old days

I sure miss the old days when we had a lively discussion group with
some very experienced pilots opining upon matters. Poster were for the
most part civil and if you could ask the right questions then listen a
guy like Nick Lappos (or many other very experienced pilots) would
respond.

Happy Holidays to all Helio drivers!

Anyone got any stories they want to tell? Near miss, mistake, how they
solved a problem? When I get the time this next week I will write up
my VERY near miss with a MD 80 out of Burbank (missed by 10 feet
according to the pilot of the MD 80).

Fly safe
Roger

Airman wrote:
I sure miss the old days when we had a lively discussion group with
some very experienced pilots opining upon matters. Poster were for the
most part civil and if you could ask the right questions then listen a
guy like Nick Lappos (or many other very experienced pilots) would
respond.

Roger, I miss the old days too. But I think there is still a
significant wealth of knowledge here, just a lot of quiet people (lurkers).

This is a little long and rambling, but I put a lot of thought into how
aircrew handle emergencies, however great or small the emergency and
whoever the crew is composed of.

I am presently a military flight instructor and have been for a bit less
than three years. I would hesitate to call myself "very" experienced.
Partly by choice and partly by circumstances, I have become specialized
in and good at instrument flying. Handling emergencies and crew
resource management both play a big part, and of course both relate to
the study of human behavior.

Today I was practicing emergencies in the simulator (required periodic
proficiency practice... say that three times fast!). Now, not because
I've become "that good" or salty (hardly), but I reacted very calmly to
one type of malfunction (erroneous engine out indication, think loud
alarm noise with bright red light and rpm gauge winding down) that
usually startles most guys. The common reaction is to be startled and
quickly lower the collective; my hands didn't even move... why? Note
that an actual engine failure is also accompanied by a physical reaction
from the aircraft and additional instrument indications. Now, I
honestly wasn't "spring loaded" in my mind for this particular
malfunction, so why did I react atypically?

It occurred to me that at my present experience level, I have grown to
regard many malfunctions and minor emergencies as a nuisance. I
wondered if this was bad, if this was a warning sign that I was falling
into a classic psychological trap of arrogance? I wondered if it was
good, if I was observing myself mature. Maybe it was neither good nor
bad. Well, what else is involved in my approach to flying? I am always
willing to learn, no matter what the source. Simulators are always
educational for me, just not usually in an introspective sense. I still
have great respect for the dangers involved with flying. I still think
about "what ifs" and work to maintain my own basic skills while building
more advanced skills.

I'm getting to the end of my line at my current job and won't be flying
on my next tour (the military likes you to be well rounded). It takes
effort for me to remain focused in the cockpit each day. Staying
focused is a conscious choice I make as part of a careful mindset. I
believe I have an overall healthy approach to flying. I believe that
the fact that I have grown to regard certain minor emergencies as
nuisances isn't dangerous, because it complements and is tempered by
other facets of "how" I fly.


I probably thought waaay too much into this... thanks for reading and I
hope you don't mind my rambling

"Jim Carriere" wrote in message
...
Airman wrote:
I sure miss the old days when we had a lively discussion group with
some very experienced pilots opining upon matters. Poster were for the
most part civil and if you could ask the right questions then listen a
guy like Nick Lappos (or many other very experienced pilots) would
respond.

Roger, I miss the old days too. But I think there is still a significant
wealth of knowledge here, just a lot of quiet people (lurkers).

This is a little long and rambling, but I put a lot of thought into how
aircrew handle emergencies, however great or small the emergency and
whoever the crew is composed of.

I am presently a military flight instructor and have been for a bit less
than three years. I would hesitate to call myself "very" experienced.
Partly by choice and partly by circumstances, I have become specialized in
and good at instrument flying. Handling emergencies and crew resource
management both play a big part, and of course both relate to the study of
human behavior.

Today I was practicing emergencies in the simulator (required periodic
proficiency practice... say that three times fast!). Now, not because
I've become "that good" or salty (hardly), but I reacted very calmly to
one type of malfunction (erroneous engine out indication, think loud alarm
noise with bright red light and rpm gauge winding down) that usually
startles most guys. The common reaction is to be startled and quickly
lower the collective; my hands didn't even move... why? Note that an
actual engine failure is also accompanied by a physical reaction from the
aircraft and additional instrument indications. Now, I honestly wasn't
"spring loaded" in my mind for this particular malfunction, so why did I
react atypically?

It occurred to me that at my present experience level, I have grown to
regard many malfunctions and minor emergencies as a nuisance. I wondered
if this was bad, if this was a warning sign that I was falling into a
classic psychological trap of arrogance? I wondered if it was good, if I
was observing myself mature. Maybe it was neither good nor bad. Well,
what else is involved in my approach to flying? I am always willing to
learn, no matter what the source. Simulators are always educational for
me, just not usually in an introspective sense. I still have great
respect for the dangers involved with flying. I still think about "what
ifs" and work to maintain my own basic skills while building more advanced
skills.

