Best dogfight gun?

[Bjørnar Bolsøy]

It takes time to wind up and has a small projectile, so how does
the M61 really stack up against, say, the BK27 og Giat 30mm as
far as dogfighting is concerned? Even with the PGU28?
Is shot density the primary factor to look at?


Regards...

[Orval Fairbairn]

In article >,
"Bjørnar Bolsøy" > wrote:

> It takes time to wind up and has a small projectile, so how does
> the M61 really stack up against, say, the BK27 og Giat 30mm as
> far as dogfighting is concerned? Even with the PGU28?
> Is shot density the primary factor to look at?


Major factors are:

1. muzzle velocity
2. bullet mass
3. rate of fire

They all have to work together to raise PK (probability of kill).

[robert arndt]

"Bjørnar Bolsøy" > wrote in message >...
> It takes time to wind up and has a small projectile, so how does
> the M61 really stack up against, say, the BK27 og Giat 30mm as
> far as dogfighting is concerned? Even with the PGU28?
> Is shot density the primary factor to look at?
>
>
> Regards...


The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:


http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.html

Rob

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(robert arndt) wrote:

> The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:
>
> http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.html

....if you don't mind only firing 1,700 rounds per minute as opposed to
about 6,000...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[John Cook]

On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 04:28:01 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> (robert arndt) wrote:
>
>> The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:
>>
>> http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.html
>
>...if you don't mind only firing 1,700 rounds per minute as opposed to
>about 6,000...


Look at the spool up times ;-)...

Whats the avarage gun burst time in a dogfight...

Cheers

John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
John Cook > wrote:

> On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 04:28:01 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> >In article >,
> > (robert arndt) wrote:
> >
> >> The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:
> >>
> >> http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.htm
> >> l
> >
> >...if you don't mind only firing 1,700 rounds per minute as opposed to
> >about 6,000...
>
> Look at the spool up times ;-)...

If you forget to warm up your Gatling, you're probably the sort to
forget to arm the darned thing to begin with. The technical term for
that is "dead guy."

> Whats the avarage gun burst time in a dogfight...

Whatever it is, you're going to have to hold the trigger down for over
three times that to get the same amount of fire downrange.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Greg Hennessy]

On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 07:45:39 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:


>> Whats the avarage gun burst time in a dogfight...
>
>Whatever it is, you're going to have to hold the trigger down for over
>three times that to get the same amount of fire downrange.

Given the that the designer of the mig-29 is on record as saying that he
should have halved the number of rounds carried for its gsh-30L. Tony
Williams has a table on his website which details why a single barrelled
cannon will get there 1st with the mostest when compared to a gatling.



greg

--
In the beginning. Back in nineteen fifty-five
Man didn’t know about a rock ’n’ roll show
And all that jive.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 17:20:23 +1100, John Cook >
wrote:

>On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 04:28:01 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
>>In article >,
>> (robert arndt) wrote:
>>
>>> The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:
>>>
>>> http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.html
>>
>>...if you don't mind only firing 1,700 rounds per minute as opposed to
>>about 6,000...
>
>
>Look at the spool up times ;-)...
>
>Whats the avarage gun burst time in a dogfight...
>
>Cheers
>
>John Cook

Cover all the bases and use a GAU-8 ;-) Takes a bit to wind up but
even those first rounds will count for something :-)

[robert arndt]

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (robert arndt) wrote:
>
> > The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:
> >
> > http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.html
>
> ...if you don't mind only firing 1,700 rounds per minute as opposed to
> about 6,000...

....when the M61 doesn't jam, that is. I prefer Mauser's BK-27
jam-proof linkless and up-coming dual feed version.
BTW, in close combat 6000 rpm bursts don't mean that much. A
1,700-1,800 rpm burst of 27mm fire from the single-barrel BK-27 will
ruin your day, especially with frangible ammo.
Now if only the Germans could fit the amazing 30mm RMK inside the
Typhoon... but I'm sure it will find its way onto the Tiger helo.

Rob :)

[Chad Irby]

(robert arndt) wrote:

> Chad Irby > wrote:
> > (robert arndt) wrote:
> >
> > > The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:
> > >
> > > http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.ht
> > > ml
> >
> > ...if you don't mind only firing 1,700 rounds per minute as opposed to
> > about 6,000...
>
> ...when the M61 doesn't jam, that is.

....which is pretty much all of the time. If the Gatling guns were prone
to jamming, someone would have mentioned it sometime in the last forty
or so years.

> I prefer Mauser's BK-27
> jam-proof linkless and up-coming dual feed version.

Here's a tip: No such thing as a "jam-proof" weapon that relies on ammo
feed of any sort. You're been reading the Mauser PR releases too much.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Ed Rasimus]

On 5 Dec 2003 07:42:43 -0800, (robert arndt) wrote:

>Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
>> In article >,
>> (robert arndt) wrote:
>>
>> > The M61 is a poor substitute for this bad baby:
>> >
>> > http://www.airforce-technology.com/contractors/cannons/mauser2/mauser21.html
>>
>> ...if you don't mind only firing 1,700 rounds per minute as opposed to
>> about 6,000...
>
>...when the M61 doesn't jam, that is.

Carried an M61 in the F-105 and the F-4E for 250 combat missions.
Carried the SUU-16 and SUU-23 on F-4Cs for four years. Carried the
SUU-11 mini-gun on AT-38s and fired literally hundreds of thousands of
rounds over 23 years of tactical experience. Never experienced a
single M61 variant jamming. Never saw on jam in any flight that I was
on. Never heard anyone talk about one jamming in any squadron I was
in. Doesn't sound, based on a limited empirical sampling like a
problem.

> I prefer Mauser's BK-27
>jam-proof linkless and up-coming dual feed version.

Should we note that the drum-fed internally carried M-61 is linkless?

>BTW, in close combat 6000 rpm bursts don't mean that much.

You're correct. "Close combat" is stupid. It means you screwed up at
several earlier decision points. But, if you reach that point, why
don't 6K RPM bursts mean much? Would a 1K RPM burst be more
meaningful? Or were you suggesting that more RPM would be desireable.

If the burst will be on the target for .2 seconds, would it be better
to have more rounds or fewer during that interval?

> A
>1,700-1,800 rpm burst of 27mm fire from the single-barrel BK-27 will
>ruin your day, especially with frangible ammo.

How about HEI instead of "frangible"? I'm not worried about
frangibility, as I would be if discharging a .45 ACP at a burglar in a
mid-town apartment. I'm worried about damaging the airframe and that
means HEI or maybe HEI/API mix.

>Now if only the Germans could fit the amazing 30mm RMK inside the
>Typhoon... but I'm sure it will find its way onto the Tiger helo.

Going from .50 cal to 20mm to 25mm to 30mm, etc, always incurs a
weight penalty. There are trade-offs between weight, ballistics,
accuracy, burst density, etc. Consider that one round of 155mm would
surely result in a kill, do we than suggest mounting artillery in the
nose of fighters? Clearly hyperbole for argument's sake.

Consider further that a gun will be carried on every sorties for the
life of the aircraft and for most aircraft will never be fired at
another aircraft in anger.

"Hoser" said, "There's no kill like a gun kill...." but, that may be
because gun kills are so damn rare.


>
>Rob :)

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> On 5 Dec 2003 07:42:43 -0800, (robert arndt) wrote:
>
> >...when the M61 doesn't jam, that is.
>
> Never experienced a single M61 variant jamming. Never saw on jam in
> any flight that I was on. Never heard anyone talk about one jamming
> in any squadron I was in. Doesn't sound, based on a limited empirical
> sampling like a problem.

Well, Ed, you have to remember you're talking to Arndt. As fas as he's
concerned, everything important ever invented for aviation was invented
in Germany, all German-made machinery is the best in the world at
everything, and all American equipment is simply terrible and unreliable.

Which is why he's touting a weapon with less than one-third the firing
rate, and claiming that it's immune to mechanical problems...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Lyle]

On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 18:58:36 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>
>> On 5 Dec 2003 07:42:43 -0800, (robert arndt) wrote:
>>
>> >...when the M61 doesn't jam, that is.
>>
>> Never experienced a single M61 variant jamming. Never saw on jam in
>> any flight that I was on. Never heard anyone talk about one jamming
>> in any squadron I was in. Doesn't sound, based on a limited empirical
>> sampling like a problem.
>
>Well, Ed, you have to remember you're talking to Arndt. As fas as he's
>concerned, everything important ever invented for aviation was invented
>in Germany, all German-made machinery is the best in the world at
>everything, and all American equipment is simply terrible and unreliable.
>
>Which is why he's touting a weapon with less than one-third the firing
>rate, and claiming that it's immune to mechanical problems...
dont forget that the gatling is designed for longterm use unlike a
single barrel cannon. each barrel is only shooting 1/6, 1/7 etc of the
time. what is the lifecyle of the single barrel cannons compared to
the m61/Gau-8/Gau-25

[John Cook]

On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 13:31:25 -0800, Lyle > wrote:

>On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 18:58:36 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
>>In article >,
>> Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>>
>>> On 5 Dec 2003 07:42:43 -0800, (robert arndt) wrote:
>>>
>>> >...when the M61 doesn't jam, that is.
>>>
>>> Never experienced a single M61 variant jamming. Never saw on jam in
>>> any flight that I was on. Never heard anyone talk about one jamming
>>> in any squadron I was in. Doesn't sound, based on a limited empirical
>>> sampling like a problem.
>>
>>Well, Ed, you have to remember you're talking to Arndt. As fas as he's
>>concerned, everything important ever invented for aviation was invented
>>in Germany, all German-made machinery is the best in the world at
>>everything, and all American equipment is simply terrible and unreliable.
>>
>>Which is why he's touting a weapon with less than one-third the firing
>>rate, and claiming that it's immune to mechanical problems...
>dont forget that the gatling is designed for longterm use unlike a
>single barrel cannon. each barrel is only shooting 1/6, 1/7 etc of the
>time. what is the lifecyle of the single barrel cannons compared to
>the m61/Gau-8/Gau-25

The weight penalty of the multi barrels is a major drawback, its not
like the cannon is the primary weapon anymore....
The BK-27 has a good reputation, same as the M61!, the question
remains which is the most accurate and is a better dispersal an
advantage or not???.
Which has the Higher PK?.

Cheers


John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

[Tony Williams]

Greg Hennessy > wrote in message >...
> On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 07:45:39 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
>
> >> Whats the avarage gun burst time in a dogfight...
> >
> >Whatever it is, you're going to have to hold the trigger down for over
> >three times that to get the same amount of fire downrange.
>
> Given the that the designer of the mig-29 is on record as saying that he
> should have halved the number of rounds carried for its gsh-30L. Tony
> Williams has a table on his website which details why a single barrelled
> cannon will get there 1st with the mostest when compared to a gatling.

This is from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and
myself, due to be published in March next year:

"There are three competing philosophies when it comes to gun design
for fighter aircraft. One is the US rotary; fast-firing but (to date)
only 20 mm in calibre, and a very bulky system. The second is the West
European preference for a 27 – 30 mm revolver cannon; no lighter, but
slimmer and hard-hitting. The third is represented by the Russian GSh
301; a minimalist gun but with an equally hard-hitting performance.
The twin-barrel GSh-30 also deserves mention, even though it has not
been used in fighter aircraft. It weighs about the same as the western
guns at 105 kg, but fires powerful 30 mm ammunition at up to 3,000
rpm.

The merits of the 27 mm BK 27 revolver as opposed to the M61A1 can be
clearly demonstrated. In the first 0.5 seconds of firing, the M61
fires 18 rounds massing 1.8 kg in total weight of projectiles, the BK
27 fires 14 rounds weighing 3.7 kg. In the first full second, the M61
fires 68 rounds weighing 6.9 kg, the BK 27 fires 28 rounds weighing
7.4 kg. In weight of fire, as well as the destructiveness of the
individual projectiles, the Mauser clearly has an advantage, albeit
one that the faster-accelerating M61A2 reduces somewhat. This is
significant in that dogfights frequently permit only the briefest of
firing opportunities, and although a skilled pilot anticipating a
firing opportunity can 'spin up' a rotary in advance, such notice
cannot always be guaranteed.

The Mauser projectiles are also relatively heavier, resulting in a
sectional density (SD) of .507 compared to .363 for the 20 mm, which
means they will retain their initial velocity out to a greater range.
The 30 mm GSh-301 offers similar performance to the BK 27 with about
half the weight. On paper, this is an impressive fighter gun, although
its maintenance requirements have been criticised. The choice of a
heavy projectile (with an SD of .616) at a moderate velocity for the
Russian 30 mm guns implies that ground attack has a higher priority
than aerial combat in Russian thinking.

The ideal gun for aerial combat will of course combine the best of all
worlds: a high rate of fire, instantly achieved; a high muzzle
velocity to minimise flight time; and projectiles large enough to
inflict serious damage with each hit (requiring a calibre in the 25 –
30 mm range). The optimum weapon among those currently developed may
well be the new GIAT 30M791 revolver, although its weight means that
two GSh 301s (or a GSh-30) could be carried instead, with a higher
rate of fire. If the Russian guns' 30 x 165 ammunition were loaded
with lighter projectiles for a higher muzzle velocity, its aerial
combat capabilities would be improved, at the cost of some loss of
ground attack effectiveness."

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
John Cook > wrote:

> The weight penalty of the multi barrels is a major drawback, its not
> like the cannon is the primary weapon anymore....

The BK27 weighs about 100 kilograms, the lightweight version of the M61
(used in the Raptor) weighs about 100 kilograms. Kinda hard to call
that much of a penalty.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Hog Driver]

> Cover all the bases and use a GAU-8 ;-) Takes a bit to wind up but
> even those first rounds will count for something :-)

Amen brother! The API round will go in one end of an aircraft and out the
other without slowing down.

A lot of people are forgetting about range and bullet dispersion. The GAU-8
can reach out and touch someone at twice the range of most cannon, without
the huge loss in bullet density.

If you actually ever get into the dreaded knife-fight in a phone booth, the
other guy is going to have second thoughts about screwing with an A-10 when
the nose erupts in a huge cloud of smoke well beyond the range he can employ
his gun.

[Paul F Austin]

"Tony Williams" > wrote
>
> The merits of the 27 mm BK 27 revolver as opposed to the M61A1 can be
> clearly demonstrated. In the first 0.5 seconds of firing, the M61
> fires 18 rounds massing 1.8 kg in total weight of projectiles, the BK
> 27 fires 14 rounds weighing 3.7 kg. In the first full second, the M61
> fires 68 rounds weighing 6.9 kg, the BK 27 fires 28 rounds weighing
> 7.4 kg. In weight of fire, as well as the destructiveness of the
> individual projectiles, the Mauser clearly has an advantage, albeit
> one that the faster-accelerating M61A2 reduces somewhat. This is
> significant in that dogfights frequently permit only the briefest of
> firing opportunities, and although a skilled pilot anticipating a
> firing opportunity can 'spin up' a rotary in advance, such notice
> cannot always be guaranteed.

Tony, why have none of the Gatling guns been designed to be "armed" and spun
up with the ammunition feed disengaged and "fired" at full rate by engaging
the ammunition feed? It seems obvious enough. There are some obvious issues
in inertial loads in the ammunition train but a "burst's worth" of rounds
could be decoupled from the main ammo tank.

[B2431]

>uk (Tony Williams)

<snip>

>The merits of the 27 mm BK 27 revolver as opposed to the M61A1 can be
>clearly demonstrated. In the first 0.5 seconds of firing, the M61
>fires 18 rounds massing 1.8 kg in total weight of projectiles, the BK
>27 fires 14 rounds weighing 3.7 kg. In the first full second, the M61
>fires 68 rounds weighing 6.9 kg, the BK 27 fires 28 rounds weighing
>7.4 kg. In weight of fire, as well as the destructiveness of the
>individual projectiles, the Mauser clearly has an advantage, albeit
>one that the faster-accelerating M61A2 reduces somewhat.

You shoot your own argument down. The BK27's projectile weight has no effect if
you don't actually strike the target. A 27 mm projectile that misses is not as
efective a 20 mm projectile that hits. In your example above the M61 has more
projectiles in the air at any given time than the BK27 giving a greater
probable hit with the M61.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

> The merits of the 27 mm BK 27 revolver as opposed to the M61A1 can be
> clearly demonstrated. In the first 0.5 seconds of firing, the M61
> fires 18 rounds massing 1.8 kg in total weight of projectiles, the BK
> 27 fires 14 rounds weighing 3.7 kg. In the first full second, the M61
> fires 68 rounds weighing 6.9 kg, the BK 27 fires 28 rounds weighing
> 7.4 kg. In weight of fire, as well as the destructiveness of the
> individual projectiles, the Mauser clearly has an advantage, albeit
> one that the faster-accelerating M61A2 reduces somewhat. This is
> significant in that dogfights frequently permit only the briefest of
> firing opportunities, and although a skilled pilot anticipating a
> firing opportunity can 'spin up' a rotary in advance, such notice
> cannot always be guaranteed.

This skips one of the big advantages of a faster-firing gun.

When your target is crossing your sights, having twice the "cycle time"
puts bullets into the other plane twice as often. Skeet shooters use
shotguns instead of rifles. Weight of fire is nice, but heavier bullets
don't help much if the other plane gets missed altogether due to not
having enough of them on target.

Note also that the Mauser install in the Typhoon holds about 1/3 of the
ammo that the M61A2 in the Raptor will, so things come out pretty even
as far as throw weight and firing time, with a small advantage for the
Mauser in promptness, and a small one the other way for the M61A2 in
overall bullet weight in the aircraft (eight one-second bursts versus
five for the Mauser).

Now, if you're shooting at tanks and other ground vehicles, that Mauser
sure has an advantage, but the F-22 probably won't be spending a lot of
time at that...

(The British Typhoons aren't even going to have guns in them after the
first tranche, BTW. Bad idea.)

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Hog Driver" > wrote:

> If you actually ever get into the dreaded knife-fight in a phone booth, the
> other guy is going to have second thoughts about screwing with an A-10 when
> the nose erupts in a huge cloud of smoke well beyond the range he can employ
> his gun.

Didn't some Warthogs chew up some F-15s in an exercise that way, once?
Sit in the weeds, wait for the Eagles to get in "close," and gun kill
them from a couple of miles off...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[WaltBJ]

What I have read here is a lot of hot air coming from people who have
never fired either of these weapons, and probably have never fired on
either an aerial or ground target with any weapon. Spool-up time on a
M61? Have you ever heard one shoot? You sure as hell can't hear it
spool up. I've fired them in the air and on the ground in the firing
butts - all you hear on the ground is a very loud BRRRRR with the
individual shots indistinguishable from the first one. Watching the
gun itself you see it go from 'stop' to 'blur' instantly. The only
difference I ever noted was that the SUU23 pod gun had a slight
'tail-off' as it fired itself dry when you released the trigger. Note
that the 100 rps in the hydraulic driven M61 (25HP motor) in the
F4/14/15/16/ give these aircraft a real high-deflection (actually,
all-aspect) capability - and if a fraction of a second spin-up makes a
difference between a hit or a miss all I can say is the shooter
didn't see the opportunity in time. Even in the electric drive (15HP,
67 rps) gun in the 104A I've seen gun camera film which showed that if
the M61 gun had been firing the other aircraft would have take two
dozen rounds, from nose to tail, crossing at 70+ degrees with the
shooter pulling max G attainable in the situation, just not enough to
track him but enough to get a good shot in at close range - about 100
yards. How do you do this? You start shooting early and hose him as he
sails past. BTW that 104A installation had a 3-mil dispersion - I've
seen that proven in the firing-in butts, too.
Walt BJ -

[John Keeney]

"Tony Williams" > wrote in message
m...
> The ideal gun for aerial combat will of course combine the best of all
> worlds: a high rate of fire, instantly achieved; a high muzzle
> velocity to minimise flight time; and projectiles large enough to
> inflict serious damage with each hit (requiring a calibre in the 25 -
> 30 mm range). The optimum weapon among those currently developed may
> well be the new GIAT 30M791 revolver, although its weight means that
> two GSh 301s (or a GSh-30) could be carried instead, with a higher
> rate of fire. If the Russian guns' 30 x 165 ammunition were loaded
> with lighter projectiles for a higher muzzle velocity, its aerial
> combat capabilities would be improved, at the cost of some loss of
> ground attack effectiveness."

Is there more behind the "requiring a calibre in the 25-30 mm range"
than hand-waving to dismiss 20mm guns? Granted, bigger is better,
but why isn't 40mm required or 20mm enough?

[Richard Brooks]

Paul F Austin wrote:
> "Tony Williams" > wrote
>>
>> The merits of the 27 mm BK 27 revolver as opposed to the M61A1 can be
>> clearly demonstrated. In the first 0.5 seconds of firing, the M61
>> fires 18 rounds massing 1.8 kg in total weight of projectiles, the BK
>> 27 fires 14 rounds weighing 3.7 kg. In the first full second, the M61
>> fires 68 rounds weighing 6.9 kg, the BK 27 fires 28 rounds weighing
>> 7.4 kg. In weight of fire, as well as the destructiveness of the
>> individual projectiles, the Mauser clearly has an advantage, albeit
>> one that the faster-accelerating M61A2 reduces somewhat. This is
>> significant in that dogfights frequently permit only the briefest of
>> firing opportunities, and although a skilled pilot anticipating a
>> firing opportunity can 'spin up' a rotary in advance, such notice
>> cannot always be guaranteed.
>
> Tony, why have none of the Gatling guns been designed to be "armed"
> and spun up with the ammunition feed disengaged and "fired" at full
> rate by engaging the ammunition feed? It seems obvious enough. There
> are some obvious issues in inertial loads in the ammunition train but
> a "burst's worth" of rounds could be decoupled from the main ammo
> tank.

One thing I've not thought of before and that's the gyroscopic effects
of a fast rotating drum on the directional abilities of an aircraft ?
It can't be that much of course or it would not have been used at all. I
assume that the drum is relatively low mass ?


Richard.

[Paul F Austin]

"John Keeney" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Tony Williams" > wrote in message
> m...
> > The ideal gun for aerial combat will of course combine the best of all
> > worlds: a high rate of fire, instantly achieved; a high muzzle
> > velocity to minimise flight time; and projectiles large enough to
> > inflict serious damage with each hit (requiring a calibre in the 25 -
> > 30 mm range). The optimum weapon among those currently developed may
> > well be the new GIAT 30M791 revolver, although its weight means that
> > two GSh 301s (or a GSh-30) could be carried instead, with a higher
> > rate of fire. If the Russian guns' 30 x 165 ammunition were loaded
> > with lighter projectiles for a higher muzzle velocity, its aerial
> > combat capabilities would be improved, at the cost of some loss of
> > ground attack effectiveness."
>
> Is there more behind the "requiring a calibre in the 25-30 mm range"
> than hand-waving to dismiss 20mm guns? Granted, bigger is better,
> but why isn't 40mm required or 20mm enough?

One reason is range but that's a mug's game, trying to compete with SRAAMs.
The other reason, lethality, is driven by the fact that fighters are a lot
tougher targets now than they were fifty years ago. In a progression of
lethality, during WWII, .50cal machine guns were adequately lethal against
fighter sized targets but not against bombers. With the advent of jet
propulsion, increased air speed required stronger structure and fighters got
physically tougher, so 20mm was optimum against fighters in the late forties
and early fifties. Supersonic fighters are tougher still, mostly because of
increase design dynamic pressure but also because they are stressed for
larger loads and higher g-loads, so the thought is that 20mm rounds have
inadequate Pk (given a hit).

Of course, gun installations are questionable now because the SRAAMs have
gotten so good and because guns in general pose a significant cost in
reliability (the firing forces become the design environment for all the
electronics in the vicinity) and a significant maintenance burden.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Sat, 6 Dec 2003 11:23:25 -0000, "Richard Brooks"
> wrote:

>Paul F Austin wrote:
>> "Tony Williams" > wrote
>>>
>>> The merits of the 27 mm BK 27 revolver as opposed to the M61A1 can be
>>> clearly demonstrated. In the first 0.5 seconds of firing, the M61
>>> fires 18 rounds massing 1.8 kg in total weight of projectiles, the BK
>>> 27 fires 14 rounds weighing 3.7 kg. In the first full second, the M61
>>> fires 68 rounds weighing 6.9 kg, the BK 27 fires 28 rounds weighing
>>> 7.4 kg. In weight of fire, as well as the destructiveness of the
>>> individual projectiles, the Mauser clearly has an advantage, albeit
>>> one that the faster-accelerating M61A2 reduces somewhat. This is
>>> significant in that dogfights frequently permit only the briefest of
>>> firing opportunities, and although a skilled pilot anticipating a
>>> firing opportunity can 'spin up' a rotary in advance, such notice
>>> cannot always be guaranteed.
>>
>> Tony, why have none of the Gatling guns been designed to be "armed"
>> and spun up with the ammunition feed disengaged and "fired" at full
>> rate by engaging the ammunition feed? It seems obvious enough. There
>> are some obvious issues in inertial loads in the ammunition train but
>> a "burst's worth" of rounds could be decoupled from the main ammo
>> tank.
>
>One thing I've not thought of before and that's the gyroscopic effects
>of a fast rotating drum on the directional abilities of an aircraft ?


Which brings up something I've always wondered. Why doesn't the
compressor and turbines of a jet engine have that effect but on a much
larger scale? I imagine the gyroscopic effects of the rotor in an
F110 on an F-16 would be nothing to sneeze at.




>It can't be that much of course or it would not have been used at all. I
>assume that the drum is relatively low mass ?

[Keith Willshaw]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 6 Dec 2003 11:23:25 -0000, "Richard Brooks"
> > wrote:

>
>
> Which brings up something I've always wondered. Why doesn't the
> compressor and turbines of a jet engine have that effect but on a much
> larger scale? I imagine the gyroscopic effects of the rotor in an
> F110 on an F-16 would be nothing to sneeze at.
>

For one thing the modern aircraft have a greater ratio of mass
of aircfraft as a whole to the engine. The PW-200 series
engine weighs in at around 3400lb or rather less that 10%
of the F-16's all up weight and only a fraction of that is rotating.

In contrast the engine of a Sopwith Camel weighed around
300 lbs and was ALL rotating when the aircraft all up weight
was less than 1000lbs.

Then again the control authority of modern aorcraft is higher
and the fly by wire control system can compensate for
gyroscopic forces rather better than a human being.

Keith

[Guy Alcala]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> > On Sat, 6 Dec 2003 11:23:25 -0000, "Richard Brooks"
> > > wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > Which brings up something I've always wondered. Why doesn't the
> > compressor and turbines of a jet engine have that effect but on a much
> > larger scale? I imagine the gyroscopic effects of the rotor in an
> > F110 on an F-16 would be nothing to sneeze at.

It can be a problem at very slow speeds, which is why the Pegasus engine in
the Harrier has its two spools (low and high pressure) counter-rotate.
Offhand, I can't remember if the F100 or F110 do as well, but then a/c like
the F-15 and F-16 are unlikely to spend much time slow enough for it to
matter (thrust-vectoring nozzles can help there). OTOH, the engines for the
F-35 probably have to counter-rotate.

Guy

[Smartace11]

>> > Which brings up something I've always wondered. Why doesn't the
>> > compressor and turbines of a jet engine have that effect but on a much
>> > larger scale? I imagine the gyroscopic effects of the rotor in an
>> > F110 on an F-16 would be nothing to sneeze at.
>
>It can be a problem at very slow speeds, which is why the Pegasus engine in
>the Harrier has its two spools (low and high pressure) counter-rotate.
>Offhand, I can't remember if the F100 or F110 do as well, but then a/c like
>the F-15 and F-16 are unlikely to spend much time slow enough for it to
>matter (thrust-vectoring nozzles can help there). OTOH, the engines for the
>F-35 probably have to counter-rotate.
>
>Guy
>

In general, engined have counterrotating spools for efficiency not gyroscopic
effect. Most Brit engines use thhis approach but it is hell on bearings because
of the higher rotaional speeds. The three spool RB211 is kind of the ultimate
in that regard.

I'd guess that gyro effect isn't really an issue with the airframe guys since
with most engines since the mass is concentrated more in the center of the
rotors instead of in the periphery whless gyroscopic and centrifugal forces are
generated.

From what I recall from my involvement in the F100-220 and F110-100 engines,
the engine bearing and structural guys are the most concerned because of loads
and load paths during throttle transients. Didn't come up during the
airframe-engine integration meetings. Don't recall it as an issue in my J79
flying days either.

My memory is hazy on this but I think the F119 in both the F-22 and F-35
versions does not employ counter-rotating spools either. Now what forces the
lift fan generates to the airframe is a different story I an sure.

Steve

[Tony Williams]

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> "Hog Driver" > wrote:
>
> > If you actually ever get into the dreaded knife-fight in a phone booth, the
> > other guy is going to have second thoughts about screwing with an A-10 when
> > the nose erupts in a huge cloud of smoke well beyond the range he can employ
> > his gun.
>
> Didn't some Warthogs chew up some F-15s in an exercise that way, once?
> Sit in the weeds, wait for the Eagles to get in "close," and gun kill
> them from a couple of miles off...

The problem with a GAU-8/A as a fighter gun is that the weapon and its
ammunition tank are so enormous that the plane has to be designed
around them, and they would use up a substantial part of the internal
volume of a fighter aircraft. Better to go with the Oerlikon KCA,
which fires equally powerful ammo in a much more compact package.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

A few comments on recent posts:

The M61 is an extremely reliable and long-lasting gun. However, the
little 20mm shells only weigh 102g compared with 180g for the 25mm
GAU-12/U, 260g for the 27mm BK 27, 270g for the 30mm GIAT 30M791 and
390g for the Russian 30mm guns. This means that the M61 has to score
many more hits than 30mm guns to have the same effect on the target (I
have read an estimate of around 20 hits needed to bring down a modern
fighter).

This lack of hitting power was recognised by the USAF as early as the
1960s and led to the development of the 25mm GAU-7/A, which was
intended to replace the M61 as the standard fighter gun, and was
planned for installation in the F-15. This fired 200g projectiles for
a considerable increase in effectiveness. However, the advanced,
combustible-cased ammo ran into technical difficulties which could not
be solved in time so the gun was scrapped and the M61 soldiered on.
Its survival for so long can only be put down to the fact that fighter
guns are much less important nowadays with the development of better
missiles, so it hasn't been worth the cost of developing a new one.

More recently, as has been pointed out, the 27mm Mauser was selected
by both of the JSF contenders as providing the optimum balance of
characteristics for an aircraft gun, despite being a foreign design
produced by a country which is not even a member of the JSF consortium
- that tells you how good it must be compared with the home-grown
product.

Incidentally, there is still some mystery about the current situation
- I have it on good authority that GD (given the job of integrating
the BK 27 to the F-35) have proposed using the GAU-12/U instead
(allegedly for cost reasons), but every publication I have seen on the
F-35 still mentions the BK 27. Can anyone point to a definitive
reference?

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Brett]

"Tony Williams" > wrote:
| A few comments on recent posts:
|
| The M61 is an extremely reliable and long-lasting gun. However, the
| little 20mm shells only weigh 102g compared with 180g for the 25mm
| GAU-12/U, 260g for the 27mm BK 27, 270g for the 30mm GIAT 30M791 and
| 390g for the Russian 30mm guns. This means that the M61 has to score
| many more hits than 30mm guns to have the same effect on the target (I
| have read an estimate of around 20 hits needed to bring down a modern
| fighter).
|
| This lack of hitting power was recognised by the USAF as early as the
| 1960s and led to the development of the 25mm GAU-7/A, which was
| intended to replace the M61 as the standard fighter gun, and was
| planned for installation in the F-15. This fired 200g projectiles for
| a considerable increase in effectiveness. However, the advanced,
| combustible-cased ammo ran into technical difficulties which could not
| be solved in time so the gun was scrapped and the M61 soldiered on.
| Its survival for so long can only be put down to the fact that fighter
| guns are much less important nowadays with the development of better
| missiles, so it hasn't been worth the cost of developing a new one.
|
| More recently, as has been pointed out, the 27mm Mauser was selected
| by both of the JSF contenders as providing the optimum balance of
| characteristics for an aircraft gun, despite being a foreign design
| produced by a country which is not even a member of the JSF consortium
| - that tells you how good it must be compared with the home-grown
| product.
|
| Incidentally, there is still some mystery about the current situation
| - I have it on good authority that GD (given the job of integrating
| the BK 27 to the F-35) have proposed using the GAU-12/U instead
| (allegedly for cost reasons), but every publication I have seen on the
| F-35 still mentions the BK 27. Can anyone point to a definitive
| reference?

