In message >, Kevin
Brooks > writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
>...
>> Fit for purpose. The cost of stopping the line, debugging a notional F6F
>> cannon armament, securing sufficient cannon, ensuring supply of spares
>> and parts, and managing multiple supply lines outweighed the benefit of
>> upgunning the Hellcat.
>
>And why the Bearcat entered into production in 45 with MG's...?
And why it was regunned with 20mm? (You have a point, though, the switch
happened later than I thought)
>> Why were the first Hawker Typhoons armed with .303 MGs? Because that was
>> the quickest way to get a new type flying.
>
>The armament on the Corsair changed between prototype and production
>machines--why do you suppose, if the USN was not happy with the .50
>cal, this did not happen with the F8F?
Then why did they change to quad 20s, if 4x50" was perfectly sufficient?
>
>> For night raids with incendiaries? Gunners are useful as lookouts rather
>> than killers.
>
>Yes, even for those night raids. My father, still alive and kicking,
>performed night raids with incendiaries, and yes, they had their guns
>onboard. If you think it was as widespread as some pubs would have you
>believe (though as best i can determine most of those pubs merely
>mention Lemay's (in)famous decision and *assume* that is what
>followed), why can't we find very much evidence of this in crew
>accounts from various units?
>> Jumping threads, for night bombing I'd have binned the mid-upper turret
>> on the Lancaster and Halifax, and put 2 or 4 .50s in the tail (possibly
>> with two crewmen, doing shifts to keep their alertness up). For day
>> bombing, I'd have kept single calibres in each turret, but fuselage guns
>> get .50 and the tail gets twin 20s.
>
>I'd think the MG, regardless of our differing views on its fighter
>usage, would have been a better choice for a bomber, especially in a
>night role.
The .303 was really too light, even in quadruple batteries, and the 20mm
too heavy for convenient flexible mounting. The .50 was a good
compromise: decent weight of fire, adequately destructive projectile,
available with 'headlight' tracer for deterrent fire, and light enough
to be put in power-operated turrets.
20mm for fighters, .50" for flexible guns :)
>Fleeting targets with a generally closer detection range
>would I think be better handled by high volume of fire (and even you
>would agree that it is easier to carry a few hundred rounds of .50 cal
>than it is an equivalent amount of 20mm) as opposed to placing
>emphasis on hitting power.
Bombers didn't have ammunition problems, as a rule: Lancasters carried
about _two thousand_ rounds of .303 for the tail guns - each! 99% of
missions fired less than 250-odd, which is 150rpg of cannon ammo if
you've got quad 20s aft. Also, the M2 didn't fire any faster than a
Hispano.
Trouble is, the Hispano wasn't easy to mount in a turret, and
>> Same reason the Typhoon was first produced with twelve .303 guns - "what
>> was available to get this thing flying".
>
>For heavens sakes, we changed the armament fit for the Corsair during
>the period between prototype and production (and I would bet we can
>find others where similar changes were made). Are you thinking the
>rush to get the Bearcat into operations in 45 was somehow more intense
>than getting the Corsair into service earlier in the war to replace
>the likes of Buffalos and Wildcats?!
>> If the Bearcat was so great with fifty-cals, why were most produced with
>> cannon? Why go through the hassle of change?
>
>Hey, I am not arguing that the USN started its shift to the 20mm
>(though I was surprised to see they predated the USAF in this regard
>to the extent they did), I was pointing out that the USN did not up
>and decide that the .50 cal was a decidedly inferior armament to the
>20mm, as you seemed to say in the initial exchange that started this
>thread.
20mm was superior enough to be worth changing over. Doesn't make the .50
"useless", just less efficient at turning payload into carnage.
>> Except that comparing typical batteries, you're comparing two 20mm to
>> three .50" rounds. You seem to have this notion that the M3 .50 arrived
>> in 1942 - it was a postwar innovation.
>
>In terms of CAS/BAI use, which this was all about (don't know how/why
>we shifted off into the air-to-air...), an examination of the .50 cal
>versus the 20mm could lead to several conclusions. I believe I pointed
>out that the typical full weapons load on the P-47 with its eight
>MG's, in terms of total kW of power involved, dwarfed that of the
>Tempest with its four Hispano V's.
Hey, by that argument the Lancaster's huge ammo load for the tail guns
made it _lethal_.
How many rounds were fired, with how much energy, in a typical firing
pass? Carrying more rounds gets you more firing passes, but doesn't
increase the lethality of each pass.
