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It was just a news blurb this morning on the local TV news, but they
claimed that investigators now blame the loss of the Air Bus 300's tail on the improper use of the rudder by the co-pilot. If true (that the co-pilot is actually being blamed), I find that difficult to believe. A little research on the net uncovered a bunch of articles about how the Air Bus encountered wake turbulence from a preceding airliner and that the rudder experienced some rapid movement which exceeded it's structural design parameters, and it cleanly parted the aircraft. Prior to this accident, were Air Bus 300 pilots specifically told NOT to use the rudder in flight? Because if they did they might exceed the design parameters of the rudder? One article claimed that pilots were taught to counter wake turbulence using ailerons only. It wasn't clear to me if that applied to Air Buses only, or all airliners. Or did they learn not to use the rudder during flight because of this accident? Either way, I find it difficult to blame the co-pilot for reacting in what is likely a normal pilot response to turbulence. Surely all airliners aren't so tempermental when it comes to rudder input are they? Corky Scott |
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Corky Scott wrote:
If true (that the co-pilot is actually being blamed), I find that difficult to believe. A little research on the net uncovered a bunch of articles I've always been wondering why they do those thorough and long lasting investigations when all it takes to find the truth is a quick google search... Stefan |
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A tremendous amount of money could be save by eliminating the investigation
in the first place. There would still be articles written about crashes and we could simply google up the cause. Mike MU-2 "Stefan" wrote in message ... Corky Scott wrote: If true (that the co-pilot is actually being blamed), I find that difficult to believe. A little research on the net uncovered a bunch of articles I've always been wondering why they do those thorough and long lasting investigations when all it takes to find the truth is a quick google search... Stefan |
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On Tue, 26 Oct 2004 15:36:02 +0200, Stefan
wrote: I've always been wondering why they do those thorough and long lasting investigations when all it takes to find the truth is a quick google search... Stefan You will notice that I was asking a question, not suggesting a conclusion. I used the internet to refresh my memory of the crash and the particulars surrounding it, not to second guess the NTSB. Or maybe you wouldn't notice. Corky Scott |
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Corky Scott wrote:
Or maybe you wouldn't notice. Maybe, I didn't want to? :-P Stefan |
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Well, throughout the process, Airbus has submitted a large number of documents
in the effort to prove that they've been trying for years to get American Airlines to wake up and correct their flawed training procedures. Some of these documents are co-introduced by Boeing, and apply to "Airliners" indicating efforts on Airbus' behalf to get the spotlight away from their product. Some pilots expressed their astonishment at the fact that there would be instances, in normal operations and within the manoeuvering speed of the aircraft, where full-amplitude control inputs would have the risk of destroying the aircraft. The most surprising thing to me in all of this is that in their never-ending quarrel over whose "method" is better - the hardcore fly-by-wire method of Airbus or the "assisted" method of Boeing, Airbus never ceases to stress the fact that their computers will prevent inadvertent "inappropriate" control inputs from pilots, such as increasing pitch angle to where the AOA exceeds stall margin.* Now are we supposed to believe that rudder inputs were simply "not included" in this guardian angel policy? Though it may not be fair to the NTSB, it is sometimes hard not to conclude that placing the blame on a pilot, who is no longer here to defend himself, is far less "costly" than implicating an airline or major airfarme manufacturer. *Boeing, it must be said, has not done much better, because they chose to counter the Airbus argument by saying there could be cases where the theoretical limits of useful control inputs could (an should) be exceeded momentarily in an emergency situation. They chose to illustrate this with the 757 accident in Cali. Couldn't they find a more, well, successful, illustration? G Faris |
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G Farris wrote:
Though it may not be fair to the NTSB, it is sometimes hard not to conclude that placing the blame on a pilot, who is no longer here to defend himself, is far less "costly" than implicating an airline or major airfarme manufacturer. The NTSB has no interest in what is "costly" or not. It frequently makes recommendations that the FAA and the airlines decide not to heed for "cost" reasons. Obviously we haven't seen the print of the "fimal" report, but I suspect that the results will be improper control input by the pilot flying with some blame on the training by the manufacturer or airline on how to deal with wake turbulance encounters. |
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#9
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On Tue, 26 Oct 2004 11:15:09 -0400, Ron Natalie
wrote: G Farris wrote: Though it may not be fair to the NTSB, it is sometimes hard not to conclude that placing the blame on a pilot, who is no longer here to defend himself, is far less "costly" than implicating an airline or major airfarme manufacturer. The NTSB has no interest in what is "costly" or not. It frequently makes recommendations that the FAA and the airlines decide not to heed for "cost" reasons. Obviously we haven't seen the print of the "fimal" report, but I suspect that the results will be improper control input by the pilot flying with some blame on the training by the manufacturer or airline on how to deal with wake turbulance encounters. I recall some question concerning a weakness in the design of the rudder itself, in that the supports to the composite structure were too few. Not too long after the accident, I saw it was explained on TV that the manufacturer should have distributed the load over more points for the sake of the composite material. The known and understood weakness of composites, compared to metals, is their lesser ability to handle bearing stress. So Airbus should've known better, presumably. I think I heard this on CNN, and their expert (probably Boeing, but I don't recall) seemed to know what he was talking about; even supplying drawings of the rudder. From current discussion, I assume this is not considered valid anymore, and so I may not be valid in bringing it up. But I thought the problem close to being solved way back when. If the control inputs are controlled, as I believe Airbus is, then the pilot cannot be blamed for over-controlling; unless the manufacturer pointedly states not to do that. So I'm thinking Airbus is really getting a free one from the NTSB on this. Or the report we are reading is premature. Typical structure failure is from stabilizer abuse, not the rudder, I thought. But now do I need to be concerned with what I do with my feet? --Mike |
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"Mike Rhodes" wrote in message
... [...] If the control inputs are controlled, as I believe Airbus is, then the pilot cannot be blamed for over-controlling; unless the manufacturer pointedly states not to do that. The manual for my airplane (and most, I believe) says nothing about not pulling too hard on the yoke when recovering from a dive in which the airspeed exceeds Vne. Does that mean that the manufacturer would be to blame if I caused the wings to fail by doing so? I don't think so. I'm curious why it appears that you would. This vertical stabilizer failure is a more esoteric issue, granted...but it's essentially the same. All aircraft have their limits, and pilots should be aware of them. Typical structure failure is from stabilizer abuse, not the rudder, I thought. But now do I need to be concerned with what I do with my feet? You needed to be before. Though, to be fair, unless you're flying transport category aircraft, your concerns are defined by different certification rules than those at issue here. As far as how structure failure happens, I don't know what you mean by "from stabilizer abuse, not the rudder". The rudder is the primary way to stress the vertical stabilizer, it being attached to it and all, as well as using the vertical stabilizer to transmit forces generated by the control surface to the airframe. Pete |
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