Thread Drift, Safety, Puchacz and Cal City

This won't make much sense, unless you have followed the thread on "Death of a Gliderport".

To rectify the drift, I began a new thread, Jim. Is this a slip or a crab?

I agree that I have talked a lot about glider safety, over many years. :-)

I disagree that I avoided addressing Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall's death nearly 16 years ago. Some folks thought the opposite to be the case. Glider folk have shown up for years for my 'lectures' at glider conventions and regional meetings. Do I think they enjoyed them? They say so, and return for subsequent presentations, particularly when I title one "What the NTSB Won't Ever Say ....". I was requested to present that topic, revised for 2012-13's accidents, at the Reno SSA Convention next month.


In July 1992- Russ Dervaes had a bad experience in an aero-retrieve from a semi-improved field. A glider was broken; thankfully no one was hurt. Cal City pilots discussed the lessons learned from this for years -- pilots needing to completely inspect the length of a runway for towing suitability (several small soft bushes slowed acceleration), recruiting a wing runner that isn't using a four footed cane, leaving the extra passenger behind for car retrieval, knowing which way in surrounding space is the best PTT option (attempting a 180 from 15 feet and 55 knots isn't going to work), perhaps the into-wind crosswind overgrown runway would have been better? Despite waiting for ~3 hours for a tug, that was the level of preparation for aeroretrieve, and it was insufficient. Lessons were learned, and shared, even via Russ's club's newsletter.

Following a spin fatality at the USAF Academy, Russ performed exhaustive spin evaluations on AS-K 21s at Edwards AFB, later resulting in Schleicher updating the recommended recovery protocol in their flight manual.

June 1993 - Peter had an unhappy flight in his 1-26, flew a little in August, and self reports not flying until 2000. Yet he took airplane lessons at SMO, and his ASEL CFI was killed in November of 1993 (LAX94FA058). Later, his glider mentor died in a soaring accident. I don't blame Peter for exiting aviation in this cruel circumstance; he perhaps never felt secure flying again.

Yes, Russ later suffered a stroke. After extensive rehab, Russ resumed flying with rated glider pilots. He never flew solo, nor with persons who could not be PIC without his assistance. He would fly Biennial Flight Reviews and check flights with current club airmen. He put no one at risk, and advised them of his limitations. I believe it was his love of soaring that motivated him to recover from his stroke to mobility and productivity. No glider pilot is required to have a medical certificate, as Peter should recall..

In 1998 - Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall were killed in a 9-month old Puchacz. On a summer afternoon, they launched for a check out flight for Todd in the Puchacz. I towed them, they released in lift west of the field at about 2000 agl. By the time I landed, tied the tug and returned to the hangar (less than :10 from release) , another glider pilot radioed seeing something "wrong". When I asked, he said he saw a spin to below the horizon by another glider. Marty took the 182 and landed within 100 yards on a dirt road amidst brush to render first aid. I coordinated emergency response, and drove out.

Both pilots were dead when Marty arrived. No glider pilots are ever happy with NTSB findings. The hands and feet we witnessed on flight controls were inconclusive. Bruising is normal when tissue holds hard things that crash-stop. Contusions are bruises. Both pilots had bruises. To envision a flight control struggle is conjecture.

Both men were retired Air Force pilots. Both men had extensive flight crew environment experience. Both men were instructors and had extensive spin experience. Both were current and professionals.

To conjecture about rudder pedal/foot jamming is wrong(denial). Feet weren't jammed under those rudder pedals. The bodies were removed before NTSB's arrival the next day. For me to believe they were trying to recover to controlled flight is easy. To ascertain what went wrong is difficult.

If Russ had intended to do spin training in the Puch, I believe he would have chosen to wear parachutes. I did much subsequent research on the Puch (which was within CG), and found that 10% of the Puchs built had spun to impact by 1998, most with CFIs on board. (Like shark bites happening where people swim, spin training happens with CFIs on board; gliders are spun less often by solo PICs.)

Several renowned CFIGs would recall that I contacted them in collecting Puch accident data and disseminating my results internationally. I believe there is undocumented spin behavior by the Puchacz. SZD limits the CG envelope for "energetic" maneuvers (snap rolls). This information was omitted by the FAA in the 'approved' shortened English USA Pilot Operating Handbook, as irrelevant - due to non-aerobatic US certification. The British Gliding Association disagreed with me, yet had tried their own spin tests following unexpected Puch-CFI deaths there in 1994. They didn't recreate unrecoverable spins in those tests.

Looking back on Google, I had compiled 24 Puch fatal spinning accidents by 1998. Many of those were deliberate spin training flights with competent CFIs on board, with no observable recovery efforts made through many turns. USA, Italy, Austria, Germany, Britain. Discussion since has turned up a tale or two of pilots who experienced severely delayed recovery response ( many turns) even using the published recovery technique.

Several US clubs would be able to confirm that I contacted them in 1999 to warn against spin training in a Puchacz, without a hard deck (bail out) policy of 3000 ft agl and firm enforcement of parachute use for any turning stall work. How much altitude is lost while trying to exit a glider? IF more than 10% of the 172s spun to impact, would they still be certificated in the US? Anyone know of another two-seater that will snap-roll 'over the top', to the outside, that is not US aerobatic certified? What happens if you snap-roll at 'less than' 2000 feet agl? Yet another CFI and young student died in 2004 in Britain in the Puchacz, and this yielded a sad yet thorough report - http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/HCD.pdf .
Finally, the Brits admit that low altitude deliberate spinning has some dangers.

I wouldn't view my actions as someone who was unconcerned by the death of two pilots, or trying to hide anything about my local safety record. If I were, I would have let this go. I can only honor those men by trying to have something be learned from their passing. As with any soaring fatality, the local group was depressed and a few members left soaring. 16 years later, revisiting the topic of spinning unnecessarily low may reach another audience.

