BUFDRVR - about new squadron structure

[Jughead]

I didn't want to hijack the "Joining the USAF" thread with somthing
unrelated, so I'll start a new thread to respond to something you wrote
over there.

>As of 1 OCT 2002 you are correct, kind of.. There are now Ops Squadrons
>and Maintenance Squadrons. I'll pleade ignorance on how they've got the
>maintenance squadrons broken up (crew chiefs in one, hydraulics in
>another, etc.), however, from 1 OCT 1993 till 1 OCT 2002 we were all
>(except the back shop guys) in one squadron. This current "break up" is
>considered a mistake Air Force wide.

It might be wise to keep in mind that the different MAJCOMs still tend to
have their own ways of going about things. I work in an AMC/AFRC unit.
Prior to the "split ops and maintenance back up" decision, all mechanics
at the base I work at were already part of their own squadrons. The
"backline" shops (e.g., ELIN or E&E, Hydraulics, Propulsion, AFIN or
Avionics or GAC, CNAD or Com/Nav, Aero Repair, etc.) all belonged to an
"MXS" (Maintenance) squadron, falling under the Logistics Group. The
flightline workers (crew chiefs and all the specialists who also have
flightline positions) belonged to an "AGS" unit (Aircraft Generation).

After 1 Oct 2002, the MXS unit stayed just the way it was all along, with
a few exceptions that don't even matter - it now falls under the
Maintenance Group rather than Logistics. The internal structure of the
MXS unit was also reorganized very slightly (e.g., one shop switching to
a different branch - flight - within the squadron). From a worker bee
perspective, it really had no impact at all on us. It only changed from
the perspective of who actually oversees (manages) each unit and flight.
LG still exists, but I believe its limited to SUPS (Supply) and perhaps
Contracting and TRANS.

The flightline side, from what I can best determine, didn't do much of
anything more than getting renamed from AGS to "AMXS" (Aircraft
Maintenance) and also moving from the LG to the MG. They were a separate
unit from the flying squadrons all along (btw, we have 2 flying squadrons
that fly a single fleet of aircraft maintained by a single AMXS unit).
There was one other change internally, AFAIK. They were previously setup
into 4 or so different flights (2 day shift + 2 night shift flights
splitting the responsibility for assigned aircraft in half). These
flights were not selective based on AFSC's. 1 flight had crew chiefs,
electricians, pointy heads, hydraulics, etc. into a single group. The
flights, I believe, are now split up based on specialty (crew chiefs =
one flight, specialists = another flight, etc.). Basically, it went back
to what it was when I was still active duty and under ACC.

When I was active duty, yes we were part of the flying squadron as well.
I'll have to ask my friends who are still stationed there how the
maintenance units are setup. Like you, I'll have to plead ignorance for
now, but I suspect they also went to the AMXS (flightline) and MXS
(backshops) structure.

Personally, the only thing that changing "AGS" to "AMXS" seemed to have
accomplished is to really confuse the heck out of those of us who are
assigned to "MXS". We were never briefed about the AGS units changing
names. The first time I ever saw "AMXS" mentioned, I thought they were
talking about us in MXS.

[Smartace11]

>
>I didn't want to hijack the "Joining the USAF" thread with somthing
>unrelated, so I'll start a new thread to respond to something you wrote
>over there.

So other than different names, how does the new structure differ from what it
was in the 70s when Ops and MX were almost mortal enemies?

[Jughead]

(Smartace11) wrote in
:

>>
>>I didn't want to hijack the "Joining the USAF" thread with somthing
>>unrelated, so I'll start a new thread to respond to something you
>>wrote over there.
>
> So other than different names, how does the new structure differ from
> what it was in the 70s when Ops and MX were almost mortal enemies?

hehe I'm too young to know anything about that. I was born in '73. But
honestly, I don't notice any major "ops vs. maintenance" problems in my
neck of the woods. Maintainers seem to have a good general idea who the
good pilots, FE's, and load toads are as well as who the not-so-good ones
are (and vice versa). As long as there is some mutual level of respect
between individuals from both sides, the "ops vs. maintenance" mentality,
for the most part, doesn't really exist.

[SteveM8597]

Tac fighter aquadrons were pretty well self contained in the late 60s with both
maintenance and ops in the same unit. Then the AF mandated a SAC type
organizational structure with separate squadrons for ops and the various
maintenance types, Avionics (AMS), Munitions (MMS), Field or backshop (FMS) and
Organizational or flightline OMS. Apparently worked for big airplanes but well
at all for fighters, but then those were still the days when SAC ran the AF and
looked at all planes as potential nuke delivery platforms.

The Wing King's scorecard was heavily based on "scheduling effectiveness". For
ops that meant that if the actual tailnumber you were scheduled to fly was not
ready, you didn't fly or at least didn't fly on time, missed your range period
or sortie with the other planes you were scheduled with. It was like night and
dayu for the ops guys who were used to flying when the schedule said they would
fly and created a great deal of animosity between Ops and Mx, and morale was
terrible.

Mx officer promotion rates, by boards staffed heavily with Ops guys, dropped to
40% or less for 0-3. Then Jimmah Cawtah was elected and immediately cut the
military. Many Mx officers saw the writing on the wall and got out. A few
years later, the AF had a critical shortage of Mx officers - duh!