>Now, I don't think that means that
>the P-47 was *better* than the Tempest in the CAS/BAI role--I just
>think it means that you cannot out-of-hand discount the .50 cal as
>being inferior in those roles (and against the types of targets that
>both were engaging in that conflict) to the 20mm.
Certainly when the US AC-130s did some comparative trials against truck
targets, 7.62mm was found to be basically useless: 20mm very effective
if fired from low enough for reliable fuzing (flying above 37mm range
meant many rounds tumbled before impact): and 40mm was good but not
infallible.
>> Was the US or UK pattern of bayonet superior in close combat? Where's
>> evidence to prove it one way or another?
>
>Exactly; they were both effective in their role (for what little use
>they saw in actually sticking people). You have not seen anyone
>claiming that either was definitely superior, have you?
Actually, I've had a US enthusiast get very abusive about the "provable
uselessness" of the British spike bayonet of the period, but that's by
the by. Not even "one was better than the other, but both worked". (And
no, he didn't have any _evidence_, or even any analysis, he just didn't
like the look of the British bayonet)
>> CAS/BAI aircraft used their guns after their primary ordnance was
>> expended. Guns were used after the primary weapons were expended.
>
>Not necessarily. I believe that, like today, it would depend on the
>nature of the target engaged as to what particular weapon was used,
>and when.
As a rule, you'd use primary weapons first, with guns used if repeat
passes were feasable.
>The aerial rockets of the day were rather effective, but
>accuracy was not always their best suit.
Whereas guns were accurate but lacked lethality against anything
hardened, and also were essentially point weapons.
>> Typhoon pilots (4x20mm, apart from a few with 12 x .303") would fiercely
>> argue that point.
>
>Then why was the RAF so happy to use the P-47 through the end of the
>war?
Because it was a really good aircraft, even if its gun armament was not
quite optimal.
Was the original M1 tank a failure because it was armed with the L7
105mm gun, rather than the later 120mm? Did the first few thousand
Abrams crews weep bitter tears because they only had a combat-proven
105mm gun instead of a 120mm?
>> For the same weight of guns and structure, the P-47 could have hauled
>> six 20mm into battle. Or four guns, and more of its primary weapon
>> (bombs, rockets and fuel... loiter time matters a lot for CAS)
>
>It about doubled the amount of energy that it could bring to bear on a
>targets,
No, that's a function of ammunition storage. Eight .50s put about half
the energy on target of four 20mm guns for a given firing pass (which is
limited by time not ammunition)
While the P-47 carried a lot of ammunition, it needed twice the armament
weight to do so. A P-47 with 4 x 20mm could have made more firing passes
for the same weight, or delivered the same destructive energy and had
some weight over.
>> The Germans after 1918 determined that the Kar98 rifle was "darned
>> effective". The US decided that a five-shot bolt-action rifle was
>> lacking, and produced and fielded the M1 Garand. (The UK looked at
>> alternatives but refused to pay for them)
>>
>> Sitting on your laurels gets you in trouble. That's the trouble with
>> having a capable weapon that's been surpassed (think the Lee-Enfield in
>> 1938 or so). Yes, it's got superb history; it went on to win a war. But
>> was it really the best possible option? Or would we have done better had
>> we selected a .280" short-case selective-fire rifle in 1936?
>
>Different weapons, different characteristics in comparison (i.e., rate
>of fire), and different target sets. I don't see the link to the .50
>cal vs. 20mm issue.
The US had a really, really good .50 MG at the end of WW2. Good against
aircraft, against tanks, against people, against pretty much anything it
was fired at.
By 1941 it was no longer an antitank weapon but it was still very
effective in all sorts of roles. That selfsame Browning M2 (albeit in a
modified form to improve the barrel change) is _now_ in service with the
British Army, adopted about seventy years after the US took it on board.
>> Not by the USN, though, who were selecting existing 20mm weapons over
>> existing .50" guns..
>
>And they were killing very few Migs with those 20mm's... :)
Out of how many engagements? The figures I'd like are the numbers of
times aircraft got MiGs under the pipper and fired, and the numbers of
kills.
>> The USN had picked 20mm by 1945.
>
>Really? Then why was an aircraft that entered production that year
>still carrying the .50 cal's?
Why were most produced with 20mm?
>> How many P-47 sorties? How many A-36 sorties?
>
>I have no idea. Nor do I care. The fact is that the A-36 and P-51 did
>fly CAS/BAI, though obviously not as often as the P-47 which formed
>the backbone of IX TAF, etc, in that role.