Am I guilty of 'lecturing'? Yes. Having seen horrible things happen in aviation, I don't want those things repeated. I am proud of my record of only one canopy coming open on launch, and one failure to brake after landing (and taxiing into a fence) being the sum total of my renters' misadventures over +20 years as an FBO. Did private owners make mistakes creating accidents at Cal City in that period? Sure. Would more flights have taken place with a laissez-faire management style? Sure -- until I had no gliders to rent, or became uninsurable or was heartsick.

Did I 'talk about' pilot's mistakes? Sure, I did, and still do. I talk about my boo-boos -- landing out with not enough wind awareness resulting in a ground loop. Failure to intercede early enough in XC training to return to an airport, resulting in an out landing (shortest XC from Cal City - 4 miles - to a known landable-derigging spot). Being scared witless by near-midair power traffic a couple of times. Failure to tie down a glider well enough to protect it from summer overnight wave. My list is longer. I am fallible.

I hope by talking about my and other pilot's human moments, respectfully, that I can reduce the number of future soaring accidents. But that is an unquantifiable effort.

Twice in 22 years, I have had a pilot come to me and tell me my training saved their life. First was a private owner who was able to benign spiral out of a wave flight blunder into cloud flight (IMC), who phoned me a week later in chagrin. Second was a low-time Eastern club pilot who heard me talk about parasitic drag in Memphis. At a later Eastern convention, he came to tell me I had kept him from an accident, from an absurdly high approach situation. (We had never flown together.) So, yes, talking about problems helps avoid accidents.

Placing those discussions in a poignant setting, naming people and places we know, makes those lessons visceral and more durable. I regret if someone is offended when I make the discussion 'personal'.

I would hope my students, customers, potential customers know that my emphatic moments are driven by a love for soaring, and the people in soaring. I routinely pulled down pants cuffs, straightened seat belts and oxygen lines, but seldom kissed foreheads on pre-launch, and don't view myself as a hottie, unless you count hot-under-the-collar when someone badmouths the hard-working people who try to keep soaring going.

Soaring has given me many years of joy.
I will be very sad this weekend, as gliders and pilots exit California City..


Cindy B

On Friday, January 31, 2014 6:29:11 PM UTC-8, CindyB wrote:
Anyone know of another two-seater that will snap-roll 'over the top', to the outside, that is not US aerobatic certified?

Yes, first time I experienced a snap-roll 'over the top' was in a nearly new ASK-13 when I was 16. The CFI-G in the back seat (also 16, legal back then) suggested I try some slow turns, then pull back a little bit more. He laughed all the way through my yelling "oh sh*t" and the rather shaky recovery...

Marc R

Cindy,

Very nicely stated, clear analysis from your considerable experience. It's wonderful to see a discussion like this... full of good safety data ... while speaking from your heart. Too often these r.a.s threads wonder to far off course.

Walt Rogers WX

Cindy, I appreciate your efforts to figure what happened to Puchacz that spun in at Cal City. I remember the event and I know that it affected you deeply and I'm sorry for the manner in which it was brought up in this forum.
Unfortunately there are many accidents that we never fully understand. And absent black boxes that record flight parameters and control and control surface deflections and forces (and maybe a few million Synapses too) there will be more.
As pilots, we accept that risk. We also accept responsibility, as pilot in command, for the outcome of our flight. Blaming a tow operation for a subsequent accident is silly... even a botched off-field retrieve. We have a release (and yes, mine is in my hand during rollout). If we're not accelerating fast enough or off the ground by a predetermined point, it's up to us to abort. And if the field isn't safe, we shouldn't start the tow in the first place - I've declined a tow, despite a willing tow pilot, when it exceeded my personal risk tolerance.
As glider pilots we should also recognize that the tow pilot is responsible for his own ship. He has the right to drop the rope if he's not going to make the fence... it behooves us to drop off before that.
Mike Koerner