Things improved a lot under COMO and POMO in TAC. Now the pendulum is headed
the other way again for some strange reason, apparently.

Steve







>Subject: Re: BUFDRVR - about new squadron structure
>From: Jughead
>Date: 11/15/2003 10:02 PM Eastern Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
(Smartace11) wrote in
:
>
>>>
>>>I didn't want to hijack the "Joining the USAF" thread with somthing
>>>unrelated, so I'll start a new thread to respond to something you
>>>wrote over there.
>>
>> So other than different names, how does the new structure differ from
>> what it was in the 70s when Ops and MX were almost mortal enemies?
>
>hehe I'm too young to know anything about that. I was born in '73. But
>honestly, I don't notice any major "ops vs. maintenance" problems in my
>neck of the woods. Maintainers seem to have a good general idea who the
>good pilots, FE's, and load toads are as well as who the not-so-good ones
>are (and vice versa). As long as there is some mutual level of respect
>between individuals from both sides, the "ops vs. maintenance" mentality,
>for the most part, doesn't really exist.

[Jughead]

(SteveM8597) wrote in
:

> The Wing King's scorecard was heavily based on "scheduling
> effectiveness". For ops that meant that if the actual tailnumber you
> were scheduled to fly was not ready, you didn't fly or at least didn't
> fly on time, missed your range period or sortie with the other planes
> you were scheduled with. It was like night and dayu for the ops guys
> who were used to flying when the schedule said they would fly and
> created a great deal of animosity between Ops and Mx, and morale was
> terrible.

Thanks for the snipped history lesson. In response to the above, that's
something I can somewhat relate to. There always seems to be some degree of
finger pointing with regard to the causes of delayed and/or canceled
flights. I never noticed any difference regardless of where exactly
maintenance falls in the chain of command. I'm guessing the finger pointing
is sort of what you had in mind when you mentioned ops and mx with respect
to delays and/or cancellations.

[Dweezil Dwarftosser]

SteveM8597 wrote:
>
> Tac fighter aquadrons were pretty well self contained in the late 60s with both
> maintenance and ops in the same unit.

I remember the "fighter squadron concept"; my first real
assignment was to the 43rd TFS (MacDill). It worked okay,
but required massive duplication of manpower (specialties)
in every squadron - and some of those skills were in very
short supply.

Of course, it was tried only in TAC - while the combat
wings in PACAF and USAFE stayed with the older AMS/MMS/FMS/OMS
mold.

The earlier "Armament & Electronics" squadrons (along with
FMS for the mechanical trades) and OMS for crew cheifs was
pretty good, too.

> Then the AF mandated a SAC type organizational structure with separate
> squadrons for ops and the various maintenance types, Avionics (AMS),
> Munitions (MMS), Field or backshop (FMS) and Organizational or
> flightline OMS.

This was the norm; it was efficient of manpower, and
gave good training to the specialties.

> Apparently worked for big airplanes but well at all for fighters

Your dreaming. It worked oustandingly for fighters.

> Things improved a lot under COMO and POMO in TAC.

Let me correct that: you're ****in' delusional.

POMC (it's first name), COMO, and POMO (all the same thing)
were a disaster of major proportions for the fighter forces,
particularly when it came to maintenance training.
We had 7-level specialists in AGS who didn't have a clue
about how their systems worked. Not surprising: they never
got a chance to fix them. They spent most of their time
kicking chocks, hanging tanks, and manhandling refuels.
Under POMO, the only time a lot of jets were actually fixed
(instead of patched PMC) - was when they were handed over to
EMS or CRS for phase, radar cal, etc. Otherwise, "tires and
fires" were all that mattered.

- John T., F-4 WCS toad and memeber of the 1st, 4th, 15th,
36th, 50th, 56th, 86th, and 388th (Korat) TFWs...

[WaltBJ]