By that argument the B-24 was a CAS/BAI aircraft, although it didn't fly
many such sorties. Hey, the C-130 is an anti-shipping striker, it flew a
couple of such sorties in 1982...
>> Yep. What is easily forgotten today was that Korea was a peripheral
>> concern for the West. The threat was on the Central Front in Germany and
>> _that_ was where effort was focussed: Korea got what could be spared.
>> Nobody was going to pay to re-gun WW2 leftovers for fighting in
>> Southeast Asia.
>
>Didn't we do exactly that, and more, with the B-26 Invaders?
Not particularly, considering they were being withdrawn by war's end.
They were used because they were available, and the best was made of
what was spared (stories of aircrew shovelling tacks out of the bomb-bay
during 'Operation Strangle' in hope of bursting NK truck tyres come to
mind - brave, but not the mark of a really co-ordinated campaign)
>> Because it was the best possible weapon? Or because it was fitted to the
>> available aircraft? When did Korea ever get first call on forces? (The
>> F-84 saga is a great example)
>
>With the F-86 it seemed to.
With the F-84 it certainly wasn't, and Korea was thoroughly behind
Europe and the US in terms of supplies of new-model aircraft.
With the F-86 the shortage of numbers is indicative. The US could have
blackened the Korean sky with aircraft... except for other commitments
elsewhere.
>> Your assumption, not mine. If you found yourself in combat armed with a
>> .38 Special rather than a .357 Magnum, would you insist on being pulled
>> out of battle to be re-armed, or would you fight on with what you had?
>
>Come on--re equipping of units was *continuous* during the Korean War.
When improvements were available.
>Improvements were implemented in the field as well (see the history of
>the large capacity drop tanks on the F-80's).
Changing fighter armament isn't a field mod unless explicitly designed
in, especially not on early jets with their sensitivity to gas
ingestion.
>> That's because you insist on seeing matters as "because the 20mm is
>> better, the .50 must be useless". And that just is not so. The .50 is a
>> good weapon; just not the best.
>
>And the 20mm of WWII can be claimed, hands-down, as being the "best"?
Depends. For shredding unarmoured Japanese aircraft? I'd toss a coin for
most missions, vote 20mm for killing Kamikazes. For shooting at
Luftwaffe fighters? Probably the 20, but the Browning will have
adherents. For strafing? Explosive payload is a significant edge. For
shooting at armoured bombers? 20mm is really too small and .50 is
useless (but that was never an Allied mission).
Is it _so much_ better that I'd order a switch from something that
worked quite adequately, is in universal service, and has a huge user
base, in the hope that the replacement's theoretical advantages proved
real? Probably not, especially if the replacement was proving unreliable
(as the US Hispanos were). The USN decided to move to 20mm regardless
(certainly on the SB2C) despite the negatives.
After all, the UK went from .303 to 20mm without an intermediate step,
which might colour thinking. The US discovered .30 was of limited value,
but had a very good .50 available and a co-operative target set.
>I don't think so; I 'd give them parity.
Just don't see it. The 20mm fires at the same rate, with the same
velocity, with a much more destructive projectile.
If the .50 really offered parity, why weren't the F-100 and F-8 armed
with six .50" guns? (In the case of the F-8, which had persistent gun
problems, that might have even been a good idea)
>> What's the cost of changeover? Consider changing production for the F6F
>> - you now need two armourer streams, two training streams, twice the
>> spare parts, two ammunition pipelines, two parts chains...
>
>Exactly what occured with the Corsair and the Bearcat anyway--so why
>would this have been a great issue?
Because it _was_ an issue? Case-by-case judgement. Evidently worth
forming some specialist Corsair units, regunning the Bearcat, but not
worth changing the Hellcat yet.
>> From the OA of that conflict.
>>
>> Missess are still relevant because very few pilots shoot to miss. You
>> fire when you think you'll hit. If you hit and don't kill... that's bad
>> news, as bad as firing and missing. .
>>
>> The .50 was able to hit, but had trouble killing, MiG-15s.
>
>And the performance of the 20mm? Not many 20mm kills were registered,
>IIRC...
How many 20mm shots were taken? The Navy's jets were relatively few in
number and lacking in performance, but how many firing opportunities did
they turn into confirmed kills compared to Sabres?