I'm getting to the end of my line at my current job and won't be flying on
my next tour (the military likes you to be well rounded). It takes effort
for me to remain focused in the cockpit each day. Staying focused is a
conscious choice I make as part of a careful mindset. I believe I have an
overall healthy approach to flying. I believe that the fact that I have
grown to regard certain minor emergencies as nuisances isn't dangerous,
because it complements and is tempered by other facets of "how" I fly.


I probably thought waaay too much into this... thanks for reading and I
hope you don't mind my rambling



Please do ramble... I have been reading the posts on this group for some
time and find it interesting at times. Unfortunately I haven't read the
posts in "the old times" and you could say I'm a frequent lurker
I'm currently working as a military instructor too.. but I suppose I haven't
got the hours or the experience like the guys in the USA.
Anyway, to start off a discussion - have been doing the what ifs and there
are several opinions on the particular emergency that I need to solve.
Engine failure during transition to forward flight. Specificaly after the
transverse flow effect (say doing 40 knots, around 50 feet AGL). What to do
with the collective? Do you slam it down to maintain as much RPM as you can
and then quickly pull it up to cushion the landing or is there not enough
time to lower the collective fully? Maybe a newbie question but as you
probably know once you ask the question a dozen theories pop up. Thanks...

I'll try one: What are the sources of 2/rev vibration in a two bladed helo?
I know that I don't have any significant 2/rev in hover, but do in forward
flite.

--
Stuart Fields
Experimental Helo magazine
P. O. Box 1585
Inyokern, CA 93527
(760) 377-4478
(760) 408-9747 general and layout cell
(760) 608-1299 technical and advertising cell

www.vkss.com
www.experimentalhelo.com


"John Doe" wrote in message
...

"Jim Carriere" wrote in message
...
Airman wrote:
I sure miss the old days when we had a lively discussion group with
some very experienced pilots opining upon matters. Poster were for the
most part civil and if you could ask the right questions then listen a
guy like Nick Lappos (or many other very experienced pilots) would
respond.

Roger, I miss the old days too. But I think there is still a
significant
wealth of knowledge here, just a lot of quiet people (lurkers).

This is a little long and rambling, but I put a lot of thought into how
aircrew handle emergencies, however great or small the emergency and
whoever the crew is composed of.

I am presently a military flight instructor and have been for a bit less
than three years. I would hesitate to call myself "very" experienced.
Partly by choice and partly by circumstances, I have become specialized
in
and good at instrument flying. Handling emergencies and crew resource
management both play a big part, and of course both relate to the study
of
human behavior.

Today I was practicing emergencies in the simulator (required periodic
proficiency practice... say that three times fast!). Now, not because
I've become "that good" or salty (hardly), but I reacted very calmly to
one type of malfunction (erroneous engine out indication, think loud
alarm
noise with bright red light and rpm gauge winding down) that usually
startles most guys. The common reaction is to be startled and quickly
lower the collective; my hands didn't even move... why? Note that an
actual engine failure is also accompanied by a physical reaction from
the
aircraft and additional instrument indications. Now, I honestly wasn't
"spring loaded" in my mind for this particular malfunction, so why did I
react atypically?

It occurred to me that at my present experience level, I have grown to
regard many malfunctions and minor emergencies as a nuisance. I
wondered
if this was bad, if this was a warning sign that I was falling into a
classic psychological trap of arrogance? I wondered if it was good, if
I
was observing myself mature. Maybe it was neither good nor bad. Well,
what else is involved in my approach to flying? I am always willing to
learn, no matter what the source. Simulators are always educational for
me, just not usually in an introspective sense. I still have great
respect for the dangers involved with flying. I still think about "what
ifs" and work to maintain my own basic skills while building more
advanced
skills.

I'm getting to the end of my line at my current job and won't be flying
on
my next tour (the military likes you to be well rounded). It takes
effort
for me to remain focused in the cockpit each day. Staying focused is a
conscious choice I make as part of a careful mindset. I believe I have
an
overall healthy approach to flying. I believe that the fact that I have
grown to regard certain minor emergencies as nuisances isn't dangerous,
because it complements and is tempered by other facets of "how" I fly.


