burning the material in the pipe. There wouldn't be effect beyond the fence. If the plant systems functioned properly, the outage might be less than two weeks. BTW, how would you go about breaking this line? A buldozer isn't going to get there. These lines are fairly robust and plant's just in case defenses against leaks are considerable. Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard to contain. The regulations must be drastically different over there. Go and look at the report on what happened at Flixborough I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't generally available. (I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator or maintenance error compounded by control room error.) In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units. Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose. Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC, they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed. Gee I just said that No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass. There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not centrally controlled. Quite so , not that it would have helped much It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes. The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless No part of the plant met modern standards. There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants still out there and the best control system in the world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of Cyclohexane into the environment. There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture. The causes of the event were internal to the plant. The process affected was obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such. A bulldozer tearing open a line would have had the same effect. How do you get the bulldozer to the line? Then how do you get the line to dump much more than its contents? And who still oxidizes cyane outside a collum? The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would be one hell of a whoosh. You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened by that flame and what happens when they fail. No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about. BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant. It's not all that easy to do here. It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve. Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere BANG You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an attack. The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of explosions or chemical plants. The plant you chose is ludicrously different from existing types. The CPI is not immune to accident. There have been many, there will be more but this is a low-probablility scenario. In the case at question, calling in an air strike because of the possibility that the bulldozer might enter a chemical plant and do mischief, I'll stick with what they decided to do. Peter Skelton |
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"Tamas Feher" wrote in message ... Posse Comitatus Act and such ..do not affect the ANG (Air National Guard), of course. You didn't read the very post you replied to! Thank you for confirming that you haven't the faintest idea what you are talking about. -- Jim McLaughlin Please don't just hit the reply key. Remove the obvious from the address to reply. ************************************************** ************************* |
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"Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: snip Go and look at the report on what happened at Flixborough I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't generally available. Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you wonder why more and more folks don't believe you? snip The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response below...amazing, huh? Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless snip Brooks |
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"Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard to contain. The regulations must be drastically different over there. LPG cant read Go and look at the report on what happened at Flixborough I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't generally available. Yeah right, I only read the official report and work on reliability and failure studies for a living, what would I know ? More than you it seems since I knew the full extent of the damage. (I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator or maintenance error compounded by control room error.) In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units. Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose. Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC, they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed. Gee I just said that No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass. Which is functionally identical to what you posted. Did you even read it ? There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not centrally controlled. Quite so , not that it would have helped much It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes. Only if it were still functional after the initial explosion, given the scale of the damage done by what was to all intents a 50 ton FAE thats unlikely. The issue is moot however since the major damage was done by the initial explosion The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless No part of the plant met modern standards. There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants still out there and the best control system in the world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of Cyclohexane into the environment. There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture. There are lots of plants built in 60's and 70's The causes of the event were internal to the plant. The process affected was obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such. A bulldozer tearing open a line would have had the same effect. How do you get the bulldozer to the line? How you ever actually seen a pipe trench ? Then how do you get the line to dump much more than its contents? Have you ever calculated how much Cyclohexane a 14" line 1000 m long contains ? Try it , just for kicks. And who still oxidizes cyane outside a collum? It was cyclohexane and its widely used in the production of Nylon, and any leak is highly likely to oxidise externally. The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would be one hell of a whoosh. You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened by that flame and what happens when they fail. No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about. Controls dont stop steel losing its structural strength in a fire BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant. It's not all that easy to do here. Bull**** Peter, all that protects most plant are earth bunds and chain link wire fences It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve. Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere BANG You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an attack. I responded to a claim that it couldnt happen - IT CAN The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of explosions or chemical plants. Really , care to dispute the facts ? The plant you chose is ludicrously different from existing types. Peter I have worked in this industry since I was 16, I have seen 2 major Petrochemical incidents and investigated many others. One of those included a major fire and explosion caused by a mobile crane striking a pipe bridge. Go find your Granny and teach her to suck eggs. The CPI is not immune to accident. There have been many, there will be more but this is a low-probablility scenario. In the case at question, calling in an air strike because of the possibility that the bulldozer might enter a chemical plant and do mischief, I'll stick with what they decided to do. So will I but that doesnt eliminate the potential risk from a bulldozer or any other piece of heavy plant. Keith |
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On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 14:59:36 -0400, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote: "Peter Skelton" wrote in message .. . On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: snip Go and look at the report on what happened at Flixborough I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't generally available. Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you wonder why more and more folks don't believe you? I expalined quite directly why I had deeper knowledge than generally available. Anybody who worked at Maitland or the Texas plant (Victoria?) had the same. As you snipped that, I conclude you're up to your old bull again, removing context so that you can invent some. You've recently proven yourself grossly dishonest three times, isn't that enough? snip The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response below...amazing, huh? I certainly had a senior moment there. Kieth handled it nicely. Do you have anything to contribute? Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless Peter Skelton |
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: You mean the ukrainians, about two years ago? That chartered Tu-154 had : five israeli bioweapon "scientists" on-board en route to Russia. They : were such a grave danger to the whole mankind that they needed to be : eliminated at such a huge price in civilians. : You mean the USSR, with KAL-007? There was an US RC-135 in the air, : using the KAL-007 to hide behind it. The laser gyroscope error that led : the Jumbo to fly over soviet territory and super-secret ICBM sites is : certainly strange. You can blame that Jumbo on the CIA, rather than the : soviets. Actually I was thinking about Israel (a nation filled with Russians) shooting down an Egyptian airliner. And no doubt the rooskies had a hand in that whole 'Vincennes' thing... :-) regards, --------------------------------------------------- |
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