On Friday, January 31, 2014 9:29:11 PM UTC-5, CindyB wrote:
This won't make much sense, unless you have followed the thread on "Death of a Gliderport". To rectify the drift, I began a new thread, Jim. Is this a slip or a crab? I agree that I have talked a lot about glider safety, over many years. :-) I disagree that I avoided addressing Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall's death nearly 16 years ago. Some folks thought the opposite to be the case. Glider folk have shown up for years for my 'lectures' at glider conventions and regional meetings. Do I think they enjoyed them? They say so, and return for subsequent presentations, particularly when I title one "What the NTSB Won't Ever Say ....". I was requested to present that topic, revised for 2012-13's accidents, at the Reno SSA Convention next month. In July 1992- Russ Dervaes had a bad experience in an aero-retrieve from a semi-improved field. A glider was broken; thankfully no one was hurt. Cal City pilots discussed the lessons learned from this for years -- pilots needing to completely inspect the length of a runway for towing suitability (several small soft bushes slowed acceleration), recruiting a wing runner that isn't using a four footed cane, leaving the extra passenger behind for car retrieval, knowing which way in surrounding space is the best PTT option (attempting a 180 from 15 feet and 55 knots isn't going to work), perhaps the into-wind crosswind overgrown runway would have been better? Despite waiting for ~3 hours for a tug, that was the level of preparation for aeroretrieve, and it was insufficient. Lessons were learned, and shared, even via Russ's club's newsletter. Following a spin fatality at the USAF Academy, Russ performed exhaustive spin evaluations on AS-K 21s at Edwards AFB, later resulting in Schleicher updating the recommended recovery protocol in their flight manual. June 1993 - Peter had an unhappy flight in his 1-26, flew a little in August, and self reports not flying until 2000. Yet he took airplane lessons at SMO, and his ASEL CFI was killed in November of 1993 (LAX94FA058). Later, his glider mentor died in a soaring accident. I don't blame Peter for exiting aviation in this cruel circumstance; he perhaps never felt secure flying again. Yes, Russ later suffered a stroke. After extensive rehab, Russ resumed flying with rated glider pilots. He never flew solo, nor with persons who could not be PIC without his assistance. He would fly Biennial Flight Reviews and check flights with current club airmen. He put no one at risk, and advised them of his limitations. I believe it was his love of soaring that motivated him to recover from his stroke to mobility and productivity. No glider pilot is required to have a medical certificate, as Peter should recall. In 1998 - Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall were killed in a 9-month old Puchacz. On a summer afternoon, they launched for a check out flight for Todd in the Puchacz. I towed them, they released in lift west of the field at about 2000 agl. By the time I landed, tied the tug and returned to the hangar (less than :10 from release) , another glider pilot radioed seeing something "wrong". When I asked, he said he saw a spin to below the horizon by another glider. Marty took the 182 and landed within 100 yards on a dirt road amidst brush to render first aid. I coordinated emergency response, and drove out. Both pilots were dead when Marty arrived. No glider pilots are ever happy with NTSB findings. The hands and feet we witnessed on flight controls were inconclusive. Bruising is normal when tissue holds hard things that crash-stop. Contusions are bruises. Both pilots had bruises. To envision a flight control struggle is conjecture. Both men were retired Air Force pilots. Both men had extensive flight crew environment experience. Both men were instructors and had extensive spin experience. Both were current and professionals. To conjecture about rudder pedal/foot jamming is wrong(denial). Feet weren't jammed under those rudder pedals. The bodies were removed before NTSB's arrival the next day. For me to believe they were trying to recover to controlled flight is easy. To ascertain what went wrong is difficult. If Russ had intended to do spin training in the Puch, I believe he would have chosen to wear parachutes. I did much subsequent research on the Puch (which was within CG), and found that 10% of the Puchs built had spun to impact by 1998, most with CFIs on board. (Like shark bites happening where people swim, spin training happens with CFIs on board; gliders are spun less often by solo PICs.) Several renowned CFIGs would recall that I contacted them in collecting Puch accident data and disseminating my results internationally. I believe there is undocumented spin behavior by the Puchacz. SZD limits the CG envelope for "energetic" maneuvers (snap rolls). This information was omitted by the FAA in the 'approved' shortened English USA Pilot Operating Handbook, as irrelevant - due to non-aerobatic US certification. The British Gliding Association disagreed with me, yet had tried their own spin tests following unexpected Puch-CFI deaths there in 1994. They didn't recreate unrecoverable spins in those tests. Looking back on Google, I had compiled 24 Puch fatal spinning accidents by 1998. Many of those were deliberate spin training flights with competent CFIs on board, with no observable recovery efforts made through many turns. USA, Italy, Austria, Germany, Britain. Discussion since has turned up a tale or two of pilots who experienced severely delayed recovery response ( many turns) even using the published recovery technique. Several US clubs would be able to confirm that I contacted them in 1999 to warn against spin training in a Puchacz, without a hard deck (bail out) policy of 3000 ft agl and firm enforcement of parachute use for any turning stall work. How much altitude is lost while trying to exit a glider? IF more than 10% of the 172s spun to impact, would they still be certificated in the US? Anyone know of another two-seater that will snap-roll 'over the top', to the outside, that is not US aerobatic certified? What happens if you snap-roll at 'less than' 2000 feet agl? Yet another CFI and young student died in 2004 in Britain in the Puchacz, and this yielded a sad yet thorough report - http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/HCD.pdf . Finally, the Brits admit that low altitude deliberate spinning has some dangers. I wouldn't view my actions as someone who was unconcerned by the death of two pilots, or trying to hide anything about my local safety record. If I were, I would have let this go. I can only honor those men by trying to have something be learned from their passing.. As with any soaring fatality, the local group was depressed and a few members left soaring. 16 years later, revisiting the topic of spinning unnecessarily low may reach another audience. Am I guilty of 'lecturing'? Yes. Having seen horrible things happen in aviation, I don't want those things repeated. I am proud of my record of only one canopy coming open on launch, and one failure to brake after landing (and taxiing into a fence) being the sum total of my renters' misadventures over +20 years as an FBO. Did private owners make mistakes creating accidents at Cal City in that period? Sure. Would more flights have taken place with a laissez-faire management style? Sure -- until I had no gliders to rent, or became uninsurable or was heartsick. Did I 'talk about' pilot's mistakes? Sure, I did, and still do. I talk about my boo-boos -- landing out with not enough wind awareness resulting in a ground loop. Failure to intercede early enough in XC training to return to an airport, resulting in an out landing (shortest XC from Cal City - 4 miles - to a known landable-derigging spot). Being scared witless by near-midair power traffic a couple of times. Failure to tie down a glider well enough to protect it from summer overnight wave. My list is longer. I am fallible. I hope by talking about my and other pilot's human moments, respectfully, that I can reduce the number of future soaring accidents. But that is an unquantifiable effort. Twice in 22 years, I have had a pilot come to me and tell me my training saved their life. First was a private owner who was able to benign spiral out of a wave flight blunder into cloud flight (IMC), who phoned me a week later in chagrin. Second was a low-time Eastern club pilot who heard me talk about parasitic drag in Memphis. At a later Eastern convention, he came to tell me I had kept him from an accident, from an absurdly high approach situation. (We had never flown together.) So, yes, talking about problems helps avoid accidents. Placing those discussions in a poignant setting, naming people and places we know, makes those lessons visceral and more durable. I regret if someone is offended when I make the discussion 'personal'. I would hope my students, customers, potential customers know that my emphatic moments are driven by a love for soaring, and the people in soaring. I routinely pulled down pants cuffs, straightened seat belts and oxygen lines, but seldom kissed foreheads on pre-launch, and don't view myself as a hottie, unless you count hot-under-the-collar when someone badmouths the hard-working people who try to keep soaring going. Soaring has given me many years of joy. I will be very sad this weekend, as gliders and pilots exit California City. Cindy B