GD's web site? "The 25mm GAU-12/U system produced by General Dynamics
Armament and Technical Products (GDATP) was recently selected for the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)..."

http://www.gdatp.com/products/lethality/gau-12u/gau-12.htm

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

> The problem with a GAU-8/A as a fighter gun is that the weapon and its
> ammunition tank are so enormous that the plane has to be designed
> around them, and they would use up a substantial part of the internal
> volume of a fighter aircraft. Better to go with the Oerlikon KCA,
> which fires equally powerful ammo in a much more compact package.

Well, for a fighter-only gun, versus the GAU-8, yeah. But for a
ground-attack weapon, the GAU-8 is pretty cool for air-to-air.

(Three times the firing rate, and seven times as much ammo in the plane.)

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>In article >,
> "Hog Driver" > wrote:
>> If you actually ever get into the dreaded knife-fight in a phone booth, the
>> other guy is going to have second thoughts about screwing with an A-10 when
>> the nose erupts in a huge cloud of smoke well beyond the range he can employ
>> his gun.
>
>Didn't some Warthogs chew up some F-15s in an exercise that way, once?
>Sit in the weeds, wait for the Eagles to get in "close," and gun kill
>them from a couple of miles off...

Going slow and turning with an A-10 is about as smart as "turning with a
Zero" used to be in 1942.

Unfortunately, the A-10 doesn't have many ways to prevent an adversary
using energy tactics, and can't do more than dodge and pray in that
fight.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> Going slow and turning with an A-10 is about as smart as "turning with a
> Zero" used to be in 1942.
>
> Unfortunately, the A-10 doesn't have many ways to prevent an adversary
> using energy tactics, and can't do more than dodge and pray in that
> fight.

Actually, the Hog does, if it knows what direction the other guy is
coming from.

Turn into the oncoming fighter, and open fire from a mile or so further
out...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>In article >,
> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>> Going slow and turning with an A-10 is about as smart as "turning with a
>> Zero" used to be in 1942.
>>
>> Unfortunately, the A-10 doesn't have many ways to prevent an adversary
>> using energy tactics, and can't do more than dodge and pray in that
>> fight.
>
>Actually, the Hog does, if it knows what direction the other guy is
>coming from.

That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
suite fitted to the A-10...

>Turn into the oncoming fighter, and open fire from a mile or so further
>out...

Are you keeping your ordnance for this turn? How long does it take to
get the nose pointed at the target while still having time to get that
shot off? (driving your required detection range). How much airspeed do
you have left at the end of it, which has a serious effect on your
ability to escape the wingman? And what happens when you discover the
attacking aircraft was firing a missile, rather than making a gun pass?

If this analysis was accurate, the F-15 and F-22 would be screaming for
27mm or 30mm guns...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Ron]

>Actually, the Hog does, if it knows what direction the other guy is
>coming from.
>
>Turn into the oncoming fighter, and open fire from a mile or so further
>out...

I have been setting up some scenaries with the LO-MAC "Lock On- Modern Air
Combat" Sim/Game,
involving A-10s vs Su27/33, and it often is not too pretty for the Su's in a
head on merge..The A-10s gun does a good job of reaching out and touching
someone :) But if the Su survives that, then the A-10 is at a bad
disadvantage.

Yes I know it is a sim/gam..But it is sure fun to set up and watch.


Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> In message >, Chad Irby
> > writes
> >In article >,
> > "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
> >> Going slow and turning with an A-10 is about as smart as "turning with a
> >> Zero" used to be in 1942.
> >>
> >> Unfortunately, the A-10 doesn't have many ways to prevent an adversary
> >> using energy tactics, and can't do more than dodge and pray in that
> >> fight.
> >
> >Actually, the Hog does, if it knows what direction the other guy is
> >coming from.

First, you're addressing a more "average" scenario than the one I was
talking about (no missiles for the F-15, A-10 ready for the incoming
threat).

> That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
> suite fitted to the A-10...

It's called a "radar warning receiver," and it tells you which direction
you're being radiated from. If the other guy isn't using radar, they're
proabably not going to see you in the weeds at all from any rational
distance.

> >Turn into the oncoming fighter, and open fire from a mile or so further
> >out...
>
> Are you keeping your ordnance for this turn? How long does it take to
> get the nose pointed at the target while still having time to get that
> shot off? (driving your required detection range).

Lots of time, in the case I was originally talking about (F-15s on the
way back from an air-to-air sortie going after an opportune A-10
target). If you allow missiles for the F-15s and no cover for the A-10,
it's a turkey shoot. But we were talking about gun tactics...

> How much airspeed do you have left at the end of it, which has a
> serious effect on your ability to escape the wingman?

Not as such, since the only reason you need a lot of energy going into
this sort of fight is to match someone else with a similar weapon. If
you're up against someone who can blow you out of the sky from a mile or
so further out than your weapon can reach, and who can fly below treetop
level for a good part of the engagement, it's a whole different ballgame.

> And what happens when you discover the
> attacking aircraft was firing a missile, rather than making a gun pass?

Not in this scenario. Sorry you came in late.

> If this analysis was accurate, the F-15 and F-22 would be screaming for
> 27mm or 30mm guns...

....or more bullets. It's a very narrow scenario, and in this case, the
A-10 isn't the helpless target you seem to want it to be.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Tony Williams]

"Brett" > wrote in message >...
> "Tony Williams" > wrote:
> |
> | Incidentally, there is still some mystery about the current situation
> | - I have it on good authority that GD (given the job of integrating
> | the BK 27 to the F-35) have proposed using the GAU-12/U instead
> | (allegedly for cost reasons), but every publication I have seen on the
> | F-35 still mentions the BK 27. Can anyone point to a definitive
> | reference?
>
> GD's web site? "The 25mm GAU-12/U system produced by General Dynamics
> Armament and Technical Products (GDATP) was recently selected for the
> Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)..."
>
> http://www.gdatp.com/products/lethality/gau-12u/gau-12.htm

Many thanks - that wasn't there last time I looked!

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Volk]

> I have been setting up some scenaries with the LO-MAC "Lock On- Modern Air
> Combat" Sim/Game,
> involving A-10s vs Su27/33, and it often is not too pretty for the Su's in
a
> head on merge..The A-10s gun does a good job of reaching out and touching
> someone :) But if the Su survives that, then the A-10 is at a bad
> disadvantage.

I have to get that game myself, but it brings up an important point.
What are the avionics behind the gun? I'd imagine that an A-10 would lack
an accurate a-a mode for aiming its gun. The same thing applies to the
other guns mentioned in the debate. A gun's merits are important, but they
don't mean squat if it's impossible to hit anything with it! The
laser-rangefinders on the latest Russian jets (e.g., Su-27 series, Mig-29
too I believe) stand out as an excellent example of using superior avionics
to make a gun more effective. Anything similar on the Rafale, Grippen,
Raptor?

Tony

[WaltBJ]

20 20mm hits to bring down a modern fighter? Where are they located?
I'd say it would take some pretty selective hit location to place 20
hits on any fighter (well, maybe a Frogfoot) and still have the target
perform at any level close to its pristine capability. Since the M61's
shells are coming in trail about 50 feet apart they will be clustered
- meaning the hit damage will accumulate pretty much in the same area.
Bye-bye wing surface, and now control that airplane! Of course, if the
shot comes in from the six o-clock, the length of the fuselage is
subject to damage. Nowadays a gun shot is so rare that the shooter
will most likely hold the trigger down to see what happens, instead of
the half-second burst most good shooters use in a smooth tracking pass
when firing on the dart target. In that case, the armor may survive
but nothing else will after say 50-150 hits.
Walt BJ

[The Enlightenment]

(Tony Williams) wrote in message >...
> A few comments on recent posts:
>
> The M61 is an extremely reliable and long-lasting gun. However, the
> little 20mm shells only weigh 102g compared with 180g for the 25mm
> GAU-12/U, 260g for the 27mm BK 27, 270g for the 30mm GIAT 30M791 and
> 390g for the Russian 30mm guns. This means that the M61 has to score
> many more hits than 30mm guns to have the same effect on the target (I
> have read an estimate of around 20 hits needed to bring down a modern
> fighter).
>

I suspect it may be possible to fit proximity fuses to 27mm/30mm class
amunition to improve Pk and open up engagement envelope. Los Alamos
Labs developed single chip radars sever years ago and combined with
new explosives and fragmentation methods migh make such munitions
usefull.

Here is a swedish 'radar on a chip' program:
http://www.ek.isy.liu.se/2003/radaronchip/

Also laser beam riding guidence similar to the guided darts on the BAE
starstreak MANPADS missile could be integrated into 27mm/30mm class
munitions.

There have been a number of guided cannon shell projects. The Italian
OTO Malera companies efforts on is 76.2mm cannon (laser beam rider I
think) and then efforts by the USAF for the 105mm howitzers on the
AC130 gunships (laser spot homming to open up range) and USN work on
its 5 inch rocket boosted shells and US Army work on its 155mm
howizers. (GPS and/or laser homming)

Actuators relying on piezioelectric forces working on nose twisting
simplify such shells.

Such development smigh extend the effective range of cannon by a large
amount (out to 3-4 km I suspect) and favour big 30mm cannon such as
the Oerlikon KCA used on the Viggen.

On the other hand a turreted or tail sting 30mm cannon of ADEN sized
recoil firing guided munitions might make possible some interesting
defensive/offensive concepts.

[Urban Fredriksson]

In article >,
Keith Willshaw > wrote:

>Then again the control authority of modern aorcraft is higher
>and the fly by wire control system can compensate for
>gyroscopic forces rather better than a human being.

And assymetric recoil as well I assume, but I think I read
that test firing of the F-22's gun induced yaw, but little
enough that the pilot easily could compensate, which must
mean the FCS doesn't try to.
--
Urban Fredriksson http://www.canit.se/%7Egriffon/
Things that try to look like things often look more like
things than things do.

[Tony Williams]

"Tony Volk" > wrote in message >...
> > I have been setting up some scenaries with the LO-MAC "Lock On- Modern Air
> > Combat" Sim/Game,
> > involving A-10s vs Su27/33, and it often is not too pretty for the Su's in
> a
> > head on merge..The A-10s gun does a good job of reaching out and touching
> > someone :) But if the Su survives that, then the A-10 is at a bad
> > disadvantage.
>
> I have to get that game myself, but it brings up an important point.
> What are the avionics behind the gun? I'd imagine that an A-10 would lack
> an accurate a-a mode for aiming its gun. The same thing applies to the
> other guns mentioned in the debate. A gun's merits are important, but they
> don't mean squat if it's impossible to hit anything with it! The
> laser-rangefinders on the latest Russian jets (e.g., Su-27 series, Mig-29
> too I believe) stand out as an excellent example of using superior avionics
> to make a gun more effective. Anything similar on the Rafale, Grippen,
> Raptor?

I understand that the SAAB Viggen armed with Oerlikon KCA has an
'AutoAim' system which effectively takes over the autopilot and aims
the plane at the designated target to ensure that the gun is properly
aimed. This enables engagement at up to 3,000m in a head-on attack.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Scott Ferrin]

On 8 Dec 2003 10:14:03 +0100, (Urban Fredriksson)
wrote:

>In article >,
>Keith Willshaw > wrote:
>
>>Then again the control authority of modern aorcraft is higher
>>and the fly by wire control system can compensate for
>>gyroscopic forces rather better than a human being.
>
>And assymetric recoil as well I assume, but I think I read
>that test firing of the F-22's gun induced yaw, but little
>enough that the pilot easily could compensate, which must
>mean the FCS doesn't try to.


The would really surprise me as the thing tries to use control
surfaces to account for little bumps and gusts on the runway :-)

[Scott Ferrin]

On 8 Dec 2003 03:59:15 -0800, (Tony
Williams) wrote:

>"Tony Volk" > wrote in message >...
>> > I have been setting up some scenaries with the LO-MAC "Lock On- Modern Air
>> > Combat" Sim/Game,
>> > involving A-10s vs Su27/33, and it often is not too pretty for the Su's in
>> a
>> > head on merge..The A-10s gun does a good job of reaching out and touching
>> > someone :) But if the Su survives that, then the A-10 is at a bad
>> > disadvantage.
>>
>> I have to get that game myself, but it brings up an important point.
>> What are the avionics behind the gun? I'd imagine that an A-10 would lack
>> an accurate a-a mode for aiming its gun. The same thing applies to the
>> other guns mentioned in the debate. A gun's merits are important, but they
>> don't mean squat if it's impossible to hit anything with it! The
>> laser-rangefinders on the latest Russian jets (e.g., Su-27 series, Mig-29
>> too I believe) stand out as an excellent example of using superior avionics
>> to make a gun more effective. Anything similar on the Rafale, Grippen,
>> Raptor?
>
>I understand that the SAAB Viggen armed with Oerlikon KCA has an
>'AutoAim' system which effectively takes over the autopilot and aims
>the plane at the designated target to ensure that the gun is properly
>aimed. This enables engagement at up to 3,000m in a head-on attack.


From what I've read (albeit it was years ago) the KCA hits damn near
as hard as the GAU-8. It just doesn't have the rate of fire.

[Hog Driver]

----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul J. Adam" >
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Sent: Sunday, December 07, 2003 11:52 AM
Subject: Re: Best dogfight gun?


> In message >, Chad Irby
> > writes
> >In article >,
> > "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
> >> Going slow and turning with an A-10 is about as smart as "turning with
a
> >> Zero" used to be in 1942.
> >>
> >> Unfortunately, the A-10 doesn't have many ways to prevent an adversary
> >> using energy tactics, and can't do more than dodge and pray in that
> >> fight.
> >
> >Actually, the Hog does, if it knows what direction the other guy is
> >coming from.
>
> That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
> suite fitted to the A-10...

Well, using AWACS and mutual support tactics, the A-10 pilots are going to
have an idea where to pick up the tally. Once that happens, it isn't the
best 'suite' that is going to win the fight, it's the best BFM to get to the
WEZ.

>
> >Turn into the oncoming fighter, and open fire from a mile or so further
> >out...
>
> Are you keeping your ordnance for this turn? How long does it take to
> get the nose pointed at the target while still having time to get that
> shot off? (driving your required detection range). How much airspeed do
> you have left at the end of it, which has a serious effect on your
> ability to escape the wingman? And what happens when you discover the
> attacking aircraft was firing a missile, rather than making a gun pass?

It all depends upon the situation. Hopefully the A-10 pilot(s) pick up the
tally at least 3 or 4 miles out near 3 or 9 o'clock, coming out of a good
RMD. Then they only have slightly more than 90 degrees to get the nose to
bear. Even with all the ordnance still on the jet, at the most a six to
seven second turn in the A-10 not including reaction lag time. Again,
depending on lots of factors, they may get nose-on in time to hose off a
sidewinder and open up with the gun around or slightly inside 9,000' (no
peacetime TRs to worry about). Most likely it will be a beak-to-beak pass
with the A-10s not getting a shot off, which they will try to drive to a
one-circle if the idiot(s) hang around. If bad guy decides to go vertical,
the engaged A-10 may go with him energy dependant and hose off a sidewinder
to give him sometime to think about, even with an opening Vc. Smart A-10
driver won't continue uphill, instead try to keep tally and get a circle of
hogs going.

If the A-10s get any ordnance off prior to the merge, it might coax the bad
guy into thinking twice about keeping his fangs out. Since the primary A-10
role is to kill them by the bushels instead of one at a time, most A-10
pilots won't hit the emer jett until they get wrapped up with the guy for
180 degrees of turn. Again, situation dependent, lots of 'what ifs' that
you can't know about until you are there.

Or, the possibility exists that he shows up at 6 o'clock and the first
indication is the wingman calls a break turn and chaff and flares. Get the
jet moving, start puking out stuff, and at the earliest opportunity hit the
emer jett. Do best defensive BFM, try to get nuetral or in the best case
reverse or have the wingman schwack him (if the wingman isn't already tied
up with the bad guy's #2).

In answer to your airspeed question, the A-10 will be headed downhill the
entire time to maintain corner velocity, and if he's coming out of RMD, he
should know what's coming so he'll probably be carrying extra knots for the
initial turn at the merge.

The smart A-10 pilot will be flaring and chaffing early and often in
anticipation of that missile shot you are talking about...and keeping the
jet moving.

> If this analysis was accurate, the F-15 and F-22 would be screaming for
> 27mm or 30mm guns...

I think we both know that the possibility of air-to-air gun fighting today
is highly unlikely. Lessons learned from the past would behoove us to have
them on our jets, or in the case of the A-10, use them to really screw up
the bad guys on the ground.

The initial question asked was how multi-barrel and single barrel cannons
stack up, and the subject is best dogfight guns. Just because the A-10 is
built around the GAU-8 doesn't mean it is any less of an effective dogfight
gun, especially with the high rates of turn the A-10 is capable of, small
bullet dispersion over the tac effective range, and relatively high rate of
fire.

ATTACK!

[Hog Driver]

> > I have been setting up some scenaries with the LO-MAC "Lock On- Modern
Air
> > Combat" Sim/Game,
> > involving A-10s vs Su27/33, and it often is not too pretty for the Su's
in
> a
> > head on merge..The A-10s gun does a good job of reaching out and
touching
> > someone :) But if the Su survives that, then the A-10 is at a bad
> > disadvantage.
>
> I have to get that game myself, but it brings up an important point.
> What are the avionics behind the gun? I'd imagine that an A-10 would lack
> an accurate a-a mode for aiming its gun. The same thing applies to the
> other guns mentioned in the debate. A gun's merits are important, but
they
> don't mean squat if it's impossible to hit anything with it! The
> laser-rangefinders on the latest Russian jets (e.g., Su-27 series, Mig-29
> too I believe) stand out as an excellent example of using superior
avionics
> to make a gun more effective. Anything similar on the Rafale, Grippen,
> Raptor?

Superior avionics do not make a superior pilot.

The A-10 uses three different A-A sights, and these sights use pilot inputs
of enemy aircraft airspeed, wingspan, and fuselage length. These inputs are
usually set up pre-mission (they can be set in the air as well, just
time-consuming) and the pilot can cycle through the presets in flight. All
three sights are displayed on the HUD at the same time.

The reason for the three different sights is the required lead isn't
computed by a radar, so depending on aspect (simplified definition:
difference in fuselage alignment between the two aircraft) the pilot must
choose the proper sight to use. It just so happens that if the A-10 pilot
is pulling the proper lead, and is 'in plane' with the target (two of the
three requirements for a gunshot to work), then the proper sight picture
usually develops and the high-aspect and medium-aspect sights will line up
over the target (those are the two most commonly used sights, since your
target will most likely be maneuvering).

Smart A-10 pilot will pull slightly too much lead, open up with the gun,
then ease off slightly on the lead to 'rake' bullets through and reduce
inaccuracies in the sight. Hammer down until the enemy aircraft explodes,
just like you see in WWII gun camera footage.

A-10 pilots who go through weapons school and get to shoot at the dart
(towed target) say the gun is deadly accurate out to the A-A tac effective
range, which is a lot farther than an M61A1. Granted, it's not a
maneuvering target, but it does prove the sight(s) works.

ATTACK!

[Ron]

>Smart A-10
>driver won't continue uphill, instead try to keep tally and get a circle of
>hogs going.

Exactly what one of my Viper friends was faced with, going up against some
Battle Creek A-10s....Never was able to get a shot off


Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

[Hog Driver]

"Ron" > wrote in message
...
> >Smart A-10
> >driver won't continue uphill, instead try to keep tally and get a circle
of
> >hogs going.
>
> Exactly what one of my Viper friends was faced with, going up against some
> Battle Creek A-10s....Never was able to get a shot off

I have some great guncamera footage of an A-10 saddling up on a Viper who
had two full bags of gas and decided to stick with the Hog and slow
down...the A-10 driver was also tuned into the F-16s VHF air-air freq, and
the Viper driver says, "I don't believe it...I'm about to get gunned by a
Hog!" Sure enough, a few seconds later guns-track-kill by the Hog on the
floundering Viper.

ATTACK!

[WaltBJ]

The SUU23 pod gun on the F4 centerline would pull the nose down - the
pipper would start to move down on the target about half a second
after firing began, but it was easily compensated with a little aft
pressure in the stick. I once fired a 3-second burst (doing a little
pre-combat research) beginning at 4500 feet from the ground target
(acoustic scorer) and scored 100 hits. FWIW the pod gun's dispersion
was such that it would make a good 'shotgun' for the
knife fight'. The SUU23's shot pattern was about 8 mils in elevation
and about 10 in azimuth; still a pretty concentrated pattern at 100
yards - the length of an American football field, and a familiar
distance to most US fighter pilots.
The 366th Wing at Danang had an F4E (call sign Chico) with two
wing-mounted SUU23s plus the nose gun. It was hogged by the 0-6s who
took it out on troops-in-contact calls. Would have made a heck of a
dog fighter because you could take any kind of shot with a good chance
of a kill - including those hairy head-on passes.
Walt BJ

[Tony Volk]

> Superior avionics do not make a superior pilot.

Certainly not, but all else equal, they make a superior weapons system!

> The A-10 uses three different A-A sights, and these sights use pilot
inputs
> of enemy aircraft airspeed, wingspan, and fuselage length. These inputs
are
> usually set up pre-mission (they can be set in the air as well, just
> time-consuming) and the pilot can cycle through the presets in flight.
All
> three sights are displayed on the HUD at the same time.
> A-10 pilots who go through weapons school and get to shoot at the dart
> (towed target) say the gun is deadly accurate out to the A-A tac effective
> range, which is a lot farther than an M61A1. Granted, it's not a
> maneuvering target, but it does prove the sight(s) works.

My take on this would be that you're using gun sights that are 40's-50's
era in their accuracy against maneuvering targets. I would think that would
put you at a serious disadvantaged (especially when couple with the lower
a-a training of attack pilots vs. fighter pilots). How flexible would the
preprogrammed sites be for fighting a Viper vs. a Turkey or Eagle (with much
larger wingspans and lengths- or a Mig-29 vs. Su-27)? Also, assuming he'd
be slashing from the vertical, what would that do to lessen the range
difference (his bullets with gravity, yours against?).
I appreciate that a good pilot is worth more than a
super-duper-great-jet, and I also appreciate that there are circumstances
when a Hog could be a nasty opponent. I just think that against an equally
good pilot in a fighter jet, the Hog would be in serious trouble. But
that's just an opinion from an armchair pilot with no time under his ass in
either a Hog or a fighter. Thanks for your comments Hog Driver, they're
most appreciated. Regards,

Tony Volk

p.s.- 74th squadron or not, all Hogs should have shark mouths (or hog
tusks)!

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Hog Driver
> writes
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Paul J. Adam" >
>> That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
>> suite fitted to the A-10...
>
>Well, using AWACS and mutual support tactics, the A-10 pilots are going to
>have an idea where to pick up the tally.

Again, AWACS is situation-dependent, and there's that oft-quoted
statistic about 80% of surviving pilots wondering who shot them down
(tracking that statistic to a source is probably good for a PhD thesis -
anyone up for funding it? :) )

>Once that happens, it isn't the
>best 'suite' that is going to win the fight, it's the best BFM to get to the
>WEZ.

Depends what weapons the assorted combatants brought to the fight: for
many engagements, the A-10 is totally defensive and manoevering against
RWR indications. (Does it have any IRWR gear? It's a natural platform to
get some sort of missile-warning gear over RWR)

Again, for real life this isn't much of a problem because the A-10
operates in total air supremacy and has never had an enemy aircraft ever
get a chance to shoot at it (rendering the preparations of the A-10
crews to fight back untested).

>> Are you keeping your ordnance for this turn? How long does it take to
>> get the nose pointed at the target while still having time to get that
>> shot off? (driving your required detection range). How much airspeed do
>> you have left at the end of it, which has a serious effect on your
>> ability to escape the wingman? And what happens when you discover the
>> attacking aircraft was firing a missile, rather than making a gun pass?
>
>It all depends upon the situation. Hopefully the A-10 pilot(s) pick up the
>tally at least 3 or 4 miles out near 3 or 9 o'clock, coming out of a good
>RMD. Then they only have slightly more than 90 degrees to get the nose to
>bear. Even with all the ordnance still on the jet, at the most a six to
>seven second turn in the A-10 not including reaction lag time. Again,
>depending on lots of factors, they may get nose-on in time to hose off a
>sidewinder and open up with the gun around or slightly inside 9,000' (no
>peacetime TRs to worry about). Most likely it will be a beak-to-beak pass
>with the A-10s not getting a shot off, which they will try to drive to a
>one-circle if the idiot(s) hang around. If bad guy decides to go vertical,
>the engaged A-10 may go with him energy dependant and hose off a sidewinder
>to give him sometime to think about, even with an opening Vc. Smart A-10
>driver won't continue uphill, instead try to keep tally and get a circle of
>hogs going.

Good to hear some of my WAGs confirmed :)

I guess you could describe my position thusly... A-10s engaged by modern
fighters are in bad trouble, but have a few cards to play (low altitude,
high turn rate and large countermeasure magazines come to mind) while
they can give over-aggressive enemy fighters some very nasty problems to
solve.

>If the A-10s get any ordnance off prior to the merge, it might coax the bad
>guy into thinking twice about keeping his fangs out. Since the primary A-10
>role is to kill them by the bushels instead of one at a time, most A-10
>pilots won't hit the emer jett until they get wrapped up with the guy for
>180 degrees of turn.

Do you have options short of "full jettison"? I freely confess that my
flying experience is limited to civil propjobs and computer games, but
does the A-10 have (for instance) any option to jettison A/G ordnance
while keeping outboard pylons (Sidewinders and jammer pods)?

>Again, situation dependent, lots of 'what ifs' that
>you can't know about until you are there.

This is too true, sadly, and imposes all sorts of limits on open debate.

>In answer to your airspeed question, the A-10 will be headed downhill the
>entire time to maintain corner velocity, and if he's coming out of RMD, he
>should know what's coming so he'll probably be carrying extra knots for the
>initial turn at the merge.

Trouble with that is, how do you get that energy back, especially if you
started out low? Bear in mind that if there are enemy fighters up and
flying, their IADS is probably still operational complete with
radar-guided SAMs.

(And, given recent experience, what if the Bad Guys have orders that
"anything you can shoot at is hostile" while their fighters have stern
orders to stay high and fast no matter how tempting the diving target?)

But then, this keeps coming back to Bad Guys who can mount a credible
air threat. Not sure where to find a likely enemy that can seriously
sustain any sort of counter-air operations against the US...

>The smart A-10 pilot will be flaring and chaffing early and often in
>anticipation of that missile shot you are talking about...and keeping the
>jet moving.

Again, that's keeping the A-10 defensive rather than having it turn and
fight an attacking Su-27 or similar... just because
>
>> If this analysis was accurate, the F-15 and F-22 would be screaming for
>> 27mm or 30mm guns...
>
>I think we both know that the possibility of air-to-air gun fighting today
>is highly unlikely. Lessons learned from the past would behoove us to have
>them on our jets, or in the case of the A-10, use them to really screw up
>the bad guys on the ground.

I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
isn't healthy.

>The initial question asked was how multi-barrel and single barrel cannons
>stack up, and the subject is best dogfight guns. Just because the A-10 is
>built around the GAU-8 doesn't mean it is any less of an effective dogfight
>gun, especially with the high rates of turn the A-10 is capable of, small
>bullet dispersion over the tac effective range, and relatively high rate of
>fire.

Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a Light
Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat! Other
than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
enemy, or otherwise cheating...)

One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
into the beaten zone of a machinegun)

I'd hazard that where a credible air-to-air threat might exist then the
A-10's Sidewinder and countermeasure fit becomes of more importance than
its gun loadout, however reassuring the gun is as a weapon of last
extremity.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Alan Minyard]

On 6 Dec 2003 19:49:44 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
>> In article >,
>> "Hog Driver" > wrote:
>>
>> > If you actually ever get into the dreaded knife-fight in a phone booth, the
>> > other guy is going to have second thoughts about screwing with an A-10 when
>> > the nose erupts in a huge cloud of smoke well beyond the range he can employ
>> > his gun.
>>
>> Didn't some Warthogs chew up some F-15s in an exercise that way, once?
>> Sit in the weeds, wait for the Eagles to get in "close," and gun kill
>> them from a couple of miles off...
>
>The problem with a GAU-8/A as a fighter gun is that the weapon and its
>ammunition tank are so enormous that the plane has to be designed
>around them, and they would use up a substantial part of the internal
>volume of a fighter aircraft. Better to go with the Oerlikon KCA,
>which fires equally powerful ammo in a much more compact package.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat proven,
and has a useful rate of fire.

Al Minyard

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Alan Minyard
> writes
>Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat proven,
>and has a useful rate of fire.

Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50" was
a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the MiG-15s
of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
impressive.


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Hog Driver
> > writes
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Paul J. Adam" >

<snip>

> >
> >I think we both know that the possibility of air-to-air gun fighting
today
> >is highly unlikely. Lessons learned from the past would behoove us to
have
> >them on our jets, or in the case of the A-10, use them to really screw up
> >the bad guys on the ground.
>
> I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
> contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
> and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
> Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
> isn't healthy.

Paul, doing away with a tool from your kit without a compelling reason to do
so, along with having a danged foolproof method of handling the situations
that said tool could handle, is unwise. As to air-to-ground use, I believe
the resident Strike Eagle driver has already provided a reason for retaining
a strafe capability, i.e., recent operations in Afghanistan. During Anaconda
the need for up-close-and-personal support (read that as well within the
danger-close margin) was reported. You can't *always* use your LGB's or
JDAM's, which is why the grunts liked the cannon armed aircraft during that
fight. Yes, it brings the air in within MANPADS range--but that is a risk
those guys are willing to accept when the fight on the ground gets hairy
(and thank goodness for that). Arguing that they can't (or never should)
face such a risk is a bit illogical--if all services followed that thought
process, we'd stop issuing rifles to infantrymen because in order to use one
you have to close to within the effective range of the other guy's weapons.

>
> >The initial question asked was how multi-barrel and single barrel cannons
> >stack up, and the subject is best dogfight guns. Just because the A-10
is
> >built around the GAU-8 doesn't mean it is any less of an effective
dogfight
> >gun, especially with the high rates of turn the A-10 is capable of, small
> >bullet dispersion over the tac effective range, and relatively high rate
of
> >fire.
>
> Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a Light
> Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
> mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat! Other
> than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
> enemy, or otherwise cheating...)
>
> One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
> make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
> over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
> sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
> into the beaten zone of a machinegun)

But there are tasks for which that bayonet is oh-so-much better than say, an
M16A2 with state-of-the-art night optics. I saw a fair amount of peanut
butter spread with bayonets; had we had to use our M16's for that it would
have been rather messy. Now that is I admit a rather extreme example, but
again it points out the wisdom of retaining those tools we have even in the
face of longer ranged/more lethal options.

Brooks

<snip>

[Tony Williams]

Scott Ferrin > wrote in message >...
> On 8 Dec 2003 10:14:03 +0100, (Urban Fredriksson)
> wrote:
>
> >In article >,
> >Keith Willshaw > wrote:
> >
> >>Then again the control authority of modern aorcraft is higher
> >>and the fly by wire control system can compensate for
> >>gyroscopic forces rather better than a human being.
> >
> >And assymetric recoil as well I assume, but I think I read
> >that test firing of the F-22's gun induced yaw, but little
> >enough that the pilot easily could compensate, which must
> >mean the FCS doesn't try to.
>
>
> The would really surprise me as the thing tries to use control
> surfaces to account for little bumps and gusts on the runway :-)

I understand that pressing the firing button for the off-centre gun in
the F-16 and F-15 automatically adjusts the rudder to compensate for
yaw.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

"Hog Driver" > wrote in message >...
> "Ron" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Smart A-10
> > >driver won't continue uphill, instead try to keep tally and get a circle
> of
> > >hogs going.
> >
> > Exactly what one of my Viper friends was faced with, going up against some
> > Battle Creek A-10s....Never was able to get a shot off
>
> I have some great guncamera footage of an A-10 saddling up on a Viper who
> had two full bags of gas and decided to stick with the Hog and slow
> down...the A-10 driver was also tuned into the F-16s VHF air-air freq, and
> the Viper driver says, "I don't believe it...I'm about to get gunned by a
> Hog!" Sure enough, a few seconds later guns-track-kill by the Hog on the
> floundering Viper.