Shades of Linebacker II: while the USAF complained that "lack of guns
was the problem" and achieved around a 2:1 kill ratio, the wholly
gunless USN achieved 6:1 and persuaded the NVAF that the Air Force were
easier marks. In raw kills, the USAF killed more, but they were a lot
less effective doing it. (Lots of factors: pilot training, weapons
maintenance, doctrine, tactics... post-war often hidden under a mantra
of 'we needed more guns' )
>> With extra weight of guns and ammo, invalidating the comparison.
>
>Hey, the 47 carried more guns--is that a crime?
More guns and more ammo means more weight. In this case, about six
hundred pounds more weight. That's weight not usable for other weapons,
fuel, pilot armour, or just extra agility (lighter for the same
horsepower).
If I load a three-quarter-ton 'mission package' into your favourite
NASCAR racer, am I handicapping its performance if the same package in
other cars weighs less than half a ton?
>maybe that was one
>reason it was considered by many to be more effective than the
>Tempest...
The P-47 was considered better than the Tempest? Source for this?
(I can see it competing very well with the Typhoon. But the Tempest?)
>> Interesting that the 'standard' 6 x 50" battery is disregarded and
>> we're now into comparing a "six fifties-equivalent" cannon with "eight
>> fifties".
>
>You were the one who brought up europe versus the Pacific, right? And
>you seem to find that the Tempest was a better CAS/BAI gun platform
>than the eight-gun P-47...or not?
Yep. And the P-47 still puts half the energy downrange of a quad-20
armed fighter, for the same burst length.
>> So, when was the last time a frontline fast-jet chose .50 over 20mm?
>
>Strawman. We were talking WWII strafing operations, weren't we? before
>we got sidetracked into Korea?
Okay, then the USN evaluated strafing weapons for their new divebomber
(which would do noticeable amounts of strafing) and picked 20mm over
..50cal.
>> I agree completely. The US Navy also agreed and put 20mm in all its new
>> production. The USAF stuck with .50" and found it lacking in battle
>> (else why switch to a larger calibre?)
>
>Uhmm...it seems that the USN was still quite satisfied with the .50
>cal during WWII, enough so that it had that armament included in
>fighters produced during the closing months of the war. That they
>thought they could increase their hitting power by shifting to the
>20mm is evident, and yes, they began that shift as the war closed--but
>they apparently were still quite happy with the .50 cal MG.
So why switch, if .50 was just as good?
You say it was no better air-to-air and no better air-to-ground - so
changing was pretty damn stupid!
>> The USN looked ahead,
>
>They did? And what crystal ball were they using? In 1945 the USN was
>looking no further ahead than the invasion of Japan, IMO.
Not true by a long shot, as far as I can tell.
>figured they needed more destructive guns. The
>> USAF insisted their .50" was adequate. A war proved the USAF wrong and
>> the USN right.
>
>And all of those F9F Mig kills happened when...?
What's the lethality of a 20mm firing pass compared to a .50 firing
pass? What did the next generation of USAF fighters appear armed with?
By this argument, roughly 5% of the US MiG kills in 1972 were scored by
guns... suggesting that, far from being the crucial weapon often
claimed, the gun was a relatively marginal weapon by then.
>> It's your strawman, not mine.
>
>No, it is not.
The .50 is an excellent weapon for strafing, according to you, making up
in volume of fire for its lack of round-for-round lethality. So, why not
a battery of .50s instead of the GAU-8?
>Why is the GAU-8 so much better for
>> strafing than a battery of .50" guns? By your argument, the explosive
>> HEI shells and the penetration of the AP rounds should be oughtweighed
>> by the sheer volume of fire from a equal-weight battery of .50.
>
>There were no GAU-8s available in WWII. Period.
We're now talking about arming the A-10 in the early 1970s, where there
were both GAU-8s and M3 Brownings (and many other options beside)
>The threat was
>different in 1945 than it was in 1975 (if you had not noticed).
>Period. You understand now?
Yes. When was the A-10 designed? When did strafing change so radically?
>> The A-10 was designed for CAS/BAI. For tank-killing its primary weapon
>> is the Maverick missile, for killing APCs/IFVs it uses guns and cluster
>> bombs.
>
>Its 30mm was a armored vehicle killer. Period. Including tanks.
Tanks that could be caught from behind without undue exposure of the
aircraft. I submit that this is a fairly restricted target set.
>Period. It is only reasonable that it would have used its PGM's first
>against harder targets (duh!).
Not "duh" at all, given the number of armchair commentators who insist
that the GAU-8 is some sort of ultimate weapon (rather than a rather
good airborne 30mm cannon) and that it is the A-10's "primary weapon".