Well said. Many times we don't stop and take a deep breath before responding to nastiness.
Thanks to you and Marty and the others that helped make Cal City a soaring destination for so many years. Some of us understand the sacrifices required.
Our sport is constantly under attack from outside forces and we all need to stick together.
Ya done good Cindy.
UH

On Friday, January 31, 2014 6:29:11 PM UTC-8, CindyB wrote:
This won't make much sense, unless you have followed the thread on "Death of a Gliderport".



To rectify the drift, I began a new thread, Jim. Is this a slip or a crab?



I agree that I have talked a lot about glider safety, over many years. :-)



I disagree that I avoided addressing Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall's death nearly 16 years ago. Some folks thought the opposite to be the case. Glider folk have shown up for years for my 'lectures' at glider conventions and regional meetings. Do I think they enjoyed them? They say so, and return for subsequent presentations, particularly when I title one "What the NTSB Won't Ever Say ....". I was requested to present that topic, revised for 2012-13's accidents, at the Reno SSA Convention next month.





In July 1992- Russ Dervaes had a bad experience in an aero-retrieve from a semi-improved field. A glider was broken; thankfully no one was hurt. Cal City pilots discussed the lessons learned from this for years -- pilots needing to completely inspect the length of a runway for towing suitability (several small soft bushes slowed acceleration), recruiting a wing runner that isn't using a four footed cane, leaving the extra passenger behind for car retrieval, knowing which way in surrounding space is the best PTT option (attempting a 180 from 15 feet and 55 knots isn't going to work), perhaps the into-wind crosswind overgrown runway would have been better? Despite waiting for ~3 hours for a tug, that was the level of preparation for aeroretrieve, and it was insufficient. Lessons were learned, and shared, even via Russ's club's newsletter.



Following a spin fatality at the USAF Academy, Russ performed exhaustive spin evaluations on AS-K 21s at Edwards AFB, later resulting in Schleicher updating the recommended recovery protocol in their flight manual.



June 1993 - Peter had an unhappy flight in his 1-26, flew a little in August, and self reports not flying until 2000. Yet he took airplane lessons at SMO, and his ASEL CFI was killed in November of 1993 (LAX94FA058). Later, his glider mentor died in a soaring accident. I don't blame Peter for exiting aviation in this cruel circumstance; he perhaps never felt secure flying again.



Yes, Russ later suffered a stroke. After extensive rehab, Russ resumed flying with rated glider pilots. He never flew solo, nor with persons who could not be PIC without his assistance. He would fly Biennial Flight Reviews and check flights with current club airmen. He put no one at risk, and advised them of his limitations. I believe it was his love of soaring that motivated him to recover from his stroke to mobility and productivity. No glider pilot is required to have a medical certificate, as Peter should recall.



In 1998 - Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall were killed in a 9-month old Puchacz. On a summer afternoon, they launched for a check out flight for Todd in the Puchacz. I towed them, they released in lift west of the field at about 2000 agl. By the time I landed, tied the tug and returned to the hangar (less than :10 from release) , another glider pilot radioed seeing something "wrong". When I asked, he said he saw a spin to below the horizon by another glider. Marty took the 182 and landed within 100 yards on a dirt road amidst brush to render first aid. I coordinated emergency response, and drove out.



Both pilots were dead when Marty arrived. No glider pilots are ever happy with NTSB findings. The hands and feet we witnessed on flight controls were inconclusive. Bruising is normal when tissue holds hard things that crash-stop. Contusions are bruises. Both pilots had bruises. To envision a flight control struggle is conjecture.



Both men were retired Air Force pilots. Both men had extensive flight crew environment experience. Both men were instructors and had extensive spin experience. Both were current and professionals.



To conjecture about rudder pedal/foot jamming is wrong(denial). Feet weren't jammed under those rudder pedals. The bodies were removed before NTSB's arrival the next day. For me to believe they were trying to recover to controlled flight is easy. To ascertain what went wrong is difficult.



If Russ had intended to do spin training in the Puch, I believe he would have chosen to wear parachutes. I did much subsequent research on the Puch (which was within CG), and found that 10% of the Puchs built had spun to impact by 1998, most with CFIs on board. (Like shark bites happening where people swim, spin training happens with CFIs on board; gliders are spun less often by solo PICs.)



Several renowned CFIGs would recall that I contacted them in collecting Puch accident data and disseminating my results internationally. I believe there is undocumented spin behavior by the Puchacz. SZD limits the CG envelope for "energetic" maneuvers (snap rolls). This information was omitted by the FAA in the 'approved' shortened English USA Pilot Operating Handbook, as irrelevant - due to non-aerobatic US certification. The British Gliding Association disagreed with me, yet had tried their own spin tests following unexpected Puch-CFI deaths there in 1994. They didn't recreate unrecoverable spins in those tests.



Looking back on Google, I had compiled 24 Puch fatal spinning accidents by 1998. Many of those were deliberate spin training flights with competent CFIs on board, with no observable recovery efforts made through many turns.. USA, Italy, Austria, Germany, Britain. Discussion since has turned up a tale or two of pilots who experienced severely delayed recovery response ( many turns) even using the published recovery technique.



