pearl harbor, why no usn a/c in the air?

I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based
at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually happened to immobilize the navy air?

The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token defense.


Al

"old hoodoo" wrote in message
...

I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at
Pearl Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based
at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what
actually happened to immobilize the navy air?

The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least
a token defense.


The Navy fighters were aboard the carriers which were all at sea.

From: "old hoodoo"
Date: 4/9/2004 12:58 Pacific Daylight Time

I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl
Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based
at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually
happened to immobilize the navy air?

The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token
defense.

As stated, Navy fighters were aboard the at-sea carriers. In addition, the
USAAC had the responsibility for aerial fighter defense of Hawaii did it not?

Don't think there were even USMC fighter squadrons on Oahu. VMF-211 was at sea
on Big E -- heading for Wake and VMF-221 was at SDiego, about to put aboard
Sara for transit to Oahu.

MW

On Fri, 9 Apr 2004 14:58:09 -0500, "old hoodoo"
wrote:

I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based
at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually happened to immobilize the navy air?

Because all the Navy fighters were aboard the carriers which were,
famously, absent. Launching things like seaplanes, which were present
at Pearl, would be useless and suicidal.

Fighters from ENTERPRISE did arrive over Pearl in the course of the
attack.

--
Andrew Toppan --- --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/

Andrew C. Toppan wrote:
Because all the Navy fighters were aboard the carriers which were,
famously, absent. Launching things like seaplanes, which were present
at Pearl, would be useless and suicidal.

IMHO the single biggest mistake at Pearl was not having the PBYs out for
patrols in every direction at dawn every morning.

-HJC

From: Henry J Cobb
Date: 4/9/2004 17:23 Pacific Daylight Time

Andrew C. Toppan wrote:
Because all the Navy fighters were aboard the carriers which were,
famously, absent. Launching things like seaplanes, which were present
at Pearl, would be useless and suicidal.

IMHO the single biggest mistake at Pearl was not having the PBYs out for
patrols in every direction at dawn every morning.

Assuming in the first place that there were indications there was such a
sea-borne threat to Hawaii, how would it be done if there weren't even enough
PBYs in Hawaii to cover "every direction" of the compass -- for what sector
width and for what range ...????

MW

Mike Weeks wrote:
Assuming in the first place that there were indications there was such a
sea-borne threat to Hawaii, how would it be done if there weren't even enough
PBYs in Hawaii to cover "every direction" of the compass -- for what sector
width and for what range ...????

Well, look at what they were actually doing.

http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/pearl/ph11.htm
VP-21 7 planes - in the air conducting search 120° to 170° to 450
miles from Midway.
....
VP-14 3 planes - in the air on morning security patrol armed with
depth charges.
....
VP-24 4 planes - in the air conducting inter-type tactics with
submarines.
....
To summarize the foregoing, at the moment the first bomb dropped,
aircraft of this command were in the following condition:

14 - in the air (7 on a search from Midway).
58 - on the surface ready for flight in four hours or less.
9 - undergoing repairs.
81 - Total.

The only early warning system Hawaii had (besides the overlooked radar)
weren't on patrol, instead they were doing ASW exercises.

Applying VP-21's numbers we get 51 planes required to do a 360° search
to 450 miles so just 20 planes in the air could have done a search
beyond the strike radius of any Japanese carrier based aircraft.

-HJC

"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message

snipped for brevity

The only early warning system Hawaii had (besides the overlooked radar)
weren't on patrol, instead they were doing ASW exercises.

ASW was a valid mission and practice would be A Good Thing.

Applying VP-21's numbers we get 51 planes required to do a 360° search
to 450 miles so just 20 planes in the air could have done a search
beyond the strike radius of any Japanese carrier based aircraft.

Well, no.

First off, setting up an air plan for surface search with multiple aircraft
is a complex enterprise. The effective area of coverage for visual search
is highly dependant upon environmental conditions. This does not mean you
don't do it, only that it's not something you "just do."

Second, the only air-surface detection system on any patrol aircraft at that
time was the Mark I Eyeball. A fine device during daylight, but of limited
utility at night or in less than fine VMC conditions. Since the Japanese
force approached within strike range during the night then the only
detection opportunities might have been at dusk the night before (but at the
extreme range of the search) or at dawn as they were launching. Having
spent a lot of hours doing open ocean visual search I can assure you that
neither time is optimal.

Third, your program would have been a MAXEFFORT thing. Sure it can be done,
but it consumes aircraft and crews. So if you are going to run hard you
must have something to run for. No one KNEW the location of the Japanese
fleet. There was a bunch of speculation, but no one KNEW. Consuming your
fuel and spares under those circumstances would not have been a wise
military decision.

With the aid of hindsight (which is always 20/20) a high intensity air plan
starting on Friday, December 5, 1941 would have been a wise plan (even if it
didn't work). But with the information at hand there was no justification
for such an effort.

Bill Kambic
CDR, USNR(Ret)
VS-27, VS-30, VS-73, VP 93, FASOTRAGRULANT

From: Henry J Cobb
Date: 4/9/2004 19:26 Pacific Daylight Time

snip

Applying VP-21's numbers

Which wasn't based at PH in any event ...

we get 51 planes required to do a 360° search
to 450 miles so just 20 planes in the air could have done a search
beyond the strike radius of any Japanese carrier based aircraft.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/martin_1.html

The "Martin-Bellinger Report" on aircraft availability

start
PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
December 19, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am
forwarding to you the following information:
....

[i]t should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian
Area effectively to do the Job required. For the commander of a search group to
be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot
250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection would require an
effective daily search through 360 to a distance of at least 800 miles.
Assuming a 16-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour
flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 209 patrol planes, adequate spare
parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such operations.

(Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
end

RADM Bellinger appears to not agree.

MW

"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message
...

IMHO the single biggest mistake at Pearl was not having the PBYs out for
patrols in every direction at dawn every morning.

yeah hindsight is crystal clear ain't it ?