I was in the USAF from 1951 to 1980. I started out as a 30150 airborne
radio mechanic and went to aviation cadets and spent the rest of my
career flying fighters (except when a desk caught me for 4 years.) AFM
66-1 (Socialized maintenance) came in to my view about 1959. Prior to
that I'd been in outfits with their own maintenance. It was workig
pretty well at RG AFB but we only had one squadron there a big one
with about 34 F/TF102As. From there I went to teh 332 FIS/F102 at
Thule and here it bit us in the butt. Our flying schedule was by tail
number and printed out a month in advance. Any deviation was a gig. We
had half a squadron - 10 F102s. If one went down for extended
maintenance and you were scheduled to fly it - too bad. You sat on the
ground. My next assigment was the 319FIS/F104A at Homestead. We had a
600 man outfit with 30 F104A/Bs. No 66-1 - we all worked for the same
man. The 319th had the best maintenance bar none I ever saw in the
USAF. Our in-commission rate was always over 94%. The only problems we
experienced were tired engines and AOCP. Then I went down the road to
the 31TFW, same base, and F4s and 66-1 'Sacumcised' maintenance. The
concept originated in SAC where they scheduled B52s about once a week
and had 168 hours to get the thing ready to go. the control process
was far too slow and unwieldy to generate fighters and fly them twice
a day. (In the 319th we once flew 65 sorties in about four hours -
supersonic to and from the target! and 15 minute turnarounds. 15
minute missions were common.) Morale was low because the DM and the DO
were at each other's throats. This was also at a time when
'management' was prime - and sonmeone forgot about leadership.
Apparently the Harvard Business School hadn't incorporated it into the
syllabus.
Yes, 66-1 was very efficient as to manning; unfortunately the gain in
manpower resources was a loss on the flightline maintenance response
because we lost a lot of time waiting for specialists to arrive at the
airplane. (And the F4 was a maintenance hog - at DaNang we were
running about 53 M/Hr per flying hour!)
One of the big problems was unquantifiable - the 'gung-ho' spirit that
in 66-1 was almost ignored, except by perceptive senior officers - of
which there was a dearth. I took that to heart when I got a squadron -
(68TFS/Homestead and later 390TFS/DaNang). I used the 'walking around'
theory and it really paid off. You got to get all the guys reading off
the same page and singing the same tune. Back in the States at
Homestead 76-80 we were under TAC 'whateveritwas' that put the AGS
'units' with the fighter squadrons (same color hats and badges) and
disolved 31MMS (I commanded it for about 6 months) and gave the
bombloaders something to do besides load planes - they became deputy
assistant whatevers to the crewchiefs. The flightline guys also
learned how to help the specialists, like open and close the bird as
nee3ded before the 'specs' got there. A lot of cross-training was
involved and it really helped maintain the birds and - ta-da! sparked
morale. I was Chief of QC then because of a request from an old
colleague who was the DM. (I also got to fly test hops besides subbing
as a 307th IP.) Anyway he was getting worn down; so was I; in 1980 we
both thought Cawtah was going to be reelected and we were out of parts
for our 120 F4s and about 2/3 manned in skills and 4/3 manned in FNGs
so we both bailed out in April of 80. It had stopped being fun when I
saw an Estimated Delivery Date 21 months in the future for one of our
AOCP F4Es. (We had 4 real hangar queens - they were missing about 250
items apiece we'd canned for other birds and awaiting parts for them.
'Consolidated Cannery' ships, I called them. And that was what was
documented! It was/is not unknown for gung-ho crewchiefs to make
midnight requisitions to get their own bird airborne. Swap parts -
don't leave the hole vacant! And if you want to be really 'honest'
write it up as inop and sign a fake name. Not that I ever did that . .
..) FWIW once I put my papers in my blood pressure went down 20 points.
One thing - with the parts and manning problems I knew we were going
to lose airplanes but there wasn't a damn thing I could do about it.
Well, we did, but the crews got out okay. Thank God. One of them was
me.
Walt BJ

[Leslie Swartz]

We-e-e-e-ell yes we've all heard from several ops guys who related anecdotal
stories about how much "better" things were "back in the day" when Ops owned
the on-equipment maintenance and the "tough jobs got done in spite of
undermanning, underfunding, etc."

And I'm sure that everything happened exactly the way you remember it, and
"perception is reality."

However

while it is true that bad leadership can screw up a good situation- and vice
versa- some actual "scientific studies" have been done on this topic.

Generalizable results are as follows:

1) R&M varies considerably between MDS
2) Low R&M = high workload, irrespective of parts funding
3) Low parts funding=higher workload, irrespective of R&M
4) Maintenance will ALWAYS get the job done, irrespective of manning
5) Low manning makes it harder to get the job done
6) There will always be more sorties required than available (OPS has
unlimited wants and needs)

and, as a very low priority (1-6 above drives the train)

7) Specialists in backshops fill the shelves
8) Specialists on the flightline wait for redballs
9) Consolidating specialists into shops is more efficient (fewer troops,
more work done)

Therefore?

If you have high R&M, lots of spares, and high manning, by all means- put
specialists onto the flightline. It's more fun. If you don't- then you
really ought to consolidate into backshops (and dispatch them from there),
or you will work them unecessarily. And that ceases to be fun fairly
quickly. However, see 4) above. By the time Ops sees the troops burning
out, it'll be too late.

By the way, it might *seem* like a good idea to have a bunch of 7-levels
sitting around playing cards in the breadtrucks waiting for redballs;
however, preflight ain't where the workload is for specialists. Write-ups
need to be worked on postflight.