Several US clubs would be able to confirm that I contacted them in 1999 to warn against spin training in a Puchacz, without a hard deck (bail out) policy of 3000 ft agl and firm enforcement of parachute use for any turning stall work. How much altitude is lost while trying to exit a glider? IF more than 10% of the 172s spun to impact, would they still be certificated in the US? Anyone know of another two-seater that will snap-roll 'over the top', to the outside, that is not US aerobatic certified? What happens if you snap-roll at 'less than' 2000 feet agl? Yet another CFI and young student died in 2004 in Britain in the Puchacz, and this yielded a sad yet thorough report - http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/HCD.pdf ..

Finally, the Brits admit that low altitude deliberate spinning has some dangers.



I wouldn't view my actions as someone who was unconcerned by the death of two pilots, or trying to hide anything about my local safety record. If I were, I would have let this go. I can only honor those men by trying to have something be learned from their passing. As with any soaring fatality, the local group was depressed and a few members left soaring. 16 years later, revisiting the topic of spinning unnecessarily low may reach another audience.



Am I guilty of 'lecturing'? Yes. Having seen horrible things happen in aviation, I don't want those things repeated. I am proud of my record of only one canopy coming open on launch, and one failure to brake after landing (and taxiing into a fence) being the sum total of my renters' misadventures over +20 years as an FBO. Did private owners make mistakes creating accidents at Cal City in that period? Sure. Would more flights have taken place with a laissez-faire management style? Sure -- until I had no gliders to rent, or became uninsurable or was heartsick.



Did I 'talk about' pilot's mistakes? Sure, I did, and still do. I talk about my boo-boos -- landing out with not enough wind awareness resulting in a ground loop. Failure to intercede early enough in XC training to return to an airport, resulting in an out landing (shortest XC from Cal City - 4 miles - to a known landable-derigging spot). Being scared witless by near-midair power traffic a couple of times. Failure to tie down a glider well enough to protect it from summer overnight wave. My list is longer. I am fallible.



I hope by talking about my and other pilot's human moments, respectfully, that I can reduce the number of future soaring accidents. But that is an unquantifiable effort.



Twice in 22 years, I have had a pilot come to me and tell me my training saved their life. First was a private owner who was able to benign spiral out of a wave flight blunder into cloud flight (IMC), who phoned me a week later in chagrin. Second was a low-time Eastern club pilot who heard me talk about parasitic drag in Memphis. At a later Eastern convention, he came to tell me I had kept him from an accident, from an absurdly high approach situation. (We had never flown together.) So, yes, talking about problems helps avoid accidents.



Placing those discussions in a poignant setting, naming people and places we know, makes those lessons visceral and more durable. I regret if someone is offended when I make the discussion 'personal'.



I would hope my students, customers, potential customers know that my emphatic moments are driven by a love for soaring, and the people in soaring. I routinely pulled down pants cuffs, straightened seat belts and oxygen lines, but seldom kissed foreheads on pre-launch, and don't view myself as a hottie, unless you count hot-under-the-collar when someone badmouths the hard-working people who try to keep soaring going.



Soaring has given me many years of joy.

I will be very sad this weekend, as gliders and pilots exit California City.





Cindy B

Hi Cindy,
Long time no see!..............Good report on your safety efforts at Cal City.

I rebuilt a Puchacz a few years back and was amazed to see aluminum turn-buckles bolted directly to the rear rudder pedals, where the rear seat pilot could kick and bend the aluminum without knowing it. Normal rudder control pressures would tend to straighten it back out. Repeat this a few times and aluminum will break! There was an AD published after the Cal City fatal accident to replace the aluminum turn-buckle with steel units and also to no longer bolt the turn-buckle directly to the rear rudder pedals.
I have often wondered if the Cal City accident was caused by one of the aluminum turn-buckles breaking..........resulting in return springs pulling in full opposite rudder? Can you confirm that the rudder cables were both attached from both seats to the rudder on the Cal City accident?
JJ

What a wonderful, informative, sane, heart-felt posting! How I wish more
were worth reading like this one.

A couple of questions/comments:

Regarding Russ' administering of BFRs - was that legal? True, glider pilots
do not require a medical certificate, but the FARs require a pilot to ground
himself if he has a condition which is disqualifying for a medical
certificate. I would think a stroke fits that description. Or is it simply
that, while administering a BFR, the CFI, is not the PIC?

My comment about the "Hottie" was not descriptive of anyone. It was
directed to the man who made the original catty comment about facilities and
equipment that did not live up to his expectations. Besides, beauty comes
from within.

No, the NTSB's reports are rarely satisfying. When my partner crashed our
LS-6a (thankfully, he survived a low altitude stall/spin), the NTSB report
is so far off the mark as to be ludicrous. I witnessed the flight from
brake release until impact which occurred within 100 feet of where I sat. I
know what happened, but it's nowhere in the report.

I'm sorry that I did not have the opportunity to fly at Cal City.


"CindyB" wrote in message
...

This won't make much sense, unless you have followed the thread on "Death of
a Gliderport".

To rectify the drift, I began a new thread, Jim. Is this a slip or a crab?

I agree that I have talked a lot about glider safety, over many years.
:-)

I disagree that I avoided addressing Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall's death
nearly 16 years ago. Some folks thought the opposite to be the case. Glider
folk have shown up for years for my 'lectures' at glider conventions and
regional meetings. Do I think they enjoyed them? They say so, and return for
subsequent presentations, particularly when I title one "What the NTSB Won't
Ever Say ....". I was requested to present that topic, revised for
2012-13's accidents, at the Reno SSA Convention next month.


