Weather vs. Combat

How accurate is that statement and
did weather also account for more losses than combat
in previous wars (e.g: WW2, Korea, etc?)

My specialty is WWII nightfighting and I can say that, particularly in the
first half of the war, as many a/c were lost or abandoned due to weather (or
collisions in poor visibility) than to enemy action. One night off the top of
my head, a small RAF bomber force had to all abandon their aircraft due to viz
over their bases - something like 5 Wimpys, I think. On more than one occasion,
a Mosquito raid that lost no aircraft due to enemy action had to abandon their
aircraft upon return because there was no clear landing field. Such events were
not rare on either side and veteran nightfighter pilots uniformly considered
the weather every bit as much of an enemy as the other team.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

(Gordon) wrote:

My specialty is WWII nightfighting and I can say that, particularly in the
first half of the war, as many a/c were lost or abandoned due to weather (or
collisions in poor visibility) than to enemy action. One night off the top of
my head, a small RAF bomber force had to all abandon their aircraft due to viz
over their bases - something like 5 Wimpys, I think. On more than one occasion,
a Mosquito raid that lost no aircraft due to enemy action had to abandon their
aircraft upon return because there was no clear landing field. Such events were
not rare on either side and veteran nightfighter pilots uniformly considered
the weather every bit as much of an enemy as the other team.

I can think of a time or two that I would've loved to "abandon the
A/C" in Can't-See-**** conditions had I been wearing a chute.
One of my former bosses flew Huns in 'Nam and used to poo-poo
us lowly charter jockies when we'd complain about launching from
a short runway way over gross at night and in bad weather (of course,
he hadn't flown in ages and it was our asses on the line and not
his!) Granted, we weren't getting shot at but the risk was probably
just as great because we weren't launching from a nice 10,000 ft. long
runway with barriers and emergency equipment/personnel at the end
in a jet equipped with an ejection seat and the best maintenance
that money could buy. In any event, other than NDB's, what type of
instrument approaches were generally available back in WW2?

-Mike Marron

Mike Marron wrote:
In any event, other than NDB's, what type of
instrument approaches were generally available back in WW2?


Radio ranges. Pilots flew along a beam listening to dots and dashes. The tone
changed if you drifted off the beam. Some of the old timers here can explain
this a lot better than me since I didn't start flying until the late 1970's.



--
Mortimer Schnerd, RN


http://www.mortimerschnerd.com

"Mike Marron" wrote in message
...
(Gordon) wrote:

My specialty is WWII nightfighting and I can say that, particularly in
the
first half of the war, as many a/c were lost or abandoned due to weather
(or
collisions in poor visibility) than to enemy action. One night off the
top of
my head, a small RAF bomber force had to all abandon their aircraft due
to viz
over their bases - something like 5 Wimpys, I think. On more than one
occasion,
a Mosquito raid that lost no aircraft due to enemy action had to abandon
their
aircraft upon return because there was no clear landing field. Such
events were
not rare on either side and veteran nightfighter pilots uniformly
considered
the weather every bit as much of an enemy as the other team.

I can think of a time or two that I would've loved to "abandon the
A/C" in Can't-See-**** conditions had I been wearing a chute.
One of my former bosses flew Huns in 'Nam and used to poo-poo
us lowly charter jockies when we'd complain about launching from
a short runway way over gross at night and in bad weather (of course,
he hadn't flown in ages and it was our asses on the line and not
his!) Granted, we weren't getting shot at but the risk was probably
just as great because we weren't launching from a nice 10,000 ft. long
runway with barriers and emergency equipment/personnel at the end
in a jet equipped with an ejection seat and the best maintenance
that money could buy. In any event, other than NDB's, what type of
instrument approaches were generally available back in WW2?