Steve

"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
> I was in the USAF from 1951 to 1980. I started out as a 30150 airborne
> radio mechanic and went to aviation cadets and spent the rest of my
> career flying fighters (except when a desk caught me for 4 years.) AFM
> 66-1 (Socialized maintenance) came in to my view about 1959. Prior to
> that I'd been in outfits with their own maintenance. It was workig
> pretty well at RG AFB but we only had one squadron there a big one
> with about 34 F/TF102As. From there I went to teh 332 FIS/F102 at
> Thule and here it bit us in the butt. Our flying schedule was by tail
> number and printed out a month in advance. Any deviation was a gig. We
> had half a squadron - 10 F102s. If one went down for extended
> maintenance and you were scheduled to fly it - too bad. You sat on the
> ground. My next assigment was the 319FIS/F104A at Homestead. We had a
> 600 man outfit with 30 F104A/Bs. No 66-1 - we all worked for the same
> man. The 319th had the best maintenance bar none I ever saw in the
> USAF. Our in-commission rate was always over 94%. The only problems we
> experienced were tired engines and AOCP. Then I went down the road to
> the 31TFW, same base, and F4s and 66-1 'Sacumcised' maintenance. The
> concept originated in SAC where they scheduled B52s about once a week
> and had 168 hours to get the thing ready to go. the control process
> was far too slow and unwieldy to generate fighters and fly them twice
> a day. (In the 319th we once flew 65 sorties in about four hours -
> supersonic to and from the target! and 15 minute turnarounds. 15
> minute missions were common.) Morale was low because the DM and the DO
> were at each other's throats. This was also at a time when
> 'management' was prime - and sonmeone forgot about leadership.
> Apparently the Harvard Business School hadn't incorporated it into the
> syllabus.
> Yes, 66-1 was very efficient as to manning; unfortunately the gain in
> manpower resources was a loss on the flightline maintenance response
> because we lost a lot of time waiting for specialists to arrive at the
> airplane. (And the F4 was a maintenance hog - at DaNang we were
> running about 53 M/Hr per flying hour!)
> One of the big problems was unquantifiable - the 'gung-ho' spirit that
> in 66-1 was almost ignored, except by perceptive senior officers - of
> which there was a dearth. I took that to heart when I got a squadron -
> (68TFS/Homestead and later 390TFS/DaNang). I used the 'walking around'
> theory and it really paid off. You got to get all the guys reading off
> the same page and singing the same tune. Back in the States at
> Homestead 76-80 we were under TAC 'whateveritwas' that put the AGS
> 'units' with the fighter squadrons (same color hats and badges) and
> disolved 31MMS (I commanded it for about 6 months) and gave the
> bombloaders something to do besides load planes - they became deputy
> assistant whatevers to the crewchiefs. The flightline guys also
> learned how to help the specialists, like open and close the bird as
> nee3ded before the 'specs' got there. A lot of cross-training was
> involved and it really helped maintain the birds and - ta-da! sparked
> morale. I was Chief of QC then because of a request from an old
> colleague who was the DM. (I also got to fly test hops besides subbing
> as a 307th IP.) Anyway he was getting worn down; so was I; in 1980 we
> both thought Cawtah was going to be reelected and we were out of parts
> for our 120 F4s and about 2/3 manned in skills and 4/3 manned in FNGs
> so we both bailed out in April of 80. It had stopped being fun when I
> saw an Estimated Delivery Date 21 months in the future for one of our
> AOCP F4Es. (We had 4 real hangar queens - they were missing about 250
> items apiece we'd canned for other birds and awaiting parts for them.
> 'Consolidated Cannery' ships, I called them. And that was what was
> documented! It was/is not unknown for gung-ho crewchiefs to make
> midnight requisitions to get their own bird airborne. Swap parts -
> don't leave the hole vacant! And if you want to be really 'honest'
> write it up as inop and sign a fake name. Not that I ever did that . .
> .) FWIW once I put my papers in my blood pressure went down 20 points.
> One thing - with the parts and manning problems I knew we were going
> to lose airplanes but there wasn't a damn thing I could do about it.
> Well, we did, but the crews got out okay. Thank God. One of them was
> me.
> Walt BJ

[Smartace11]

> I'm guessing the finger pointing
>is sort of what you had in mind when you mentioned ops and mx with respect
>to delays and/or cancellations.
>

Some of the time. Often it was just because mx cold take credit for scheduling
effectiveness on a late sortie when the ops guys, having missed range slots,
basically just had to bore holes in the air. Upset a lot of guys because it
seemed the priority was to fly planes not train crews.

[Smartace11]

>I remember the "fighter squadron concept"; my first real
>assignment was to the 43rd TFS (MacDill). It worked okay,
>but required massive duplication of manpower (specialties)
>in every squadron - and some of those skills were in very
>short supply.

Worked fine for maintenance but not for ops as it meant a lot of lost range
times and crews sitting around waiting for planes to come OR so maint could
take credit for a flight. I was in a PACAF squadron, 391st TFS, Misawa later
34th, Kunsan when they went to the AFM 66-1 maint structure and the difference
in training effectiveness for crews was like night and day. I was also ops and
maint in the 48th TFW, and coold see the problems it caused for crews.

It did help maintenance in that it made scheduling easier and kept flying time
on birds pretty well balanced out.
>
>Of course, it was tried only in TAC - while the combat
>wings in PACAF and USAFE stayed with the older AMS/MMS/FMS/OMS
>mold.

Not really it was used worldwide. I was in fighter wings in TAC, PACAF, and
USAFE under both concepts.


>
>The earlier "Armament & Electronics" squadrons (along with
>FMS for the mechanical trades) and OMS for crew cheifs was
>pretty good, too.
>
>> Then the AF mandated a SAC type organizational structure with separate
>> squadrons for ops and the various maintenance types, Avionics (AMS),
>> Munitions (MMS), Field or backshop (FMS) and Organizational or
>> flightline OMS.
>
>This was the norm; it was efficient of manpower, and
>gave good training to the specialties.

Also madeif very difficult at times to work on planes like the F-4 because
suddenly everyone was carrying union guys.Each specialty could only touch their
part of the plane and lot of time was lost "waiting for specialists" when
formerly in the past, crew chiefs did many of the same tasks, so planes got
fixed quicker.



>
>> Apparently worked for big airplanes but well at all for fighters
>
>Your dreaming. It worked oustandingly for fighters.

Not the F-4 from 69 - 79. I lived the problems. It made life far easier for
the specialist shops but aircraft availability suffered. Ask anyone who flew
jets under both concepts and see which they liked best.

The 388th at Korat in md 73 was a good example.
>WE almost quit flying after the war ended because maintenance could hardly
generate airplanes going to a strict 66-1 concept.

Prior to that I hardly remember a sortie lost because maintenance couldn't get
a bird ready. A lot of it had to do with what was allowable for tail number
substitution. If your plane wasn't ready for its takeoff time you probably
wouldn't go even though there may be plenty of others ready but not on the
schedule that day.


>> Things improved a lot under COMO and POMO in TAC.
>
>Let me correct that: you're ****in' delusional.
>
>POMC (it's first name), COMO, and POMO (all the same thing)
>were a disaster of major proportions for the fighter forces,
>particularly when it came to maintenance training.
>We had 7-level specialists in AGS who didn't have a clue
>about how their systems worked. Not surprising: they never
>got a chance to fix them. They spent most of their time
>kicking chocks, hanging tanks, and manhandling refuels.
>Under POMO, the only time a lot of jets were actually fixed
>(instead of patched PMC) - was when they were handed over to
>EMS or CRS for phase, radar cal, etc. Otherwise, "tires and
>fires" were all that mattered.
>
>- John T., F-4 WCS toad and memeber of the 1st, 4th, 15th,
> 36th, 50th, 56th, 86th, and 388th (Korat) TFWs...
>
>
>
>
>
>

[WaltBJ]

The real problem comes from the different missions of the 'biggies'
and the fighters. The 'biggies' all fly canned schedules, with lots of
time to figure things out. A fighter outfit following a canned traing
schedule is in much the same boat. But fighters must 'surge' now and
then, either for evaluation (flunk and hell breaks loose)or for combat
(flunk and hell is for real.) My outfit at Danang had a stand-down day
- the other two squadrons were going to cover the frag. They fell on
their butt and while 115 of my guys were at China Beach 22 of my guys
launched 19 sorties with our 20 old F4Ds. ADC used to run 72 hour
exercises. No-notice, unscheduled, max effort. 15-20 minute
turn-arounds. I have flown 12 sorties in 72 hours several times in
those things. In the Cuban Crisis we flew 1800 hours in one month with
20 F102As. That sort of effort takes the highest degree of morale and
esprit and training to pull off. That is when the extra manpower has
to be there to hack the mission. 66-1 may be efficient in the use of
manpower but there is generally no slack even considering a canned
training schedule what with real manning under authorized levels
especially in the higher skill levels plus guys on leave, TDY, etc. If
the wheels had ever manned the units to meet surge requirements -
well, any organization would have worked with good people at the helm.
But to get a guy to put out his best over any considerable time takes
personal contact and visible leadership. It is much easier to get
everybody going the same direction if there is no visible tangible
demarcation between ops and maintenance ie we all wear the same patch.
As for 7-levels sitting in bread trucks playing cards waiting a call -
it didn't happen in the 102 or F4D outfits I was in. They were busy
fixing airplanes or training the FNGs.
Walt BJ

[Buzzer]

On 18 Nov 2003 21:34:49 -0800, (WaltBJ) wrote:

>The real problem comes from the different missions of the 'biggies'
>and the fighters. The 'biggies' all fly canned schedules, with lots of
>time to figure things out.

In your fantasy dreams..

>A fighter outfit following a canned traing
>schedule is in much the same boat. But fighters must 'surge' now and
>then, either for evaluation (flunk and hell breaks loose)or for combat
>(flunk and hell is for real.)

So what would you call ORI, Chrome Dome, and something called ARC
Light, etc., on the "biggies"?
Have you ever been around the maintenace shops for B-52s when they
were regenerating aircraft for alert after an ORI? After your're in
the middle of an ORI and HQ decides to throw in some special missions?

>My outfit at Danang had a stand-down day
>- the other two squadrons were going to cover the frag. They fell on
>their butt and while 115 of my guys were at China Beach 22 of my guys
>launched 19 sorties with our 20 old F4Ds. ADC used to run 72 hour
>exercises. No-notice, unscheduled, max effort. 15-20 minute
>turn-arounds. I have flown 12 sorties in 72 hours several times in
>those things.

Sorties are apples and oranges when comparing fighters and bombers.
They are two very different machines. There were more ECM systems
alone on a bomber than all the electronic systems that could be
crammed in a fighter. I am not sure, but I think a bomber just might
have a few more ounces of fuel than a fighter so it just might take a
few minutes more for refueling. Then there is lox, expendables, etc.
That was the good old days though. I wonder how the "biggies" have
done in our latest wars? All canned schedules, etc.?

>In the Cuban Crisis we flew 1800 hours in one month with
>20 F102As. That sort of effort takes the highest degree of morale and
>esprit and training to pull off. That is when the extra manpower has
>to be there to hack the mission. 66-1 may be efficient in the use of
>manpower but there is generally no slack even considering a canned
>training schedule what with real manning under authorized levels
>especially in the higher skill levels plus guys on leave, TDY, etc. If
>the wheels had ever manned the units to meet surge requirements -
>well, any organization would have worked with good people at the helm.