In July 1992- Russ Dervaes had a bad experience in an aero-retrieve from a
semi-improved field. A glider was broken; thankfully no one was hurt. Cal
City pilots discussed the lessons learned from this for years -- pilots
needing to completely inspect the length of a runway for towing suitability
(several small soft bushes slowed acceleration), recruiting a wing runner
that isn't using a four footed cane, leaving the extra passenger behind for
car retrieval, knowing which way in surrounding space is the best PTT option
(attempting a 180 from 15 feet and 55 knots isn't going to work), perhaps
the into-wind crosswind overgrown runway would have been better? Despite
waiting for ~3 hours for a tug, that was the level of preparation for
aeroretrieve, and it was insufficient. Lessons were learned, and shared,
even via Russ's club's newsletter.

Following a spin fatality at the USAF Academy, Russ performed exhaustive
spin evaluations on AS-K 21s at Edwards AFB, later resulting in Schleicher
updating the recommended recovery protocol in their flight manual.

June 1993 - Peter had an unhappy flight in his 1-26, flew a little in
August, and self reports not flying until 2000. Yet he took airplane
lessons at SMO, and his ASEL CFI was killed in November of 1993
(LAX94FA058). Later, his glider mentor died in a soaring accident. I don't
blame Peter for exiting aviation in this cruel circumstance; he perhaps
never felt secure flying again.

Yes, Russ later suffered a stroke. After extensive rehab, Russ resumed
flying with rated glider pilots. He never flew solo, nor with persons who
could not be PIC without his assistance. He would fly Biennial Flight
Reviews and check flights with current club airmen. He put no one at risk,
and advised them of his limitations. I believe it was his love of soaring
that motivated him to recover from his stroke to mobility and productivity.
No glider pilot is required to have a medical certificate, as Peter should
recall.

In 1998 - Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall were killed in a 9-month old
Puchacz. On a summer afternoon, they launched for a check out flight for
Todd in the Puchacz. I towed them, they released in lift west of the field
at about 2000 agl. By the time I landed, tied the tug and returned to the
hangar (less than :10 from release) , another glider pilot radioed seeing
something "wrong". When I asked, he said he saw a spin to below the horizon
by another glider. Marty took the 182 and landed within 100 yards on a dirt
road amidst brush to render first aid. I coordinated emergency response, and
drove out.

Both pilots were dead when Marty arrived. No glider pilots are ever happy
with NTSB findings. The hands and feet we witnessed on flight controls were
inconclusive. Bruising is normal when tissue holds hard things that
crash-stop. Contusions are bruises. Both pilots had bruises. To envision a
flight control struggle is conjecture.

Both men were retired Air Force pilots. Both men had extensive flight crew
environment experience. Both men were instructors and had extensive spin
experience. Both were current and professionals.

To conjecture about rudder pedal/foot jamming is wrong(denial). Feet weren't
jammed under those rudder pedals. The bodies were removed before NTSB's
arrival the next day. For me to believe they were trying to recover to
controlled flight is easy. To ascertain what went wrong is difficult.

If Russ had intended to do spin training in the Puch, I believe he would
have chosen to wear parachutes. I did much subsequent research on the Puch
(which was within CG), and found that 10% of the Puchs built had spun to
impact by 1998, most with CFIs on board. (Like shark bites happening where
people swim, spin training happens with CFIs on board; gliders are spun less
often by solo PICs.)

Several renowned CFIGs would recall that I contacted them in collecting Puch
accident data and disseminating my results internationally. I believe there
is undocumented spin behavior by the Puchacz. SZD limits the CG envelope for
"energetic" maneuvers (snap rolls). This information was omitted by the FAA
in the 'approved' shortened English USA Pilot Operating Handbook, as
irrelevant - due to non-aerobatic US certification. The British Gliding
Association disagreed with me, yet had tried their own spin tests following
unexpected Puch-CFI deaths there in 1994. They didn't recreate unrecoverable
spins in those tests.

Looking back on Google, I had compiled 24 Puch fatal spinning accidents by
1998. Many of those were deliberate spin training flights with competent
CFIs on board, with no observable recovery efforts made through many turns.
USA, Italy, Austria, Germany, Britain. Discussion since has turned up a tale
or two of pilots who experienced severely delayed recovery response ( many
turns) even using the published recovery technique.

Several US clubs would be able to confirm that I contacted them in 1999 to
warn against spin training in a Puchacz, without a hard deck (bail out)
policy of 3000 ft agl and firm enforcement of parachute use for any turning
stall work. How much altitude is lost while trying to exit a glider? IF
more than 10% of the 172s spun to impact, would they still be certificated
in the US? Anyone know of another two-seater that will snap-roll 'over the
top', to the outside, that is not US aerobatic certified? What happens if
you snap-roll at 'less than' 2000 feet agl? Yet another CFI and young
student died in 2004 in Britain in the Puchacz, and this yielded a sad yet
thorough report - http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/HCD.pdf
..
Finally, the Brits admit that low altitude deliberate spinning has some
dangers.

I wouldn't view my actions as someone who was unconcerned by the death of
two pilots, or trying to hide anything about my local safety record. If I
were, I would have let this go. I can only honor those men by trying to have
something be learned from their passing. As with any soaring fatality, the
local group was depressed and a few members left soaring. 16 years later,
revisiting the topic of spinning unnecessarily low may reach another
audience.

Am I guilty of 'lecturing'? Yes. Having seen horrible things happen in
aviation, I don't want those things repeated. I am proud of my record of
only one canopy coming open on launch, and one failure to brake after
landing (and taxiing into a fence) being the sum total of my renters'
misadventures over +20 years as an FBO. Did private owners make mistakes
creating accidents at Cal City in that period? Sure. Would more flights have
taken place with a laissez-faire management style? Sure -- until I had no
gliders to rent, or became uninsurable or was heartsick.