Incidentally, a three-barrel lightweight version of the GAU-8/A was
developed, firing the same ammo at 2,000 rpm. It was known as the CHAG
(compact, high-performance aircraft gun IIRC) and would I expect have
been fitted to modern fighters instead of the M61 if the gun had
remained more important in air combat.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

Scott Ferrin > wrote in message >...
> On 8 Dec 2003 03:59:15 -0800, (Tony
> Williams) wrote:
>
> >"Tony Volk" > wrote in message >...
> >> > I have been setting up some scenaries with the LO-MAC "Lock On- Modern Air
> >> > Combat" Sim/Game,
> >> > involving A-10s vs Su27/33, and it often is not too pretty for the Su's in
> a
> >> > head on merge..The A-10s gun does a good job of reaching out and touching
> >> > someone :) But if the Su survives that, then the A-10 is at a bad
> >> > disadvantage.
> >>
> >> I have to get that game myself, but it brings up an important point.
> >> What are the avionics behind the gun? I'd imagine that an A-10 would lack
> >> an accurate a-a mode for aiming its gun. The same thing applies to the
> >> other guns mentioned in the debate. A gun's merits are important, but they
> >> don't mean squat if it's impossible to hit anything with it! The
> >> laser-rangefinders on the latest Russian jets (e.g., Su-27 series, Mig-29
> >> too I believe) stand out as an excellent example of using superior avionics
> >> to make a gun more effective. Anything similar on the Rafale, Grippen,
> >> Raptor?
> >
> >I understand that the SAAB Viggen armed with Oerlikon KCA has an
> >'AutoAim' system which effectively takes over the autopilot and aims
> >the plane at the designated target to ensure that the gun is properly
> >aimed. This enables engagement at up to 3,000m in a head-on attack.
>
>
> From what I've read (albeit it was years ago) the KCA hits damn near
> as hard as the GAU-8. It just doesn't have the rate of fire.

The 30x173 cartridge for the GAU-8/A was actually 'borrowed' from the
KCA, the most obvious difference being that the KCA's ammo is
steel-cased rather than aluminium alloy. The power of the HE rounds is
exactly the same. The KCA was adopted by the USA as the GAU-9/A, in
case the 8A failed (the A-10 would have had two KCAs).

As I've posted elsewhere on this thread, as well as the podded
four-barrel GAU-13/A version of the GAU-8/A, a lightweight
three-barrel CHAG version in 30x173 was also produced, firing at 2,000
rpm. That would have been interesting....

It's worth noting that the current Russian 30x165 ammo isn't that much
less powerful than the 30x173, and they do make a six-barrel rotary,
the GSh-6-30, which fires at 5,000 rpm and weighs only 160kg (M61 =
114 kg, GAU-8/A = 281 kg). If you really want bang for your buck, you
can't do much better than that, but the Russians only ever fitted it
to the MiG-27 for ground-attack.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Scott Ferrin]

>As I've posted elsewhere on this thread, as well as the podded
>four-barrel GAU-13/A version of the GAU-8/A,

I saw a picture once of the original Strike Eagle with three of those
babies on it. :-)




> a lightweight
>three-barrel CHAG version in 30x173 was also produced, firing at 2,000
>rpm. That would have been interesting....
>
>It's worth noting that the current Russian 30x165 ammo isn't that much
>less powerful than the 30x173, and they do make a six-barrel rotary,
>the GSh-6-30, which fires at 5,000 rpm and weighs only 160kg (M61 =
>114 kg, GAU-8/A = 281 kg). If you really want bang for your buck, you
>can't do much better than that, but the Russians only ever fitted it
>to the MiG-27 for ground-attack.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Scott Ferrin]

On 8 Dec 2003 17:50:29 -0800, (Tony
Williams) wrote:

>Scott Ferrin > wrote in message >...
>> On 8 Dec 2003 10:14:03 +0100, (Urban Fredriksson)
>> wrote:
>>
>> >In article >,
>> >Keith Willshaw > wrote:
>> >
>> >>Then again the control authority of modern aorcraft is higher
>> >>and the fly by wire control system can compensate for
>> >>gyroscopic forces rather better than a human being.
>> >
>> >And assymetric recoil as well I assume, but I think I read
>> >that test firing of the F-22's gun induced yaw, but little
>> >enough that the pilot easily could compensate, which must
>> >mean the FCS doesn't try to.
>>
>>
>> The would really surprise me as the thing tries to use control
>> surfaces to account for little bumps and gusts on the runway :-)
>
>I understand that pressing the firing button for the off-centre gun in
>the F-16 and F-15 automatically adjusts the rudder to compensate for
>yaw.

I know it does on the F-16 but I don't know if it does on the -15

[Nele VII]

Wrongo. Mig-27 has elevation-movable GSh-6-23 that uses 23mm ammo (same ammo
of twin-barrel GSh-23 used on MiG-21, 23...) and fires around 7,000-8,000
RPM. The same gun is installed into MiG-31 for AA, carried internally and
deployed on a movable gun-bay when used. What is interesting about this gun
is that it is, although Gatling-type gun, it is gas-operated (don't ask me
how!) and therefore so light. On trials it achieved some 10,000 RPM (!!!)
but it is tuned-down for practical use on MiG-27 and MiG-31.

The -other- Russian gatling gun GSh-6-30 You were talking about is not in
use yet (at least I do not know which aircraft carries it)

Nele

NULLA ROSA SINE SPINA

Tony Williams wrote in message ...
>
>The 30x173 cartridge for the GAU-8/A was actually 'borrowed' from the
>KCA, the most obvious difference being that the KCA's ammo is
>steel-cased rather than aluminium alloy. The power of the HE rounds is
>exactly the same. The KCA was adopted by the USA as the GAU-9/A, in
>case the 8A failed (the A-10 would have had two KCAs).
>
>As I've posted elsewhere on this thread, as well as the podded
>four-barrel GAU-13/A version of the GAU-8/A, a lightweight
>three-barrel CHAG version in 30x173 was also produced, firing at 2,000
>rpm. That would have been interesting....
>
>It's worth noting that the current Russian 30x165 ammo isn't that much
>less powerful than the 30x173, and they do make a six-barrel rotary,
>the GSh-6-30, which fires at 5,000 rpm and weighs only 160kg (M61 =
>114 kg, GAU-8/A = 281 kg). If you really want bang for your buck, you
>can't do much better than that, but the Russians only ever fitted it
>to the MiG-27 for ground-attack.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Ron]

>The same gun is installed into MiG-31 for AA

Talk about optimism!


Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Nele VII" > wrote:

> Wrongo. Mig-27 has elevation-movable GSh-6-23 that uses 23mm ammo (same ammo
> of twin-barrel GSh-23 used on MiG-21, 23...) and fires around 7,000-8,000
> RPM. The same gun is installed into MiG-31 for AA, carried internally and
> deployed on a movable gun-bay when used. What is interesting about this gun
> is that it is, although Gatling-type gun, it is gas-operated (don't ask me
> how!) and therefore so light. On trials it achieved some 10,000 RPM (!!!)
> but it is tuned-down for practical use on MiG-27 and MiG-31.

The only problem is that the GSh-6-23 is *heavy*, running almost 200 kg,
and on the MiG-31 it only has 260 rounds... giving it about two seconds
of full-rate (7000 per minute) firing.

Other than that, it seems like a heckuva scary piece of iron.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

"Nele VII" > wrote:

> The -other- Russian gatling gun GSh-6-30 You were talking about is not in
> use yet (at least I do not know which aircraft carries it)

I saw some references to the MiG-27 using the -30...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Nele VII]

No. My sources are, among others is website "Russian Aviation Museum",
Article from Military Parade July-August '97, Salamander book "MiGs" with a
nice photo of the gun, from what is obvious it is(they are) 23, NOT 30mm
barrel(s).

-30 is the newer gun that belongs to -30mm "family" that includes
single-barrel GSh-301 (MiG-29/Su27), single-barrel 2A42 (choppers) double
barrel GSh 30 (Su-25) and 30K, six barrel GSh-6-30...

Nele

NULLA ROSA SINE SPINA

Chad Irby wrote in message ...
>"Nele VII" > wrote:
>
>> The -other- Russian gatling gun GSh-6-30 You were talking about is not
in
>> use yet (at least I do not know which aircraft carries it)
>
>I saw some references to the MiG-27 using the -30...
>
>--
>cirby at cfl.rr.com
>
>Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
>Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Alan Minyard]

On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

>In message >, Alan Minyard
> writes
>>Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat proven,
>>and has a useful rate of fire.
>
>Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50" was
>a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
>was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the MiG-15s
>of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
>weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
>impressive.

And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.

Al Minyard

[Chad Irby]

"Nele VII" > wrote:

(Top posting repaired)

> Chad Irby wrote in message ...
> >"Nele VII" > wrote:
> >
> >> The -other- Russian gatling gun GSh-6-30 You were talking about
> >> is not in use yet (at least I do not know which aircraft carries
> >> it)
> >
> >I saw some references to the MiG-27 using the -30...

> No. My sources are, among others is website "Russian Aviation Museum",
> Article from Military Parade July-August '97, Salamander book "MiGs" with a
> nice photo of the gun, from what is obvious it is(they are) 23, NOT 30mm
> barrel(s).

....from a six year old article.

Meanwhile, the *current* FAS site mentions the -30 in the MiG.

<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/mig-27.htm>

....along with:

<http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/vvs/mig27-01.htm>

And others.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Tony Williams]

Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>
> >In message >, Alan Minyard
> > writes
> >>Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat proven,
> >>and has a useful rate of fire.
> >
> >Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50" was
> >a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
> >was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the MiG-15s
> >of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
> >weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
> >impressive.
>
> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.

Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

"Nele VII" > wrote in message >...
> No. My sources are, among others is website "Russian Aviation Museum",
> Article from Military Parade July-August '97, Salamander book "MiGs" with a
> nice photo of the gun, from what is obvious it is(they are) 23, NOT 30mm
> barrel(s).
>
> -30 is the newer gun that belongs to -30mm "family" that includes
> single-barrel GSh-301 (MiG-29/Su27), single-barrel 2A42 (choppers) double
> barrel GSh 30 (Su-25) and 30K, six barrel GSh-6-30...

Sorry, but I must disagree with you. It may be that some MiG-27s were
fitted with the GSh-6-23, but the GSh-6-30 is the more common fit.
This is from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era':

"Later the USSR decided that the MiG-23 fighter would be a good basis
for a modern Shturmovik, and ordered a dedicated attack development
that was designated MiG 27. After some debate, supersonic performance
was retained, to enable the aircraft to get in and out of the fighting
area quickly, but the engine installation was considerably simplified.
The MiG 27 had a flat "duck nose" with navigation and attack systems
instead of fighter radar. The lower nose allowed redesign of the
cockpit, with a much better forward and downward view and armour to
protect the pilot. The aircraft also received a system that
pressurised the fuel tanks with inert gas, and stronger landing gear
for rough-field operations. The GSh-6-30 cannon was installed instead
of the GSh-23L.

The MiG-27 is the sole confirmed carrier of the GSh-6-30 (although
there are reports that it has been fitted to some versions of the
MiG-31 and Su-25), a six-barrel rotary gun firing the powerful 30x165
cartridge at up to 5,000 rpm. The vibration and recoil of this potent
weapon caused MiG considerable installation problems. Only 265 rounds
are carried, limiting the firing time to 3.2 seconds. The gun was at
first left totally exposed, but on the MiG 27M later the breech was
given a cover to protect it from debris thrown up by the tires, and
gas deflector vanes were added. On the wing SPPU-22-01 gun pods, with
guns that can be depressed for ground strafing, can be carried."

Incidentally, I don't know where the figure of 200 kg for the GSh-6-23
came from - possibly for the whole installation, but the gun weighs
only around 75 kg. Even the GSh-6-30 weighs only 160kg as a bare gun.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>In article >,
> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>> >Actually, the Hog does, if it knows what direction the other guy is
>> >coming from.
>
>First, you're addressing a more "average" scenario than the one I was
>talking about (no missiles for the F-15, A-10 ready for the incoming
>threat).

Pretty extreme, then...

>> That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
>> suite fitted to the A-10...
>
>It's called a "radar warning receiver," and it tells you which direction
>you're being radiated from. If the other guy isn't using radar, they're
>proabably not going to see you in the weeds at all from any rational
>distance.

Are there no AWACS? And does nobody use eyeball-shooter tactics?

I can easily construct highly scenarios where enemy tanks down attaking
Warthogs with accurately-thrown dinnerware, but that doesn't make
cutlery into a generally useful anti-aircraft munition...

>> Are you keeping your ordnance for this turn? How long does it take to
>> get the nose pointed at the target while still having time to get that
>> shot off? (driving your required detection range).
>
>Lots of time, in the case I was originally talking about (F-15s on the
>way back from an air-to-air sortie going after an opportune A-10
>target). If you allow missiles for the F-15s and no cover for the A-10,
>it's a turkey shoot. But we were talking about gun tactics...

I'm reminded of some of Jeff Cooper's rules.

I'm also considering that if you're engaging A-10s, you'd do so to
maximise your strengths and their weaknesses; which among other things
means staying off their nose.
>
>> How much airspeed do you have left at the end of it, which has a
>> serious effect on your ability to escape the wingman?
>
>Not as such, since the only reason you need a lot of energy going into
>this sort of fight is to match someone else with a similar weapon. If
>you're up against someone who can blow you out of the sky from a mile or
>so further out than your weapon can reach, and who can fly below treetop
>level for a good part of the engagement, it's a whole different ballgame.
>
>> And what happens when you discover the
>> attacking aircraft was firing a missile, rather than making a gun pass?
>
>Not in this scenario. Sorry you came in late.
>
>> If this analysis was accurate, the F-15 and F-22 would be screaming for
>> 27mm or 30mm guns...
>
>...or more bullets.

What's the point of more ammunition, if you can't get into range to use
what you already have?

>It's a very narrow scenario, and in this case, the
>A-10 isn't the helpless target you seem to want it to be.

You misspelled "is", against any sort of capable air opposition.
Fortunately, the A-10 has always operated under air supremacy and
there's no sign of that changing soon.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin Brooks
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
>> contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
>> and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
>> Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
>> isn't healthy.
>
>Paul, doing away with a tool from your kit without a compelling reason to do
>so, along with having a danged foolproof method of handling the situations
>that said tool could handle, is unwise.

Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
jettisoned.

>As to air-to-ground use, I believe
>the resident Strike Eagle driver has already provided a reason for retaining
>a strafe capability, i.e., recent operations in Afghanistan. During Anaconda
>the need for up-close-and-personal support (read that as well within the
>danger-close margin) was reported. You can't *always* use your LGB's or
>JDAM's, which is why the grunts liked the cannon armed aircraft during that
>fight.

Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

>Yes, it brings the air in within MANPADS range--but that is a risk
>those guys are willing to accept when the fight on the ground gets hairy
>(and thank goodness for that). Arguing that they can't (or never should)
>face such a risk is a bit illogical--if all services followed that thought
>process, we'd stop issuing rifles to infantrymen because in order to use one
>you have to close to within the effective range of the other guy's weapons.

More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
soldiers...

>> Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a Light
>> Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
>> mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat! Other
>> than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
>> enemy, or otherwise cheating...)
>>
>> One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
>> make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
>> over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
>> sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
>> into the beaten zone of a machinegun)
>
>But there are tasks for which that bayonet is oh-so-much better than say, an
>M16A2 with state-of-the-art night optics.

True, but how much does a bayonet weigh and what else can you use it
for? I notice that while the bayonet I was issued for use with L1A1 was
strictly and firmly only for fixing to the muzzle and jabbing enemy
with... probing for mines was a grudgingly acceptable alternative. But
Nothing Else! Hence even when I was issued a bayonet I at least had a
good lock knife for utility task.

The other allowable uses of a good stout sharp knife have grown
steadily: I was always amused that the cheap copy of a K-Bar I carried
on my webbing was much mocked at the start of an exercise and much
demanded by the end. Now, bayonets are having their utility as tools
rated as important as their ability to become improvised spears.


But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
fight with, certainly not in peacetime, and I'd certainly not have
bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.

And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes with
as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's length,
so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

>I saw a fair amount of peanut
>butter spread with bayonets; had we had to use our M16's for that it would
>have been rather messy. Now that is I admit a rather extreme example, but
>again it points out the wisdom of retaining those tools we have even in the
>face of longer ranged/more lethal options.

Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for strafing)
and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
close' missions?


Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and leave
station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
negotiable.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> Chad Irby > writes
>
> >First, you're addressing a more "average" scenario than the one I was
> >talking about (no missiles for the F-15, A-10 ready for the incoming
> >threat).
>
> Pretty extreme, then...

Only for a "first day," "first hour" war. But yes, it's odd, which is
why I've mentioned it as such two or three times so far.

> I can easily construct highly scenarios where enemy tanks down attaking
> Warthogs with accurately-thrown dinnerware, but that doesn't make
> cutlery into a generally useful anti-aircraft munition...

If you're comparing forks and knives to 30mm HEI at a couple of thousand
yards, we can tell where your argument has gone.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
> bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

"Hey, Bob, there's a couple of MiGs between us and the base, I'm a
little low on fuel, no missiles, and we've got no guns."

"Better strap one on, then..."

The "missiles will rule" argument is coming back, I see. But McNamara
is still alive and well...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Kevin Brooks
> > writes
> >"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
> >> contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
> >> and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
> >> Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
> >> isn't healthy.
> >
> >Paul, doing away with a tool from your kit without a compelling reason to
do
> >so, along with having a danged foolproof method of handling the
situations
> >that said tool could handle, is unwise.
>
> Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
> still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
> jettisoned.

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?

>
> >As to air-to-ground use, I believe
> >the resident Strike Eagle driver has already provided a reason for
retaining
> >a strafe capability, i.e., recent operations in Afghanistan. During
Anaconda
> >the need for up-close-and-personal support (read that as well within the
> >danger-close margin) was reported. You can't *always* use your LGB's or
> >JDAM's, which is why the grunts liked the cannon armed aircraft during
that
> >fight.
>
> Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
> bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,
aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I believe
the former wins.

>
> >Yes, it brings the air in within MANPADS range--but that is a risk
> >those guys are willing to accept when the fight on the ground gets hairy
> >(and thank goodness for that). Arguing that they can't (or never should)
> >face such a risk is a bit illogical--if all services followed that
thought
> >process, we'd stop issuing rifles to infantrymen because in order to use
one
> >you have to close to within the effective range of the other guy's
weapons.
>
> More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
> soldiers...

No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the CAS
platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope. That is not something we
would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
may have to be accepted. If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
them makes much sense to me.

>
> >> Sure, just as a modern bayonet is a miserable weapon compared to a
Light
> >> Infantry sword (a proper sword that just happened to have fittings to
> >> mount onto a Baker rifle... beat _that_ for close quarters combat!
Other
> >> than by eschewing melee and throwing in a grenade, or shooting the
> >> enemy, or otherwise cheating...)
> >>
> >> One 2Lt Patton wrote the US Army's last swordsmanship manual... doesn't
> >> make swords a useful weapon, whatever the advantages his technique had
> >> over the enemy's _code duello_, if you find yourself trying to use a
> >> sabre against an enemy with a pistol (or, worse, an enemy luring you
> >> into the beaten zone of a machinegun)
> >
> >But there are tasks for which that bayonet is oh-so-much better than say,
an
> >M16A2 with state-of-the-art night optics.
>
> True, but how much does a bayonet weigh and what else can you use it
> for? I notice that while the bayonet I was issued for use with L1A1 was
> strictly and firmly only for fixing to the muzzle and jabbing enemy
> with... probing for mines was a grudgingly acceptable alternative. But
> Nothing Else! Hence even when I was issued a bayonet I at least had a
> good lock knife for utility task.
>
> The other allowable uses of a good stout sharp knife have grown
> steadily: I was always amused that the cheap copy of a K-Bar I carried
> on my webbing was much mocked at the start of an exercise and much
> demanded by the end. Now, bayonets are having their utility as tools
> rated as important as their ability to become improvised spears.
>
>
> But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
> what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
> fight with, certainly not in peacetime, and I'd certainly not have
> bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
> is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
> weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
> rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.
>
> And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
> close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
> you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes with
> as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
> too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
> always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's length,
> so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how effective
it really is in that role)...

>
> >I saw a fair amount of peanut
> >butter spread with bayonets; had we had to use our M16's for that it
would
> >have been rather messy. Now that is I admit a rather extreme example, but
> >again it points out the wisdom of retaining those tools we have even in
the
> >face of longer ranged/more lethal options.
>
> Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
> that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
> light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for strafing)
> and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
> quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR reading
that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.

>
> If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
> the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
> KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
> close' missions?

That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal strafe
capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still *add*
those pods you keep talking about). Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
Mauser 27mm. Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.

>
>
> Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
> get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and leave
> station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
> of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
> negotiable.

We have KC's that refuel TACAIR. If you are talking the CAS mission, which
we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will be
doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what, a
whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon fuel
margine you are likely in deep do-do already.

Brooks

[phil hunt]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 04:51:34 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
>And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
>of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
>Typhoon, is not risky?

How much does a Mauser BK 27 cost, I wonder? I bet removing it would
save them no more than the cost of one plane, over the entire
programme.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

[Tony Williams]

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>
> > Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
> > bolted onto aircraft as necessary.
>
> "Hey, Bob, there's a couple of MiGs between us and the base, I'm a
> little low on fuel, no missiles, and we've got no guns."
>
> "Better strap one on, then..."
>
> The "missiles will rule" argument is coming back, I see. But McNamara
> is still alive and well...

This is from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era':

"Podded guns have the advantage that they don't need to be lugged
around unless the planes are in circumstances in which a gun is likely
to be needed. Like any other piece of hardware, they can be fitted
according to requirements. The downside of this is that you first have
to make sure that the gunpods are available when required, you have to
be psychic to determine when they might be useful, they use up a
hardpoint which would otherwise be available for fuel or other
weapons, they take some time to harmonise – and keep harmonised – when
fitted, and even then are less accurate than integral guns. Gunpods
generate more drag, usually affect handling and are also much less
"stealthy" than integral guns; a factor likely to be increasingly
important as stealth measures are leading to the internal carriage of
all weapons. This solution is therefore very much second best, but it
is better than nothing. The installation of weapons in
purpose-designed conformal pods fitted directly to the fuselage and
intended to be more or less permanent fixtures does reduce or avoid
some of the above problems."

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[John Keeney]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Kevin Brooks
> > writes
> >As to air-to-ground use, I believe
> >the resident Strike Eagle driver has already provided a reason for
retaining
> >a strafe capability, i.e., recent operations in Afghanistan. During
Anaconda
> >the need for up-close-and-personal support (read that as well within the
> >danger-close margin) was reported. You can't *always* use your LGB's or
> >JDAM's, which is why the grunts liked the cannon armed aircraft during
that
> >fight.
>
> Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
> bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Gun pods are great draggy things that really cut in to performance.

> If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
> the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
> KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
> close' missions?

The problem is that those danger close missions tend to be unpredicted
by their nature otherwise we would simply avoid the great majority all
together. And in many cases arming up a plane specifically to fly one
-say in Qatar- and getting it on station -oh, over Afghanistan- is going to
take too long.

[Nele VII]

Tony Williams wrote in message ...
>
>Sorry, but I must disagree with you. It may be that some MiG-27s were
>fitted with the GSh-6-23, but the GSh-6-30 is the more common fit.
>This is from 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era':
<lots of good stuff snipped>

I have nothig to say but to agree with You and Mr. Gustin. I have been on
Indian military site and they also state GSh-6-30 -only one correction-it is
6,000 RPM, not 5,000 (they were licence-building MiG-27M, so I assume they
know better). However, I have also read about problems with the MiG-27 gun
installation (vibrations!), but that gun was GSh-6-23 (sorry I cannot give
reference, the link is dead). I assume that they've tried '23 gun first,
went on short production, but discarded it for more 'docile' 30 mm gun.

GSh-6-23 is installed in Su-24 Fencer and MiG-31. I am surprised that such a
light and powerful gun was not installed in other figters. Its construction
is ingenious-it requires no external power source (gas-operated!), fires
10-12,000RPM (which probably can be reduced) and have a good ammunition.

Nele

NULLA ROSA SINE SPINA

[Urban Fredriksson]

In article >,
Tony Williams > wrote:

>I understand that the SAAB Viggen armed with Oerlikon KCA has an
>'AutoAim' system which effectively takes over the autopilot

But actually only the pitch and yaw channels.

>and aims
>the plane at the designated target to ensure that the gun is properly
>aimed. This enables engagement at up to 3,000m in a head-on attack.

And letting the pilot look at something other when firing.
--
Urban Fredriksson http://www.canit.se/%7Egriffon/
There is always a yet unknown alternative.

[Urban Fredriksson]

In article >,
Scott Ferrin > wrote:

>The would really surprise me as the thing tries to use control
>surfaces to account for little bumps and gusts on the runway :-)

The article in Flight International was quite clear on the
matter with a quote that didn't leave room for
interpretation. I'm still trying to figure out exactly why
it doesn't (if the information is right), apart from the
reason it's not told the gun is fired because that's not
something which happens often.
--
Urban Fredriksson http://www.canit.se/%7Egriffon/
A boundary between the known and the unknown always exists.

[Alan Minyard]

On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>> On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>>
>> >In message >, Alan Minyard
>> > writes
>> >>Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat proven,
>> >>and has a useful rate of fire.
>> >
>> >Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50" was
>> >a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
>> >was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the MiG-15s
>> >of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
>> >weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
>> >impressive.
>>
>> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
>> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
>> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.
>
>Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
>have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
>Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
>weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
>its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
>are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
>20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Al Minyard

[Kevin Brooks]

"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
> On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony
Williams) wrote:
>
> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message
>...
> >> On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:
> >>
> >> >In message >, Alan Minyard
> >> > writes
> >> >>Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat
proven,
> >> >>and has a useful rate of fire.
> >> >
> >> >Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50"
was
> >> >a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
> >> >was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the
MiG-15s
> >> >of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
> >> >weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
> >> >impressive.
> >>
> >> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable,
heavy, slow
> >> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough
to
> >> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the
M-61.
> >
> >Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
> >have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
> >Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
> >weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
> >its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
> >are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
> >20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.
> >
> >Tony Williams
> >Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
> >Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun
range
> you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks

>
> Al Minyard

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
>
>> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun
>> range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
>> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
>> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>
>Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
>accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
>"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
>during Anaconda.
>
>Brooks

The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

1. The M-61, with roughly fifty years of experience is a reliable gun.
It's been modded and carried in a lot of different systems and made a
number of A/A kills.

A.) It doesn't jam. (It is possible, but it definitely isn't
common.)

B.) The the internal gun and several pod variants are linkless
feed. Some pods are link-fed.

C.) Spin-up time is virtually negligible. Consider that in the
F-105, the barrel in which the cartridge was sparked was still
internal, meaning the gun must rotate to the exposed barrel position
before the bullet leaves the barrel. Pass through of unfired rounds
on spin-up/down was usually counted as six. On scored strafe, the
rounds limiter was traditionally set at 150 round. With that, you
could get four or five strafe passes. A good shooter could score 80%
or higher out of rounds fired and every pass counted those six unfired
rounds. That means spin up is virtually instantaneous. Trigger squeeze
to release on strafe was taught to be .5 seconds. Good strafers could
get a shorter burst. Spin up is negligible.

D.) Projectile size/payload is important, but a trade-off.
Yes, a kill with a 37mm hit is more likely than a 20mm hit. But, if I
can't carry enough projectiles to give me a good density or chance to
hit, then the higher Pk is meaningless.

2. Dogfighting, meaning one-v-one maneuvering to a gun kill is a
foolish endeavor. You might wind up there, but you should studiously
avoid it. Once there, shoot and scoot. This isn't an airshow display
and no one but the survivor will recount the aeronautical skill
displayed. Shoot with missiles. Shoot at the maximum range. Get the
kill confirmed by AWACS.

3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion. The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.
It's great for SAR and can be effective on close-in CAS, but it's
better done with an A-10 type system than an A/A optimized platform
(which was what the thread has been talking about.)

E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

At least, those are some of my impressions on the argument.

[Alan Minyard]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" > wrote:

>
>"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
>> On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony
>Williams) wrote:
>>
>> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message
>...
>> >> On Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:29:04 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >In message >, Alan Minyard
>> >> > writes
>> >> >>Much better to go with an M-61 variant that actually works, is combat
>proven,
>> >> >>and has a useful rate of fire.
>> >> >
>> >> >Trouble is, this gets you back where the US was in 1950; the M3 .50"
>was
>> >> >a superb gun in terms of reliability, ballistics and rate of fire and
>> >> >was a thoroughly proven weapon. Trouble is, nobody convinced the
>MiG-15s
>> >> >of that fact, so they soaked up a _lot_ of hits where a larger-calibre
>> >> >weapon would have made the F-86 versus MiG-15 kill ratio even _more_
>> >> >impressive.
>> >>
>> >> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable,
>heavy, slow
>> >> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough
>to
>> >> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the
>M-61.
>> >
>> >Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
>> >have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
>> >Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
>> >weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
>> >its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
>> >are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
>> >20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.
>> >
>> >Tony Williams
>> >Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>> >Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>>
>> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun
>range
>> you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
>> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
>> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>
>Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
>accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
>"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
>during Anaconda.
>
>Brooks
>
In which case an M-61 works quite well.

Al Minyard
>

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Alan Minyard > wrote:

> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
> gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
> ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
> on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

It's funny to hear someone call a gun "unreliable," since the failure
rate for modern aircraft guns is *miniscule*...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun
> >> range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch,
desperation
> >> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
> >> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
> >
> >Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
> >accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
> >"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
> >during Anaconda.
> >
> >Brooks
>
> The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
> opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
> this.
>
> Some points:
>
<snip good info>

>
> 3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The
> question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
> weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
> evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
> NOTHING more important. But:
>
> A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
> aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
> conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.

>
> B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
> snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
> doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.

>
> C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
> accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
> delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
seems to share that view.

>
> D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
> soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
> risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

> It's great for SAR and can be effective on close-in CAS, but it's
> better done with an A-10 type system than an A/A optimized platform
> (which was what the thread has been talking about.)

As to "what this thread has been talking about", this thread has also the
comment, "Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s
that isn't healthy." And the fact is that the majority of CAS missions are
being flown by F-15E's, F-16's, F/A-18's, and most likely in the future by
platforms like the F-35 and even (gasp!) the F/A-22, not by A-10's. See
below for the types of aircraft flying strafe during Anaconda.

>
> E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
> convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
> allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
> emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
> readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

"Then F-15s were overhead and the combat controller was directing them to
the enemy according to my
instructions. I told the combat controller to have the F-15s to strafe the
bunker and have them come in from our right to our left....I told him to
clear them and the rounds hit right by the bunker. I told him to have them
do that over and over again. I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s
and F-16s." (globalspecops.com/sts.html )

Go to Google and search based upon "Operation Anaconda strafe" and you can
find quite a few specific reports.

>
> F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
> early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
> getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
> wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
> payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
> etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Brooks

>
> At least, those are some of my impressions on the argument.
>
>
>

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...

>>
>> The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
>> opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
>> this.
>>
>> Some points:
>>
><snip good info>
>
>>
>> 3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.
>
>When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
>in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
>conclusion of irrelevance.

The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.
>
>The
>> question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
>> weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
>> evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
>> NOTHING more important. But:
>>
>> A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
>> aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
>> conflict since WW II.
>
>That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
>increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
>significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.

The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.
>
>>
>> B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
>> snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
>> doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.
>
>But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
>reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.

It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
conclusions.
>
>>
>> C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
>> accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
>> delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.
>
>And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
>close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
>option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
>we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
>kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
>seems to share that view.

Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
"Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
the right time and the right place.

I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios. I'm not willing
to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
wise.
>
>>
>> D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
>> soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
>> risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.
>
>Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

Prosecution rest time again.
>
>>
>> E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
>> convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
>> allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
>> emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
>> readily available option.
>
>It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
>you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.
>
>"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
>were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
>lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
>the area with guns," said the sergeant.
>(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
the reliability of PGMs.

Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
"winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
out the bunker.

Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
I don't know.
>
>
>> F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
>> early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
>> getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
>> wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
>> payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
>> etc.
>
>That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
>Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
>a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
>flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
>perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
>not arguing that would be the way to go.

Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
resort in modern aircraft.

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>In article >,
> Alan Minyard > wrote:
>> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
>> gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
>> ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
>> on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>
>Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
>early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
>suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

>Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
>gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

"We're not training our crews properly, aren't using our weapons
correctly, and are employing poor tactics that make us very vulnerable"
is much less palatable than "the only problem is the aircraft imposed on
us doesn't have a gun!"

Note that the missiles have improved very significantly since 1972,
while the M61 - though a fine weapon -has had only incremental
modifications.

[1] Stats from "Clashes" by Marshal Michel III
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, phil hunt
> writes
>On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 04:51:34 GMT, Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>>
>>And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
>>of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
>>Typhoon, is not risky?
>
>How much does a Mauser BK 27 cost, I wonder? I bet removing it would
>save them no more than the cost of one plane, over the entire
>programme.

The official explanation follows...

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmpubacc/136/1
011710.htm#note12
+++++
Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
APPENDIX 2
Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Defence Procurement Agency
00-01/62)

QUESTIONS 264 AND 306. BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION NOT TO EQUIP
EUROFIGHTER WITH A GUN

7. Since the introduction of air-to-air missiles, a gun has been
used in an air-to-air role for very close range engagements where the
target was inside a short-range air-to-air missile's minimum range.
Notably during the early years of the Vietnam war, the probability of
kill in short-range engagements of the air-to-air missiles then
available proved so low that the very modest capability of gun systems
added significantly to overall effectiveness. The probability of success
with guns has advanced little over the years[12]. By contrast, the
performance of air-to-air missiles has improved dramatically. Indeed, in
short-range engagements, the minimum range capability and agility of the
missiles that Eurofighter will carry, together with its planned
helmet-mounted sight targeting system, offers the pilot a shot with a
very high probability of success in almost every conceivable situation.
A gun could be seen as a defence of last resort when all the aircraft's
missiles had been fired. However, even then the gun's usefulness would
be severely limited because of the possibility of engagement by missile
armed aircraft from well outside the gun's range.

8. Firing "warning shots across the bow" with a gun is not an
effective means of coercion in modern operations. The cockpit
environment of modern aircraft is such that the pilot is extremely
unlikely to hear such warning shots and would only see them if they were
tracer rounds. The value of such a display against a civilian aircraft
is dubious and against a military aircraft it may well be misconstrued.

9. Against some threats, missiles may be susceptible to
counter-measures employed by the opposing aircraft. However, ASRAAM has
already proven itself against typical current countermeasure doctrines
and is designed to overcome extreme levels of countermeasures. Even
should an advanced hostile aircraft have decoyed Eurofighter's
air-to-air missiles successfully, there is again little benefit in
adding a gun to Eurofighter's armament. If the UK pilot were then to
close on that hostile target to within the range of the gun, he would be
placing the aircraft—and himself—at unnecessarily high risk of being
shot down by the hostile aircraft's own missiles. Moreover, gun systems
are not completely invulnerable to countermeasures, not least because
most depend on accurate radar range

10. As for air-to-ground combat, it is worth noting that the original
European Staff Requirement, signed by the Chiefs of Air Staffs from the
partner nations in December 1985, specifies the gun only in an
air-to-air role. So, even then, experienced airmen in the partner
nations did not regard the gun as a valuable weapon for ground attack.
It remains the view of experts that it is difficult to justify using the
gun in Eurofighter's offensive support role, owing to:

— the risk of collateral damage resulting from the relative
inefficiency of gun firing from a fixed-wing aircraft, especially in
this age of precision-guided munitions, with which Eurofighter will be
armed; and

— the increased vulnerability of the aircraft because the gun's short
range would leave the aircraft very exposed to surface-to-air missiles
and anti-aircraft gunfire.

11. Overall, therefore, it is clear that the utility of a gun on an
aircraft such as Eurofighter in modern operations is questionable. To
perform its roles effectively, Eurofighter's armament should emphasise
not the very short-range capability that a gun would offer, but the
long-range capability to be offered initially by the Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). and later by the Meteor beyond
visual range air-to-air missile.

12. The minimal combat value that the gun does provide is more than
outweighed by the support, fatigue and training cost penalties of
retaining it. Specific disadvantages of the gun include:

— the damaging effects of the shock of its recoil on the electronics
(approximately 4 tons recoil shock 30 times a second);
— the corrosive effects of its exhaust gas;
— the strain which it puts on the airframe, reducing the aircraft's
useful life. (Even the weight of 80kg of ammunition can add well over
half a tonne load at the wing roots of the aircraft when it is subject
to high gravitational pull in manoeuvre. Each aircraft has a finite
design fatigue life. Using up this life much more rapidly would require
us to purchase a greater number of aircraft or to undertake a life
extension programme, the cost and operational penalties of which cannot
be justified by the minimal operational benefits of the gun.); and
— a range of training costs, including the provision of new targets,
the increased demands on the Hawk aircraft towing the targets (which
must shortly be replaced by new aircraft), and the cost of removing
training rounds from the environment.

13. We understand that our partner nations currently intend to retain
the gun on Eurofighter. The American F-14, F-15, F/A-18 all have
internal guns, though the F-117 does not; and the F-22 is planned to
have one. The Russian MiG-29 and the Su-27/31 also have guns as do
Gripen and Rafale. Some of these aircraft types entered service many
years ago when missile technology was far less advanced. However, it is
not currently planned to fit an internal gun to the Short Take-Off and
Vertical Landing variant of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), although it will
be able to carry an externally mounted gun which can be put on and
removed from the aircraft for particular missions.

14. Our assessment remains that, in the future operational roles for
which we require Eurofighter, the minimal value of a gun is more than
outweighed by its considerable associated costs and disadvantages.
+++++



--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>>
>>Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
>>early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
>>suddenly needed guns again.
>
>It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
>comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
>forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
>four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
>MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
>chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
>for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

While numbers tell a story, they can occasionally mislead. USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.
>
>Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
>near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
>but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
>the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
>Rolling Thunder.

I don't know of any instances in which F-4Ds were carrying gun pods
into RP VI during Linebacker. There were lots of external gun sorties
flown in Rolling Thunder.

>Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
>barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
>of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
>despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.
>
>>Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
>>gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.
>
>"We're not training our crews properly, aren't using our weapons
>correctly, and are employing poor tactics that make us very vulnerable"
>is much less palatable than "the only problem is the aircraft imposed on
>us doesn't have a gun!"

Amen! It's much easier to write off a combat loss than to suffer
accidents in training.
>

[Alan Minyard]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:36:08 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> Alan Minyard > wrote:
>
>> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
>> gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
>> ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
>> on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>
>Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
>early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
>suddenly needed guns again.
>
>Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
>gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.
>
>It's funny to hear someone call a gun "unreliable," since the failure
>rate for modern aircraft guns is *miniscule*...

I did not mean "no gun", I meant that the M-61 is quite adequate for the
scenarios that are likely to occur in ACM.

Al Minyard

[Kevin Brooks]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> >>
> >> The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
> >> opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
> >> this.
> >>
> >> Some points:
> >>
> ><snip good info>
> >
> >>
> >> 3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.
> >
> >When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be
included
> >in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
> >conclusion of irrelevance.
>
> The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
> is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
> freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.

Threads drift. FYI, the introduction of the air-to-ground issue was from
another poster.

> >
> >The
> >> question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
> >> weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
> >> evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
> >> NOTHING more important. But:
> >>
> >> A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
> >> aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
> >> conflict since WW II.
> >
> >That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
> >increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
> >significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.
>
> The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
> exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
> hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.

Uhmmm...do you or do you not agree that the air-to-ground role has consumed
the vast majority of USAF (and for that matter USN aviation) missions since
WWII?

> >
> >>
> >> B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
> >> snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
> >> doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.
> >
> >But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
> >reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.
>
> It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
> conclusions.

I'd consider disparate and repeated "anecdotal evidence" of the sort
provided below to be rather compelling. According to what our resident
current Strike eagle driver has posted in a similar thread, the USAF
apparently agrees.

> >
> >>
> >> C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
> >> accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
> >> delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.
> >
> >And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
> >close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
> >option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything
since
> >we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
> >kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the
USAF
> >seems to share that view.
>
> Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
> "Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
> mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
> better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
> it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
> fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
> the right time and the right place.

Mortars have to have a dedicated logistics effort behind them--during
Anaconda that feature was somewhat stretched, from what I have read.
Fortifications in an offensive operation? Hey, survivability enhancement was
one of our primary considerations as combat engineers, but we rarely plan
for such near the LC during an offensive operation--that sort of went out
with the days of scientific seige warfare with its "circumvalation" and what
not. Army aviation assets are great, but as we saw in Anaconda (and during
OIF as well) there are environments where its capabilities are challenged
such that fixed wing CAS provides a better alternative. Yes, we plan for the
use of all of these whenever possible--but maintaining the strafe capability
in the collective bag of tricks can still come in handy.

>
> I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
> the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios.

Agreed. My argument is not that the gun is the paramount, or in most cases
even an "equally important" component of the overall weapons suite, but that
it can be of valuable use in the CAS arena in some circumstances, and that
deletion of gun armament accomplishes little for the loss of some valuable
flexibility.

I'm not willing
> to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
> I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
> cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
> with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
> wise.

Agreed again. Taking the fight into the other guy's "backyard", so to speak,
should only be done when the gain is assessed as being worth the additional
risk. During Anaconda that was a no brainer--the Taliban/AQ folks had not
demonstrated any capability with MANPADS (and there had always been
significant doubt as to the viability of those Stingers we heard so much
about due to the storage limits on their batteries, not to mention their
cooling system for the seeker), so the additional risk was marginal, while
the payoff was reportedly quite valuable, in terms of actual target effects
and, likely just as important, I'd imagine the morale of those guys pinned
down in some shallow wadi under close engagement proabably improved every
time one of the fast movers passed overhead.

> >
> >>
> >> D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
> >> soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
> >> risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.
> >
> >Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.
>
> Prosecution rest time again.
> >
> >>
> >> E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
> >> convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
> >> allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
> >> emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
> >> readily available option.
> >
> >It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder
how
> >you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?
>
> It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
> Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
> Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
> extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
> for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

I have not gotten that impression. Yeah, there was a distance to be covered
(not sure it applied to all CAS assets, as IIRC there were A-10's forward
based in Afghanistan proper rather early, and a couple of airfields located
just north of Afghanistan in one of the other -stans). But there was
apparently a CAS stack of sorts available, which is why these examples of
timely support are evident. I'd be careful about using MG Hagenbach's after
action criticisms of CAS in such a vein.


> >
> >"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
> >were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
> >lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and
strafe
> >the area with guns," said the sergeant.
> >(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )
>
> The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
> of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
> the reliability of PGMs.
>
> Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
> "winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
> please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
> out the bunker.
>
> Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
> for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
> I don't know.

From reading the full account (see
http://www.robins.af.mil/pa/revup-online/2002%20pages/May31-02-all.pdf ), it
is apparent that they went to a rather nasty danger-close bomb effort only
when things were even worse in terms of their situation. What about the
other account? Can you discount it as readily? Or...

"According to the citation, Captain Russell's flight, call sign Twister 52,
made contact with an American ground forward air controlling team that was
taking fire from enemy troops 75 meters away. The ground team restricted
Twister flight to strafe passes due to a "danger close" condition. This
condition meant friendly troops were within minimal risk distances of injury
or death from friendly weapons on enemy locations...Twister flight made six
strafe passes while firing 20-mm rounds from an altitude of 1,500 feet over
the target area. This was well within the threat zone of small arms fire and
surface to air missiles. The ground team reported enemy fire was suppressed
on each pass, but requested more passes to kill steadily increasing numbers
of reinforced Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Out of 20-mm ammunition, Twister
51, the aircraft manned by Maj. Chris Short and Lt. Col. Jim Fairchild,
became the airborne forward air controller and targeted Captain Russell's
jet on four additional low-altitude strafe passes. Due to radio failure,
Twister 51 then passed the tactical lead to Captain Russell's aircraft. With
the ground team's concurrence, Twister flight began employing laser-guided
bombs. The two aircrews attempted to guide each successive bomb closer to
enemy forces without injuring American service members. The aircrews were
able to drop bombs as close as 200 meters from friendly forces."

www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/dec02/02414.ht


Then there is the following from an F-16 pilot who flew some of these
missions during Anaconda:

"When Burt and his wingman arrived, the first words they heard from Slick
01, the ground controller on the scene, were "Danger close, seventy-five
meters." The words sent a chill down Burt's spine. The ground controller
relayed they had two casualties and two critically wounded. Burt made two
passes over the enemy position and emptied all 500 rounds. His wingman then
came in and emptied all his 500 rounds. "We realized how close we were
firing to the helicopter on the ground when we reviewed the cockpit tapes,"
Burt said. Though the F-16 pilots couldn't see exactly where their rounds
were hitting, the troops on the ground indicated that they were getting good
results. With their ammunition spent and the soldiers on the ground still
coming under enemy fire, Burt talked to Slick 01 about bringing in some
heavy ordnance. The enemy's close proximity, however, made a strike
dangerous, even with laser-guided munitions. Burt had to be extremely
careful not to drop his 500-pound bombs too close to the ground troops."

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archives/2002/articles/jul_02/354th/

So it appears there were numerous occasions of strafe missions being
requested from the ground folks.

> >
> >[i]
> >> F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
> >> early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
> >> getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
> >> wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
> >> payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
> >> etc.
> >
> >That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
> >Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities
of
> >a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
> >flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
> >perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you
are
> >not arguing that would be the way to go.
>
> Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
> resort in modern aircraft.

No disagreement there.

Brooks

>
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Chad Irby
> > writes
> >In article >,
> > Alan Minyard > wrote:
> >> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
> >> gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
> >> ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
> >> on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
> >
> >Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
> >early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
> >suddenly needed guns again.
>
> It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
> comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
> forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
> four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
> MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
> chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
> for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
was...

Brooks

<snip>

[Tony Williams]

Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> >> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
> >> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
> >> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.
> >
> >Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
> >have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
> >Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
> >weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
> >its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
> >are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
> >20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.
>
> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
> you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Guided missiles? Now that you mention it, I have heard something about
them - but IIRC this thread is all about guns.

Your post seems to imply that you think that anything bigger than a
20mm is by definition bulky, heavy, slow-firing and unreliable. Well,
lets take the M61A1 as the standard, shall we? It weighs 114 kg, and
is very bulky because there are six barrels which all need room to
spin. Then, because it fires its little shells so fast (and you need
to hit with a lot of them to have the desired effect) it needs a big
ammunition capacity, with a big magazine - much more space and weight.
In fact, the magazine and ammo feed weigh about as much as the gun,
and the full load of ammo typically weighs the same again.

Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
and uses much less space (only one barrel). The ammo is bigger, but
less of it is needed because it's much more effective. For a bit more
weight (120 kg) you can get a GIAT 30M791 which is equally powerful
and can fire up to 2,500 rpm. Both of these guns hit their top speed
instantly, unlike the M61. Look to Russia and things get even more
interesting: the GSh-30 weighs 105 kg and fires powerful 30mm ammo at
up to 3,000 rpm (again, instantly). The little GSh-301 used in the
MiG-29 and Su-27 only fires at 1,500-1,800 rpm (instantly) but weighs
a trivial 45 kg and is tiny by comparison with the M61. If you really
want firepower, then there's the GSh-6-30 which fires the same,
powerful, 30mm ammo at around 5,000 rpm for just 160 kg. I admit that
is heavier than an M61, but it's hardly any bigger and has several
times the firepower.

There is a legitimate debate about whether fighter guns are needed
anymore, given the much improved performance of guided missiles. I am
willing to argue that on several grounds, and am supported by the fact
that despite all the high-tech gee-whizz weaponry used recently in
Afghanistan and Iraq, US fighters were still using their guns in
circumstances where nothing else was suitable. If you're going to
retain a gun, it might as well be the best you can get. The price,
space and weight costs are negligible as a fraction of a modern
fighter.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> In message >, Chad Irby
> > writes

> It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
> comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
> forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
> four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
> MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
> chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
> for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]
>
> Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
> near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
> but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
> the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
> Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
> barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
> of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
> despite the efforts made to fit them)
>
> >Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
> >gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

....and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin
Brooks > writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
>> still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
>> jettisoned.
>
>And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
>of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
>Typhoon, is not risky?

Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
training burden)

>> Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
>> bolted onto aircraft as necessary.
>
>Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,

How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?

>aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
>request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
>and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I believe
>the former wins.

How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
little result.

>> More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
>> soldiers...
>
>No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the CAS
>platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope.

As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)

Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
necessary" is a shaky proposition.

>That is not something we
>would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
>may have to be accepted.

Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
"really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
is now and forever a fixture.

What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?

Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
procure in the future.


>If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
>*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
>issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
>engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
>them makes much sense to me.

What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
unless someone's willing to take some risks.

The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
straight-line path... like a strafing run.

Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
not the best solution to the problem.

>> But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
>> what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
>> fight with, certainly not in peacetime, and I'd certainly not have
>> bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
>> is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
>> weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
>> rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.
>>
>> And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
>> close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
>> you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes with
>> as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
>> too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
>> always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's length,
>> so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?
>
>Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
>bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how effective
>it really is in that role)...

Our SA80 bayonet even has a saw in the scabbard as well as wire-cutting
capability. Like you, I'm dubious about its actual utility. How many
saws does a rifle section need? Why not issue one or two proper saws per
section, if there's a real requirement, rather than give everyone a
folding saw on a bayonet scabbard?

But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
of their main armament?

>> Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
>> that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
>> light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for strafing)
>> and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
>> quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.
>
>Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR reading
>that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
>support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.

The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
hot-and-high conditions.

The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.

I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..

>> If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
>> the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
>> KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
>> close' missions?
>
>That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
>M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal strafe
>capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still *add*
>those pods you keep talking about).

Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?

>Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
>Mauser 27mm.

Interestingly, the F-35 took this approach for some versions. So did the
AV-8B.

>Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
>(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
>say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.

Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.

>> Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
>> get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and leave
>> station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
>> of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
>> negotiable.
>
>We have KC's that refuel TACAIR.

If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.

And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
more time between those absences.

>If you are talking the CAS mission, which
>we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will be
>doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
>thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what, a
>whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon fuel
>margine you are likely in deep do-do already.

How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
stack'? When you're a long way from home, time on station gets to be
important, because so much of the sortie and your fuel load gets eaten
up in "getting there" and "getting home". (CAP experience in the
Falklands comes to mind, where that sort of fuel could double on-station
time)

I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
you've also got something badly wrong.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>In article >,
> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>...and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
>You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

(Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

>For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
>meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
>run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
>fighters and bombers went over.

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

>One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
>were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Ed Rasimus
> writes
>On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:
>>It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
>>comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
>>forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
>>four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
>>MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
>>chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
>>for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]
>
>While numbers tell a story, they can occasionally mislead.

Of course - these are broad strokes, and I know enough to know there's a
lot of detail I've missed.

>USAF to USN
>comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
>conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
>would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
>resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
very clear questions.

>With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
>specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
>herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
>on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
personal interest rather than a funded study :)

>>Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
>>barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
>>of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
>>despite the efforts made to fit them)
>
>It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
>as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
>The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
>tour" policy impacted the competence level.

Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

(Smiley for the humour impaired)

Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
fighters don't have guns".

>The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
>TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
>the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
>and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
satisfactory answer?

The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
results achieved, compared to the other variables..


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:40:10 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>In message >, Ed Rasimus
> writes
>>On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>>USAF to USN
>>comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
>>conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
>>would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
>>resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.
>
>I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
>very clear questions.
>
>>With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
>>specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
>>herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
>>on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.
>
>True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
>enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

I'd say that the effectiveness of the enemy defenses greatly reduced
by the AF specialization and packages. The losses/sortie difference
between '66/'67 and '72 were significant. Let's not get too tightly
wrapped around the MiG axle. The core of the defense was integrated
AAA and SA-2. MiGs were a factor, but relatively a small one. In
Linebacker, if MiGs got airborne, they generally died. (Or, they never
engaged.)
>
>However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
>any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
>vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
>by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
>personal interest rather than a funded study :)

The "relative vulnerability" to MiGs isn't demonstrated by loss
ratios, because the mission wasn't to sweep the skies of enemy
aircraft. Our mission was to deliver iron on targets. The MiGs mission
was to prevent that. While we all wanted to get a MiG, there weren't
enough to go around. And while the MiG pilots had the more agile
aircraft, their mission was to deter the bomb droppers.
>
>>>Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
>>>barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
>>>of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
>>>despite the efforts made to fit them)
>>
>>It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
>>as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
>>The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
>>tour" policy impacted the competence level.
>
>Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
>its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
>from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

Sorry, not true. During the period of Rolling Thunder, the greater
number of sorties were flown into MiG country by gun-equipped F-105s
(and on the Navy side, A-4, A-7 and F-8). By the time of Linebacker,
there were more F-4Es involved in the Pack VI missions than D's. If
anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should have
been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion,
indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns.
>
>Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
>a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
>justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
>chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
>certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
>fighters don't have guns".

Personnel policies and the related errors in applying them, are
background to the tactics issues. Clearly the issue can be traced in
USAF all the way back to the decision in the late '50's to go with
single-track "all jet" pilot training and the assumption of a
universally assignable pilot. The Navy used prop aircraft for primary
training continually and multi-tracking to get dedicated F/A, heavy
and helo pilots. Check USAF today---introducing a prop for primary and
multi-tracking. Score: USN 1/USAF 0!!
>
>>The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
>>TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
>>the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
>>and negate the requirement to close to gun range.
>
>Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
>Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
>nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
>guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
>satisfactory answer?

I argue that "lack of guns" is not the reason for poor kill ratios.
The F-4E "arrived" in 1968--nearly four full years before Linebacker
commenced. In 150 missions into North Vietnam, I only went twice
without a gun (flying a deployed F-4D from the 35th TFS in Korea
during September of '72.) Every other time I had a gun, either in the
F-105D or F-4E. I should note that in all of those sorties, I never
once had an occasion to fire the gun at another aircraft. Never came
close. Never dispatched an A/A missile either. Several times came
close.
>
>The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
>having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
>were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
>results achieved, compared to the other variables..

Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well
beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue
for guns on fighters.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
>predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
>MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
>dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
>SAMs.

Break the image of B-17 "box" out of Linebacker stories. Pod roll-ins
were a tactic in late '67, but totally abandoned in Linebacker. Bomb
droppers flew in flights of four with independent target area tactics
and roll-ins.
>
>Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
>sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
>chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Think integrated force (albeit first modern generation). Escort
sections are supposed to be counter-air. We didn't have AWACS, but we
got situation update from a lot of outside-the-flight sources.
>

>>One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
>>were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.
>
>This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
>flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
>Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
>guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

In Linebacker the USAF was carrying AIM-9E and J. Never encountered a
"G". The F-4E only carried heaters when specifically tasked A/A. (We
did not yet have the shoulder mount for AIM-9 on inboard pylons.)
Given an A/A load in an E, the first weapon employed for most of us
would be AIM-9.

[Chad Irby]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
> intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
> aim?

Very few, which is why they needed weapons of different types. Like
missiles and guns.

> Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
> sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe

And all the missiles won't help much in this case, either.

> and won't help you chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Actually, that's *exactly* what it would do, if you're out of missiles.

> >For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
> >meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
> >run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
> >fighters and bombers went over.
>
> So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
> I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

If you want to find that out, find it yourself. *You're* the one who
wants that data. Let us know how it goes. Until you do, that other
comparison is still pretty useless.

> >One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
> >were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.
>
> This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
> flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
> Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
> guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Even carrying four and four (on the Phantom), that gives you only four
long range shots and four short range shots. In Vietnam, it was a
fairly sharp distinction, since the Sparrow kinda sucked at short range.

Once those are gone, you're done. No more shots, go home or fly around
and hope nobody shows up.

And what do you do if something goes wrong with your radar, or if you're
in the middle of a dogfight with a bunch of your guys and a bunch of
other guys (we still lose fighters to fratricide from radar and IR
missiles, you know)?

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
> a complete and satisfactory answer?

It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."

It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
bloody useful."

We learned that lesson over 30 years ago, and a whole new generation of
bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> If anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should
> have been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion,
> indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns.

During the Linebacker time period, the Navy aircraft spent a lot of time
dropping mines and hitting coastal targets, which reduced their exposure
to the serious SAM defenses.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Thomas Schoene]

Tony Williams wrote:

> Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
> BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
> and uses much less space (only one barrel).

Of course, the BK27 was then abandoned by Lockheed Martin after the JSF
source selection and replaced by a 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling gun.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Ron]

>> This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
>> flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
>> Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
>> guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?
>
>They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
>missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
>discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Especially when over 50 sparrows in a row once did not achieve a hit during
Vietnam..

Granted probably some of those shots were not in the right parameters....but
still...


Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Kevin
> Brooks > writes
> >"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
> >> still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
> >> jettisoned.
> >
> >And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it
because
> >of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the
RAF
> >Typhoon, is not risky?
>
> Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
> certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
> capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
> seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
> training burden)

The training burden? For gosh sakes, you already have to have armorers, and
I doubt that including a periodic requirement for the pilots to do some
range work would be that great a burden--it is after all what they do during
peacetime.

>
> >> Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
> >> bolted onto aircraft as necessary.
> >
> >Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,
>
> How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?

Apparently a pretty decent one including F-15E's, F-16's, and A-10's as
well, from what I have read of the reports on Anaconda.

>
> >aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
> >request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
> >and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I
believe
> >the former wins.
>
> How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
> judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
> in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
> and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
> help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
> little result.

Actually, one senior US Army commander *did* sort of hammer the CAS effort
after-the-fact, though not specifically directed at the strafe operations.
Some of his comments were valid, and some were likely as not an attempt to
shovel off blame that he should have borne on his own shoulders. As to
effect, the reports I read varied, with some indicating that in some
instances they ended up having to resort to using PGM's a lot closer than
they originally cared to in order to finally destroy the target (and in at
least one case that almost literally "blew up in their face", so to speak,
yielding a quick, "you almost got us with that last bomb" from the CCT). I
recall two reports indicated that the strafes were on target and at least
suppressed the bad guys (and sometimes suppression is the best you can hope
for).

>
> >> More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
> >> soldiers...
> >
> >No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the
CAS
> >platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope.
>
> As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
> fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
> effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
> aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
> out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)

Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is
it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda
participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. Imagine a scenario
where the bad guy has a better MANPADS capability and you are stuck in a
similar (daytime) situation--which would you rather commit to making
strafing runs to suppress the bad guys, fast-movers or that AC-130? If you
are as concerned about risk as you claim, you know what the answer to that
one is.

>
> Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
> available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
> necessary" is a shaky proposition.

Better than, "This was not available, so it could not be used, and we lost a
lot of guys", IMO.

>
> >That is not something we
> >would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
> >may have to be accepted.
>
> Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
> "really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
> and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
> low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
> on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
> is now and forever a fixture.

OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a
participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to
*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide
available to be tried first? I wouldn't.

>
> What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
> Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
> different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
> option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?

For gosh sakes, Paul, we are talking a real world example where the M61 was
their best hope, at least initially. They did not have arty tubes in place
to support them, they had *very* limited mortar support (and too many
simultaneous targets to engage even had they had more available), a very
difficult ammo resupply situation, and lots of bad guys very much
up-close-and-personal to deal with. Now hopefully this was the exception to
the rule, but we all know that plans start going south *before* you cross
the LD and the LC is at best a prediction in many operations, so having that
air-to-ground gunnery asset in the toolbag is a way of ensuring maximum
flexibility.

>
> Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
> existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
> procure in the future.

So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well
as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that
will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find
itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and
STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?

>
>
> >If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
> >*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
> >issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
> >engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
> >them makes much sense to me.
>
> What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
> serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
> unless someone's willing to take some risks.

Taking risks is inherent to military operations. METT-T rules, and the
commanders get paid to weigh those risks versus gains. If you are claiming
otherwise, then thank goodness our fathers who fought in WWII did not take
that view.

>
> The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
> possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
> They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
> straight-line path... like a strafing run.

No, they are even more lethal to that guy flying the AC-130, or to those
guys flying the cargo helos in to haul all those mortar and arty rounds that
you would prefer we use exclusively.

>
> Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
> a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
> not the best solution to the problem.

I'd imagine had you been with those guys from the 10th LID who were so happy
to get those strafing runs you'd have a slightly different view of the value
of retaining that capability, as distasteful as having to resort to its use
may be.

>
> >> But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
> >> what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
> >> fight with, certainly not in peacetime, nd I'd certainly not have
> >> bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
> >> is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
> >> weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
> >> rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.
> >>
> >> And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
> >> close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
> >> you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes
with
> >> as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
> >> too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
> >> always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's
length,
> >> so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?
> >
> >Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
> >bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how
effective
> >it really is in that role)...
>
> Our SA80 bayonet even has a saw in the scabbard as well as wire-cutting
> capability. Like you, I'm dubious about its actual utility. How many
> saws does a rifle section need? Why not issue one or two proper saws per
> section, if there's a real requirement, rather than give everyone a
> folding saw on a bayonet scabbard?
>
> But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
> line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
> Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
> a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
> themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
> significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
> load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
> of their main armament?

Not if their main armamnet was incapable of handling the situation that
arose. That is the difference, when viewed against the Anaconda model. Had
you taken up that M61 space and crammed a few new radios, or another few
pounds of fuel onboard, it would still not have allowed those CAS aircraft
to do what they were *there* to do, which was support the troops engaged, no
matter how close the separation of the two combatants. With the M61's they
did that.

>
> >> Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
> >> that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
> >> light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for
strafing)
> >> and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
> >> quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.
> >
> >Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR
reading
> >that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
> >support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.
>
> The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
> five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
> was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
> hot-and-high conditions.

Those AH-64's were indeed getting hammered--but because they hung around and
continued to press home repeated gun runs against the critical targets. How
many AH-64 crews were lost? None. How many lives did they save on the
ground? We'll never know.

>
> The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
> fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.

They wanted fire that would not also kill them in the bargain, which is why
they repeatedly *requested* strafe, again and again. In some cases they
later resorted to using LGB's, with the curious methos of walking them in as
if they were conventional rounds, from what I could decypher. And yet they
still continued to request gun runs...wonder why?

>
> I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
> coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
> available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
> without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..

Yep, and what was available that day (or days, as IIRC this lasted well into
the next day) was CAS, and what those soldiers kept asking for from the CAS
was guns, at least in the early stages. Tells me they liked the guns.

>
> >> If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
> >> the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
> >> KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
> >> close' missions?
> >
> >That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
> >M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal
strafe
> >capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still
*add*
> >those pods you keep talking about).
>
> Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
> tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
> Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
> emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
> into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?

It is not that important an issue. The fact is that all of the incoming
aircraft we will be fighting with in the foreseeable future, minus the STOVL
version of the F-35, have guns included in their armament suites. I say
great, keep 'em and keep that flexibility they give us.

>
> >Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
> >Mauser 27mm.
>
> Interestingly, the F-35 took this approach for some versions. So did the
> AV-8B.
>
> >Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
> >(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
> >say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.
>
> Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
> internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.

From what I gather that was dictated by the addition of the STOVL
capability, which necessitates making room for the lift fan, etc.

>
> >> Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
> >> get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and
leave
> >> station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
> >> of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
> >> negotiable.
> >
> >We have KC's that refuel TACAIR.
>
> If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
> I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.
>
> And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
> breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
> more time between those absences.

Those absences are kind of meaningless if the alternative is another couple
of circuits with an arament suite that does not allow you to serve the
customers down below, aren't they? I doubt the groundpounder down below who
is in a situation where his options are such that he wants a strafe/can't
risk even a PGM is going to be very relieved by the knowledge that his CAS
stack can do a few more circles without being able to actually handle his
request.

>
> >If you are talking the CAS mission, which
> >we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will
be
> >doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
> >thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what,
a
> >whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon
fuel
> >margine you are likely in deep do-do already.
>
> How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
> stack'?


It does NOT matter if that CAS asset can't conduct the kind of attack you
need!

When you're a long way from home, time on station gets to be
> important, because so much of the sortie and your fuel load gets eaten
> up in "getting there" and "getting home". (CAP experience in the
> Falklands comes to mind, where that sort of fuel could double on-station
> time)
>
> I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
> so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
> you've also got something badly wrong.

You just don't get it, do you? "**** happens" in combat, and flexibility is
what allows you to adjust. having that aerial gun option is a tool for
flexibility. If you don't want that flexibility, fine, but the
powers-that-be here in the US seem to consider it worthwhile, as evidenced
by the recent comments from our resident Strike Eagle pilot in another
similar thread of late. I'll side with the "more tools are better than less
when dealing with uncertainty" side of the house.

Brooks

[Scott Ferrin]

>Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well
>beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue
>for guns on fighters.
>


Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.