One of the problems the A-10 has acquired is excessive expectation:
there is a significant fanbase that is convinced that the GAU-8 will
defeat modern MBTs in the frontal arc, and base their thinking
accordingly.
>> Secondary armament is by its nature secondary. Show me where the .50
>> overcame its theoretical disadvantages to prove itself superior to the
>> 20mm.
>
>Unlike you, I don't claim one was superior to the other.
So, when was the last time anyone armed an aircraft with a battery of
..50 machineguns?
>I have
>repeatedly said that they were both effective, and nonone can draw any
>clear claim to superiority in the CAS/BAI role *during WWII* for
>either. Is that really that hard to comprehend?
No, even though I disagree. The 20mm was more effective when analysed,
but both batteries were pretty horrible for the recipients.
The Lee-Enfield wasn't as effective as the M1 Garand, but it still
worked well enough to serve out the war even though a .280 semi-auto
would have been better (and a short-cased assault rifle even better
yet). We didn't get an automatic rifle until after Korea (and I was
still using the same rifle when I signed up in 1989). Doesn't mean the
Lee-Enfield was bad - just that some other possibilities would have been
better.
>> Okay, I know you can't. Where was the last time anyone built a
>> frontline fighter armed with .50" guns? _Everyone_ abandoned the calibre
>> for fixed-wing jets in the 1950s (still valued for rotary-wing, but
>> that's life)
>
>Are you going into serial production of scarecrows? The way you tote
>out these strawmen...
No, I'm just curious. If the .50 was effective, why was it, the huge
infrastructure for its production and its support, and all the trained
crew to maintain it abandoned?
Why change unless the 20mm was better?
>> How many firing runs can you make? "One pass, haul ass" is a mantra for
>> a very good reason.
>
>Not during WWII, apparently. Going "Winchester", or bingo on fuel,
>were the primary reasons for leaving the area.
In other words, 'expendables' are key - fuel and ammunition.
And guess what - weight spent on ammunition is weight not available for
fuel. It's also not available for more bombs or rockets, which are the
primary CAS/BAI weapons.
>> Yep. Because going back for multiple passes against well-defended
>> targets was a great way to lose pilots and aircraft.
>
>Oh, so now it is not general CAS/BAI we were discussing, as the thread
>started out, but attacking "well-defended targets" (not many CAS
>targets of the day met that criteria in regards to air defense).
CAS targets tend to shoot back, with increasing effectiveness after the
first attack.
>But
>hey, since you keep toting out the A-10 in this WWII based debate, why
>not give the groundpounders a few Stingers as well...
That _would_ rule out most A/G guns use.
>> Yes. The P-51B had huge trouble with its .50" guns at first - was that a
>> problem with the M2 Browning, or the installation in the P-51B?
>
>Again, are you claiming that the 20mm cannon of the day were as
>relaiable as the M2's? Those in US service during WWII sure did not
>seem to be...
The US had some self-inflicted problems in that regard: the UK was a lot
happier with its guns. (Tony Williams, predictably for a historian of
the issue, has chronicled the matter and offered a history)
>> How many hits were scored at six hundred yards? How many kills were
>> confirmed when fire was opened at that range?
>
>And just how freakin' close do you think the average strafe was
>conducted at?
Far enough out for aircraft to routinely run out of ammo, apparently,
meaning some _long_ open-fire ranges.
Given issues of gun harmonisation, 800 yards would be a long open-fire
range.
>We are talking CAS/BAI here; or do you think they all
>came back with telegraph wires and fir boughs in their cowlings?
That's the problem of using guns for CAS/BAI: how to pull out in time
without flying through own ricochets, or terrain, or ground fire, while
still getting close enough to be effective.
>> Quite possibly.
>
>No possible about it, unless you have managed to contravene the laws
>of aerodynamics and drag.
Trouble is, the 20mm shells have explosive fillers, the .50 rounds do
not. This makes quite a difference in that range band where .50s aren't
effective but 20mm are still exploding.
>On the other hand, explosive shells are more lethal and
>> less velocity-dependent than ball rounds.
>
>For gosh sakes, the amount of explosive in the 20mm of the day, not to
>mention its relative low pwer, did not make them the battlefield
>clearing agent that you seem to find they were.
It made them significantly more lethal than a streamlined and
ballistically-shaped 20mm ball would have been. (Otherwise, why bother
with 20mm HE?)
>One has to wonder how
>many of those rounds buried themselves in the dirt before "burping"
>when used in the CAS/BAI role...
Not enough to argue against the calibre, from the evidence.
>> State your assumptions and we'll explore.