Did I 'talk about' pilot's mistakes? Sure, I did, and still do. I talk
about my boo-boos -- landing out with not enough wind awareness resulting in
a ground loop. Failure to intercede early enough in XC training to return to
an airport, resulting in an out landing (shortest XC from Cal City - 4
miles - to a known landable-derigging spot). Being scared witless by
near-midair power traffic a couple of times. Failure to tie down a glider
well enough to protect it from summer overnight wave. My list is longer. I
am fallible.

I hope by talking about my and other pilot's human moments, respectfully,
that I can reduce the number of future soaring accidents. But that is an
unquantifiable effort.

Twice in 22 years, I have had a pilot come to me and tell me my training
saved their life. First was a private owner who was able to benign spiral
out of a wave flight blunder into cloud flight (IMC), who phoned me a week
later in chagrin. Second was a low-time Eastern club pilot who heard me
talk about parasitic drag in Memphis. At a later Eastern convention, he
came to tell me I had kept him from an accident, from an absurdly high
approach situation. (We had never flown together.) So, yes, talking about
problems helps avoid accidents.

Placing those discussions in a poignant setting, naming people and places we
know, makes those lessons visceral and more durable. I regret if someone is
offended when I make the discussion 'personal'.

I would hope my students, customers, potential customers know that my
emphatic moments are driven by a love for soaring, and the people in
soaring. I routinely pulled down pants cuffs, straightened seat belts and
oxygen lines, but seldom kissed foreheads on pre-launch, and don't view
myself as a hottie, unless you count hot-under-the-collar when someone
badmouths the hard-working people who try to keep soaring going.

Soaring has given me many years of joy.
I will be very sad this weekend, as gliders and pilots exit California City.


Cindy B

On Friday, January 31, 2014 7:29:11 PM UTC-7, CindyB wrote:
This won't make much sense, unless you have followed the thread on "Death of a Gliderport".



To rectify the drift, I began a new thread, Jim. Is this a slip or a crab?



I agree that I have talked a lot about glider safety, over many years. :-)



I disagree that I avoided addressing Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall's death nearly 16 years ago. Some folks thought the opposite to be the case. Glider folk have shown up for years for my 'lectures' at glider conventions and regional meetings. Do I think they enjoyed them? They say so, and return for subsequent presentations, particularly when I title one "What the NTSB Won't Ever Say ....". I was requested to present that topic, revised for 2012-13's accidents, at the Reno SSA Convention next month.





In July 1992- Russ Dervaes had a bad experience in an aero-retrieve from a semi-improved field. A glider was broken; thankfully no one was hurt. Cal City pilots discussed the lessons learned from this for years -- pilots needing to completely inspect the length of a runway for towing suitability (several small soft bushes slowed acceleration), recruiting a wing runner that isn't using a four footed cane, leaving the extra passenger behind for car retrieval, knowing which way in surrounding space is the best PTT option (attempting a 180 from 15 feet and 55 knots isn't going to work), perhaps the into-wind crosswind overgrown runway would have been better? Despite waiting for ~3 hours for a tug, that was the level of preparation for aeroretrieve, and it was insufficient. Lessons were learned, and shared, even via Russ's club's newsletter.



Following a spin fatality at the USAF Academy, Russ performed exhaustive spin evaluations on AS-K 21s at Edwards AFB, later resulting in Schleicher updating the recommended recovery protocol in their flight manual.



June 1993 - Peter had an unhappy flight in his 1-26, flew a little in August, and self reports not flying until 2000. Yet he took airplane lessons at SMO, and his ASEL CFI was killed in November of 1993 (LAX94FA058). Later, his glider mentor died in a soaring accident. I don't blame Peter for exiting aviation in this cruel circumstance; he perhaps never felt secure flying again.



Yes, Russ later suffered a stroke. After extensive rehab, Russ resumed flying with rated glider pilots. He never flew solo, nor with persons who could not be PIC without his assistance. He would fly Biennial Flight Reviews and check flights with current club airmen. He put no one at risk, and advised them of his limitations. I believe it was his love of soaring that motivated him to recover from his stroke to mobility and productivity. No glider pilot is required to have a medical certificate, as Peter should recall.



In 1998 - Russ Dervaes and Todd Marshall were killed in a 9-month old Puchacz. On a summer afternoon, they launched for a check out flight for Todd in the Puchacz. I towed them, they released in lift west of the field at about 2000 agl. By the time I landed, tied the tug and returned to the hangar (less than :10 from release) , another glider pilot radioed seeing something "wrong". When I asked, he said he saw a spin to below the horizon by another glider. Marty took the 182 and landed within 100 yards on a dirt road amidst brush to render first aid. I coordinated emergency response, and drove out.



Both pilots were dead when Marty arrived. No glider pilots are ever happy with NTSB findings. The hands and feet we witnessed on flight controls were inconclusive. Bruising is normal when tissue holds hard things that crash-stop. Contusions are bruises. Both pilots had bruises. To envision a flight control struggle is conjecture.



Both men were retired Air Force pilots. Both men had extensive flight crew environment experience. Both men were instructors and had extensive spin experience. Both were current and professionals.



To conjecture about rudder pedal/foot jamming is wrong(denial). Feet weren't jammed under those rudder pedals. The bodies were removed before NTSB's arrival the next day. For me to believe they were trying to recover to controlled flight is easy. To ascertain what went wrong is difficult.



If Russ had intended to do spin training in the Puch, I believe he would have chosen to wear parachutes. I did much subsequent research on the Puch (which was within CG), and found that 10% of the Puchs built had spun to impact by 1998, most with CFIs on board. (Like shark bites happening where people swim, spin training happens with CFIs on board; gliders are spun less often by solo PICs.)



