About when did a US/CCCP war become suicidal?

I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
Americans, but not unsurvivable.

--
Goliath & Wildwing's Storage Room
http://anatidae.homestead.com/

james_anatidae wrote:
I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.

For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little chance
of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
consideration.

So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient nuclear
armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence unstoppable
in a first strike.


--
Nik Simpson

From: "Nik Simpson"

james_anatidae wrote:
I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.

For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little chance
of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
consideration.

So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient nuclear
armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence unstoppable
in a first strike.


--
Nik Simpson

In my opinion it was a very bad idea before MAD. Had Patton got his way and we
invaded the Soviet Union, even with the 20 nukes he theorized we would need, it
would have been impossible to win. The Soviets didn't disarm as the U.S. did
since Joseph "they are out to get me" Stalin was convinced the West was going
to invade. They were willing to accept huge casualties just as they had with
the Nazis.

The Soviets might have been able to take all of Europe if they tried hard
enough, but they had no way to directly attack the U.S. at the time. If they
wanted to invade the U.S. they would have had to do it through Alaska which
would be suicidal.

Dan. U.S. Air Force, retired

"Nik Simpson" wrote in message
...
james_anatidae wrote:
I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.

For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little
chance
of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
consideration.

So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient
nuclear
armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence
unstoppable
in a first strike.


Even before that the B-52's flying on alert ensured that the
Soviets couldnt rely on a first strike knocking out the US
strategic response.

Keith




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Keith Willshaw wrote:
"Nik Simpson" wrote in message
...
james_anatidae wrote:
I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.

For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little
chance
of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
consideration.

So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient
nuclear
armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence
unstoppable
in a first strike.


Even before that the B-52's flying on alert ensured that the
Soviets couldnt rely on a first strike knocking out the US
strategic response.

AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

George Z.

"George Z. Bush" wrote:

AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

George Z.


The DEW line was for air-breathers (bombers in those days) now replaced
by North Warning.

BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Warning System) was the missile warning system
based in Alaska, Greenland and the U.K.

Dave

Dave Holford wrote:
"George Z. Bush" wrote:

AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became
our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a
little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the
Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

George Z.


The DEW line was for air-breathers (bombers in those days) now replaced
by North Warning.

BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Warning System) was the missile warning system
based in Alaska, Greenland and the U.K.

Picky! Picky! So when did BMEWS become operational? We're trying to figure out
when MAD became the joint policies of the US and the USSR. You got any input?

George Z.

Dave

In article ,
"George Z. Bush" writes:

AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

The DEW Line was the line of conventional radar stations roughly along
the Arctic Circle. Not much good against ICBMs, but you'd get at
least an hour's "heads up" for a Bison/Bear/B-52 type transonic
bomber (and at least 2 hours vs. something like a Tu-4) reaching the
boundaries of the Contigous Radar Cover that began with the Mid-Canada
Line and ran all the way down to the U.S. Southern borders. They'd
have to grind their way down for an equivalant length of time to have
any worthwhile targets to hit - most of Candada's ppopulation, and
thus anything worth hitting, is within 200 miles of the U.S. border.

Once they hit the contiguous radar cover, theyre'd be enough tracking
information to allow them to be intercepted by whatever NORAD had at
the time. And there was an awful lot of NORAD, back then. When SAGE
came along in the late '50s, it became almost impossible to saturate
the defences, since the weak link - Human controllers sending voice
commands to the Interceptors - wasn't as important. I wouldn't
have wanted to in the Soviet Long Range Aviation, that's for sure.

That's one of the things that pushed the Soviets toward ICBMs rather
than somewhat bigger/faster winged aircraft (M-50 anyone?) that didn't
have a much better chance against the defences than teh slower
airplanes.

BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
Strike or Second Strike)

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

Peter Stickney wrote:
In article ,
"George Z. Bush" writes:

AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became
our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a
little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the
Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

The DEW Line was the line of conventional radar stations roughly along
the Arctic Circle. Not much good against ICBMs, but you'd get at
least an hour's "heads up" for a Bison/Bear/B-52 type transonic
bomber (and at least 2 hours vs. something like a Tu-4) reaching the
boundaries of the Contigous Radar Cover that began with the Mid-Canada
Line and ran all the way down to the U.S. Southern borders. They'd
have to grind their way down for an equivalant length of time to have
any worthwhile targets to hit - most of Candada's ppopulation, and
thus anything worth hitting, is within 200 miles of the U.S. border.

Once they hit the contiguous radar cover, theyre'd be enough tracking
information to allow them to be intercepted by whatever NORAD had at
the time. And there was an awful lot of NORAD, back then. When SAGE
came along in the late '50s, it became almost impossible to saturate
the defences, since the weak link - Human controllers sending voice
commands to the Interceptors - wasn't as important. I wouldn't
have wanted to in the Soviet Long Range Aviation, that's for sure.

That's one of the things that pushed the Soviets toward ICBMs rather
than somewhat bigger/faster winged aircraft (M-50 anyone?) that didn't
have a much better chance against the defences than teh slower
airplanes.

BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
Strike or Second Strike)

That was all very interesting, and certainly did much to refresh flagging
memories. However, it still didn't resolve the starting date for MAD, because
it ignored the ongoing SAC airborne alerts and the nuclear armed subs roaming
the oceans. I personally have the feeling that the MAD doctrine evolved from
recognition of those SAC policies by the Soviets, which would place the date at
or before construction of the DEW line.

All guesswork on my part. What do you think?

George Z.

"George Z. Bush" wrote in message ...
AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

George Z.

If you can point to an official statement from either the whitehouse
or the kremlin that MAD was a "policy", I'd be very interested. My
understanding, from it being beaten into my skull by someone in the US
thinktank industry, is that MAD was NOT a policy, it was a highly
abbraviated expression of the consequences of a large scale nuclear
exchange.