I probably thought waaay too much into this... thanks for reading and I
hope you don't mind my rambling



Please do ramble... I have been reading the posts on this group for some
time and find it interesting at times. Unfortunately I haven't read the
posts in "the old times" and you could say I'm a frequent lurker
I'm currently working as a military instructor too.. but I suppose I
haven't
got the hours or the experience like the guys in the USA.
Anyway, to start off a discussion - have been doing the what ifs and there
are several opinions on the particular emergency that I need to solve.
Engine failure during transition to forward flight. Specificaly after the
transverse flow effect (say doing 40 knots, around 50 feet AGL). What to
do
with the collective? Do you slam it down to maintain as much RPM as you
can
and then quickly pull it up to cushion the landing or is there not enough
time to lower the collective fully? Maybe a newbie question but as you
probably know once you ask the question a dozen theories pop up. Thanks...

Stu,

Stuart & Kathryn Fields wrote:
I'll try one: What are the sources of 2/rev vibration in a two bladed helo?
I know that I don't have any significant 2/rev in hover, but do in forward
flite.


A WAG says that its the due to the blades being
aligned with the airframe twice per revolution (at
0 and 180 degrees). As each advancing blade comes
out of that alignment and hits the airstream I'll
bet it gets a small quiver which you feel as 2/rev
vibration. That would explain why you don't see
it in hover, but do in forward flight.

Right??

Don W.

Don: I think that that may be one of the sources for tailbooms like the
206s, Hueys etc. but the Bell 47 and my Baby Belle has an open tail boom so
I'm not sure that there is any interaction there. I have done some math and
it shows there is a velocity term that occurs in forward flite that creates
both a lifting and drag force that varies at twice the rotation rate.
However I'm thinking that there must be more than just these?

--
Kathy Fields
Experimental Helo magazine
P. O. Box 1585
Inyokern, CA 93527
(760) 377-4478
(760) 408-9747 general and layout cell
(760) 608-1299 technical and advertising cell

www.vkss.com
www.experimentalhelo.com


"Don W" wrote in message
et...
Stu,

Stuart & Kathryn Fields wrote:
I'll try one: What are the sources of 2/rev vibration in a two bladed
helo?
I know that I don't have any significant 2/rev in hover, but do in
forward
flite.


A WAG says that its the due to the blades being
aligned with the airframe twice per revolution (at
0 and 180 degrees). As each advancing blade comes
out of that alignment and hits the airstream I'll
bet it gets a small quiver which you feel as 2/rev
vibration. That would explain why you don't see
it in hover, but do in forward flight.

Right??

Don W.

Stuart & Kathryn Fields wrote:
I'll try one: What are the sources of 2/rev vibration in a two bladed helo?
I know that I don't have any significant 2/rev in hover, but do in forward
flite.



Stuart, you are definitely more current than I on blade tracking so let
me try to remember. A 1 or 2 per rev vibration which is constant
throughout the rpm range should require PC link adjustments. I hope I
remember, I did a bunch of these, a vibration which increases as RPM is
increased should require a trim tab adjustment. A flag is the easiest
way to adjust the blade track although if you have a vibrex you can get
it fine tuned. Tomorrow I'll go find my -20s for the OH58, UH1 and AH1
and see if my memory is bad.

--

boB
copter.six

P
U.S. Army Aviation (retired)
Central Texas
5NM West of Gray Army/Killeen Regional (KGRK)

boB. I believe that the 1/rev vertical is due to tracking, and on my ship,
I either stick track for a ground check or use tip lites. Note us
experimental guys have a blade tip mounted LED two different colors, and we
can use these tip lites in forward flite. One person tracking is possible.
I also check the vertical vibration by using an accelerometer mounted down
by the passengers pedals. You are right. My initial tracking adjustments
are done with the pitch links and if I needed more in forward flight, I
would have to put some trim tabs on the blades. So far my blades run good
in forward flite, that is to say I don't have a climbing or diving blade.
My ship runs smooth in the vertical 1/rev down in the 0.1ips regions all the
way to 90mph. Even when I do vertical 2/rev, measuring in the same spot, I
don't get any significant readings. However measuring the horizontal 2/rev
just below the swash plate, I can get some significant readings when my fuel
level gets below 1/2 tank and I can feel it in the seat and controls. It
seems that all of the Baby Belles exhibit this phenomena to some extent.
Measurements on the Rotorway Exec showed similar readings but for some
reason their vibrations don't enter the cockpit.
I'm curious as to the sources of 2/rev vibrations. The two mentioned with
Don W I know about and not a lot can be done to either of these two sources,
but are there more sources?

--
Stuart Fields
Experimental Helo magazine
P. O. Box 1585
Inyokern, CA 93527
(760) 377-4478
(760) 408-9747 general and layout cell
(760) 608-1299 technical and advertising cell

www.vkss.com
www.experimentalhelo.com


"boB" wrote in message
...
Stuart & Kathryn Fields wrote:
I'll try one: What are the sources of 2/rev vibration in a two bladed
helo?
I know that I don't have any significant 2/rev in hover, but do in
forward
flite.