>
>ISTR the Tempest carried enough rounds for about sixteen seconds of
>fire, the P-47 some thirty-two seconds of fire.
How many Tempests came home with dry guns per-sortie? How many
Thunderbolts?
How many Thunderbolts needed multiple passes on a target to kill it,
compared to how many Tempests?
>> If your fire is rapidly lethal, you need fewer rounds.
>
>Those atomic 20mm rounds of yours again?
Yep. As confirmed by US procurement policy.
>> Why transition? If the .50 is so good, why waste time and effort
>> changing armament?
>
>Hey, you are the guy who claimed the F8F was 20mm armed (or was that
>keith?),
Bulk of early production was, before the war ended and the changed
version ended up an export version.
If the war had ended in 1942, the Typhoon 1A might have defined British
fighter armament as 12 x .303".
>and that the USN was heel-fired bent on changing to the 20 mm
>before the war was over, that no aircraft entered into production
>after 44 with the MG's, etc., right?
Bearcat did (but switched to 20mm ASAP), Helldiver certainly didn't.
>> I'm talking about new designs, you're talking about different letters of
>> existing platforms (such as B-17F to B-17G)
>
>With different armament. You say the USN found the .50 cal was
>deficient--I have shown that it was quite possible to rectify that if
>they felt it as keenly as you claim, but they didn't.
If there wasn't a problem, why change?
In 1940, we'd lost most of our heavy weapons in France, and had to
choose between keeping the 2pdr AT gun in production (adequate for
today, clearly soon to be outclassed) or retooling for the 6pdr gun (a
much better weapon - but what do we fight with in the meantime?)
That we stuck with the 2pdr proves neither that it was inadequate for
the existing threat, nor that the 6pdr was not superior.
>> Source for that? (Nightfighters weren't a high priority then)
>
>The F4F-2N was a new build night fighter, completed by strapping a
>radar under the wing of an otherwise standard -2 series Corsair, and
>IIRC rearranging the MG's a bit.
So it was a rebuilt airframe with some new systems (existing aircraft
with a new radar added) rather than built-for-purpose..
>> Why did they want to, if the .50" was so good?
>
>Because they did decide to change to the 20mm--but they never really
>apparently found the difference between the two weapons that great a
>difference, as they were also quite happy to continue receiving and
>operating the MG armed aircraft until and after the war was over.
You can have "not enough" M-16 rifles, or you can have "not enough"
M-16s and "enough" M-14s.
Reality isn't simple.
>> Uhmmmm... yes :)
>
>No, you continue to ignore the change in threat and role.
We're talking BAI against soft targets - if 20mm was inferior to 40mm,
what does that say about 12.7mm vice 20mm?
>> It's a very poor choice for use against targets under canopy, because it
>> will tumble early. An overspun ball round is the requirement - don't
>> know if anyone fielded such.
>
>The 7.62 does not tumble all that quickly, and then again, so what?
>You were going after an area target you could not see... a tumbling
>7.62 would be quite nasty to the crunchie on the receiving end.
But pretty useless against a truck, since it hits sideways, and trucks
are the smallest targets likely to give you targets through canopy.
>> You don't see a serious change both in German armour, and in their
>> reaction to air attack, between 1942 and 1944?
>
>While fighters did kill German armor, with both MG's and cannon,
>during the latter part of the war, the rocket was the preffered round
>ISTR. OTOH, German horses, trucks, troops, and locomotives were pretty
>much the same throughout...
Tanks were very hard to kill with any air-launched weapons. Rockets or
bombs would kill with hits, but misses were survivable (whereas softer
targets were killed by near-misses). Guns were unreliable in most
sub-37mm calibres against tanks. (Trouble is, kill the tanker trucks and
ammo wagons and the tank becomes useless very soon anyway).
>> Yes, it is. Why did they go for a new calibre and new weapon unless they
>> found it necessary to do so? Why not just keep buying .50"-armed Sabres
>> if they're so successful?
>
>More straw... different war, different threat
T-34s changed radically between WW2 and Korea?
(Trouble is, using T-34s as the threat gets you into German 20mm and
30mm gun development, much-copied in the West; or Soviet 20mm, 23mm and
37mm guns with MG calibres largely relegated to flexible mounts)
>....you need to study the
>concept of an evolving threat scenario, IMO.
Kevin, that's what I get paid for. Have I told _you_ to instruct a
maternal grandparent in the art of extracting ovine nutrition from its
protective casing by the application of a local pressure reduction?
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk