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#11
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"old hoodoo" wrote in message ...
I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually happened to immobilize the navy air? The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token defense. Al According to Morison, three Kanehoe based PBYs were aloft when the attack started. One of these, working the Ward datum, sighted a sub and dropped smoke pots at 0633. He also notes that one "combat plane available for instant use" on Ford Island was launched "with difficulty" during the attack and ordered to search a sector between 280 and 330 by Adm Bellinger. Apparently several utility types wre lauched from Ford during this timeframe as well. The hapless SBD's from Enterpise were aloft inbound to Ford and found themselves in the fray as well. They left the boat between 0615 and 0637. Several were shot down by the Japs with the survivors landing at Ford late in the attack while getting a Blue-on-Blue smackdown to boot. More were shot down in later searches by both enemy and friendly fire that afternoon and evening. (Later Admiral) Moorer went aloft in one of the 3 surviving PBYs just after the attack. |
#12
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Here is a thread i picked up in a Google search:
http://www.j-aircraft.com/bbs/pearl_config.pl?read=291 Dano "old hoodoo" wrote in message ... I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually happened to immobilize the navy air? The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token defense. Al |
#13
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From: Henry J Cobb
Date: 4/9/2004 19:26 Pacific Daylight Time snip Applying VP-21's numbers Which wasn't based at PH in any event ... we get 51 planes required to do a 360° search to 450 miles so just 20 planes in the air could have done a search beyond the strike radius of any Japanese carrier based aircraft. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/martin_1.html The "Martin-Bellinger Report" on aircraft availability start PATROL WING TWO U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941. Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am forwarding to you the following information: .... [i]t should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the Job required. For the commander of a search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective daily search through 360 to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 16-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 209 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such operations. (Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Patrol Wing TWO. end RADM Bellinger appears to not agree. MW |
#14
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Snip
Launching things like seaplanes, which were present at Pearl, would be useless and suicidal. Fighters from ENTERPRISE did arrive over Pearl in the course of the attack. -- Andrew Toppan --- --- "I speak only for myself" "Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/ Of course, if the relatively limited seaplane patrol assets had been used for long range search, there was the possibility the attack force might have been detected prior (perhaps well prior) to launch. As there were insufficient aircraft to provide a truly effective search (perhaps 180 degree hemisphere to the west of Oahu), it was decided to not search at all. The short and long term impacts of an early warning at Pearl are interesting to ponder. There are a number of scenarios in which the outcome for the US could have been far worse. R / John |
#15
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It's a given the search capability wasn't there. It's also a given there
was a war warning out. I'd think a prudent commander would do the best he could with the assets he had. Formulate some threat axes. 270 would be more likely than 090. Application of a little common sense (your enemy might like to avoid detection, therefor he's likely to give your forward bases: Wake, Midway, etc) might refine that considerably. There's even a discipline (Operations analysis, senior course at USNA) that's intended for problems just like this: maximization of search detection with given assets. So maybe you wind up with a pattern that gives a PsubD of 30%. An educated guess (threat axis either NW or SW of Pearl) might sweeten that considerably. And you FLY! They had SOME search capability, why not use it? Instead they played staff games ... memos flying all over the place. Can't do a full search, so we'll ask for the assets (non-existent) and sit on our hands till we get them. The underlying problem was that while a Japanese attack was expected, no one knew where it might occur. But on Oahu in early December 1941, everyone knew, in their hearts, it couldn't happen there (or if it did, it would be sabotage by all those Japanese living on the island). R / John |
#16
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poor intelligence from the dem administration
"old hoodoo" wrote in message ... I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually happened to immobilize the navy air? The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token defense. Al |
#17
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http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/...365-Pearl.html
On Sunday, December 7, 1941, this ship, acting as squadron leader for the Commander Destroyer Squadron THREE, was at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, in a restricted availability status undergoing preliminary radar installation work. How many radar equiped ships did the Navy have sitting at Pearl Harbor? -HJC |
#18
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"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message
On Sunday, December 7, 1941, this ship, acting as squadron leader for the Commander Destroyer Squadron THREE, was at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, in a restricted availability status undergoing preliminary radar installation work. How many radar equiped ships did the Navy have sitting at Pearl Harbor? Damned if I know. Why don't you take a look at Vol. 3, "History of U.S. Naval Operations in WWII" by CAPT Samuel Elliot Morrison, USNR. IIRC he has a complete order of battle for PACFLT in December, 1941 that includes some information on the technical capabilites and availability of U.S. vessels. Your tone suggests some hostility toward strategic and tactical decisions made at the time. Placing the Fleet forward at Pearl (instead of back at Dago) was controversial when it was made. It was a political decision made at the highest levels of government. Much has been made of the "proof" of Pearl Harbor vulnerablity given a successful raid during naval exercises a few years before and the successful British attack at Taranto. In truth those operations don't really show the basing decision, or the specific defense decisions, to be inherently unsound. They only show that any base is vulnerable to attack under some conditions. Toland has written a couple of books, IIRC, on the subject of December, 7, 1941. I comment them to you. Bill Kambic |
#19
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Bill Kambic wrote:
Your tone suggests some hostility toward strategic and tactical decisions made at the time. Placing the Fleet forward at Pearl (instead of back at Dago) was controversial when it was made. It was a political decision made at the highest levels of government. That's still a good idea today. 5200 nautical miles between San Diego and Soul and almost 6000 between San Diego and Taipei vs 4200 nautical miles between the East Coast and Tripoli. The only place you could base a carrier further from any place you'd possibly use it is in Texas. I just hope that as the Navy once again becomes more forward based that better care is put on force protection this time. -HJC |
#20
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"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message
Bill Kambic wrote: Your tone suggests some hostility toward strategic and tactical decisions made at the time. Placing the Fleet forward at Pearl (instead of back at Dago) was controversial when it was made. It was a political decision made at the highest levels of government. That's still a good idea today. Indeed. 5200 nautical miles between San Diego and Soul and almost 6000 between San Diego and Taipei vs 4200 nautical miles between the East Coast and Tripoli. I'm not sure I see your point. The only place you could base a carrier further from any place you'd possibly use it is in Texas. I just hope that as the Navy once again becomes more forward based that better care is put on force protection this time. Sure, but no defense is 100% (as no offense in 100%). Commanders do the best they can with the assets available. Bill Kambic Mangalarga Marchador: Uma raça, uma paixão |
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