Stuart, you are definitely more current than I on blade tracking so let
me try to remember. A 1 or 2 per rev vibration which is constant
throughout the rpm range should require PC link adjustments. I hope I
remember, I did a bunch of these, a vibration which increases as RPM is
increased should require a trim tab adjustment. A flag is the easiest
way to adjust the blade track although if you have a vibrex you can get
it fine tuned. Tomorrow I'll go find my -20s for the OH58, UH1 and AH1
and see if my memory is bad.

--

boB
copter.six

P
U.S. Army Aviation (retired)
Central Texas
5NM West of Gray Army/Killeen Regional (KGRK)

John Doe wrote:


Please do ramble... I have been reading the posts on this group for some
time and find it interesting at times. Unfortunately I haven't read the
posts in "the old times" and you could say I'm a frequent lurker
I'm currently working as a military instructor too.. but I suppose I haven't
got the hours or the experience like the guys in the USA.
Anyway, to start off a discussion - have been doing the what ifs and there
are several opinions on the particular emergency that I need to solve.
Engine failure during transition to forward flight. Specificaly after the
transverse flow effect (say doing 40 knots, around 50 feet AGL). What to do
with the collective? Do you slam it down to maintain as much RPM as you can
and then quickly pull it up to cushion the landing or is there not enough
time to lower the collective fully? Maybe a newbie question but as you
probably know once you ask the question a dozen theories pop up. Thanks...



I had the fortune of flying helicopters during Vietnam. Back in the days
where pilots passed along their experiences and how to survive getting
the helicopter shot out from under them. I did not fly in Vietnam. My
orders were to report in Feb 1973. In January they ended the war (so to
speak) and my orders were canceled.

But before I knew my orders were going to be canceled I flew with all
Vets and soaked up everything they would teach me. One maneuver many of
them had experience with was an engine failure at 50 ft AGL at a hover
and moving forward. Both situations required the same response in the
UH-1. The collective was slammed down and without a pause, was raised
quickly to cushion the landing. It was almost a continuous movement,
down and then back up. These were pilots teaching me, not IPs. By the
time I started instructing in 1978 the world of Army Aviation had
changed. Even as an IP I could not teach, or even demonstrate, some of
the maneuvers that combat veterans had learned the hard way.

Some of the other maneuvers I was taught turned out to be a bit on the
extreme side of the coin. An OH58 hovering at 500 feet AGL, engine
failure, lower the collective and apply aft cyclic until backing up a
few knots, then lower the nose to get at least 40 knots and apply
collective to cushion landing directly under the point of the engine
failure. As I remember the minimum rate of descent in an OH58 is 43
knots. I remember at that airspeed there was no deceleration, only a
quick and continuous application of collective to keep the skids from
wrapping around the fuselage.

I was not required to remember how to react to those situations in
Desert Storm. I flew OH58D's and as far as I could tell I was never seen
or shot at.

--

boB
copter.six

"boB" wrote in message
...

I had the fortune of flying helicopters during Vietnam. Back in the days
where pilots passed along their experiences and how to survive getting the
helicopter shot out from under them. I did not fly in Vietnam. My orders
were to report in Feb 1973. In January they ended the war (so to speak)
and my orders were canceled.

But before I knew my orders were going to be canceled I flew with all Vets
and soaked up everything they would teach me. One maneuver many of them
had experience with was an engine failure at 50 ft AGL at a hover and
moving forward. Both situations required the same response in the UH-1.
The collective was slammed down and without a pause, was raised quickly to
cushion the landing. It was almost a continuous movement, down and then
back up. These were pilots teaching me, not IPs. By the time I started
instructing in 1978 the world of Army Aviation had changed. Even as an IP
I could not teach, or even demonstrate, some of the maneuvers that combat
veterans had learned the hard way.

Some of the other maneuvers I was taught turned out to be a bit on the
extreme side of the coin. An OH58 hovering at 500 feet AGL, engine
failure, lower the collective and apply aft cyclic until backing up a few
knots, then lower the nose to get at least 40 knots and apply collective
to cushion landing directly under the point of the engine failure. As I
remember the minimum rate of descent in an OH58 is 43 knots. I remember at
that airspeed there was no deceleration, only a quick and continuous
application of collective to keep the skids from wrapping around the
fuselage.

I was not required to remember how to react to those situations in Desert
Storm. I flew OH58D's and as far as I could tell I was never seen or shot
at.

--

boB
copter.six


Thanks a lot boB... It means a world of difference having someone with real
life (or even better - combat) experience giving their opinion... Sadly I
have never done anything but power recovery autos and I'm currently passing
through 550 hours (Bell206B) - so any answer I give to my students is purely
theoretical. And sometimes it's hard to be convincing Not to mention the
discussions that go on once the subject is open between my coworkers
If you or anyone else has any info on theese "nonstandard" procedures I'd be
happy to hear them out...