SAC sucked and and the morale and esprit and training was lousy. I saw
better morale and esprit and training in SAC than at most any fighter
base. The one exception was Ubon with then Col. Olds, but before and
after things were not exactly great. People at the helm came and went,
but the NCOs were there doing the job. A job they believed in and
passed on to the new troops.

>But to get a guy to put out his best over any considerable time takes
>personal contact and visible leadership. It is much easier to get
>everybody going the same direction if there is no visible tangible
>demarcation between ops and maintenance ie we all wear the same patch.

And you still have people in the back shops that never see the light
of day right? The shop tech probably sees a crew member about as often
as the clerk did in the base tech order library? Home many shop techs
were behind the guy on the flightline?

>As for 7-levels sitting in bread trucks playing cards waiting a call -
>it didn't happen in the 102 or F4D outfits I was in. They were busy
>fixing airplanes or training the FNGs.

Not unusual in our biggies shop at three in the morning while the crew
chiefs were sleeping, I mean doing record checks, that a 7 or 5-level
would be heading to a dark, empty flightline to replace a unit he had
removed hours earlier, repaired, and was now ready to reinstall.

I will admit I always thought it was something of a waste to train
someone for a highly technical electronics field and then have them
spend the rest of their enlistment loading tinfoil and changing 200+lb
transmitters. There were some that really disliked the shop, but if
the flightline work was finished as much as it could be they could at
least be breaking down equipment for repair, doing some of the less
technical work, paperwork, etc. Seems more prodcutive from the shop
point of view than pumping up tires, or sitting in a line truck
watching the stars...

[BUFDRVR]

>The 'biggies' all fly canned schedules, with lots of
>time to figure things out. A fighter outfit following a canned traing
>schedule is in much the same boat. But fighters must 'surge' now and
>then, either for evaluation (flunk and hell breaks loose)or for combat

Uhh, Walt, you do realize "heavies" surge for evaluations, combat or
preparation for both/either as well?


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[BUFDRVR]

>So what would you call ORI, Chrome Dome, and something called ARC
>Light, etc., on the "biggies"?
>Have you ever been around the maintenace shops for B-52s when they
>were regenerating aircraft for alert after an ORI?

Can I get an Amen?

>Sorties are apples and oranges when comparing fighters and bombers.
>They are two very different machines. There were more ECM systems
>alone on a bomber than all the electronic systems that could be
>crammed in a fighter. I am not sure, but I think a bomber just might
>have a few more ounces of fuel than a fighter so it just might take a
>few minutes more for refueling. Then there is lox, expendables, etc.
>That was the good old days though. I wonder how the "biggies" have
>done in our latest wars? All canned schedules, etc.?

I don't know what that means? We flew so many different types of sorties, I
can't even begin to count. Just for daily training from a MNX side, different
fuel loads, different weapons loads, some flare loads, some no flare loads, ECM
software XX here, ECM software XY there, pylons or no pylons, Litening II or no
Litening II, Combat Track II or no Combat Track II, I could literally go on for
twenty or so more iterations. So my question is; Walt, what is a "canned heavy
sortie"?


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[SteveM8597]

>Uhh, Walt, you do realize "heavies" surge for evaluations, combat or
>preparation for both/either as well

As a fighter guy, I'd call a surge when you fly the same plane 4 or more times
a day and get 150 sorties to the range out of 72 planes, 1/3 of which are down
for heavy maint.

I have to admit I know nothing about maint on the heavies but I do know as an
ops guy and a maintenance control officer that surging under the old 66-1 one
concept was exceedingly difficult and time consuming because there was so much
downtime waiting for the highly skilled and well trained specialists. Plus
everyone carried a union card and only did "their" tasks.

To pull an F-4 cabin turbine for example first the crew chief had to pull the
panel. Then a machinist had to come to remove bad screws. Then hydraulics had
to come to remove some lines. Next aerospace repair had to come pull some air
lines, Then environmental had to come to pull the turbine. Re-installation was
the reverse. Imagine if it took seven mechanics to service the a/c or change
spark plugs on your car while each was also doing the same on other cars. A
competent mechanic can do all these tasks, ditto with working on planes.

The specialist concept might work good for extensive maintenance but not on
the flightline where the task at hand is to turn airplanes as quickly as
possible to get the air cleared and bombs on target.

My son just finished a maintenance training course on the Apache AH-64D Longbow
and was taught to do all the flightline tasks needed to keep the birds in the
air, armament, avionics, fire contril, flight controls, propulsion, rotors, and
so on. I think the AF is making a mistake switching back to the SAC concept
for fighters.

Steve

[KenG]

Right ON!! I spent 16 years of my time in SAC as a Comm Tech(32870).
Loved it. It was very clear what was expected of you. It was very clear
what would happen if you didn't adhere to that expectation. If you did
adhere, You were given the authority, responsibility, and perks
comensurate with your position. The command always backed my decisions.
I once stopped a Looking Glass aircraft that was taxiing for a flight,
because I saw a problem with an HF longwire antenna. There was never a
word asked of me like "are you sure, you were over a hundred feet
away...". The aircraft was directed to return to the parking spot and
the antenna was checked (and repaired) in short order. The aircraft was
only minutes late for takeoff. I got a personal call from the
BattleStaff Commander (O7) thanking me for my attention to detail. It
seems that one week earlier, this same O7 was BattleStaff Commander on a
Looking Glass mission when a longwire antenna defect similar to this one
resulted in a flailing longwire breaking a window causing a rapid
decompression inflight. Once during an ORI I was dispatched (REDBALL)
to a tanker being generated for Alert duty. The problem was COMM 1 INOP
(mission esential). When I got to the bird, the Capt. Aircraft commander
told me to change it and get off the plane. I told him (with the ORI
evaluator standing behind him) "Sir, the problem might not be the RT, I
need to check it out first". A/C said "I can't, just change it and
leave". ORI evaluator said "Capt.... You are hereby grounded, please
exit the aircraft NOW." Then said to me "TSgt G..., you may now repair
the radio." The ORI evaluator was making a very strong point:
1. The maintenance tech is the expert on the system.
2. The expert on the system cannot test the radio with you in the seat.
3. The aircraft cannot perform alert duties without COMM 1.
4. Refusing to leave the seat when the expert requests you do so,
prevents the aircraft performing its Alert duties.

I was stunned when this happened, as I would have never intentionally
done something that would have resulted in such a dire consequence. BTW
the Capt. was requalified quickly (after the ORI). Still, I'm sure that
being grounded by an ORI evaluator doesn't look good on your permanent
record.

Speaking of AFM66-1. To me it is the best. A tech would often pull the
box, repair the box on the bench, then reinstall it. YOU were sure that
the box you pulled was bad. Fewer CNDs that way.

Those were the days eh?
KenG

Buzzer wrote:
> On 18 Nov 2003 21:34:49 -0800, (WaltBJ) wrote:
>
>
>>The real problem comes from the different missions of the 'biggies'
>>and the fighters. The 'biggies' all fly canned schedules, with lots of
>>time to figure things out.
>
>
> In your fantasy dreams..
>
>
>>A fighter outfit following a canned traing
>>schedule is in much the same boat. But fighters must 'surge' now and
>>then, either for evaluation (flunk and hell breaks loose)or for combat
>>(flunk and hell is for real.)
>
>
> So what would you call ORI, Chrome Dome, and something called ARC
> Light, etc., on the "biggies"?
> Have you ever been around the maintenace shops for B-52s when they
> were regenerating aircraft for alert after an ORI? After your're in
> the middle of an ORI and HQ decides to throw in some special missions?
>
>
>>My outfit at Danang had a stand-down day
>>- the other two squadrons were going to cover the frag. They fell on
>>their butt and while 115 of my guys were at China Beach 22 of my guys
>>launched 19 sorties with our 20 old F4Ds. ADC used to run 72 hour
>>exercises. No-notice, unscheduled, max effort. 15-20 minute
>>turn-arounds. I have flown 12 sorties in 72 hours several times in
>>those things.
>
>
> Sorties are apples and oranges when comparing fighters and bombers.
> They are two very different machines. There were more ECM systems
> alone on a bomber than all the electronic systems that could be
> crammed in a fighter. I am not sure, but I think a bomber just might
> have a few more ounces of fuel than a fighter so it just might take a
> few minutes more for refueling. Then there is lox, expendables, etc.
> That was the good old days though. I wonder how the "biggies" have
> done in our latest wars? All canned schedules, etc.?
>
>
>>In the Cuban Crisis we flew 1800 hours in one month with
>>20 F102As. That sort of effort takes the highest degree of morale and
>>esprit and training to pull off. That is when the extra manpower has
>>to be there to hack the mission. 66-1 may be efficient in the use of
>>manpower but there is generally no slack even considering a canned
>>training schedule what with real manning under authorized levels
>>especially in the higher skill levels plus guys on leave, TDY, etc. If
>>the wheels had ever manned the units to meet surge requirements -
>>well, any organization would have worked with good people at the helm.
>
>
> SAC sucked and and the morale and esprit and training was lousy. I saw
> better morale and esprit and training in SAC than at most any fighter
> base. The one exception was Ubon with then Col. Olds, but before and
> after things were not exactly great. People at the helm came and went,
> but the NCOs were there doing the job. A job they believed in and
> passed on to the new troops.
>
>
>>But to get a guy to put out his best over any considerable time takes
>>personal contact and visible leadership. It is much easier to get
>>everybody going the same direction if there is no visible tangible
>>demarcation between ops and maintenance ie we all wear the same patch.
>
>
> And you still have people in the back shops that never see the light
> of day right? The shop tech probably sees a crew member about as often
> as the clerk did in the base tech order library? Home many shop techs
> were behind the guy on the flightline?
>
>
>>As for 7-levels sitting in bread trucks playing cards waiting a call -
>>it didn't happen in the 102 or F4D outfits I was in. They were busy
>>fixing airplanes or training the FNGs.
>
>
> Not unusual in our biggies shop at three in the morning while the crew
> chiefs were sleeping, I mean doing record checks, that a 7 or 5-level
> would be heading to a dark, empty flightline to replace a unit he had
> removed hours earlier, repaired, and was now ready to reinstall.
>
> I will admit I always thought it was something of a waste to train
> someone for a highly technical electronics field and then have them
> spend the rest of their enlistment loading tinfoil and changing 200+lb
> transmitters. There were some that really disliked the shop, but if
> the flightline work was finished as much as it could be they could at
> least be breaking down equipment for repair, doing some of the less
> technical work, paperwork, etc. Seems more prodcutive from the shop
> point of view than pumping up tires, or sitting in a line truck
> watching the stars...

[KenG]

Your example is why there was AFM66-1 and AFM66-6. One addressed the
needs of long haul aircraft, the other addressed the needs of the
gunfighter. If the USAF is now going to AFM66-6 across the board, that
would be a mistake.
KenG

SteveM8597 wrote:

>>Uhh, Walt, you do realize "heavies" surge for evaluations, combat or
>>preparation for both/either as well
>
>
> As a fighter guy, I'd call a surge when you fly the same plane 4 or more times
> a day and get 150 sorties to the range out of 72 planes, 1/3 of which are down
> for heavy maint.
>
> I have to admit I know nothing about maint on the heavies but I do know as an
> ops guy and a maintenance control officer that surging under the old 66-1 one
> concept was exceedingly difficult and time consuming because there was so much
> downtime waiting for the highly skilled and well trained specialists. Plus
> everyone carried a union card and only did "their" tasks.
>
> To pull an F-4 cabin turbine for example first the crew chief had to pull the
> panel. Then a machinist had to come to remove bad screws. Then hydraulics had
> to come to remove some lines. Next aerospace repair had to come pull some air
> lines, Then environmental had to come to pull the turbine. Re-installation was
> the reverse. Imagine if it took seven mechanics to service the a/c or change
> spark plugs on your car while each was also doing the same on other cars. A
> competent mechanic can do all these tasks, ditto with working on planes.
>
> The specialist concept might work good for extensive maintenance but not on
> the flightline where the task at hand is to turn airplanes as quickly as
> possible to get the air cleared and bombs on target.
>
> My son just finished a maintenance training course on the Apache AH-64D Longbow
> and was taught to do all the flightline tasks needed to keep the birds in the
> air, armament, avionics, fire contril, flight controls, propulsion, rotors, and
> so on. I think the AF is making a mistake switching back to the SAC concept
> for fighters.
>
> St

[Smartace11]

Probably one of those discussions that will never be resolved because missions
are so different..

Now put yourself on a fighter ramp in the middle of semi indian country whenthe
bad guys are constantly lobbing rockets, mortars, and small arms fire and
trying to get the bird up on cockpit alert at the end of the runway, with the
bird cocked on 3 min alert and tell me how great that same approach is.

In SEA, about all you needed was two good engines, operating flight controls,
and a weapons release system that worked, when push came to shove and the bad
guys were trying to come over the fence.

>The problem was COMM 1 INOP
>(mission esential). When I got to the bird, the Capt. Aircraft commander
>told me to change it and get off the plane. I told him (with the ORI
>evaluator standing behind him) "Sir, the problem might not be the RT, I
>need to check it out first". A/C said "I can't, just change it and
>leave". ORI evaluator said "Capt.... You are hereby grounded, please
>exit the aircraft NOW." Then said to me "TSgt G..., you may now repair
>the radio." The ORI evaluator was making a very strong point:
>1. The maintenance tech is the expert on the system.
>2. The expert on the system cannot test the radio with you in the seat.
>3. The aircraft cannot perform alert duties without COMM 1.
>4. Refusing to leave the seat when the expert requests you do so,
>prevents the aircraft performing its Alert duties.
>
>I was stunned when this happened, as I would have never intentionally
>done something that would have resulted in such a dire consequence. BTW
>the Capt. was requalified quickly (after the ORI). Still, I'm sure that
>being grounded by an ORI evaluator doesn't look good on your permanent
>record.
>
>Speaking of AFM66-1. To me it is the best. A tech would often pull the
>box, repair the box on the bench, then reinstall it. YOU were sure that
>the box you pulled was bad. Fewer CNDs that way.
>
>Those were the days eh?
>KenG
>

[[email protected]]

(Smartace11) wrote:

>
>In SEA, about all you needed was two good engines, operating flight controls,
>and a weapons release system that worked, when push came to shove and the bad
>guys were trying to come over the fence.
>

This is likely a different situation and requires a different
approach...I see nothing wrong with what the tech (nor the
evaluator) did at all. I congratulate the tech, he did what his
expert knowledge told him to.
--

-Gord.

[BUFDRVR]

>As a fighter guy, I'd call a surge when you fly the same plane 4 or more
>times
>a day

Pretty narrow view of life you have there...


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[Smartace11]

>
>>As a fighter guy, I'd call a surge when you fly the same plane 4 or more
>>times
>>a day
>
>Pretty narrow view of life you have there...
>
>
>BUFDRVR

Agreed totally but that is the business. There are basically just trwo tyoes
aof airplanes, Fighrters and targets. :>)

I don't think the same maintenance concept for bot is the right approach. The
new concept solves AF personnel manning, and training problems and clearly it
works well for heavies. The historical facts are that it doesn't do much for
aircrew compentency in the fighter business and does not produce as high a
sortie generation rate either. Well trained and staffed maintenance crews
don't do you much good when you don't have planes to fly.