[Paul F Austin]

"Chad Irby" wrote
> "Paul J. Adam" wrote:
>
> > If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
> > a complete and satisfactory answer?
>
> It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."
>
> It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
> bloody useful."
>
> We learned that lesson over 30 years ago, and a whole new generation of
> bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
> McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...

Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no idea
about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1, 2
or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?

There's always a lip-curl reflex about "bean counters" but every time you
make a choice, you've rejected an alternative. There's money, weight, volume
and time budgets because all of those are fungible, exchangeable among the
possible choices.

Remove a gun and save money? Sure, but you spend that money, space, power
and weight for something else, possibly more ordnance of a different kind.
Or maybe not. Maybe more volume for better ESM or countermeasures or a lower
crap-out rate for your RADAR.

The guy who straps on the airplane (which I will never do) has to live with
those choices and he may curse the "bean counters" who made them but every
single characteristic (not just gun/no gun) within a weapons system competes
with some other alternative. The payoff for some of these trades isn't
always as obvious as a tank full of cannon rounds but it's there.

[Tony Williams]

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message et>...
> Tony Williams wrote:
>
> > Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
> > BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
> > and uses much less space (only one barrel).
>
> Of course, the BK27 was then abandoned by Lockheed Martin after the JSF
> source selection and replaced by a 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling gun.

I understand that was at the initiative of GD, who happened to be
given the contract for designing the JSF's BK 27 gun installation and
also just happen to make the GAU-12/U (shouldn't they have declared an
interest, or something?) .....their argument was on cost grounds, not
quality (and I suspect they may have received a sympathetic hearing in
favour of a US gun rather than a German one, especially post-Iraq).
The BK 27 was originally selected purely on merit.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

> Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no idea
> about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1, 2
> or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?

It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a big
automated missile launcher in them.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Alan Minyard]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 20:39:49 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" > wrote:

>
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> In message >, Chad Irby
>> > writes
>> >In article >,
>> > Alan Minyard > wrote:
>> >> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
>> >> gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
>> >> ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
>> >> on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>> >
>> >Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
>> >early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
>> >suddenly needed guns again.
>>
>> It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
>> comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
>> forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
>> four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
>> MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
>> chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
>> for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]
>
>Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
>analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
>era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
>the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
>succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
>was...
>
>Brooks
>
><snip>
>
OR has been in use since WWII, when it was used to determine such things
as the parameters of an "ideal" depth charge attack. It was quite effective
at the time, and still is. I certainly have no love of McN, he did an amazing
amount of damage to the US Military (the term "McNamara's Nightmare"
was applied to *numerous* systems).

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 10 Dec 2003 12:56:12 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>> On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>
>> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>> >> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
>> >> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
>> >> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.
>> >
>> >Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
>> >have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
>> >Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
>> >weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
>> >its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
>> >are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
>> >20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.
>>
>> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
>> you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
>> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
>> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>
>Guided missiles? Now that you mention it, I have heard something about
>them - but IIRC this thread is all about guns.
>
>Your post seems to imply that you think that anything bigger than a
>20mm is by definition bulky, heavy, slow-firing and unreliable. Well,
>lets take the M61A1 as the standard, shall we? It weighs 114 kg, and
>is very bulky because there are six barrels which all need room to
>spin. Then, because it fires its little shells so fast (and you need
>to hit with a lot of them to have the desired effect) it needs a big
>ammunition capacity, with a big magazine - much more space and weight.
>In fact, the magazine and ammo feed weigh about as much as the gun,
>and the full load of ammo typically weighs the same again.
>
>Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
>BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders

That has changed. The Mouser is out.

>, weighs 100 kg
>and uses much less space (only one barrel). The ammo is bigger, but
>less of it is needed because it's much more effective.

And I suppose that you have verifiable combat records to support this??

> For a bit more
>weight (120 kg) you can get a GIAT 30M791 which is equally powerful
>and can fire up to 2,500 rpm. Both of these guns hit their top speed
>instantly, unlike the M61.

The spin up of the M-61 is so minor as to not be an issue, ask the
people who have used them.

> Look to Russia and things get even more
>interesting:

If you consider bankruptcy interesting.

> the GSh-30 weighs 105 kg and fires powerful 30mm ammo at
>up to 3,000 rpm (again, instantly). The little GSh-301 used in the
>MiG-29 and Su-27 only fires at 1,500-1,800 rpm (instantly) but weighs
>a trivial 45 kg and is tiny by comparison with the M61. If you really
>want firepower, then there's the GSh-6-30 which fires the same,
>powerful, 30mm ammo at around 5,000 rpm for just 160 kg. I admit that
>is heavier than an M61, but it's hardly any bigger and has several
>times the firepower.

There is no evidence that it works, much less its firepower, accuracy, etc.

>
>There is a legitimate debate about whether fighter guns are needed
>anymore, given the much improved performance of guided missiles. I am
>willing to argue that on several grounds, and am supported by the fact
>that despite all the high-tech gee-whizz weaponry used recently in
>Afghanistan and Iraq, US fighters were still using their guns in
>circumstances where nothing else was suitable. If you're going to
>retain a gun, it might as well be the best you can get. The price,
>space and weight costs are negligible as a fraction of a modern
>fighter.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Your anti-US bias is noted. The best is the M-61.

Al Minyard

[Kevin Brooks]

"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 20:39:49 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" >
wrote:
>
> >
> >"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> In message >, Chad Irby
> >> > writes
> >> >In article >,
> >> > Alan Minyard > wrote:
> >> >> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get
into
> >> >> gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
> >> >> ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
> >> >> on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
> >> >
> >> >Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
> >> >early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
> >> >suddenly needed guns again.
> >>
> >> It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
> >> comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
> >> forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
> >> four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
> >> MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
> >> chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
> >> for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]
> >
> >Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or
systems
> >analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
> >era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves
of
> >the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only
partially
> >succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as
it
> >was...
> >
> >Brooks
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> OR has been in use since WWII, when it was used to determine such things
> as the parameters of an "ideal" depth charge attack. It was quite
effective
> at the time, and still is.

But it was taken waaay too far by the McNamara crowd, who felt that all
things were quantifiable by numbers, and numbers were more important than
actual results.

I certainly have no love of McN, he did an amazing
> amount of damage to the US Military (the term "McNamara's Nightmare"
> was applied to *numerous* systems).

Not to mention his micromanagement in Vietnam, and his later published
fandango about his involvement in the decisionmaking that went into that
conflict.

Brooks

>
> Al Minyard

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
.. .
>
> "Chad Irby" wrote
> > "Paul J. Adam" wrote:
> >
> > > If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
> > > a complete and satisfactory answer?
> >
> > It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."
> >
> > It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
> > bloody useful."
> >
> > We learned that lesson over 30 years ago, and a whole new generation of
> > bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
> > McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...
>
> Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no idea
> about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1, 2
> or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?

Given that the lieklihood of us facing a credible air-to air threat is
receding, and advanced fighters alreay have a rather decent basic loadout of
AAM's, I'd think that you are better off with the gun and the additional
versatility/flexibility it accords versus a few more AAM's that don't add
anything to the aircraft's ability to react to unexpected circumstances.

Brooks

>
> There's always a lip-curl reflex about "bean counters" but every time you
> make a choice, you've rejected an alternative. There's money, weight,
volume
> and time budgets because all of those are fungible, exchangeable among the
> possible choices.
>
> Remove a gun and save money? Sure, but you spend that money, space, power
> and weight for something else, possibly more ordnance of a different kind.
> Or maybe not. Maybe more volume for better ESM or countermeasures or a
lower
> crap-out rate for your RADAR.
>
> The guy who straps on the airplane (which I will never do) has to live
with
> those choices and he may curse the "bean counters" who made them but every
> single characteristic (not just gun/no gun) within a weapons system
competes
> with some other alternative. The payoff for some of these trades isn't
> always as obvious as a tank full of cannon rounds but it's there.
>
>

[Jake McGuire]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
> Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is
> it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
> get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
> interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda
> participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
> AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
> those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support.

It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
passes before he's out of ammunition.

> OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a
> participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
> *seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to
> *your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide
> available to be tried first? I wouldn't.

There is a good point buried in here - namely that minimum
friendly-target distance is an important figure-of-merit for CAS
weaponry. It might also be true that the M61 is the best existing
fighter-mounted weapon by that standard. Your mistake is to assume
that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
then it's always possible to develop something better.

> So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well
> as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that
> will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find
> itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and
> STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?

Depends on what weapons they're carrying. If they have a pair of 2000
pound JDAMs each, probably not. If they've each got 12 SDBs and 38
laser-guided 70mm rockets, then that's a very different story. And in
that case, having STOVL in the case of the JSF or another 15 minutes
on station or another 4 SDBs in the case of the Eurofighter are both
probably more valuable than the three or four strafing runs you get
from a gun.

-jake

[Alan Minyard]

On 11 Dec 2003 05:45:39 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message et>...
>> Tony Williams wrote:
>>
>> > Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
>> > BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
>> > and uses much less space (only one barrel).
>>
>> Of course, the BK27 was then abandoned by Lockheed Martin after the JSF
>> source selection and replaced by a 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling gun.
>
>I understand that was at the initiative of GD, who happened to be
>given the contract for designing the JSF's BK 27 gun installation and
>also just happen to make the GAU-12/U (shouldn't they have declared an
>interest, or something?) .....their argument was on cost grounds, not
>quality (and I suspect they may have received a sympathetic hearing in
>favour of a US gun rather than a German one, especially post-Iraq).
>The BK 27 was originally selected purely on merit.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.

Al Minyard

[Kevin Brooks]

"Jake McGuire" > wrote in message
om...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
>...
> > Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem,
is
> > it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat
element)
> > get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it
is
> > interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the
Anaconda
> > participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
> > AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
> > those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support.
>
> It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
> support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
> support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
> with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
> not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
> passes before he's out of ammunition.

Well, you kind of snipped away the related bit about the scenario where you
are well within danger-close and under a significant MANPADS threat during
daytime, which sort of eliminates the AC-130 from the running. The point
was that the groundpounders found the guns a better starting point for CAS
during that operation than PGM's. Are you claiming that the 10th LID and
101st AASLT DIV folks did not like getting that 20mm strafe support they
received from the F-15E's and F-16's that day?

>
> > OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one
from a
> > participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
> > *seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close
to
> > *your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of
fratricide
> > available to be tried first? I wouldn't.
>
> There is a good point buried in here - namely that minimum
> friendly-target distance is an important figure-of-merit for CAS
> weaponry. It might also be true that the M61 is the best existing
> fighter-mounted weapon by that standard.


It is hardly buried, if you bothered to read the previous messages in the
thread--it (being within danger-close range) has been a key point.

Your mistake is to assume
> that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
> the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
> and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
> then it's always possible to develop something better.

Your mistake is drawing the wrong conclusions based upon different platform
requirements, for starters. APKWS is a Hydra-based (or Hellfire based)
solution (neither is scheduled for USAF use), and just like the option of
using a gun pod, requires specific load out. In other words if your existing
CAS support package does not have it onboard when they show up, or are
routed in based upon urgent need, and the separation between forces
precludes use of larger PGM's, the ground guys are out of luck. OTOH, if
they have their trusty internal cannon the ground guys will get at least
some form of support. SDB is admittedly going to have a smaller danger close
margin than the current minimum 500 pounders, but even a 200-250 pound bomb
is going to have a danger close margin that exceeds 75 meters.

>
> > So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as
well
> > as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere
that
> > will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and
find
> > itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons
and
> > STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?
>
> Depends on what weapons they're carrying. If they have a pair of 2000
> pound JDAMs each, probably not. If they've each got 12 SDBs and 38
> laser-guided 70mm rockets, then that's a very different story. And in
> that case, having STOVL in the case of the JSF or another 15 minutes
> on station or another 4 SDBs in the case of the Eurofighter are both
> probably more valuable than the three or four strafing runs you get
> from a gun.

Hydra is a rotary delivered weapon, and unless they change their plans to
make it a fixed wing package it is a non-player in the conventional CAS
arena (we are not talking helos here). SDB is still going to have a danger
close margin. So you are back to the question of whether or not you want to
remain flexible enough to provide gunfire support when the situation
precludes use of the bigger stuff. Since the gun also serves as a secondary
air-to-air weapon, IMO retaining it for the foreseeable future is a wise
move.

Brooks

>
> -jake

[Greg Hennessy]

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 13:21:39 -0600, Alan Minyard >
wrote:


>>Tony Williams
>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
>You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.
>
>Al Minyard


ROFLMAO! How did you draw that stunning conclusion.


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 06:30:14 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:

>
>"Chad Irby" wrote
>> "Paul J. Adam" wrote:
>>
>> > If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
>> > a complete and satisfactory answer?
>>
>> It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."
>>
>> It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
>> bloody useful."
>>
>> We learned that lesson over 30 years ago, and a whole new generation of
>> bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
>> McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...
>
>Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no idea
>about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1, 2
>or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?
>
>There's always a lip-curl reflex about "bean counters" but every time you
>make a choice, you've rejected an alternative. There's money, weight, volume
>and time budgets because all of those are fungible, exchangeable among the
>possible choices.
>
>Remove a gun and save money? Sure, but you spend that money, space, power
>and weight for something else, possibly more ordnance of a different kind.
>Or maybe not. Maybe more volume for better ESM or countermeasures or a lower
>crap-out rate for your RADAR.
>
>The guy who straps on the airplane (which I will never do) has to live with
>those choices and he may curse the "bean counters" who made them but every
>single characteristic (not just gun/no gun) within a weapons system competes
>with some other alternative. The payoff for some of these trades isn't
>always as obvious as a tank full of cannon rounds but it's there.
>


The thing is you can pretty much use the gun on anything. If you're
the closest aircraft to the troops on the ground and they need someone
taken off their back a strafe or two is always handy. If you've
somehow gotten in too close for an IR shot you've still got the gun.
If you want to warn an aircraft that you're serious you've got the gun
(if there aren't any tracers I don't know how useful that would be
though). It's just a nice thing to have around "just in case".

[Paul Krenske]

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 09:29:33 -0600, Alan Minyard
> wrote:

>On 10 Dec 2003 12:56:12 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
>>Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>>> On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>>
>>> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>>> >> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
>>> >> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
>>> >> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.
>>> >
>>> >Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
>>> >have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
>>> >Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
>>> >weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
>>> >its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
>>> >are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
>>> >20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.
>>>
>>> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
>>> you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
>>> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
>>> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>>
>>Guided missiles? Now that you mention it, I have heard something about
>>them - but IIRC this thread is all about guns.
>>
>>Your post seems to imply that you think that anything bigger than a
>>20mm is by definition bulky, heavy, slow-firing and unreliable. Well,
>>lets take the M61A1 as the standard, shall we? It weighs 114 kg, and
>>is very bulky because there are six barrels which all need room to
>>spin. Then, because it fires its little shells so fast (and you need
>>to hit with a lot of them to have the desired effect) it needs a big
>>ammunition capacity, with a big magazine - much more space and weight.
>>In fact, the magazine and ammo feed weigh about as much as the gun,
>>and the full load of ammo typically weighs the same again.
>>
>>Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
>>BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders
>
>That has changed. The Mouser is out.
>
>>, weighs 100 kg
>>and uses much less space (only one barrel). The ammo is bigger, but
>>less of it is needed because it's much more effective.
>
>And I suppose that you have verifiable combat records to support this??
>
>> For a bit more
>>weight (120 kg) you can get a GIAT 30M791 which is equally powerful
>>and can fire up to 2,500 rpm. Both of these guns hit their top speed
>>instantly, unlike the M61.
>
>The spin up of the M-61 is so minor as to not be an issue, ask the
>people who have used them.
>
>> Look to Russia and things get even more
>>interesting:
>
>If you consider bankruptcy interesting.
>
>> the GSh-30 weighs 105 kg and fires powerful 30mm ammo at
>>up to 3,000 rpm (again, instantly). The little GSh-301 used in the
>>MiG-29 and Su-27 only fires at 1,500-1,800 rpm (instantly) but weighs
>>a trivial 45 kg and is tiny by comparison with the M61. If you really
>>want firepower, then there's the GSh-6-30 which fires the same,
>>powerful, 30mm ammo at around 5,000 rpm for just 160 kg. I admit that
>>is heavier than an M61, but it's hardly any bigger and has several
>>times the firepower.
>
>There is no evidence that it works, much less its firepower, accuracy, etc.
>
>>
>>There is a legitimate debate about whether fighter guns are needed
>>anymore, given the much improved performance of guided missiles. I am
>>willing to argue that on several grounds, and am supported by the fact
>>that despite all the high-tech gee-whizz weaponry used recently in
>>Afghanistan and Iraq, US fighters were still using their guns in
>>circumstances where nothing else was suitable. If you're going to
>>retain a gun, it might as well be the best you can get. The price,
>>space and weight costs are negligible as a fraction of a modern
>>fighter.
>>
>>Tony Williams
>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
>Your anti-US bias is noted. The best is the M-61.
>
>Al Minyard

Ummmmm. I think you are being very critical without much actual
logical rhetoric about the points put forward considering the person
you are criticising.

Tony writes reference works on automatic canons and firearms and has
spent ages collecting and documenting just about everything you may
want to know, especially with regards to aerial cannon and ammunition.
If you are going to make declerative statements about his points, at
least elaborate so we can have a proper discussion.

While Tony does often put forward raw stats in comments, these do work
for many comparrisons. A lighter cannon that throws heavier ammunition
at faster speeds and with similar or better reliability does tend to
'win' arguments. Of course a m61 will still do damage but what if the
engagement is fleeting and you can only get 2 or 3 rounds on target. I
would prefer them to be 30mm rather than 20mm based simply on HE
content expectations. If it happens to come from a lighter gun then
thats all the better.

[Alan Minyard]

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 15:35:37 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" > wrote:

>
>"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
>> On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 20:39:49 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" >
>wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> In message >, Chad Irby
>> >> > writes
>> >> >In article >,
>> >> > Alan Minyard > wrote:
>> >> >> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get
>into
>> >> >> gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
>> >> >> ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
>> >> >> on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>> >> >
>> >> >Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
>> >> >early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
>> >> >suddenly needed guns again.
>> >>
>> >> It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
>> >> comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
>> >> forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
>> >> four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
>> >> MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
>> >> chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
>> >> for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]
>> >
>> >Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or
>systems
>> >analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
>> >era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves
>of
>> >the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only
>partially
>> >succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as
>it
>> >was...
>> >
>> >Brooks
>> >
>> ><snip>
>> >
>> OR has been in use since WWII, when it was used to determine such things
>> as the parameters of an "ideal" depth charge attack. It was quite
>effective
>> at the time, and still is.
>
>But it was taken waaay too far by the McNamara crowd, who felt that all
>things were quantifiable by numbers, and numbers were more important than
>actual results.
>
>I certainly have no love of McN, he did an amazing
>> amount of damage to the US Military (the term "McNamara's Nightmare"
>> was applied to *numerous* systems).
>
>Not to mention his micromanagement in Vietnam, and his later published
>fandango about his involvement in the decisionmaking that went into that
>conflict.
>
>Brooks

Roger that!!

Al Minyard
>

[Peter Kemp]

On or about Thu, 11 Dec 2003 13:21:39 -0600, Alan Minyard
> allegedly uttered:

>On 11 Dec 2003 05:45:39 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
>>"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message et>...
>>> Tony Williams wrote:
>>>
>>> > Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
>>> > BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
>>> > and uses much less space (only one barrel).
>>>
>>> Of course, the BK27 was then abandoned by Lockheed Martin after the JSF
>>> source selection and replaced by a 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling gun.
>>
>>I understand that was at the initiative of GD, who happened to be
>>given the contract for designing the JSF's BK 27 gun installation and
>>also just happen to make the GAU-12/U (shouldn't they have declared an
>>interest, or something?) .....their argument was on cost grounds, not
>>quality (and I suspect they may have received a sympathetic hearing in
>>favour of a US gun rather than a German one, especially post-Iraq).
>>The BK 27 was originally selected purely on merit.
>>
>>Tony Williams
>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
>You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.

Really, why?

"Citing lower costs, greater lethality and improved supportability,
The Boeing Company this week targeted the Advanced 27mm Aircraft
Cannon for its next-generation Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) combat
aircraft"
"It's the lightest, most accurate and reliable gun based on our
initial studies," said Dennis Muilenburg, JSF weapon system director
for Boeing. "Our comparative assessment found the 27mm cannon to be
more affordable, more lethal and more supportable than any of the
competitors."

Both from
http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/1999/news_release_990428n.htm

Yes they are the losers, but they seemed convinced.

Or we could look at the specs

BK27
100kg
ROF 1770 rpm
Muzzle Velocity 1025m/s

GAU-12/U
123kg
ROF 4200rpm
Muzzle Velocity 1036m/s (API)
Muzzle Velocity 1085m/s (TP, HEI)

SO the major differences are:

BK has more muzzle energy
BK is lighter
BK has ballistically matched ammunition so a consistent aimpoint
BK round is more destructive
BK round will hold it's energy for a further distance
GAU has a higher ROF.

So tell us again why the Mauser is an inferior weapon?

---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - Drink Faster

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(Paul Krenske) wrote:

> While Tony does often put forward raw stats in comments, these do work
> for many comparrisons. A lighter cannon that throws heavier ammunition
> at faster speeds and with similar or better reliability does tend to
> 'win' arguments. Of course a m61 will still do damage but what if the
> engagement is fleeting and you can only get 2 or 3 rounds on target.

That's the point, though. If the M61 could only get two or three rounds
on target, the slower-firing 30mm Mauser could only expect to get one.
If the Mauser gets two or three, the Gatling gets six to ten.

A bigger gatling-type (the Russian one mentioned earlier in the thread)
would also be a good thing, but you're running into recoil and
ammunition mass issues at that point.

The recent move to 25mm for the Gatling is a compromise in the "more
damage per shot" trend, but still keeps the "more holes in the other
guy" philosophy.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Brett]

"Chad Irby" > wrote:
| In article >,
| (Paul Krenske) wrote:
|
| > While Tony does often put forward raw stats in comments, these do
work
| > for many comparrisons. A lighter cannon that throws heavier
ammunition
| > at faster speeds and with similar or better reliability does tend to
| > 'win' arguments. Of course a m61 will still do damage but what if
the
| > engagement is fleeting and you can only get 2 or 3 rounds on target.
|
| That's the point, though. If the M61 could only get two or three
rounds
| on target, the slower-firing 30mm Mauser could only expect to get one.
| If the Mauser gets two or three, the Gatling gets six to ten.

In the first second of operation the 27mm Mauser will discharge 28 260gm
projectiles. The 25mm GAU-12/U in the AV8B in the same time will only
discharge 35 180gm projectiles. In the first half second the 27mm Mauser
will discharge 13-14 projectiles, the GAU-12/U in the AV8B is still
"thinking" about firing its 14 projectile. The comment for the JSF is
that an improved derivative of GAU-12/U will be used but no figures are
quoted for what improvements, if any are expected.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Peter Kemp <peter_n_kempathotmaildotcom@> wrote:

> Or we could look at the specs
>
> BK27
> 100kg
> ROF 1770 rpm
> Muzzle Velocity 1025m/s
>
> GAU-12/U
> 123kg
> ROF 4200rpm
> Muzzle Velocity 1036m/s (API)
> Muzzle Velocity 1085m/s (TP, HEI)
>
> SO the major differences are:
>
> BK has more muzzle energy
> BK is lighter
> BK has ballistically matched ammunition so a consistent aimpoint
> BK round is more destructive
> BK round will hold it's energy for a further distance
> GAU has a higher ROF.

> So tell us again why the Mauser is an inferior weapon?

BK has higher specific recoil (28 versus 22 kN), so needs much more
reinforcement of airframe, negating weight difference

GAU has a *much* higher rate of fire, so much higher chance of actually
hitting the target

While a single BK round does slightly more damage, it doesn't do twice
as much damage, so firing rate is too slow

BK has about twice the barrel wear at full fire rate

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Brett" > wrote:

> "Chad Irby" > wrote:

> | That's the point, though. If the M61 could only get two or three
> | rounds on target, the slower-firing 30mm Mauser could only expect
> | to get one. If the Mauser gets two or three, the Gatling gets six
> | to ten.
>
> In the first second of operation the 27mm Mauser will discharge 28 260gm
> projectiles. The 25mm GAU-12/U in the AV8B in the same time will only
> discharge 35 180gm projectiles.

....and after four or five one-second shots, the Mauser will be out,
while the GAU will have three or four left.

Or, using half-second bursts, the Mauser will have about one-*quarter*
the firing time...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Brett]

"Chad Irby" > wrote:
| In article >,
| "Brett" > wrote:
|
| > "Chad Irby" > wrote:
|
| > | That's the point, though. If the M61 could only get two or three
| > | rounds on target, the slower-firing 30mm Mauser could only expect
| > | to get one. If the Mauser gets two or three, the Gatling gets six
| > | to ten.
| >
| > In the first second of operation the 27mm Mauser will discharge 28
260gm
| > projectiles. The 25mm GAU-12/U in the AV8B in the same time will
only
| > discharge 35 180gm projectiles.
|
| ...and after four or five one-second shots, the Mauser will be out,
| while the GAU will have three or four left.
|
| Or, using half-second bursts, the Mauser will have about one-*quarter*
| the firing time...

Your original claim was the advantage enjoyed by the gatling from the
much larger the number of projectiles sent in the direction of the
target when required, if it is actually sending less the advantage
should belong to the Mauser.

[Paul F Austin]

"Chad Irby" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote:
>
> > Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no
idea
> > about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1,
2
> > or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?
>
> It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a big
> automated missile launcher in them.

Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun. And my
question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when you're
making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some of the
other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to earn
its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You (the
customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft
thoughout its life.

Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the F4H
configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case now.
Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with "looks
can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much to the
table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.

It's not just weapons fit either. The vibration from gun firing costs
significantly higher failure rates in electronics near the gun. Having a
major electronics failure is a mission kill these days.

[Tony Williams]

Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>
> You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.

Sources for that statement, please.

These quotes are from an official JSF press release:

'Citing lower costs, greater lethality and improved supportability,
The Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for
its next generation JSF combat aircraft.....The gun is also a
candidate for the Lockheed Martin version of the JSF...."It's the
lightest, most accurate and reliable gun based on our initial studies"
said Dennis Muilenburg, JSF weapon system director for Boeing. "Our
comparative assessment found the 27mm cannon to be more affordable,
more lethal and more supportable than any of its competitors".'

Inferior, yeah.

In contrast, the press release from GD just mentioned that they were
proposing the GAU-12/U instead because it was cheaper and the ammo was
already in US service (you mean, that hadn't been realised before?).

If indeed the 27mm had become too expensive in the meantime, there is
only one likely explanation: the Americans spent too much time futzing
about with it to 'Americanise' it instead of simply adopting it. It's
been a reliable and effective weapon in European service for about two
decades in the Tornado and Alpha Jet, is also in service in the Gripen
and is about to enter service in the Eurofighter Typhoon.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Thomas Schoene]

Tony Williams wrote:
> "Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
> et>...
>> Tony Williams wrote:
>>
>>> Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm
>>> Mauser
>>> BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
>>> and uses much less space (only one barrel).
>>
>> Of course, the BK27 was then abandoned by Lockheed Martin after the
>> JSF
>> source selection and replaced by a 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling gun.
>
> I understand that was at the initiative of GD, who happened to be
> given the contract for designing the JSF's BK 27 gun installation and
> also just happen to make the GAU-12/U (shouldn't they have declared an
> interest, or something?) .....their argument was on cost grounds,

And especially life-cycle costing. Adopting 27mm introduces the absurd
situation of having at least four different calibers of guns fielded in
tactical aircraft (20mm, 25mm, 30mm (GAU-8), and then 27mm), with the
corresponding inventory issues and overhead costs.

From the Marine Corps pespective, caliber diversity may have been a
particular concern. The Marines already use 20mm, and 25mm, and plan to
introduce 30mm in the EFV (nee AAAV). Adding yet another caliber may have
been an unwanted complication for a service that is pushing for maximum
streamlining of its logistics.

> notquality (and I suspect they may have received a sympathetic hearing
> in favour of a US gun rather than a German one, especially post-Iraq).

Im pretty certain the decision predates the Iraq situation, so this was not
a factor.

> The BK 27 was originally selected purely on merit.

When you're talking about contracting, "merit" always includes an economic
dimension. Cost was indeed one of the main selection criteria for the
overall JSF program, so all the components were likely selected with an eye
toward their cost as well as operational effectiveness.

From what I read about the decision at the time, the cost of the BK 27 rose
sharply from the original projections after award, and that's what triggered
the change of gun. Whether that's just GD spin is of course unanswerable.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Tony Williams]

Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>
> Your anti-US bias is noted. The best is the M-61.

I gave lots of reasons for my statements. You haven't. So who's biased?

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Thomas Schoene]

Tony Williams wrote:

> In contrast, the press release from GD just mentioned that they were
> proposing the GAU-12/U instead because it was cheaper and the ammo was
> already in US service (you mean, that hadn't been realised before?).

ISTR reading that there had been a significant change in life-cycle costs.
Why, I don't know.

> If indeed the 27mm had become too expensive in the meantime, there is
> only one likely explanation: the Americans spent too much time futzing
> about with it to 'Americanise' it instead of simply adopting it.

There is one other possibnility -- the initial costs were understated for
competative reasons (IOW, they "bought in" and the "get well" proved too
expensive to bear.) There's simply no way to know without access to
information none of us have.

The one modification I know of was a fairly elaborate-looking muzzle brake
on the US version, but I think this may have also been seen in the Alphajet.

Personally, I think 27mm woudl have been a fine gun, but the logisitical
complications don't seem to justify adding yet another caliber when the
existing ones, especially 25mm, are nearly as good. If guns were still
primary weapons, I'd push hard for the ebst posible. But as a very
secondary weapon, having any gun at all is probably good enough.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Brett" > wrote:

> Your original claim was the advantage enjoyed by the gatling from the
> much larger the number of projectiles sent in the direction of the
> target when required, if it is actually sending less the advantage
> should belong to the Mauser.

Only for very short bursts. Longer ones, it's even, and you can hold
sustained fire for longer overall.

So instead of trying to hit another plane with a half-second burst five
different times before the bullets run out (like the Mauser), or a full
one-second burst the same number of times (with the Gatling).

Or you could just empty the gun, and put four times as many bullets on
target in the same burst.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

> Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun.
> And my question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft
> when you're making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of
> SRAAMs?

Yes. For flexibility, and for having a system independnt of the missile
system.

> Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the
> F4H configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the
> case now.

Funny, the fighter pilots keep telling us differently.

> It's not just weapons fit either. The vibration from gun firing costs
> significantly higher failure rates in electronics near the gun.

That's a nice theory, but not proven anywhere, and it certainly didn't
show up on the F-4Es I used to work on.

> Having a major electronics failure is a mission kill these days.

So you want a non-electronic weapon. Like a gun, instead of a missile.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article . net>,
"Thomas Schoene" > wrote:

> Tony Williams wrote:

> > The BK 27 was originally selected purely on merit.
>
> When you're talking about contracting, "merit" always includes an economic
> dimension.

From Defense Daily International:
<http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi1122.htm#A3>

"Burbage emphasized that both the BK 27 and GAU-12 were able to meet
JSF's lethality requirements, which include probability of kill and
accuracy. He said the GAU-12, which has a higher rate of fire than the
BK 27, was able to meet the requirement by putting more rounds on the
target.

'Performance and affordability are equally important in our selection
process,' Burbage said. 'If we have two candidates that are comparable
in technical performance, but have significant differences in terms of
affordability, we will pick the one that is more affordable.'

Burbage also said there were more technical negatives against the BK 27
than the GAU-12. Cost in three areas, unit recurring fly-away cost,
ammunition, and operational support, tilted the decision in favor of
the GAU-12, he said."

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Brett]

"Chad Irby" > wrote:
| In article >,
| "Brett" > wrote:
|
| > Your original claim was the advantage enjoyed by the gatling from
the
| > much larger the number of projectiles sent in the direction of the
| > target when required, if it is actually sending less the advantage
| > should belong to the Mauser.
|
| Only for very short bursts. Longer ones, it's even, and you can hold
| sustained fire for longer overall.
|
| So instead of trying to hit another plane with a half-second burst
five
| different times before the bullets run out (like the Mauser), or a
full
| one-second burst the same number of times (with the Gatling).