Several renowned CFIGs would recall that I contacted them in collecting Puch accident data and disseminating my results internationally. I believe there is undocumented spin behavior by the Puchacz. SZD limits the CG envelope for "energetic" maneuvers (snap rolls). This information was omitted by the FAA in the 'approved' shortened English USA Pilot Operating Handbook, as irrelevant - due to non-aerobatic US certification. The British Gliding Association disagreed with me, yet had tried their own spin tests following unexpected Puch-CFI deaths there in 1994. They didn't recreate unrecoverable spins in those tests.



Looking back on Google, I had compiled 24 Puch fatal spinning accidents by 1998. Many of those were deliberate spin training flights with competent CFIs on board, with no observable recovery efforts made through many turns.. USA, Italy, Austria, Germany, Britain. Discussion since has turned up a tale or two of pilots who experienced severely delayed recovery response ( many turns) even using the published recovery technique.



Several US clubs would be able to confirm that I contacted them in 1999 to warn against spin training in a Puchacz, without a hard deck (bail out) policy of 3000 ft agl and firm enforcement of parachute use for any turning stall work. How much altitude is lost while trying to exit a glider? IF more than 10% of the 172s spun to impact, would they still be certificated in the US? Anyone know of another two-seater that will snap-roll 'over the top', to the outside, that is not US aerobatic certified? What happens if you snap-roll at 'less than' 2000 feet agl? Yet another CFI and young student died in 2004 in Britain in the Puchacz, and this yielded a sad yet thorough report - http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/HCD.pdf ..

Finally, the Brits admit that low altitude deliberate spinning has some dangers.



I wouldn't view my actions as someone who was unconcerned by the death of two pilots, or trying to hide anything about my local safety record. If I were, I would have let this go. I can only honor those men by trying to have something be learned from their passing. As with any soaring fatality, the local group was depressed and a few members left soaring. 16 years later, revisiting the topic of spinning unnecessarily low may reach another audience.



Am I guilty of 'lecturing'? Yes. Having seen horrible things happen in aviation, I don't want those things repeated. I am proud of my record of only one canopy coming open on launch, and one failure to brake after landing (and taxiing into a fence) being the sum total of my renters' misadventures over +20 years as an FBO. Did private owners make mistakes creating accidents at Cal City in that period? Sure. Would more flights have taken place with a laissez-faire management style? Sure -- until I had no gliders to rent, or became uninsurable or was heartsick.



Did I 'talk about' pilot's mistakes? Sure, I did, and still do. I talk about my boo-boos -- landing out with not enough wind awareness resulting in a ground loop. Failure to intercede early enough in XC training to return to an airport, resulting in an out landing (shortest XC from Cal City - 4 miles - to a known landable-derigging spot). Being scared witless by near-midair power traffic a couple of times. Failure to tie down a glider well enough to protect it from summer overnight wave. My list is longer. I am fallible.



I hope by talking about my and other pilot's human moments, respectfully, that I can reduce the number of future soaring accidents. But that is an unquantifiable effort.



Twice in 22 years, I have had a pilot come to me and tell me my training saved their life. First was a private owner who was able to benign spiral out of a wave flight blunder into cloud flight (IMC), who phoned me a week later in chagrin. Second was a low-time Eastern club pilot who heard me talk about parasitic drag in Memphis. At a later Eastern convention, he came to tell me I had kept him from an accident, from an absurdly high approach situation. (We had never flown together.) So, yes, talking about problems helps avoid accidents.



Placing those discussions in a poignant setting, naming people and places we know, makes those lessons visceral and more durable. I regret if someone is offended when I make the discussion 'personal'.



I would hope my students, customers, potential customers know that my emphatic moments are driven by a love for soaring, and the people in soaring. I routinely pulled down pants cuffs, straightened seat belts and oxygen lines, but seldom kissed foreheads on pre-launch, and don't view myself as a hottie, unless you count hot-under-the-collar when someone badmouths the hard-working people who try to keep soaring going.



Soaring has given me many years of joy.

I will be very sad this weekend, as gliders and pilots exit California City.





Cindy B

Cindy,
That was an excellent write-up and you effort in putting this comprehensive posting together is much appreciated.

As you well know, I was very fortunate to be able to fly at California City from 1985-1987 and I was also able to attend the RESCO Wave Camp in 1985. I had some wonderful flights out of Cal City during those years and in Nov of 1985 I was also very fortunate to attain diamond altitude in my trusty 1-26. The wave was great!

It is a sad day and it is truly unfortunate to see glider operations ending at Cal City....

Thanks again - Renny

Renny Rozzoni
Albuquerque, NM

Dan,

Regarding the BFR by a CFI that may not be legal to fly PIC (how's that for acronyms):

The FAA allows a CFI to train, give BFRs and other CFI duties as long as the other pilot is the PIC.

For example, you need a review this month, but have not exceeded the 24 calendar months. I am have a condition that prevents me from doing any PIC flights. I can administer a flight review as long as you're acting a PIC. If you're over the 24 months, I cannot do the review, since I cannot act as PIC.

The generally accepted thought is that the FAA wants to allow CFIs to continue to instruct and otherwise assist the safety of the pilot population even if they personally cannot exercise the privileges.

Mike

Thanks Mike, that's the answer I expected.


"SoaringXCellence" wrote in message
...
Dan,

Regarding the BFR by a CFI that may not be legal to fly PIC (how's that for
acronyms):

The FAA allows a CFI to train, give BFRs and other CFI duties as long as the
other pilot is the PIC.

For example, you need a review this month, but have not exceeded the 24
calendar months. I am have a condition that prevents me from doing any PIC
flights. I can administer a flight review as long as you're acting a PIC.
If you're over the 24 months, I cannot do the review, since I cannot act as
PIC.

The generally accepted thought is that the FAA wants to allow CFIs to
continue to instruct and otherwise assist the safety of the pilot population
even if they personally cannot exercise the privileges.

Mike