-Mike Marron


Ground controlled approach using precision radar was pioneered by the RAF in
WW2. Arthur C Clarke wrote an excellent book
called 'Glide Path' about the project (on which he worked)

The Germans had the Lorenz blind landing system and both the
Americans and British had similar systems in use pre war

In 1930 the American Bureau of standards introduced the first directional
guidance system using a transmission on 330 kHz with two tones
that were transmitted of 65 and 85.7 Hz.
In the aircraft receiver, these were received, applied to filters, detected
and used to energise a centre zero meter. The edge of the airfield was
defined
by the cone of silence over a simple beacon modulated at 40 Hz

F. Dunmore improved on the system by adding a VHF signal on 93 MHz that
was transmitted from a location at the upwind end of the runway, if the
aerial
was mounted at a suitable height, then a line of equal field strength would
approximate to the require vertical guidance pattern.

The first blind landing using this system took place in 1931

Keith

Mortimer Schnerd, RN wrote:
Radio ranges. Pilots flew along a beam listening to dots and dashes.
The tone changed if you drifted off the beam. Some of the old timers
here can explain this a lot better than me since I didn't start
flying until the late 1970's.


As I think about it, the Morse that was transmitted was a series of A's and N's.
I can't remember any more than that about it.


--
Mortimer Schnerd, RN


http://www.mortimerschnerd.com

"Keith Willshaw" wrote:

Ground controlled approach using precision radar was pioneered by
the RAF in WW2. Arthur C Clarke wrote an excellent book
called 'Glide Path' about the project (on which he worked)

The Germans had the Lorenz blind landing system and both the
Americans and British had similar systems in use pre war

In 1930 the American Bureau of standards introduced the first directional
guidance system using a transmission on 330 kHz with two tones
that were transmitted of 65 and 85.7 Hz.
In the aircraft receiver, these were received, applied to filters, detected
and used to energise a centre zero meter. The edge of the airfield was
defined by the cone of silence over a simple beacon modulated at 40 Hz
F. Dunmore improved on the system by adding a VHF signal on 93 MHz that
was transmitted from a location at the upwind end of the runway, if the
aerial was mounted at a suitable height, then a line of equal field strength
would approximate to the require vertical guidance pattern.

The first blind landing using this system took place in 1931

So, in a nutshell GCA was the primary precision approach
and NDB was the primary non-precision approach used in WW2?

-Mike Marron

From: Mike Marron mjma

did weather also account for more losses than combat
in previous wars (e.g: WW2, Korea, etc?)
I would bet that, depending on how you define a "weather" loss, it did. (I
would classify a weather loss as including weather related navigation errors
that lead to collision with terrain or fuel exhaustion.)
I had a friend who flew P-51 escort missions to Japan. He never completed
one successfully and only twice reached Japan (going into the drink each of
these two times). Weather aborts were common. He described his missions to me
some years ago. Weather figures heavily.
for example, a mission escorting B-29s to bomb Kanoya, Kyushu. Briefing
advises might encounter "weather" as they approach Kyushu. P-51s and B-29s to
rendevous 100 miles from coast. At rendevous is where encounter weather front,
multiple dense cloud layers from 1,000 feet to over 24,000 feet. Below 1,000
feet fog and rain with only occasional glimpses of sea or land. B-29s were
stacked from 8,000 to 14,000 feet. Attempting to find them and maintain station
on them led to a series of near misses as a bomber suddenly emerged from the
opaque white void. He lost contact with all other P-51s and finally climbed to
24,000 feet in an attempt to keep clear of B-29s. A that altitude his oxygen
system failed--fortunately he noticed the problem before falling
unconscious--and he dove back into the murk and as luck would have it nearly
collided with four P-51s in a tight formation being led by the squadron CO. He
attached himself to them as they descended to below 1,000 feet and made a run
for Iwo Jima. His total flight time on this aborted mission was 7.5 hours.
Four planes and pilots from his squadron never returned, presumed lost due to
inclement weather.
Another mission to escort B-29s bombing Tachikawa, encounter similar front
looming over Honshu. Rendevous point with bombers is beyond front. Attempt to
penetrate, squadron flying tight formation on lead so no one will become lost.
Very rough air makes it impossible to maintain formation without risk of
collision. realize no possibility of effectively escorting bombers and the
mission is aborted. On return to Iwo, the island is blanketed in thick fog.
Orbit until clears enough to land. Total time six hours.
Next mission almost a repeat, on instruments from take-off through 16,000 feet,
then into clear air only to see a wall of clouds extending above 30,000 feet
looming ahead. Mission is aborted, flgith time at return four hours.
No official mission credit for any of these aborted missions, on each of which
some pilots failed to return.
As to how they navigated, they had "navigator" B-29s to follow, which worked in
good weather. And they kept a ded reckoning plot. There were a series of
volcanic islands on the way to the Tokyo area that helped them check their ded
reckoning. Later they had Uncle Dog VHF.
He noted that the heavily loaded P-51s could only climb very gradually and
would scarcely climb at all above 20,000 feet until they burned off a fair
amount of fuel. on strafing missions they carried rockets, which made the
airplane almost unmanageable for about the first hour of flight, due to the
extra weight and drag. In order to have sufficient fuel to carry out the
mission, they needed to burn 40gph on the run to and from Japan. To do that
they cruised at, iirc, 205mph at 29 inches and 2350 rpm, auto lean.
Of the two mission he actually made it to Japan he ran out of fuel on the
return from the first one, ditching near a picket boat, and was shot down by an
enemy fighter on the second one, parachuting into Tokyo Bay, where he was
rescued by a submarine.
He returned home without ever completing another mission and as a result didn't
even earn an Air Medal, althopugh he had plenty of terrifying tales to tell of
aborted missions, once you got him talking, which usually was on the second or
third evening of a packhorse trip and required a good ration of fresh-caught,
pan-fried trout, campfire biscuits, a pipe filled with his favorite Three Nuns
tobacco and copious libations of Jack Daniels. A good sunset afterglow in crisp
air, crackling campfire, nickering horses, dog lolling by your knee, good
friends, good food, good drink and good stories. What more could you want?