I get the idea that if you are not flying in a C-130 that the number of
rounds available per gun for the GAU-12/U and BK27 would be close to the
same for any small single engined attack aircraft. If that is the case
the GAU-12/U with 1 second bursts runs out before the BK27 with its half
second bursts.

| Or you could just empty the gun, and put four times as many bullets on
| target in the same burst.

"four times as many"? When they both have 150 rounds to play with, how
many rounds do they get to put down in 3 second burst.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Brett" > wrote:

> I get the idea that if you are not flying in a C-130 that the number of
> rounds available per gun for the GAU-12/U and BK27 would be close to the
> same for any small single engined attack aircraft. If that is the case
> the GAU-12/U with 1 second bursts runs out before the BK27 with its half
> second bursts.

One thing you'll notice is that the Mauser installs tend to have very
few bullets (150 or so), while Gatlings tend to the "carry a lot of
bullets" category (Harriers carry less, but they don't have a lot of
room in them).

Of course, they might end up with a lot less in the F-35 (not determined
yet), but since the lethality of the bullets is in the same category, a
difference in number isn't that important (with the 25mm cartridges
weighing a bit less than the 27mm).

Overall, it's "shoot more somewhat lighter bullets" or "shoot fewer
somewhat heavier bullets." Overall, it's about the same amount of metal
going downrange, at about the same speed and distance.

The really nice thing about the Gatling is that we know it works, and we
know it costs less overall for the same general capabilities.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Chad Irby" wrote
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> >
> > > Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no
> idea
> > > about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have
1,
> 2
> > > or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?
> >
> > It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a big
> > automated missile launcher in them.
>
> Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun. And
my
> question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when you're
> making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some of
the
> other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to earn
> its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You (the
> customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft
> thoughout its life.
>
> Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the F4H
> configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case now.
> Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with "looks
> can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much to
the
> table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.

Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the
20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996 edition of
CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs under
500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers, trenches,
fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even
given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB, it
is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to
engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap if
you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during
Anaconda.

Brooks

<snip>

[Tony Williams]

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
>
> The really nice thing about the Gatling is that we know it works, and we
> know it costs less overall for the same general capabilities.

We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
about the GAU-12/U then.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from
'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be
published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use:

"Modern short-range missiles have minimum ranges as low as 300 m, well
within gun range, and are highly agile, with wide engagement
envelopes, which make them able to hit targets well off to one side of
the firing aircraft, especially when cued by a helmet-mounted sight:
in fact, the capabilities of most recent models are such that the
aircraft carrying them barely need to manoeuvre. This does not mean
that guns are useless for air-to-air work. They have a particular
value in modern 'policing' applications, as they enable warning shots
to be fired in front of suspect aircraft. They also provide an
economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned
reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or
drug-smugglers. In a 'hot' war they still have certain advantages in
close-quarter fighting, for example in 'picking off' an enemy
attacking a wingman, who may be too close for a safe missile shot. The
ability of modern fighters to adopt extreme attitudes, pointing well
away from the line of flight, significantly assists gun aiming in
dogfights. Cannon projectiles have a shorter flight time than a
missile, a significant advantage in a dogfight.

Finally, the gun provides a last-ditch capability if the missiles run
out, or are defeated by advanced countermeasures or simply by
circumstances. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern
IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying
target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case
difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10
aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
lock on. Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot
always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter
engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it
down. In other engagements in the late 1990s, USAF and USN fighters
fired a total of seven Sparrows, AMRAAMs, and Phoenix missiles against
Iraqi MiG-25s without scoring a single hit (although the Phoenix shots
were taken at extreme range).

In part, the low success rates are due to tactical considerations, in
that missiles may deliberately be launched outside the normal
engagement envelope to distract or scare off the enemy, and sometimes
two missiles are launched at one target to increase the hit
probability. Whatever the reason, this results in missiles being used
up at a high rate, making it more likely that they will run out during
a sortie. A cannon will typically carry enough ammunition for several
engagements, usefully increasing combat persistence at a minimal cost
in weight and performance.

One curious aspect to the use of AAMs in combat is that of the
approximately 1,000 kills achieved between 1958 and 1991, only a
handful were scored beyond visual range, which does raise questions
about the significance of the very long ranges of which some missiles
are capable. It is sometimes argued that modern short-range missiles
are so good that any aircraft with the benefit of long-range sensors
and missiles should use them to try to stay outside the envelope of
the enemy's short-range AAMs. However, it is not always possible to
dictate the terms of an engagement. The Iranians made good use of the
long-range AIM-54 in the war with Iraq, but the F-14s which carried it
still found themselves engaged in gunfights from time to time.

There is a continual battle between missile sensor and countermeasure
technology. In the future, stealth technology applied to aircraft may
considerably shorten target acquisition and combat ranges, putting
into question the worth of modern BVR (beyond visual range) AAMs. The
possible future use of anti-radar missile guidance as a way of
overcoming stealth characteristics may force fighters to make minimal
use of their own radars, further reducing acquisition and combat
distances. It may also prove increasingly difficult for either IR or
radar-homing missiles to lock on to their stealthy targets,
additionally protected by extensive electronic jamming and IR
countermeasures.

Of course, modern guns are usually aimed by the plane's radar which
could also be jammed (although less easily than the much smaller and
less powerful missile seekers) but laser rangefinders could make an
acceptable alternative in providing fire control data. If planes
eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably
exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer
which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane,
calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming
information accordingly, all without emitting any signals."

And in ground attack:

"The emphasis in the use of aircraft guns has now shifted more to
air-to-ground work, although even this is becoming increasingly
hazardous in a 'hot' war. With the proliferation of anti-aircraft gun
and missile systems, including MANPADS, even the specialist
ground-attack aircraft, fitted with powerful cannon, have found it to
be safer to rely on the long range of their air-to-ground guided
weapons rather than close to gun range, although as we have seen the
USAF's A-10s still made good use of their cannon against Iraqi targets
in 1991.

This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface
missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to
provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current
development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which
aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the
little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 –
2 m at ranges of up to 5 – 6 km at a price of US$ 8 – 10,000;
one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile.

However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.
Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar
in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable
danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to
intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were
sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too
close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the
fighters – F-16s and even F-15s – went in strafing with their 20 mm
cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even
RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on
at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish
to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained
pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes
the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives."

The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Brett]

"Tony Williams" > wrote:

<...>

| USAF A-10
| aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
| 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
| lock on.

How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF
JSF?

[Paul F Austin]

"Chad Irby" wrote ..
> "Paul F Austin" wrote:
>
> > Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun.
> > And my question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft
> > when you're making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of
> > SRAAMs?
>
> Yes. For flexibility, and for having a system independnt of the missile
> system.

But you aren't buying "a missile system". Because you're building in the
interfaces (structural and electronic) for any missile that meets the
stowage and attachment envelope and interface specification, in fact the gun
is "less flexible" since over the life of the platform you can roll in a new
AAM every few years. With the gun, aside from changing ammunition natures,
you're stuck with the original decision for the life of the platform.

>
> > Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the
> > F4H configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the
> > case now.
>
> Funny, the fighter pilots keep telling us differently.

Corporate experience is valuable but can sometimes lead us astray. As
another example, just about every fast mover pilot I've ever talked
to_thoroughly_believes "speed is life" when it comes to CAS/BAI. If that
advice had been heeded in the late sixties, there would be no A-10s.
Experience has shown that the original analysis, that using an airframe
that's tough enough and slow enough that the pilot can get lined up and nail
a CAS or BAI target first time is lots better than a Speed O'Heat pass that
minimizes the exposure to ground fire but which misses the target and means
you have to make another run. Now of course, since we have ubiquitous PGMs,
"speed is life" looks better and medium altitude weapons release looks
better still.

The point of that interminable one sentence analysis of a complex subject is
that technology really does work better now than it did in 1970 and because
it does work better, the answers to key questions changes with time.

High utility of an internal gun in air combat isn't what's reflected in
recent air combat experience nor in systems evaluations of latest-generation
platforms, sensors and missile systems. In fact, some reports I've read from
Air Force evaluations of off-platform sensor fusion and intraflight datalink
operation seem to say that even SRAAMs are rarely be used. That's one of the
reasons the Europeans bought Meteor. AAMs really have improved tremendously
in thirty years. The minimum range of SRAAMs has moved in, squeezing out the
place where guns clearly had utility and the effectiveness of current
seekers combined with helmet-mounted sights is clearly much higher than a
fixed gun. The 0.15 Pk days for AIM-7Es is 'way distant

So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than
"it might be useful and you never know"..

>
> > It's not just weapons fit either. The vibration from gun firing costs
> > significantly higher failure rates in electronics near the gun.
>
> That's a nice theory, but not proven anywhere, and it certainly didn't
> show up on the F-4Es I used to work on.

That's a good point and one I didn't know. From an analysis standpoint, an
F-4E's RADAR system should have experienced higher failure rates, especially
since that generation of avionics had much higher base failure rates than do
current systems. Reliability "analysis" as opposed to failure analysis and
"lessons learned" incorporation has always had a high bogosity index.

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote
> >
> > "Chad Irby" wrote
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> > >
> > > > Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no
> > idea
> > > > about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather
have
> 1,
> > 2
> > > > or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?
> > >
> > > It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a
big
> > > automated missile launcher in them.
> >
> > Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun. And
> my
> > question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when you're
> > making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some of
> the
> > other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to
earn
> > its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You (the
> > customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft
> > thoughout its life.
> >
> > Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the F4H
> > configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case
now.
> > Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with
"looks
> > can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much to
> the
> > table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.
>
> Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the
> 20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996 edition
of
> CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs under
> 500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers,
trenches,
> fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even
> given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB,
it
> is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to
> engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap
if
> you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during
> Anaconda.

That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd expect
that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the battalion
level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire".

[Magnus Redin]

Hi!

"Paul F Austin" > writes:
> So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than
> "it might be useful and you never know"..

A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets
like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers
forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles.

The gun system reuse all the expensive parts, radar, electronics for
aiming the aeroplane and the gun while the ammunition can be dumb
and is easy to mass produce.

It is of course possible to develop a fairly cheap and small low
performance AA-missile but it is hard to get it as cheap as a gun
system. This gun competitor might be developed if someone decides to
arm small UAV:s with AA-missiles for killing other UAV:s and
helicopters.

And I realy like the idea of a backup weapon if the enemy has superior
countermeasures for your AA-missiles. But you can have that with a pod
filled with unguided rockets.

Best regards,
---
Titta gärna på http://www.lysator.liu.se/~redin och kommentera min
politiska sida.
Magnus Redin, Klockaregården 6, 586 44 LINKöPING, SWEDEN
Phone: Sweden (0)70 5160046

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > >
> > > "Chad Irby" wrote
> > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have
no
> > > idea
> > > > > about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather
> have
> > 1,
> > > 2
> > > > > or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?
> > > >
> > > > It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a
> big
> > > > automated missile launcher in them.
> > >
> > > Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun.
And
> > my
> > > question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when
you're
> > > making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some
of
> > the
> > > other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to
> earn
> > > its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You
(the
> > > customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft
> > > thoughout its life.
> > >
> > > Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the
F4H
> > > configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case
> now.
> > > Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with
> "looks
> > > can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much
to
> > the
> > > table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.
> >
> > Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the
> > 20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996
edition
> of
> > CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs
under
> > 500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers,
> trenches,
> > fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even
> > given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB,
> it
> > is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to
> > engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap
> if
> > you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during
> > Anaconda.
>
> That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd
expect
> that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the
battalion
> level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire".

There is not a soldier around who would disagree with your objective, since
groundpounders generally prefer having "their own" support completely
in-pocket. But that does not change the fact that there will be situations,
like during Anaconda, where the organic support assets are either not
available (i.e., no arty tubes were within range) or unable to handle the
scope of the mission (i.e., the mortars that the Anaconda troops did have
were over-tasked due to the unexpected number of concurrent targets, and
ammo resupply was problematic being fully dependent upon helos in what had
already become a less-than-helo-friendly environment). That is where the
internal gun on the CAS aircraft becomes a means for the commander to remain
flexible in how he responds to these "knife fight" situations.

Brooks

>
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Tony Williams" > wrote in message
m...
> Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
> should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from
> 'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be
> published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use:
>
<snip good analysis and summary>

> This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface
> missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to
> provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current
> development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which
> aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the
> little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 -
> 2 m at ranges of up to 5 - 6 km at a price of US$ 8 - 10,000;
> one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile.

To nitpick, APKWS is not currently slated for use on fixed wing assets--it
is an Army program intended for use on helos only. Even if it were adopted
for fixed wing use, it still leaves the problem of having to identify the
need for its load-out ahead of time (i.e., pre-ATO cycle). The beauty of the
internal gun on these airframes is that it is an asset that is always
available, regardless of the external loadout, so the grunts who are forced
to make an immediate (or "Oh, ****...") CAS request can count on at least
having that strafe support available if/when things go to hell in a
handbasket. That (immediate missions as opposed to pre-planned) is the kind
of mission that this capability will be critical to--if we are *planning* to
get into a "knife-fight" on the ground, other than in the urban fight, then
we have probably already screwed up big-time.

>
> However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
> armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
> dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
> missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
> high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
> operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
> they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
> attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.
> Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of
> Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar
> in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable
> danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to
> intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were
> sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too
> close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the
> fighters - F-16s and even F-15s - went in strafing with their 20 mm
> cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even
> RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on
> at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish
> to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained
> pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes
> the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives."

Exactly.

Brooks

>
> The case rests...
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
> Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
> http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

> We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
> for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
> that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
> about the GAU-12/U then.

Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
structure that fell through on closer examination.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Alan Minyard]

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 20:39:51 +0000, Greg Hennessy > wrote:

>On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 13:21:39 -0600, Alan Minyard >
>wrote:
>
>
>>>Tony Williams
>>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>>
>>You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.
>>
>>Al Minyard
>
>
>ROFLMAO! How did you draw that stunning conclusion.
>
>
>greg


Well, if you signature is and indication, you are involved in the use
of serious drugs, not someone that I would assume could make
rational judgements. The fact that the US chose a different system pretty
much tells me that the Mauser was (and is) an inferior system.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 22:16:33 GMT, (Paul Krenske) wrote:

>On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 09:29:33 -0600, Alan Minyard
> wrote:
>
>>On 10 Dec 2003 12:56:12 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>
>>>Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>>>> On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>>>> >> And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
>>>> >> cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
>>>> >> make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.
>>>> >
>>>> >Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
>>>> >have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
>>>> >Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
>>>> >weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
>>>> >its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
>>>> >are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
>>>> >20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.
>>>>
>>>> Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
>>>> you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
>>>> weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
>>>> slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.
>>>
>>>Guided missiles? Now that you mention it, I have heard something about
>>>them - but IIRC this thread is all about guns.
>>>
>>>Your post seems to imply that you think that anything bigger than a
>>>20mm is by definition bulky, heavy, slow-firing and unreliable. Well,
>>>lets take the M61A1 as the standard, shall we? It weighs 114 kg, and
>>>is very bulky because there are six barrels which all need room to
>>>spin. Then, because it fires its little shells so fast (and you need
>>>to hit with a lot of them to have the desired effect) it needs a big
>>>ammunition capacity, with a big magazine - much more space and weight.
>>>In fact, the magazine and ammo feed weigh about as much as the gun,
>>>and the full load of ammo typically weighs the same again.
>>>
>>>Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
>>>BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders
>>
>>That has changed. The Mouser is out.
>>
>>>, weighs 100 kg
>>>and uses much less space (only one barrel). The ammo is bigger, but
>>>less of it is needed because it's much more effective.
>>
>>And I suppose that you have verifiable combat records to support this??
>>
>>> For a bit more
>>>weight (120 kg) you can get a GIAT 30M791 which is equally powerful
>>>and can fire up to 2,500 rpm. Both of these guns hit their top speed
>>>instantly, unlike the M61.
>>
>>The spin up of the M-61 is so minor as to not be an issue, ask the
>>people who have used them.
>>
>>> Look to Russia and things get even more
>>>interesting:
>>
>>If you consider bankruptcy interesting.
>>
>>> the GSh-30 weighs 105 kg and fires powerful 30mm ammo at
>>>up to 3,000 rpm (again, instantly). The little GSh-301 used in the
>>>MiG-29 and Su-27 only fires at 1,500-1,800 rpm (instantly) but weighs
>>>a trivial 45 kg and is tiny by comparison with the M61. If you really
>>>want firepower, then there's the GSh-6-30 which fires the same,
>>>powerful, 30mm ammo at around 5,000 rpm for just 160 kg. I admit that
>>>is heavier than an M61, but it's hardly any bigger and has several
>>>times the firepower.
>>
>>There is no evidence that it works, much less its firepower, accuracy, etc.
>>
>>>
>>>There is a legitimate debate about whether fighter guns are needed
>>>anymore, given the much improved performance of guided missiles. I am
>>>willing to argue that on several grounds, and am supported by the fact
>>>that despite all the high-tech gee-whizz weaponry used recently in
>>>Afghanistan and Iraq, US fighters were still using their guns in
>>>circumstances where nothing else was suitable. If you're going to
>>>retain a gun, it might as well be the best you can get. The price,
>>>space and weight costs are negligible as a fraction of a modern
>>>fighter.
>>>
>>>Tony Williams
>>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>>
>>Your anti-US bias is noted. The best is the M-61.
>>
>>Al Minyard
>
>Ummmmm. I think you are being very critical without much actual
>logical rhetoric about the points put forward considering the person
>you are criticising.
>
>Tony writes reference works on automatic canons and firearms and has
>spent ages collecting and documenting just about everything you may
>want to know, especially with regards to aerial cannon and ammunition.
>If you are going to make declerative statements about his points, at
>least elaborate so we can have a proper discussion.
>
>While Tony does often put forward raw stats in comments, these do work
>for many comparrisons. A lighter cannon that throws heavier ammunition
>at faster speeds and with similar or better reliability does tend to
>'win' arguments. Of course a m61 will still do damage but what if the
>engagement is fleeting and you can only get 2 or 3 rounds on target. I
>would prefer them to be 30mm rather than 20mm based simply on HE
>content expectations. If it happens to come from a lighter gun then
>thats all the better.

Learn to use the English language, it will make your posts "seem" much
more reasonable. Tony is one of those people who will search within
the "numbers" until they can be made to "support" his pre-defined
conclusions. His idea of being "objective" is "the US sucks".

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 11 Dec 2003 17:44:42 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>>
>> You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.
>
>Sources for that statement, please.
>
>These quotes are from an official JSF press release:
>
>'Citing lower costs, greater lethality and improved supportability,
>The Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for
>its next generation JSF combat aircraft.....The gun is also a
>candidate for the Lockheed Martin version of the JSF...."It's the
>lightest, most accurate and reliable gun based on our initial studies"
>said Dennis Muilenburg, JSF weapon system director for Boeing. "Our
>comparative assessment found the 27mm cannon to be more affordable,
>more lethal and more supportable than any of its competitors".'
>
>Inferior, yeah.

That release is ancient history, but the, you have never let the facts get
in they way of your "opinions".

>
>In contrast, the press release from GD just mentioned that they were
>proposing the GAU-12/U instead because it was cheaper and the ammo was
>already in US service (you mean, that hadn't been realised before?).
>
>If indeed the 27mm had become too expensive in the meantime, there is
>only one likely explanation: the Americans spent too much time futzing
>about with it to 'Americanise' it instead of simply adopting it. It's
>been a reliable and effective weapon in European service for about two
>decades in the Tornado and Alpha Jet, is also in service in the Gripen
>and is about to enter service in the Eurofighter Typhoon.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

The aircraft that you mention are not in the same league with the F-22 or the F-35.
I know that it breaks your little heart, but we are talking real weapons, not the ones
that you and Mr Arndt fanaticize about.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 11 Dec 2003 17:47:30 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>>
>> Your anti-US bias is noted. The best is the M-61.
>
>I gave lots of reasons for my statements. You haven't. So who's biased?
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

You gave lots of unsubstantiated, dated, and incorrect "reasons". That
hardly improves your reliability. Any one can put up a web page
full of inaccuracies and innuendo.

Al Minyard

[Mary Shafer]

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

> In message >, Chad Irby
> > writes
> >In article >,
> > "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
> >...and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
> >You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.
>
> Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
> intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
> aim?
>
> (Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
> off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)

Or to strafe or nape his troops in contact. When all you have is a
Phantom, every problem has a Phantom solution.

Part of the problem with F-4 sorties is that F-4s were RFBA-4s. In
"One Day In A Long War" this was really obvious. The USN launched
F-4s to protect the A-7s, while the USAF launched fighter F-4s to
protect the bomber F-4s, and the USAF RF-4s and USN RA-5As took happy
snaps.

Because of this, you can't lump all F-4 sorties together. Ethel and
Price don't, for example. They differentiate by role, which is how it
has to be done. Bomber and attack and recce F-4s aren't fighter F-4s,
any more than A-7s are. The F/A-18, that could fight its way to the
target, wasn't invented yet.

> If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
> predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
> MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
> dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
> SAMs.

Shades of Bomber Command? Remember that the Vietnam War was only a
little more than twenty years after WW II and there were pilots flying
in SEA who had flown in WW II. When you talk about strategy and
tactics, you have to keep that in mind.

> Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
> sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
> chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Guns on fighters didn't stop the Luftwaffe from picking off B-17s,
either. Or the escorts. So what's new?

> >For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
> >meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
> >run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
> >fighters and bombers went over.
>
> So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
> I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

The data is there, but it's so often lumped into aggregate numbers
that it's hard to tease the real answers out. You have to ask how
many AAM kills per aircraft that sortied with AAMs or how many SAM
kills per SEAD aircraft or how many enemy infantry deaths per aircraft
with guns and nape and willy pete or how much materiel destroyed per
bomb truck. If you don't, you get very deceptive numbers.

> >One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
> >were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.
>
> This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
> flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
> Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
> guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They were back at base. Bomber and attack and SEAD F-4Es only have
guns to defend themselves. They left the AAM at home to carry bombs.
Fewer than half the USAF F-4 were fighters with AAM. Since the
non-fighter F-4s would have been carrying their ordnance during the
inbound half of the flight and only been able to get into the fur ball
outgoing, I'd say guns were under-represented in kills. This probably
proves that the escort F-4s had more chances at MiGs than the
home-going non-fighters.

Betcha didn't think of that, did you? I didn't think of it until
about the third time I read One Day and actually studied the tables.
It's like adding in B-17 guns kills to the escort kills to pronounce
on the effectiveness of the escort fighters guns, I suppose.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Ed Rasimus]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 08:15:44 -0800, Mary Shafer >
wrote:

>On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:
>
>> In message >, Chad Irby
>> > writes

Mary adds some info and makes some big errors:
>>
>> Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
>> intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
>> aim?
>>
>> (Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
>> off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)
>
>Or to strafe or nape his troops in contact. When all you have is a
>Phantom, every problem has a Phantom solution.

But USAF and USN didn't only have Phantoms. Regardless of whether you
are talking about Rolling Thunder or Linebacker, both services fielded
an array of aircraft including F-105, F-100, F-5, F-8, A-4, A-7, A-6,
A-37, A-1, B-57, etc. etc. etc.
>

>Because of this, you can't lump all F-4 sorties together. Ethel and
>Price don't, for example. They differentiate by role, which is how it
>has to be done. Bomber and attack and recce F-4s aren't fighter F-4s,
>any more than A-7s are. The F/A-18, that could fight its way to the
>target, wasn't invented yet.

Sorry, but the F-105 could fight its way to the target and so could
the F-4. The F/A-18 isn't going to engage any current generation
fighter enroute to the target successfully with retained iron. In
fact, the current generation of interdiction aircraft doesn't even go
to the target. That's the big advantage of stand-off PGMs.
>
>> If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
>> predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
>> MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
>> dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
>> SAMs.
>
>Shades of Bomber Command? Remember that the Vietnam War was only a
>little more than twenty years after WW II and there were pilots flying
>in SEA who had flown in WW II. When you talk about strategy and
>tactics, you have to keep that in mind.

There weren't many, although there were a few. Robin Olds being a
primary example. But you certainly wouldn't hang the charge of
stereotyped or obsolete tactical thinking on Robin. There were a few
more Korean era vets, but in large numbers the Vietnam War, even
during Rolling Thunder was folks on their first combat.

The weapons and tactics were developing and being fielded as quickly
as possible. In '65, at Nellis, the instructor cadre in F-105s got
trained in pop-up ground attack tactics while we were in the course
and trained us the following week. The syllabus changed almost daily
to incorporate new formation, new concepts, new weapons, etc.

>> >One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
>> >were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.
>>
>> This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
>> flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
>> Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
>> guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?
>
>They were back at base. Bomber and attack and SEAD F-4Es only have
>guns to defend themselves.

Absolutely incorrect! All, repeat ALL F-4s always carried Sparrows. We
didn't always have room for AIM-9s, but I never saw a combat sortie
flown by an F-4 when I was there without Sparrows.

> They left the AAM at home to carry bombs.

Sparrow wells don't hold bombs.

>Fewer than half the USAF F-4 were fighters with AAM. Since the
>non-fighter F-4s would have been carrying their ordnance during the
>inbound half of the flight and only been able to get into the fur ball
>outgoing, I'd say guns were under-represented in kills. This probably
>proves that the escort F-4s had more chances at MiGs than the
>home-going non-fighters.

The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".

Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.
>

[Mary Shafer]

On Mon, 8 Dec 2003 23:13:38 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

> In message >, Hog Driver
> > writes
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Paul J. Adam" >
> >> That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
> >> suite fitted to the A-10...
> >
> >Well, using AWACS and mutual support tactics, the A-10 pilots are going to
> >have an idea where to pick up the tally.
>
> Again, AWACS is situation-dependent, and there's that oft-quoted
> statistic about 80% of surviving pilots wondering who shot them down
> (tracking that statistic to a source is probably good for a PhD thesis -
> anyone up for funding it? :) )

I got a fair way toward a conference paper on it, with the help of the
guys at Wright-Pat. The conclusion is very limited because it's based
on very limited data, more like randomly-collected anecdote, long
before AWACS or modern RWR. I wouldn't use it to try to support my
arguments about modern air warfare.


> Again, for real life this isn't much of a problem because the A-10
> operates in total air supremacy and has never had an enemy aircraft ever
> get a chance to shoot at it (rendering the preparations of the A-10
> crews to fight back untested).

I don't think that's right. We know that two A-10s nailed helos in
'91, so the possibility of helo-A-10 combat has to be considered.
If an A-10 can get a helo kill with a gun designed for air-to-ground,
then a helo with such a gun can do the same thing to the A-10.

Restricting armament to its advertised role is silly. Just ask the
Argentineans in that ship that the Royal Marines pasted with their
Carl Gustavs. Or the F-15 that nailed the helo with the 500-lb dumb
bomb. Having seen those happen, the idea of an A-10 going up against
an enemy aircraft doesn't seem so far-fetched.

> >Again, situation dependent, lots of 'what ifs' that
> >you can't know about until you are there.
>
> This is too true, sadly, and imposes all sorts of limits on open debate.

I don't think it's that kind of limitation. I think it's more like
there being too many scenarios to really predict accurately. Most of
them are going to be kind of unexpected, which makes it hard to
predict.

> >I think we both know that the possibility of air-to-air gun fighting today
> >is highly unlikely. Lessons learned from the past would behoove us to have
> >them on our jets, or in the case of the A-10, use them to really screw up
> >the bad guys on the ground.
>
> I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
> contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
> and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
> Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
> isn't healthy.

The fighter world decided this once before, you know. They were wrong.
That was back when NATO faced the WarPac military, though, as well as
before AWACS, etc. A lot of this discussion is assuming, rightly or
wrongly, that the only scenario is the overwhelming Western military
against some over-classed small country. That may not be a good
assumption.

What about India and Pakistan? Are they going to be fighting the same
kind of air war? Probably not. The UK and Argentina fought something
a lot different from either anti-Iraqi action.

We design and build most of our aircraft for export as well as
domestic use (for pretty much every current "we"), so it's important
not to get too fixated on one combat scenario. We may have to put
guns into fighters to keep aircraft salable, after all.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Mary Shafer]

On Sun, 07 Dec 2003 18:34:42 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

> In article >,
> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> > That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
> > suite fitted to the A-10...
>
> It's called a "radar warning receiver," and it tells you which direction
> you're being radiated from. If the other guy isn't using radar, they're
> proabably not going to see you in the weeds at all from any rational
> distance.

As I recall, AWACS talks to A-10s. That's a pretty extensive sensor
suite for the A-10.

If we're talking about anything like a realistic scenario, there's
going to be an AWACS.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Paul F Austin]

"Magnus Redin" > wrote in message
...
> Hi!
>
> "Paul F Austin" > writes:
> > So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more
than
> > "it might be useful and you never know"..
>
> A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets
> like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers
> forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles.
>
> The gun system reuse all the expensive parts, radar, electronics for
> aiming the aeroplane and the gun while the ammunition can be dumb
> and is easy to mass produce.
>
> It is of course possible to develop a fairly cheap and small low
> performance AA-missile but it is hard to get it as cheap as a gun
> system. This gun competitor might be developed if someone decides to
> arm small UAV:s with AA-missiles for killing other UAV:s and
> helicopters.

And it's cheaper still to have a dedicated anti-UAV system, possibly like a
turboprop P-51. Using a $60M+ fighter to bust $100K UAVs is stupid. It's
also nearly impossible. A low signature, low altitide target loitering along
at 100kts is tough to manage in a fast mover. You'll blow though a tank of
ammunition killing very few UAVs.

>
> And I realy like the idea of a backup weapon if the enemy has superior
> countermeasures for your AA-missiles. But you can have that with a pod
> filled with unguided rockets.

That's also why you have the next generation AAM. A major portion of the
AIM-9 development over the last 50 years (!) has been improvements to
seekers to get Pk up, including in the face of better countermeasures..

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
.. .
>
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > > >
> > > > "Chad Irby" wrote
> > > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I
have
> no
> > > > idea
> > > > > > about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather
> > have
> > > 1,
> > > > 2
> > > > > > or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?
> > > > >
> > > > > It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with
a
> > big
> > > > > automated missile launcher in them.
> > > >
> > > > Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun.
> And
> > > my
> > > > question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when
> you're
> > > > making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some
> of
> > > the
> > > > other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has
to
> > earn
> > > > its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You
> (the
> > > > customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the
aircraft
> > > > thoughout its life.
> > > >
> > > > Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the
> F4H
> > > > configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the
case
> > now.
> > > > Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with
> > "looks
> > > > can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings
much
> to
> > > the
> > > > table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.
> > >
> > > Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using
the
> > > 20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996
> edition
> > of
> > > CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs
> under
> > > 500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers,
> > trenches,
> > > fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open).
Even
> > > given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller
SDB,
> > it
> > > is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use
to
> > > engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter
gap
> > if
> > > you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during
> > > Anaconda.
> >
> > That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd
> expect
> > that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the
> battalion
> > level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire".
>
> There is not a soldier around who would disagree with your objective,
since
> groundpounders generally prefer having "their own" support completely
> in-pocket. But that does not change the fact that there will be
situations,
> like during Anaconda, where the organic support assets are either not
> available (i.e., no arty tubes were within range) or unable to handle the
> scope of the mission (i.e., the mortars that the Anaconda troops did have
> were over-tasked due to the unexpected number of concurrent targets, and
> ammo resupply was problematic being fully dependent upon helos in what had
> already become a less-than-helo-friendly environment). That is where the
> internal gun on the CAS aircraft becomes a means for the commander to
remain
> flexible in how he responds to these "knife fight" situations.

If there's enough of a requirement for gun support in CAS to justify guns
across the fighter fleet, there's an alternative requirement for a
dedicated gun/CAS platform that can live in opposed airspace. We're also
splitting into the a cannon with a_very_large tank of ammo to address the
many, many soft hostiles application and the few, hard targets that require
something like a 30x173. Remember that some of the gun/aircraft combinations
discussed on this thread only carried 150 rounds or so. You won't make too
many passes with that.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mary Shafer > wrote:

> On Sun, 07 Dec 2003 18:34:42 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> > In article >,
> > "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>
> > > That's an extremely large "if", given the extensive air-to-air sensor
> > > suite fitted to the A-10...
> >
> > It's called a "radar warning receiver," and it tells you which direction
> > you're being radiated from. If the other guy isn't using radar, they're
> > proabably not going to see you in the weeds at all from any rational
> > distance.
>
> As I recall, AWACS talks to A-10s. That's a pretty extensive sensor
> suite for the A-10.

