tow rope brake practice crash, what can we learn...

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?
Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?
I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/regionalne...wiadomosc.html
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomos...wym_Targu.html

On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:
On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?
Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?
I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/regionalne...Szybowiec_rozb...

I doubt we can learn anythng from it without knowing the circustances
of the crash. Did they spin in? Did they land under control in an
unlandable area? Something else?

The instructor should be sure the turn back can be accomplished safely
considering wind, altitude, and distance from the airport. In your
case it seems his judgement was ok.

Andy

On Mon, 11 Jul 2011 14:38:10 -0700, rocketsientist001 wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz crashed
during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The instructor
(~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. It was a tow rope
brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind landing from
about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet). What can we learn from this?
Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules? Can pilot request
opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight Review to avoid getting
killed?

Been there, done that - and in a Puchacz too. I was doing the usual
commentary for the instructor about fields ahead, etc as we climbed out.
As soon as we hit 400 ft and I was half-way through saying "400 ft -
should be high enough to get back to the field" there was a BANG as the
instructor pulled the release. I flew a steep, well-banked turn with the
nose low enough that if anything we gained a little speed (I knew/know
the Puchacz fairly well), flew the approach and landed without incident
downwind. There was never any question that we would get back or, with
the Puchacz' brakes, that we would get stopped on the ground.

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

Sounds somewhat low to me, considering that was for practise, not for
real.


--
martin@ | Martin Gregorie
gregorie. | Essex, UK
org |

On Jul 11, 3:01*pm, Andy wrote:
On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?
Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?
I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/regionalne...bowca-w-nowym-.......

I doubt we can learn anythng from it without knowing the circustances
of the crash. *Did they spin in? *Did they land under control in an
unlandable area? *Something else?

The instructor should be sure the turn back can be accomplished safely
considering wind, altitude, and distance from the airport. *In your
case it seems his judgement was ok.

Andy

When I was a student my instructor discussed rope breaks with me, then
demonstrated a 'rope break' at 200 feet. After the landing, we
discussed it some more. By the time he ever pulled the release on me,
I was well prepared to deal with it.

On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:
On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

On Jul 11, 3:45*pm, BobW wrote:
On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

Condolences to everyone involved. An unfortunately similar accident
over the weekend in Montana.
http://www.kpax.com/news/strong-wind...l-plane-crash/

Craig

On Jul 11, 3:45*pm, BobW wrote:
On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

A few years back I was at a SSA CFIG re-validation seminar in Seattle
and there was a discussion of rope break training prior to solo sign-
offs. I was a solo student at the time, just there to learn. I
mentioned that I had never done a rope break but had been signed off
solo and was made to stand and repeat that while the SSA safety team
(Carlson and Wander I think it was) listened with horror. The next
weekend I went to the field and performed 4 down to 200' and still try
to do 3 or 4 every year. Once you do a few and get it down it's a non-
event and probably good to have as a skill.

On the other hand during my check ride in a 2-22 the DE pulled the
release at 200' into a strong headwind and it was pretty exciting
getting that bird down when I had been doing them in a DG303 up to
then. That same DE is in a local hospital today after crashing while
performing a rope break in Montana last week, the other pilot was
killed. Those are two very different data points to try and reconcile.

Brian

On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:
On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

Not much. Rope break at 400 feet should be a non-event. There must be
something about this accident that we do not know yet.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

FARs do not require rope breaks during a flight review, so it is up to
the instructor you fly with. Personally, if I was an instructor, I
would not sign off anyone who is not comfortable flying a simulated
rope break. Weather permitting, of course.

By the way, what seems to be a typical BFR - three flights, one of
which is a rope break - is actually illegal. Or, to be more precise,
it does NOT met the BFR requirements specified by the FARs: "Glider
pilots may substitute a minimum of three instructional flights in a
glider, each of which includes a flight to TRAFFIC PATTERN ALTITUDE,
in lieu of the 1 hour of flight training required..."

Bart

On Jul 11, 7:58*pm, Bart wrote:
On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

Not much. Rope break at 400 feet should be a non-event. There must be
something about this accident that we do not know yet.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

FARs do not require rope breaks during a flight review, so it is up to
the instructor you fly with. Personally, if I was an instructor, I
would not sign off anyone who is not comfortable flying a simulated
rope break. Weather permitting, of course.

By the way, what seems to be a typical BFR - three flights, one of
which is a rope break - is actually illegal. Or, to be more precise,
it does NOT met the BFR requirements specified by the FARs: "Glider
pilots may substitute a minimum of three instructional flights in a
glider, each of which includes a flight to TRAFFIC PATTERN ALTITUDE,
in lieu of the 1 hour of flight training required..."

Bart

This discussion reminds me of similar discussions surrounding spin
training in the power world. So many students and instructors were
killed during spin 'training' that the maneuver was eventually
banished from the required training curriculum. We in the soaring
community should be taking a very hard look at how many pilots are
injured killed in actual PTT (Premature Termination of Tow) events vs
how many are injured/killed in SRB (Simulated Rope Break) events. I
would be willing to bet real money that the statistics do not support
the continued use of SRBs in training and/or BFRs. We don't do base-
to-final turn stall/spin recovery training for obvious reasons (so the
saying goes, "You can only do a base-to-final-turn stall/spin
demonstration ONCE"), and SRBs are just slightly less dangerous.

BTW, at the risk of starting a religious war, rope breaks, spins, and
other dangerous maneuvers can be simulated realistically, at any
altitude and weather configuration in Condor. If we feel we must
continue to do SRBs as part of a training/review curriculum, they
should ONLY be done in Condor. The military, GA, and corporate/
airline communities figured this out a long time ago, and now that we
have a realistic soaring simulator, we should be doing it too. If you
haven't tried this in Condor, you should.

TA

Students learn several very valuable things during a simulated rope break.
1. they have (at least) a 3 second "oh, ****", factor where they don't
do anything until the reality sets in. I had one student that froze and
did nothing at all.
2. they don't get the nose down fast enough, far enough - even after
they recognize and react to the situation.

As others have pointed out, you have to be careful. On a hot humid day
when you're still far away from the airport at 200, the exercise might
best be postponed. I've found that on a normal day, a rope break at 275
(which is what I typically do)or so gives you an extra margin of safety
and still gets the point across - and spoilers will be needed to not
over-run the airport.

Tony