Chris Mark

"Chris Mark" wrote

....

third evening of a packhorse trip and required a good ration of fresh-caught,
pan-fried trout, campfire biscuits, a pipe filled with his favorite Three Nuns
tobacco and copious libations of Jack Daniels. A good sunset afterglow in crisp
air, crackling campfire, nickering horses, dog lolling by your knee, good
friends, good food, good drink and good stories. What more could you want?

An Internet connection! :-)

Mike Marron wrote:

The link below shows just how dangerous flying
into a thunderboomer can be. I understand that more
aircraft were lost in Vietnam due to weather than
enemy fire. How accurate is that statement and
did weather also account for more losses than combat
in previous wars (e.g: WW2, Korea, etc?)

Certainly there were losses in Vietnam due to weather factors, but I
would say definitely not more than enemy fire. In the "in-country" war
in South Vietnam, the defenses were low threat--predominantly small
arms and automatic weapons with the very occasional SA-7 thrown in
during the later years. More folks lost airplanes due to heavy-weight
ops, pilot errors, maintenance malfunction, etc.

In the North, with SAMs, MiGs and an integrated air defense system of
guns from 12.7/14.5mm up to 120 mm both visual and radar directed, the
defenses claimed the airplanes, not the weather.

In two tours, always going to NVN, I can recall only one weather
related loss--an F-4E in '73 that ran off the runway in a rain storm
at night at Korat. Hydroplaning. Crew ejected safely.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

"Mortimer Schnerd, RN" wrote:

Mortimer Schnerd, RN wrote:
Radio ranges. Pilots flew along a beam listening to dots and dashes.
The tone changed if you drifted off the beam. Some of the old timers
here can explain this a lot better than me since I didn't start
flying until the late 1970's.


As I think about it, the Morse that was transmitted was a series of A's and N's.
I can't remember any more than that about it.

Four wide angle beams. Two quadrants broadcast A and two broadcast
N--one is dot/dash, the other is dash/dot (don't remember which is A
and which is N.)

When the beams overlapped, defining the published course you got a
steady tone. Veer to one side you began to discriminate A, veer off
course the other way and you got N. One course---hummmmmmmmmm.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038