....but sometimes, AWACS is just not available, or is too busy to talk to
everyone in range.

> If we're talking about anything like a realistic scenario, there's
> going to be an AWACS.

That was kinda the point. It was an "edge" scenario.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Paul F Austin]

"Chad Irby" wrote
> (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
> > We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
> > for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
> > that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
> > about the GAU-12/U then.
>
> Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
> structure that fell through on closer examination.

Here's the prospective from a contractor's point of view: non-incumbents
bidding into a new requirement have the advantage of the valor of ignorance.
Because the contract is cost plus, in the absence of experience, a new
bidder can make bidding assumptions that <erm> turn out to be different from
reality. The_incumbent_has to know more about the real costs and as a
result, often bids a higher price.

Bidding to fixed price is different. A contractor's management with make
sure the bid price is high enough that they_will_make money. Then there are
disasters like BAE's Nimrod rebuild which scar a generation of managers (the
ones that don't get taken out back and shot). I suspect that BAE will not
bid a fixed price contract again for twenty years.

[Paul F Austin]

"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 20:39:51 +0000, Greg Hennessy > wrote:
>
> >On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 13:21:39 -0600, Alan Minyard >
> >wrote:
> >
> >
> >>>Tony Williams
> >>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
> >>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
> >>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
> >>
> >>You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.
> >>
> >>Al Minyard
> >
> >
> >ROFLMAO! How did you draw that stunning conclusion.
> >
> >
> >greg
>
>
> Well, if you signature is and indication, you are involved in the use
> of serious drugs, not someone that I would assume could make
> rational judgements. The fact that the US chose a different system pretty
> much tells me that the Mauser was (and is) an inferior system.

Al, I'm as patriotic as any, but...

One of the illuminating moments in my engineering career was when I listened
to five companies worth of very imminent engineering teams bidding to the
same set of requirements, each proving catagorically that their wildly
different offerings were each the_only_solution to the customer's problem,
with utter sincerety and honesty. Then the customer elected to buld
internally rather than buy.

Most selections are_very_closely balanced and most of the offerings will do
the job. The difference between winner and also ran will turn on
features_other than_technical performance. In fact, it's the rare
procurement these days that offers any evaluation points at all for
performance above the "goal" level. Instead heaviest weighting is usually
given to Cost, delivery, cost and oh, yes cost. Did I mention cost?

[Alan Minyard]

On 11 Dec 2003 23:33:42 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
>>
>> The really nice thing about the Gatling is that we know it works, and we
>> know it costs less overall for the same general capabilities.
>
>We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
>for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
>that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
>about the GAU-12/U then.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Of course the fact that the Mauser is produced by an enemy country, which
is totally unreliable as a source of spares, is also a consideration.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>
>The case rests...
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions.
You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start
on the second.

Al Minyard

[Tony Volk]

> The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
> to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
> the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
> Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".
> Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
> blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
> 555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.

Hi Ed. Interesting comments. Was it just the Wolfpack who practiced
herding Migs? (ironic, given their name!). "Wolfpack" (by Jerry Scutts)
lists the 433rd as getting just about as many kills as the Triple Nickel.
Were they part of the elite ace-building group too? The Wolfpack group
doesn't go into much detail about any herding tactics (IIRC), so I'd love to
hear more about them. And with the performance of a few key squadrons in GW
I (e.g., 58th), it seems that such tactics might again be the case. Are
there tactical advantages that justify committing aircraft to "herding"
duty, or is it primarily PR-related in trying to make an ace? Thanks,

Tony

[Ed Rasimus]

Don't know who wrote it originally:

>> Again, AWACS is situation-dependent, and there's that oft-quoted
>> statistic about 80% of surviving pilots wondering who shot them down
>> (tracking that statistic to a source is probably good for a PhD thesis -
>> anyone up for funding it? :) )

Would it be snobbish to point out the 80% of pilots who get shot down
have lost or never had situational awareness? Scott O'Grady stories,
anyone?

I don't think your PhD thesis will shed much light on improving combat
effectiveness.

[Greg Hennessy]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 09:24:49 -0600, Alan Minyard >
wrote:


>>greg
>
>
>Well, if you signature is and indication, you are involved in the use
>of serious drugs, not someone that I would assume could make
>rational judgements.

ROFLMAO! Oh how priceless.


> The fact that the US chose a different system pretty
>much tells me that the Mauser was (and is) an inferior system.


It doesnt, it had more to do with the knights who say NiH.



greg



--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

> And it's cheaper still to have a dedicated anti-UAV system, possibly
> like a turboprop P-51. Using a $60M+ fighter to bust $100K UAVs is
> stupid. It's also nearly impossible. A low signature, low altitide
> target loitering along at 100kts is tough to manage in a fast mover.
> You'll blow though a tank of ammunition killing very few UAVs.

They also have these things called "helicopters" that are usually all
over the modern batlefield, and could rip a low/low UAV out of the air
in short order... and they'd certainly use guns.

Gun kills for modern fighters versus high end UAVs would certainly be
cost-effective, though. Why blow off a missile on a Predator, when you
could use a couple of hundred bucks worth of bullets on a gadget that's
not going anywhere fast, and is worth blowing up?

With the increase in UAVs in the world, guns would seem to be at a
premium.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

> If there's enough of a requirement for gun support in CAS to justify guns
> across the fighter fleet, there's an alternative requirement for a
> dedicated gun/CAS platform that can live in opposed airspace.

But that's going opposite of the trend towards *less* types of
airframes. That's why we've only got two near-future fighters in the US
(long range fighter/attack and short-range fighter/attack), and why the
Europeans are trying to go with *one* plane to do all jobs.

We're having enough trouble getting the USAF to keep Warthogs, and those
have been proven bloody useful every time they've come into play.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Magnus Redin" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Hi!
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" > writes:
> > > So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more
> than
> > > "it might be useful and you never know"..
> >
> > A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets
> > like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers
> > forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles.
> >
> > The gun system reuse all the expensive parts, radar, electronics for
> > aiming the aeroplane and the gun while the ammunition can be dumb
> > and is easy to mass produce.
> >
> > It is of course possible to develop a fairly cheap and small low
> > performance AA-missile but it is hard to get it as cheap as a gun
> > system. This gun competitor might be developed if someone decides to
> > arm small UAV:s with AA-missiles for killing other UAV:s and
> > helicopters.
>
> And it's cheaper still to have a dedicated anti-UAV system, possibly like
a
> turboprop P-51.

I doubt that. Are you seriously contending that producing some single-role
anti-UAV aircraft, along with training the pilots, setting up the logistics
support system, etc., ad nauseum, is going to be cheaper than continuing to
install (multi-use) guns in modern (multirole) fighters?

> Using a $60M+ fighter to bust $100K UAVs is stupid.

I suspect it would be less stupid than recreating the whel in the form of
producing and fielding an entirely new line of limited use aircraft.

It's
> also nearly impossible. A low signature, low altitide target loitering
along
> at 100kts is tough to manage in a fast mover. You'll blow though a tank of
> ammunition killing very few UAVs.

Not all UAV's are low signature (at least not so low as to be indetectable
by a fighter). Nor do they all loiter at extremely low altitude (lest they
get plinked by the odd troopie with his rifle or the local SHORAD assets).

Brooks

>
> >
> > And I realy like the idea of a backup weapon if the enemy has superior
> > countermeasures for your AA-missiles. But you can have that with a pod
> > filled with unguided rockets.
>
> That's also why you have the next generation AAM. A major portion of the
> AIM-9 development over the last 50 years (!) has been improvements to
> seekers to get Pk up, including in the face of better countermeasures..
>
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> .. .
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >
> > > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > > > >
> > > > > "Chad Irby" wrote
> > > > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I
> have
> > no
> > > > > idea
> > > > > > > about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you
rather
> > > have
> > > > 1,
> > > > > 2
> > > > > > > or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s
with
> a
> > > big
> > > > > > automated missile launcher in them.
> > > > >
> > > > > Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a
gun.
> > And
> > > > my
> > > > > question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when
> > you're
> > > > > making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or
some
> > of
> > > > the
> > > > > other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has
> to
> > > earn
> > > > > its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You
> > (the
> > > > > customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the
> aircraft
> > > > > thoughout its life.
> > > > >
> > > > > Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year
the
> > F4H
> > > > > configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the
> case
> > > now.
> > > > > Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with
> > > "looks
> > > > > can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings
> much
> > to
> > > > the
> > > > > table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.
> > > >
> > > > Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using
> the
> > > > 20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996
> > edition
> > > of
> > > > CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs
> > under
> > > > 500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers,
> > > trenches,
> > > > fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open).
> Even
> > > > given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller
> SDB,
> > > it
> > > > is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use
> to
> > > > engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter
> gap
> > > if
> > > > you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened
during
> > > > Anaconda.
> > >
> > > That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd
> > expect
> > > that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the
> > battalion
> > > level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire".
> >
> > There is not a soldier around who would disagree with your objective,
> since
> > groundpounders generally prefer having "their own" support completely
> > in-pocket. But that does not change the fact that there will be
> situations,
> > like during Anaconda, where the organic support assets are either not
> > available (i.e., no arty tubes were within range) or unable to handle
the
> > scope of the mission (i.e., the mortars that the Anaconda troops did
have
> > were over-tasked due to the unexpected number of concurrent targets, and
> > ammo resupply was problematic being fully dependent upon helos in what
had
> > already become a less-than-helo-friendly environment). That is where the
> > internal gun on the CAS aircraft becomes a means for the commander to
> remain
> > flexible in how he responds to these "knife fight" situations.
>
> If there's enough of a requirement for gun support in CAS to justify guns
> across the fighter fleet,

If you had not noticed, CAS is flown by aircraft "across the fighter fleet",
so yes, that gun requirement would be universal.

there's an alternative requirement for a
> dedicated gun/CAS platform that can live in opposed airspace.

You are having difficulty with the concept of preserving an admittedly less
likely to be used capability (nobody in their right mind is going to argue
that the gun strafe attack should be a primary role for fast mover type CAS
assets) in order to maintain maximum flexibility and maximize the ability to
support the ground force under all conditions as opposed to the "guns are
the primary asset" alternative. The latter is unwise, and I have not seen
anyone claim the gun should be the primary CAS weapon for fast movers.

We're also
> splitting into the a cannon with a_very_large tank of ammo to address the
> many, many soft hostiles application and the few, hard targets that
require
> something like a 30x173. Remember that some of the gun/aircraft
combinations
> discussed on this thread only carried 150 rounds or so. You won't make too
> many passes with that.

A few passes when the ground guys' butts are in the crack is a heck of a lot
better than no passes at all. And the primary use of the gun in these kind
of strafe attacks is *suppression* of the opposing crunchies and their light
CSW's that are too close to engage with other more destructive weapons, so
the 20mm and 25mm are not going to be significantly worse performers than
your 30mm.

Brooks

>
>

[Ed Rasimus]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 12:51:27 -0500, "Tony Volk"
> wrote:

>> The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
>> to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
>> the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
>> Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".
>> Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
>> blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
>> 555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.
>
> Hi Ed. Interesting comments. Was it just the Wolfpack who practiced
>herding Migs? (ironic, given their name!). "Wolfpack" (by Jerry Scutts)
>lists the 433rd as getting just about as many kills as the Triple Nickel.
>Were they part of the elite ace-building group too? The Wolfpack group
>doesn't go into much detail about any herding tactics (IIRC), so I'd love to
>hear more about them. And with the performance of a few key squadrons in GW
>I (e.g., 58th), it seems that such tactics might again be the case. Are
>there tactical advantages that justify committing aircraft to "herding"
>duty, or is it primarily PR-related in trying to make an ace? Thanks,
>
>Tony

Two different campaigns involved. The "Wolf Pack" was the 8th Wg at
Ubon, with most of the MiG kills coming under the leadership of Robin
Olds from December of '66 through the cessation of Rolling Thunder in
August of '68.

The kills for the Triple Nickel come during LB in '72. At that time
they were the focus of MiGCAP and got the latest goodies for the job,
including Combat Tree, AIM-7E2, AIM-9J, "Agile Eagle" i.e. TCTO-566
with LES and TISEO (although they didn't get to do much with these).
More importantly, the Nickel got packed with Fighter Weapons School
guys who were trained in A/A and tightly integrated with GCI
controllers. Add in the discrete frequencies, the special BVR ROE, the
TEABALL data, etc. and you've got a pretty potent package.

It's all a chess game and the "animals" being herded are cognitive, so
whether it's tactically sound or not will be determined by the
outcome. Clearly sweeps and pincers are pretty effective if you've got
good sensor data.

[Greg Hennessy]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:40 -0600, Alan Minyard >
wrote:


>>Tony Williams
>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
>Of course the fact that the Mauser is produced by an enemy country, which
>is totally unreliable as a source of spares, is also a consideration.
>

Oh christ, you really are that thick. I suggest you figure out where and
who were going to be producing the BK27 variant for the JSF.


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

[Greg Hennessy]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:41 -0600, Alan Minyard >
wrote:

>On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
>>
>>The case rests...
>>
>>Tony Williams
>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
>Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions.
>You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start
>on the second.
>

Coming from a self documenting f8ckwit who couldnt figure out that the BK27
variant as fitted to the JSF was american made, your notion of accuracy is
ever so slightly suspect.


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

[Ron]

>
>But that's going opposite of the trend towards *less* types of
>airframes. That's why we've only got two near-future fighters in the US
>(long range fighter/attack and short-range fighter/attack), and why the
>Europeans are trying to go with *one* plane to do all jobs.

The navy is going even further, to the point where it only plans on having
F-18E/Fs and SH-60s on board carriers.


Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(Ron) wrote:

> >
> >But that's going opposite of the trend towards *less* types of
> >airframes. That's why we've only got two near-future fighters in the US
> >(long range fighter/attack and short-range fighter/attack), and why the
> >Europeans are trying to go with *one* plane to do all jobs.
>
> The navy is going even further, to the point where it only plans on having
> F-18E/Fs and SH-60s on board carriers.

Well, until the F-35 gets into the inventory, and the Osprey is looking
better all of the time.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Tony Williams]

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
> > We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
> > for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
> > that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
> > about the GAU-12/U then.
>
> Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
> structure that fell through on closer examination.

Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
work on hard info rather than forum gossip.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> On 11 Dec 2003 17:47:30 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> >>
> >> Your anti-US bias is noted. The best is the M-61.
> >
> >I gave lots of reasons for my statements. You haven't. So who's biased?
> >
> >Tony Williams
> >Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
> >Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
> You gave lots of unsubstantiated, dated, and incorrect "reasons". That
> hardly improves your reliability. Any one can put up a web page
> full of inaccuracies and innuendo.

Anyone can also post inaccurate innuendo on a forum like this.

Please specify which of my statements are unsubstantiated or incorrect
(I don't care about dated - age doesn't necessarily affect accuracy).
As an armament historian, I do my best to report facts, and have spent
countless hours in the Public Record Office and the Pattern Room
tracking down original documents. Any conclusions I draw are on the
best available evidence I can find. If you have better evidence,
please post it; if its valid, I'll be grateful. If you can't, kindly
stop wasting my time.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> On 11 Dec 2003 17:44:42 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
> >Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> >>
> >> You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.
> >
> >Sources for that statement, please.
> >
> >These quotes are from an official JSF press release:
> >
> >'Citing lower costs, greater lethality and improved supportability,
> >The Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for
> >its next generation JSF combat aircraft.....The gun is also a
> >candidate for the Lockheed Martin version of the JSF...."It's the
> >lightest, most accurate and reliable gun based on our initial studies"
> >said Dennis Muilenburg, JSF weapon system director for Boeing. "Our
> >comparative assessment found the 27mm cannon to be more affordable,
> >more lethal and more supportable than any of its competitors".'
> >
> >Inferior, yeah.
>
> That release is ancient history, but the, you have never let the facts get
> in they way of your "opinions".

I see. So any document which is, let's see, four years old, is
automatically wrong? Please note that the opinions expressed in this
release were not mine, but those of the JSF weapon system director for
Boeing - and that Lockheed had independently chosen the BK 27 even
earlier. So far, you have posted no facts, only opinions...

> >If indeed the 27mm had become too expensive in the meantime, there is
> >only one likely explanation: the Americans spent too much time futzing
> >about with it to 'Americanise' it instead of simply adopting it. It's
> >been a reliable and effective weapon in European service for about two
> >decades in the Tornado and Alpha Jet, is also in service in the Gripen
> >and is about to enter service in the Eurofighter Typhoon.
>
> The aircraft that you mention are not in the same league with the F-22 or the F-35.
> I know that it breaks your little heart, but we are talking real weapons, not the ones
> that you and Mr Arndt fanaticize about.

My oh my. So now the Mauser BK 27 isn't even a 'real weapon', but is
only a fantasy? I'm not the one veering off into fantasy here, and I'm
clearly wasting my time trying to hold a rational discussion. If you
have any factual evidence to back your assertions (assuming you would
recognise it if you saw it), then call me. Otherwise, don't bother.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Chad Irby]

(Tony Williams) wrote:

> Chad Irby > wrote:

> > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
> > structure that fell through on closer examination.
>
> Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
> work on hard info rather than forum gossip.

This talks about the cost issue:

<http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>

"We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
"Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
supplier on a best-value case."

A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
"they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Tony Williams]

"Brett" > wrote in message >...
> "Tony Williams" > wrote:
>
> <...>
>
> | USAF A-10
> | aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
> | 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
> | lock on.
>
> How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF
> JSF?

I don't know - I've never seen a figure quoted.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
> > Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> > > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
> > > structure that fell through on closer examination.
> >
> > Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
> > work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
>
> This talks about the cost issue:
>
> <http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>
>
> "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
> "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
> forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
> supplier on a best-value case."

Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin' :)

> A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
> "they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."

The usual response in that case is to tell the supplier to keep the
price down or lose the contract. With a potentially huge market for
the F-35, Mauser would have to have been mad to throw it away. There
is no inherent reason that I am aware of that the BK 27 should have
been more expensive to make than the GAU-12/U, particularly since both
would have been made in the USA (unless they're planning to save money
on the initial batch by re-using guns from the AV8-B). I remain
suspicious that GD was both the gun integrator and the supplier of the
GAU-12/U; they weren't exactly innocent bystanders.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Brett]

"Tony Williams" > wrote:
| Chad Irby > wrote in message
>...
| > (Tony Williams) wrote:
| >
| > > Chad Irby > wrote:
| >
| > > > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball
pricing
| > > > structure that fell through on closer examination.
| > >
| > > Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like
to
| > > work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
| >
| > This talks about the cost issue:
| >
| > <http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>
| >
| > "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
| > "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we
were
| > forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
| > supplier on a best-value case."
|
| Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
| GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
| proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
| the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin' :)

The comment in the article was "Lockheed Martin originally selected the
BK 27 27mm cannon offered by Boeing [BA] and Mauser in July 2000" which
would have been 5 months after GD had withdrawn its proposal in February
of that year. If that comment is true Lockheed Martin, by default,
selected the only weapon left in the competition.

[Paul F Austin]

"Tony Williams" > wrote in message
m...
> Chad Irby > wrote in message
>...
> > (Tony Williams) wrote:
> >
> > > Chad Irby > wrote:
> >
> > > > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
> > > > structure that fell through on closer examination.
> > >
> > > Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
> > > work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
> >
> > This talks about the cost issue:
> >
> > <http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>
> >
> > "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
> > "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
> > forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
> > supplier on a best-value case."
>
> Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
> GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
> proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
> the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin' :)
>
> > A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
> > "they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."
>
> The usual response in that case is to tell the supplier to keep the
> price down or lose the contract. With a potentially huge market for
> the F-35, Mauser would have to have been mad to throw it away. There
> is no inherent reason that I am aware of that the BK 27 should have
> been more expensive to make than the GAU-12/U, particularly since both
> would have been made in the USA (unless they're planning to save money
> on the initial batch by re-using guns from the AV8-B). I remain
> suspicious that GD was both the gun integrator and the supplier of the
> GAU-12/U; they weren't exactly innocent bystanders.

Do you remember the American production of Roland? Each and every drawing
had to be reproduced with SAE equivalents of all the metric dimensions. That
kind of "Americanization" ran the price up to the point that the AF choked.

[Michael E. Kelly]

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message
>
> It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
> Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
> Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
> extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
> for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

Ed,

I take issue with your last statement, unless you're limiting the
scope of your answer to tacair only. My wing flew 300 sorties during
Anaconda and dropped 845 JDAM's and 24 Mk84's providing excellent on
call air power. Granted we're a heavy bomber and could fly 1000 miles
and then loiter for a few hours, which the fighter guys couldn't do.
I'm sure BUFDRVR can chime in with the BUFF's contribution to CAS in
Afghanistan. It only goes to back up what you've been saying, methods
of delivering CAS are changing.

Cheers,
Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin
Brooks > writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
>> comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
>> forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
>> four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
>> MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
>> chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
>> for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]
>
>Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
>analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
>era---PLEASSSE don't go there!

What do you think my day job is? _Someone_ has to try to work out the
best way to use what we've got, and while the Services take the lead
they also hire some civilian help.


Ed raises some valid criticism of the data as raw numbers, but he agrees
with the main thrust: guns on or off fighters were a trivial factor in
air-to-air combat effectiveness; at least when compared to training,
tactics, doctrine, personnel deployments, maintenance, technology...

Trouble is, the "we did badly because we didn't have guns" mantra is
attractive, seductive... and wrong.


>It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
>the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
>succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
>was...

Too little analysis is as bad as too much.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Tony Williams]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message >...
> "Tony Williams" > wrote in message
> m...
> > Chad Irby > wrote in message
> >...
> > > (Tony Williams) wrote:
> > >
> > > > Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> > > > > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
> > > > > structure that fell through on closer examination.
> > > >
> > > > Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
> > > > work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
> > >
> > > This talks about the cost issue:
> > >
> > > <http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>
> > >
> > > "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
> > > "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
> > > forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
> > > supplier on a best-value case."
> >
> > Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
> > GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
> > proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
> > the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin' :)
> >
> > > A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
> > > "they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."
> >
> > The usual response in that case is to tell the supplier to keep the
> > price down or lose the contract. With a potentially huge market for
> > the F-35, Mauser would have to have been mad to throw it away. There
> > is no inherent reason that I am aware of that the BK 27 should have
> > been more expensive to make than the GAU-12/U, particularly since both
> > would have been made in the USA (unless they're planning to save money
> > on the initial batch by re-using guns from the AV8-B). I remain
> > suspicious that GD was both the gun integrator and the supplier of the
> > GAU-12/U; they weren't exactly innocent bystanders.
>
> Do you remember the American production of Roland? Each and every drawing
> had to be reproduced with SAE equivalents of all the metric dimensions. That
> kind of "Americanization" ran the price up to the point that the AF choked.

Yes, something like that is what I assumed in the first place.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

"Brett" > wrote in message >...
> "Tony Williams" > wrote:
> | Chad Irby > wrote in message
> >...
> | > (Tony Williams) wrote:
> | >
> | > > Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> | > > > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball
> pricing
> | > > > structure that fell through on closer examination.
> | > >
> | > > Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like
> to
> | > > work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
> | >
> | > This talks about the cost issue:
> | >
> | > <http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>
> | >
> | > "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
> | > "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we
> were
> | > forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
> | > supplier on a best-value case."
> |
> | Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
> | GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
> | proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
> | the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin' :)
>
> The comment in the article was "Lockheed Martin originally selected the
> BK 27 27mm cannon offered by Boeing [BA] and Mauser in July 2000" which
> would have been 5 months after GD had withdrawn its proposal in February
> of that year. If that comment is true Lockheed Martin, by default,
> selected the only weapon left in the competition.

Sorry, I was mixing it up with Boeing. I have a print-off of an item
from 'Defence Systems Daily' dated April 29th, 1999, which says: "The
Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for its
next-generation JSF combat aircraft...The gun is also a candidate for
the Lockheed-Martin version of the JSF."

Presumably GD saw the writing on the wall. Why else would they
withdraw their gun, which they seem more than happy to provide now?

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin
Brooks > writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
>> certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
>> capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
>> seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
>> training burden)
>
>The training burden? For gosh sakes, you already have to have armorers,

Trained gun-fitters and repair teams, and the logistic pipeline to
support them, cost money.

>and
>I doubt that including a periodic requirement for the pilots to do some
>range work would be that great a burden--it is after all what they do during
>peacetime.

Try costing up the aircraft, the range, the targets (whether air-to-air
or air-to-ground), the equipment to provide useful feedback and training
(because 'pulled trigger, gun made loud noise, came home, landed' is not
useful training) and it adds up with alarming rapidity.

>> How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?
>
>Apparently a pretty decent one including F-15E's, F-16's, and A-10's as
>well, from what I have read of the reports on Anaconda.

I'd heard the A-10s got pulled early due to hot/high problems, and given
the frequent sniping at the F-16's range I'm surprised to hear it doing
significant long-range loiter.

>> How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
>> judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
>> in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
>> and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
>> help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
>> little result.
>
>Actually, one senior US Army commander *did* sort of hammer the CAS effort
>after-the-fact, though not specifically directed at the strafe operations.
>Some of his comments were valid, and some were likely as not an attempt to
>shovel off blame that he should have borne on his own shoulders. As to
>effect, the reports I read varied, with some indicating that in some
>instances they ended up having to resort to using PGM's a lot closer than
>they originally cared to in order to finally destroy the target (and in at
>least one case that almost literally "blew up in their face", so to speak,
>yielding a quick, "you almost got us with that last bomb" from the CCT). I
>recall two reports indicated that the strafes were on target and at least
>suppressed the bad guys (and sometimes suppression is the best you can hope
>for).

According to

http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports/afghanlessons_airwar_exec.pdf

the US flew 17,500 combat sorties over Afghanistan, of which you've
heard of several failed strafes ('danger close' sorties where the gun
passes failed to stop the enemy, leading to 'even more dangerously
close' use of other munitions) and two cases where the enemy was
'suppressed'. Guesstimate two aircraft in each case for eight sorties
with a 50% success rate.

It's not an enormously convincing argument that the existing gun
armament is a potent and essential CAS tool, is it? Either the gun needs
to be made significantly more effective in order to increase its
lethality and utilisation... or it needs replacing with something better
able to provide _effective_ close fire to troops in combat.

Burdening most of your tactical air fleet with a thousand pounds of
ballast that's used on 0.05% of combat sorties is

>> As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
>> fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
>> effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
>> aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
>> out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)
>
>Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is
>it?

And you describe above how in at least one case, strafing failed to
deter the enemy and heavier weapons had to be resorted to.

Similarly, one drag on developing a weapon for danger-close CAS is the
airy claim that "that's what the gun is for" when its effectiveness is
patchy (some reports of 'suppression' when it was used, but others where
the enemy declined to be deterred)

>Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
>get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
>interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda
>participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
>AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
>those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. Imagine a scenario
>where the bad guy has a better MANPADS capability and you are stuck in a
>similar (daytime) situation--which would you rather commit to making
>strafing runs to suppress the bad guys, fast-movers or that AC-130? If you
>are as concerned about risk as you claim, you know what the answer to that
>one is.

Sounds like there's a need for a similar weight and accuracy of fire as
the AC-130 can deliver, but with the survivability of a fast jet.

In your scenario, neither aircraft is particularly suitable: if the
AC-130 can't survive the SAM threat, repeated passes by fast movers will
also get them speared by those improved MANPADS (especially since
they're delivering a lot less firepower and so *need* to make multiple
passes through the weapon envelope of an alerted enemy... this is what
is technically known as a Really Bad Idea).

>> Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
>> available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
>> necessary" is a shaky proposition.
>
>Better than, "This was not available, so it could not be used, and we lost a
>lot of guys", IMO.

So where's the evidence for that?

>> Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
>> "really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
>> and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
>> low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
>> on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
>> is now and forever a fixture.
>
>OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a
>participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
>*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to
>*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide
>available to be tried first? I wouldn't.

And the only options are 20mm cannon or 2000lb bombs? Think again. If
this is a genuine and frequent need, neither weapon is appropriate.

>> What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
>> Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
>> different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
>> option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?
>
>For gosh sakes, Paul, we are talking a real world example where the M61 was
>their best hope, at least initially.

No, we're talking about current and future procurement.

Unless you plan your only combat to be action replays, then you need to
learn what worked and what didn't; decide what lessons are valid and
which were special cases; and then plan for the future so you do more of
what worked, less of what didn't work and learn from the Lessons
Identified.

>> Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
>> existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
>> procure in the future.
>
>So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well
>as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that
>will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find
>itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and
>STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?

About as acceptable as declaring that there's no particular problem that
a few strafing passes won't completely solve.

>> What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
>> serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
>> unless someone's willing to take some risks.
>
>Taking risks is inherent to military operations. METT-T rules, and the
>commanders get paid to weigh those risks versus gains. If you are claiming
>otherwise, then thank goodness our fathers who fought in WWII did not take
>that view.

I'm not the one claiming four situations in 17,500 sorties demonstrates
a completely untouchable situation, Kevin.

Taking out an aircraft's gun is a risk (that somewhere in the future,
horrible things will happen for the lack of a strafing pass) but also an
opportunity (that's a thousand pounds more disposable load to use, and
training time freed up - now how to best use it?)

If there's a marginal capability (like danger-close CAS), does the gun
actually add much to it? Does it happen often enough to justify the very
real costs? Is there a better solution available or capable of
development?

Is it an unacceptable risk? Well, according to some... but then you get
into the mutual contradictions of "guns are essential weapons" and "it's
not worth developing anything better".


And it was my grandfather who fought in WW2, only his war started even
earlier than usual: he got a two-day head start on British and French
troops.

>> The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
>> possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
>> They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
>> straight-line path... like a strafing run.
>
>No, they are even more lethal to that guy flying the AC-130,

Who has the option of operating above the light AAA, though MANPADS are
a problem there too.

>or to those
>guys flying the cargo helos in to haul all those mortar and arty rounds that
>you would prefer we use exclusively.

Given that the mortars should be one to two miles back at least (for
81mm tubes, more for 120s) and artillery five to ten miles, that is one
_hell_ of a light AA gun or man-portable SAM that can detect and hit a
cargo flight at that distance while in contact with friendly troops and
under artillery fire. It's a *lot* easier to acquire and shoot at the
Big Loud Plane that just flew overhead.

If the enemy air defences are _that_ good, you're definitely not wanting
to fly strafing passes.

>> Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
>> a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
>> not the best solution to the problem.
>
>I'd imagine had you been with those guys from the 10th LID who were so happy
>to get those strafing runs you'd have a slightly different view of the value
>of retaining that capability, as distasteful as having to resort to its use
>may be.

>> But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
>> line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
>> Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
>> a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
>> themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
>> significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
>> load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
>> of their main armament?
>
>Not if their main armamnet was incapable of handling the situation that
>arose. That is the differnce, when viewed against the Anaconda model.

In at least one case the main armament had to be used anyway,
danger-close be damned.

>Had
>you taken up that M61 space and crammed a few new radios, or another few
>pounds of fuel onboard, it would still not have allowed those CAS aircraft
>to do what they were *there* to do, which was support the troops engaged, no
>matter how close the separation of the two combatants. With the M61's they
>did that.

In four cases, with patchy results at best.

How about improving ground-to-air comms to shorten the targeting cycle?
More fuel, meaning more loiter time per aircraft, for more responsive
support? Both reduce the time needed from call-for-fire to delivery;
meaning instead of 'suppressing' the enemy with strafing passes, they
can be engaged with destructive weapons because they've had less time to
close. Or more payload, for a new munition that's got both short
danger-close and high lethality on target?

Again, you're not talking "a few pounds", you're talking about half a
ton: some wags would have you believe you could double an F-16's payload
that way. ("Wall-to-wall bombs today, boys, I'm carrying BOTH Mark
82s!")

>> The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
>> five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
>> was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
>> hot-and-high conditions.
>
>Those AH-64's were indeed getting hammered--but because they hung around and
>continued to press home repeated gun runs against the critical targets. How
>many AH-64 crews were lost? None.

How many missions did they fly the next day? None. How much ordnance did
they deliver? None.

>How many lives did they save on the
>ground? We'll never know.

And how many helicopters were available to fly sorties the next day, and
the day after, and how many men could have died as a result? Or, what
was cancelled because the air support they needed for backup suddenly
wasn't there?

Losing a half-squadron of AH-64s in a single incident suggests that
there's a serious capability gap, not that the existing systems are just
fine.

Similarly, 88% attrition is _not_ sustainable.

>> The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
>> fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.
>
>They wanted fire that would not also kill them in the bargain, which is why
>they repeatedly *requested* strafe, again and again. In some cases they
>later resorted to using LGB's, with the curious methos of walking them in as
>if they were conventional rounds, from what I could decypher. And yet they
>still continued to request gun runs...wonder why?

Because those were the only two options available to them, and neither
sound satisfactory: the LGBs worryingly lethal over too large an area,
the gun runs inadequately lethal.

>> I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
>> coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
>> available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
>> without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..
>
>Yep, and what was available that day (or days, as IIRC this lasted well into
>the next day) was CAS, and what those soldiers kept asking for from the CAS
>was guns, at least in the early stages. Tells me they liked the guns.

Tells me they need another option available to them.

>> Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
>> tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
>> Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
>> emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
>> into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?
>
>It is not that important an issue. The fact is that all of the incoming
>aircraft we will be fighting with in the foreseeable future, minus the STOVL
>version of the F-35, have guns included in their armament suites. I say
>great, keep 'em and keep that flexibility they give us.

It must be wonderful having that much budget.

>> Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
>> internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.
>
>From what I gather that was dictated by the addition of the STOVL
>capability, which necessitates making room for the lift fan, etc.

But the STOVL version is more, not less, likely to be performing CAS.
How then can the gun be optional, if it's so effective and essential?

>> If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
>> I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.
>>
>> And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
>> breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
>> more time between those absences.
>
>Those absences are kind of meaningless if the alternative is another couple
>of circuits with an arament suite that does not allow you to serve the
>customers down below, aren't they?

Yet again, armament suites are not fixed forever.

>I doubt the groundpounder down below who
>is in a situation where his options are such that he wants a strafe/can't
>risk even a PGM is going to be very relieved by the knowledge that his CAS
>stack can do a few more circles without being able to actually handle his
>request.

Having the enemy "suppressed" for a pass or two is not a great return on
investment either.

Neither is having to use those PGMs even closer than the original "too
close" because the gun runs didn't do the job.

>> How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
>> stack'?
>
>It does NOT matter if that CAS asset can't conduct the kind of attack you
>need!

So you don't have the right weapons for the job? (20mm lacks
effectiveness, current PGMs too generous in their danger zones)

Bear in mind you're making force-wide assertions on the basis of 0.05%
of the offensive air sorties here.

>> I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
>> so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
>> you've also got something badly wrong.
>
>You just don't get it, do you? "**** happens" in combat, and flexibility is
>what allows you to adjust. having that aerial gun option is a tool for
>flexibility.

http://www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml
+++++
Combat controller recalls Operation Anaconda
by Tech. Sgt. Ginger Schreitmueller
Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking
our lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and
strafe the area with guns," said the sergeant.

The aircraft made a low and hard sweep over the entrenched area, popping
off rounds at the enemy troops.

"You could see the snow flying off the ground near the bunker and I knew
he was hitting it," said Brown.

The aircraft made several more passes at the enemy before indicating he
was out of ammo.

Despite the thousands of rounds pitting the area, the al-Qaida forces
kept firing.

"I kept yelling across the area at the platoon leader about our options
to eliminate the bunker,� said Brown. “We coordinated on what we
needed to do to 'frag' out the enemy and blow the bunker. We knew the
bad guys were still hiding in the bunker. We were already two hours into
the fight and it was only going to get worse if we couldn't take down
their position."

Using his close air support training and skills, Brown targeted the spot
using precision bombs. The need was urgent as additional al-Qaida troops
were pulling up the mountaintop toward the U.S. team.

"If we couldn't kill the bunker, we were going to be surrounded,� said
Brown. “We knew that we had enemy soldiers hiding in the terrain to
our (right). Effectively, they were moving in on us and we had nowhere
to go."

The danger-close call proved effective, as the bombs skidded across the
side of the mountain just in time and collapsed the bunker.

"The noise was just like it sounds in the movies," said Brown. "You
could smell the burning pine off the trees and see the snow kicking off
the ground."

<snip>

But with the bunker out of action and the enemy forces moving up toward
the Americans, Brown turned his attention to the rock and tree cluster
on the other side of the landing zone.

"Since I couldn't use target designators, I needed some marking to be
able to talk the bombs onto target," said Brown. "I used a small tree I
referred to as the bonsai tree as a reference point."

Brown cleared a fighter pilot to drop bombs. When the smoke cleared the
tree was now just a stick in the ground, he said.

Enemy resistance waned and Brown took a breath."
+++++

Doesn't sound like the 'flexibility' of having a gun helped much, except
to waste time; and they lost seven men in that firefight. There's an
identified need for a more effective danger-close weapon, but the gun
doesn't seem to be it.


Another account of that battle from SSgt Vance at

http://globalspecops.com/sts.html

includes the following two excerpts:

+++++
"I told the combat controller to have the F-15s to strafe the bunker and
have them come in from our right to our left. The CCT repeated what I
said. He was smart enough that I did not have to tell him too much
detail of what to say on the radio. We used the position of the
helicopter to give clock directions. He had basic knowledge of CAS so I
could tell him to have the fighters do gun runs on an area from which
direction and he would get on the radio and make it happen. The first
F-15 pass was really close and I was uncomfortable because I could not
tell if the guns were pointing at my team or the enemy bunker so I told
the CCT to abort it. I told him to have them come in more from behind
us, so I could tell they were not pointing at us. I told him to clear
them and the rounds hit right by the bunker. I told him to have them do
that over and over again. I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s
and F-16s. For the first 10-15 minutes, the CCT thought I was the team
leader. He yelled to me 'team leader' when the team leader was sitting
next to him. At this point, the team member who was injured in the leg
and could not move easily was facing one way. Another Sgt. and I were
pulling security on the bunker. The Platoon Leader and I tried to
determine where would be a good landing zone. The fighters did some more
gun runs and the enemy was still jumping up shooting at us."

<snip>

"I asked the medic 'if we hang out here, how many guys are going to
die?" The medic said at least two, maybe three. I reported to
Controller 'it is a cold PZ and we are going to lose three if we wait.
Just as I said it was a cold PZ, we were shot at. However, we could have
made it cold by the time they got the helicopters in there. It was just
every once and while the enemy would take pop shots at us. If we had CAS
on station dropping bombs, we could have gotten out of there at that
time. I told CCT to drop bombs down in the valley and on the small hill
every now and again. Every time the plane showed up and you could hear
them, we weren't being
shot at. Just having the planes nearby kept the enemy away. Continuously
dropping bombs discouraged them from coming after us. So every now and
again, we would drop bombs on them with B52s, B-1s, those were the last
aircraft we had. I cannot remember which one."
+++++

Again, not a ringing endorsement of the strafing runs...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin
Brooks > writes
>"Jake McGuire" > wrote in message
om...
>> It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
>> support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
>> support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
>> with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
>> not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
>> passes before he's out of ammunition.
>
>Well, you kind of snipped away the related bit about the scenario where you
>are well within danger-close and under a significant MANPADS threat during
>daytime, which sort of eliminates the AC-130 from the running. The point
>was that the groundpounders found the guns a better starting point for CAS
>during that operation than PGM's. Are you claiming that the 10th LID and
>101st AASLT DIV folks did not like getting that 20mm strafe support they
>received from the F-15E's and F-16's that day?

It didn't do them much good, compared to the numerous bombs they called
in. Read SSgt Vance's testimony: where the al-Qaeda troops kept firing
despite the strafing, their position was destroyed with bombs, and lack
of bombs (not guns) was cited as a significant delay in their
extraction, which contributed to at least one death (SrA Jason D.
Cunningham, who was badly wounded and died before being evacuated)

>Your mistake is to assume
>> that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
>> the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
>> and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
>> then it's always possible to develop something better.
>
>Your mistake is drawing the wrong conclusions based upon different platform
>requirements, for starters. APKWS is a Hydra-based (or Hellfire based)
>solution (neither is scheduled for USAF use)

Is it forever impossible for the USAF to use those weapons, or are they
just not in the current plan?

>, and just like the option of
>using a gun pod, requires specific load out.

You can carry plenty of APKWS with the weight freed up by deleting a
gun: so an aircraft tasked for CAS gains capability without losing
weapons or fuel.

>In other words if your existing
>CAS support package does not have it onboard when they show up, or are
>routed in based upon urgent need, and the separation between forces
>precludes use of larger PGM's, the ground guys are out of luck.

So where CAS is a likely diversion, then standard loadout includes a
seven-round APKWS launcher (just as sorties over parts of the FRY used
to require an anti-radar missile either per aircraft or per flight,
IIRC). When you've freed up a thousand pounds, using a quarter of that
for contingency CAS isn't a large problem.

>OTOH, if
>they have their trusty internal cannon the ground guys will get at least
>some form of support.

With very marginal effect, however.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Magnus Redin
> writes
>Hi!
>
>"Paul F Austin" > writes:
>> So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than
>> "it might be useful and you never know"..
>
>A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets
>like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers
>forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles.

UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
to need so many rounds per target.

>It is of course possible to develop a fairly cheap and small low
>performance AA-missile but it is hard to get it as cheap as a gun
>system.

"a gun", or "a gun system"? Be careful about actually costing everything
you need for a gun system, including the total cost of the training
sorties needed for pilots to reliably hit Predator-size or smaller
targets.

>This gun competitor might be developed if someone decides to
>arm small UAV:s with AA-missiles for killing other UAV:s and
>helicopters.

See the armed variant of Predator already for the air-to-ground
version...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>> Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
>> sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe
>
>And all the missiles won't help much in this case, either.

Why not? An aircraft diving away in afterburner is an excellent missile
target.

Now, AIM-9B lacked the range and clutter rejection for that scenario,
but it was a 1950s design; and the AIM-7D likewise wasn't useful but was
also a 1950s design.

Try that same attack against modern aircraft, and you'll still avoid the
guns shot: but you'll get a late-model Sidewinder for your pains, or an
AIM-120 as you extend.

On the other hand, the M61 cannon isn't effective in either scenario.

>> and won't help you chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.
>
>Actually, that's *exactly* what it would do, if you're out of missiles.

There seems to be this romantical view that fighter pilots, out of
ordnance and committed to their mission, will drop everything for a
fangs-out pursuit of a fleeing foe.

Do you have the fuel for the prolonged tailchase required to get into
guns range, manoeuvre for the kill, then get home? Remember, the enemy
aircraft is ahead of you, out of range, with a substantial speed
advantage.

Where is he leading you, as you try to accelerate and overtake? Are you
being lured into a SAMtrap, or is his another MiG lining up for a shot
as you fixate on that target? You'll cover a lot of ground before you
get him into 20mm range, and he's most unlikely to be leading you
towards _your_ friends.

Didn't you have somewhere else you needed to be, such as dropping chaff
or dropping bombs?

What happens when some of his friends join the party, you being down to
guns only?

>> So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
>> I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.
>
>If you want to find that out, find it yourself. *You're* the one who
>wants that data. Let us know how it goes. Until you do, that other
>comparison is still pretty useless.

In other words, "don't confuse me with facts, my mind is made up".

>> This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
>> flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
>> Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
>> guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?
>
>They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
>missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
>discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Especially when your tactic dictates firing "all available weapons" in a
salvo of whatever you had selected.
>
>Even carrying four and four (on the Phantom), that gives you only four
>long range shots and four short range shots. In Vietnam, it was a
>fairly sharp distinction, since the Sparrow kinda sucked at short range.
>
>Once those are gone, you're done. No more shots, go home or fly around
>and hope nobody shows up.

Given that Sidewinder was achieving nearly 50% kills-per-shot by war's
end (AIM-9G, fifty fired for 23 kills) and the actual number of firing
opportunities, that's less of a problem than you'd think: the number of
times an enemy aircraft dances temptingly in front of one's own is much
less than most flight-sim games would have you believe.

>And what do you do if something goes wrong with your radar,

Then your gun is in a lot of trouble, since it depends heavily on the
radar to generate its fire-control solution.

>or if you're
>in the middle of a dogfight with a bunch of your guys and a bunch of
>other guys (we still lose fighters to fratricide from radar and IR
>missiles, you know)?

When was the last air-to-air combat fratricide (by which I mean a shot
taken at an enemy aircraft diverted and destroyed a friendly)?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Mary Shafer
> writes
>On Mon, 8 Dec 2003 23:13:38 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:
>> Again, AWACS is situation-dependent, and there's that oft-quoted
>> statistic about 80% of surviving pilots wondering who shot them down
>> (tracking that statistic to a source is probably good for a PhD thesis -
>> anyone up for funding it? :) )
>
>I got a fair way toward a conference paper on it, with the help of the
>guys at Wright-Pat. The conclusion is very limited because it's based
>on very limited data, more like randomly-collected anecdote, long
>before AWACS or modern RWR. I wouldn't use it to try to support my
>arguments about modern air warfare.

Thought so (and I recall you mentioning your studies on it in the past).
It seems to be one of those guesstimates that hang around enough to
become rules of thumb, without ever being really validated.

>> Again, for real life this isn't much of a problem because the A-10
>> operates in total air supremacy and has never had an enemy aircraft ever
>> get a chance to shoot at it (rendering the preparations of the A-10
>> crews to fight back untested).
>
>I don't think that's right. We know that two A-10s nailed helos in
>'91, so the possibility of helo-A-10 combat has to be considered.
>If an A-10 can get a helo kill with a gun designed for air-to-ground,
>then a helo with such a gun can do the same thing to the A-10.

True to a point, but there are significant differences; a flexible-mount
gun on the helicopter has a lot more dispersion, less muzzle velocity
and a much lower rate of fire than the 30mm in the A-10 (using the M230
on the AH-64 as a comparison - it's one of the bigger helo guns)

The helicopter's gun is at several disadvantages in terms of its hit
probability, worsened because it's got a faster target to try to hit.

>Restricting armament to its advertised role is silly. Just ask the
>Argentineans in that ship that the Royal Marines pasted with their
>Carl Gustavs.

True to a point, but while the Guerrico retreated out of small-arms
range it didn't stop them bombarding Lt. Keith Mills's position with
100mm shellfire, or prevent Mills and his 22 men having to surrender.

>Or the F-15 that nailed the helo with the 500-lb dumb
>bomb. Having seen those happen, the idea of an A-10 going up against
>an enemy aircraft doesn't seem so far-fetched.

True again, which is why you usually see them with a pair of Sidewinders
under one wing :)

>> This is too true, sadly, and imposes all sorts of limits on open debate.
>
>I don't think it's that kind of limitation. I think it's more like
>there being too many scenarios to really predict accurately. Most of
>them are going to be kind of unexpected, which makes it hard to
>predict.

Trouble is, someone has to at least try: there simply isn't the budget
to prepare fully for all possible scenarios.

>> I hate to be contrarian... all right, I don't. I _like_ being
>> contrarian. Lessons from the past suggest that getting missiles working
>> and crews trained is a better path to dead enemies for air-to-air work.
>> Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s that
>> isn't healthy.
>
>The fighter world decided this once before, you know. They were wrong.

Correct: but does that mean the situation has not changed since then?

>A lot of this discussion is assuming, rightly or
>wrongly, that the only scenario is the overwhelming Western military
>against some over-classed small country. That may not be a good
>assumption.

Actually, quite a bit of my thinking is precisely that the Next
Enemy(TM) may be significantly more capable, and able to exploit any
mistakes, gaps or problems more effectively.

>What about India and Pakistan? Are they going to be fighting the same
>kind of air war? Probably not. The UK and Argentina fought something
>a lot different from either anti-Iraqi action.

And the clear, obvious lessons in the air war there were that the Sea
Harrier's guns were not effective air-to-air weapons: what was needed
was (a) more missiles, (b) longer-ranged missiles.
>
>We design and build most of our aircraft for export as well as
>domestic use (for pretty much every current "we"), so it's important
>not to get too fixated on one combat scenario. We may have to put
>guns into fighters to keep aircraft salable, after all.

I'd suggest that's a very French approach :)

"Never mind what *our* forces actually need... we've got to make a
profit on export, so we'll build something that will sell overseas and
Our Boys will just have to cope with it"

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Chad Irby
> writes
>In article >,
> "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>
>> If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
>> a complete and satisfactory answer?
>
>It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."
>
>It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
>bloody useful."

In other words, guns solve the problem? Not according to the facts they
don't: in fact they're pretty damn marginal (and not cheap either).

>We learned that lesson over 30 years ago,

And of course, nothing has changed since then. (Well, the M61 hasn't...)

> and a whole new generation of
>bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
>McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...

Actually, one key mistake McNamara's crowd made was to extrapolate
conclusions without information. Case in point, the "get rid of guns"
idea: made sense for a fleet air defence interceptor, but not for a
general-purpose fighter when its missiles had not even been tested in
trials against manoeuvring fighter-size targets (and when the trial was
belatedly undertaken, the AIM-9B missed every time).

Once the missiles have demonstrated ~80% lethality in actual combat
against real enemies doing their best to survive, then perhaps there's
more evidence to support the analysis. Oh, I forget - they did that
twenty-one years ago.


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Magnus Redin]

Hi!

"Paul J. Adam" > writes:
> UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size
> of them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're
> going to need so many rounds per target.

I know to little about the precision to say anything about how small
UAV:s for instance a Gripen can hit reliably with its gun. And it is
undoubtly quite secret.

> "a gun", or "a gun system"? Be careful about actually costing
> everything you need for a gun system, including the total cost of
> the training sorties needed for pilots to reliably hit Predator-size
> or smaller targets.

Definately gun system since a gun on an aeroplane is not especially
usefull withouth a good radar for aiming and fly-by-wire to aim the
gun(aeroplane). Why would hitting UAV:s require extensive training?
The pilots job is as usual to keep situational awareness. It is the
aeroplanes job to do the flying/aiming required to hit small and slow
targets. You still need the radar, fly by wire system and general
pilot training. What is added besides the gun is the software cost for
the autopilot and the testing. And the research work is also useful
for autonomous UAV:s.

What would be realy expensive is to develop and deploy a special slow
flying UAV-hunter. You get a lot more flexibility for your investment
if you buy additional Gripens, F18-E/F:s, F-35:s etc. And since you
anyway carry the gun and ammunition you can hunt UAV:s as targets of
opportunity on your way to and from other missions.

Best regards,

[Brett]

"Tony Williams" > wrote:
| "Brett" > wrote in message
>...
| > "Tony Williams" > wrote:
| > | Chad Irby > wrote in message
| > >...
| > | > (Tony Williams) wrote:
| > | >
| > | > > Chad Irby > wrote:
| >
| > | > > > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball
| > pricing
| > | > > > structure that fell through on closer examination.
| > | > >
| > | > > Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I
like
| > to
| > | > > work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
| > | >
| > | > This talks about the cost issue:
| > | >
| > | > <http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>
| > | >
| > | > "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he
said.
| > | > "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that
we
| > were
| > | > forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
| > | > supplier on a best-value case."
| > |
| > | Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered
its
| > | GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew
its
| > | proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had
selected
| > | the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin' :)
| >
| > The comment in the article was "Lockheed Martin originally selected
the
| > BK 27 27mm cannon offered by Boeing [BA] and Mauser in July 2000"
which
| > would have been 5 months after GD had withdrawn its proposal in
February
| > of that year. If that comment is true Lockheed Martin, by default,
| > selected the only weapon left in the competition.
|
| Sorry, I was mixing it up with Boeing. I have a print-off of an item
| from 'Defence Systems Daily' dated April 29th, 1999, which says: "The
| Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for its
| next-generation JSF combat aircraft...The gun is also a candidate for
| the Lockheed-Martin version of the JSF."
|
| Presumably GD saw the writing on the wall.

They probably did, they started the process to buy Primex Technologies
before the end of 2000, and if the Government didn't get involved they
would have owned Boeing Ordnance as well before the end of 2001.

| Why else would they
| withdraw their gun, which they seem more than happy to provide now?

The RAF dropped the BK27 cannon from their Typhoon's because it was
supposedly "too expensive". The defense budget may be large it isn't
bottomless.

[Bertil Jonell]

In article >,
Paul J. Adam > wrote:
>UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
>them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
>to need so many rounds per target.

Against so small targets a proximity fuzed shell, or a timed-fuzed
cannister round would be much more effective. The size means that you
don't need direct impacts of 20mm+ to bring it down, and the increased
probability of getting a hit with preformed fragments/subprojectiles
might[1] compensate for the small size.

[1] Well, I think so at least:) But you'd need to run tests on it to
be sure.

>Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

-bertil-
--
"It can be shown that for any nutty theory, beyond-the-fringe political view or
strange religion there exists a proponent on the Net. The proof is left as an
exercise for your kill-file."

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Kevin
> Brooks > writes
> >"Jake McGuire" > wrote in message
> om...
> >> It points out the value that the ground troops placed on AC-130
> >> support. Which is naturally much more effective than fighter strafing
> >> support, as the AC-130 has more, larger guns, on trainable mounts,
> >> with dedicated gunners, and a very long loiter capability. This is
> >> not the same as a fighter that can make two or three 20mm strafing
> >> passes before he's out of ammunition.
> >
> >Well, you kind of snipped away the related bit about the scenario where
you
> >are well within danger-close and under a significant MANPADS threat
during
> >daytime, which sort of eliminates the AC-130 from the running. The point
> >was that the groundpounders found the guns a better starting point for
CAS
> >during that operation than PGM's. Are you claiming that the 10th LID and
> >101st AASLT DIV folks did not like getting that 20mm strafe support they
> >received from the F-15E's and F-16's that day?
>
> It didn't do them much good, compared to the numerous bombs they called
> in. Read SSgt Vance's testimony: where the al-Qaeda troops kept firing
> despite the strafing, their position was destroyed with bombs, and lack
> of bombs (not guns) was cited as a significant delay in their
> extraction, which contributed to at least one death (SrA Jason D.
> Cunningham, who was badly wounded and died before being evacuated)

More likely they still enjoyed getting that strafe support for suppression
purposes. I note one CCT member's description of the change in situation
that finally required sucking up doing the danger-close bomb work:

"If we couldn't kill the bunker, we were going to be surrounded," said
Brown. "We knew that we had enemy soldiers hiding in the terrain to our
(right). Effectively, they were moving in on us and we had nowhere to go."
www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml

So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright
survival--understandable IMO.

And that site indicates the controller's name was SSG Gabe Brown, not
"Vance"--being as it is a USAF source I'd trust it.

>
> >Your mistake is to assume
> >> that this is always going to be the case. The Small Diameter Bomb and
> >> the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System both address this issue,
> >> and address it very well. And if they don't do a good enough job,
> >> then it's always possible to develop something better.
> >
> >Your mistake is drawing the wrong conclusions based upon different
platform
> >requirements, for starters. APKWS is a Hydra-based (or Hellfire based)
> >solution (neither is scheduled for USAF use)
>
> Is it forever impossible for the USAF to use those weapons, or are they
> just not in the current plan?

APKWS is currently planned for use only on rotary assets, beginning in 2006
IIRC.

>
> >, and just like the option of
> >using a gun pod, requires specific load out.
>
> You can carry plenty of APKWS with the weight freed up by deleting a
> gun: so an aircraft tasked for CAS gains capability without losing
> weapons or fuel.

Huh? Not if those weapons are not loaded out prior to departure. You do
realize the difference between preplanned and immediate CAS requests, right?
And what the timing cycle for the ATO is? And that in the end, regardless of
any specific loadout requested by the supported ground element, some gent in
the CAOC is actually going to decided what the external load is going to be
(been there--requested a mixed load including Gator to suppress OPFOR arty
assets (specifically the DAG) and was told, "We'll decide on the munitions
loadout, thank you very much")? So the idea that you can *depend* on the CAS
package to have these mythical USAF APKWS is highly questionable to say the
least.

>
> >In other words if your existing
> >CAS support package does not have it onboard when they show up, or are
> >routed in based upon urgent need, and the separation between forces
> >precludes use of larger PGM's, the ground guys are out of luck.
>
> So where CAS is a likely diversion, then standard loadout includes a
> seven-round APKWS launcher (just as sorties over parts of the FRY used
> to require an anti-radar missile either per aircraft or per flight,
> IIRC). When you've freed up a thousand pounds, using a quarter of that
> for contingency CAS isn't a large problem.

FYI, that little seven load RL still takes up a hardpoint, which is why no,
you *can't* plan on it being included as standard.

>
> >OTOH, if
> >they have their trusty internal cannon the ground guys will get at least
> >some form of support.
>
> With very marginal effect, however.

Again, since there were repeated requests for just that level of support
during Anaconda, and given that it is a common sense starting point to use
the safest (to your own force) option before moving up the risk category,
the gun provides that additional level of flexibility. I seriously doubt
were you in the position of calling in that "oh, ****" mission with the bad
guys well within the danger close margin for bombs that you'd have leaped
immediately to that riskiest of options. You seem to forget that the min
separation factor for 20mm is *25 meters*, while for bombs that minimum
jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in a
protected or open position). Big gap between those figures, and elevating
yourself to the higher danger close risk category from the outset seems a
bit ridiculous to me.

Brooks

>

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin Brooks
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> It didn't do them much good, compared to the numerous bombs they called
>> in. Read SSgt Vance's testimony: where the al-Qaeda troops kept firing
>> despite the strafing, their position was destroyed with bombs, and lack
>> of bombs (not guns) was cited as a significant delay in their
>> extraction, which contributed to at least one death (SrA Jason D.
>> Cunningham, who was badly wounded and died before being evacuated)
>
>More likely they still enjoyed getting that strafe support for suppression
>purposes. I note one CCT member's description of the change in situation
>that finally required sucking up doing the danger-close bomb work:
>
>"If we couldn't kill the bunker, we were going to be surrounded," said
>Brown. "We knew that we had enemy soldiers hiding in the terrain to our
>(right). Effectively, they were moving in on us and we had nowhere to go."
>www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml
>
>So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright
>survival--understandable IMO.

Still hardly a persuasive argument why the guns are indispensible. Why
wasn't 20mm able to adequately suppress, deter or destroy the enemy?

>And that site indicates the controller's name was SSG Gabe Brown, not
>"Vance"--being as it is a USAF source I'd trust it.

To quote SSGt Vance's account again:-

"There was a combat controller [CCT] with us named Gabe Brown who was
behind me a bit. I turned around and yelled at him to work on getting
communications running, he already was working on it. I decided that I
needed to be on the line fighting, if I had been on the radio, then the
combat controller would have been sitting there doing nothing because he
doesn't have the assault training. I decided that he should call in the
CAS as I directed him."

More than one person has commented on that operation.

>> Is it forever impossible for the USAF to use those weapons, or are they
>> just not in the current plan?
>
>APKWS is currently planned for use only on rotary assets, beginning in 2006
>IIRC.

Again, is that because it is physically impossible to adapt it or
develop something similar? Has analysis shown that it would be
ineffective? Or is it "not in the plan, we just strafe for danger
close"?

>> You can carry plenty of APKWS with the weight freed up by deleting a
>> gun: so an aircraft tasked for CAS gains capability without losing
>> weapons or fuel.
>
>Huh? Not if those weapons are not loaded out prior to departure. You do
>realize the difference between preplanned and immediate CAS requests, right?

See later.

>> So where CAS is a likely diversion, then standard loadout includes a
>> seven-round APKWS launcher (just as sorties over parts of the FRY used
>> to require an anti-radar missile either per aircraft or per flight,
>> IIRC). When you've freed up a thousand pounds, using a quarter of that
>> for contingency CAS isn't a large problem.
>
>FYI, that little seven load RL still takes up a hardpoint, which is why no,
>you *can't* plan on it being included as standard.

Why not? Again, you keep obsessing about current platforms and systems
as though they were the only possibilities and nothing new will ever
appear.

>> With very marginal effect, however.
>
>Again, since there were repeated requests for just that level of support
>during Anaconda

What else was available? Nothing.

You're then using the circular argument that since nothing else was then
available, there's nothing else that could ever be used.

> and given that it is a common sense starting point to use
>the safest (to your own force) option before moving up the risk category,

The safest option is to keep your forces tucked up in bed at home.

>the gun provides that additional level of flexibility. I seriously doubt
>were you in the position of calling in that "oh, ****" mission with the bad
>guys well within the danger close margin for bombs that you'd have leaped
>immediately to that riskiest of options.

"riskiest of options"? (Bear in mind that the first strafe pass was
waved off because it wasn't clear whether the F-15 was aiming at the
right troops...)

> You seem to forget that the min
>separation factor for 20mm is *25 meters*

Which tells you much about its lethality, no?

>, while for bombs that minimum
>jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in a
>protected or open position).

And those are the only options that can be considered?


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
> them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
> to need so many rounds per target.

There are a lot of "plane sized" UAVs, and if you think anaircraft the
size of a Predator is a hard gun target, well, you need to compare it to
how hard it is to hit with a cheap missile (low IR signature, low radar
signature).

The "little bitty" UAVs out there are in the "fly past really quick and
turbulence does the job" category...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Ed Rasimus]

On 13 Dec 2003 00:21:53 -0800, (Michael E. Kelly)
wrote:

>Ed Rasimus > wrote in message
>>
>> It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
>> Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
>> Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
>> extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
>> for immediate on-call CAS was not available.
>
>Ed,
>
>I take issue with your last statement, unless you're limiting the
>scope of your answer to tacair only. My wing flew 300 sorties during
>Anaconda and dropped 845 JDAM's and 24 Mk84's providing excellent on
>call air power. Granted we're a heavy bomber and could fly 1000 miles
>and then loiter for a few hours, which the fighter guys couldn't do.
>I'm sure BUFDRVR can chime in with the BUFF's contribution to CAS in
>Afghanistan. It only goes to back up what you've been saying, methods
>of delivering CAS are changing.
>
>Cheers,
>Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

Absolutely correct, and a remarkable effort. But, the discussion was
regarding the call for strafe. The image that conjures up of a Bone
rolling in and lining up for a blast of maybe eight internal
wing-mounted 20mm Vulcans delivered at 1800 feet slant range.....

Dale Brown will probably install swiveling M-61s in the swing-wing for
his next fictional foray. "Flight of the Young Pup."

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> In message >, Chad Irby
> > writes
> >"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
> >> Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
> >> sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe
> >
> >And all the missiles won't help much in this case, either.
>
> Why not? An aircraft diving away in afterburner is an excellent missile
> target.

Not that the "unseen Atoll up the tailpipe" is the *other* guy, and
won't help you defensively. You followed up your comment with:

> Try that same attack against modern aircraft, and you'll still avoid the
> guns shot: but you'll get a late-model Sidewinder for your pains, or an
> AIM-120 as you extend.

Not if it's an "unseen Atoll up the tailpipe." Tis scneario means
"you're dead." What you just described is a "*seen* Atoll up the
tailpipe."

> There seems to be this romantical view that fighter pilots, out of
> ordnance and committed to their mission, will drop everything for a
> fangs-out pursuit of a fleeing foe.

No, they're soldiers, and they'll use what they have available, like
they have for the last century.

> Do you have the fuel for the prolonged tailchase required to get into
> guns range, manoeuvre for the kill, then get home? Remember, the enemy
> aircraft is ahead of you, out of range, with a substantial speed
> advantage.

Really? How do you know? Maybe they ran out of missiles, have *no*
speed advantage at the monent, and are in a decent spot to get nailed.

It's funny how you took a fairly standard scenario, and suddenly started
changing it...

> What happens when some of his friends join the party, you being down to
> guns only?

Then you run. You see, in *my* scenario, pilots can think, and in
yours, they're overamped morons who are only in it for the blood.

> >> So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
> >> I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.
> >
> >If you want to find that out, find it yourself. *You're* the one who
> >wants that data. Let us know how it goes. Until you do, that other
> >comparison is still pretty useless.
>
> In other words, "don't confuse me with facts, my mind is made up".

Funny, that's what I just said about *you*. *You* are the guy who's
going against the last half-century of experience in jet fighter combat.
You're the one who has to prove sommething, and you're not doing it very
well so far.

> When was the last air-to-air combat fratricide (by which I mean a shot
> taken at an enemy aircraft diverted and destroyed a friendly)?

When's the last time we had a major air combat situation? All we've had
were "shoot down the one or two idiots dumb enough to get into the air"
since about 1991... although I read something recently about a Japanese
fighter lost to a Sidewinder in an exercise a year or so back.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

> In message >, Chad Irby
> > writes
> >In article >,
> > "Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
> >
> >> If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
> >> a complete and satisfactory answer?
> >
> >It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."
> >
> >It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
> >bloody useful."
>
> In other words, guns solve the problem?

They don't "solve the problem," they give you another tool to solve any
of a number of problems. Like shooting down enemy planes, shooting down
enemy UAVs without firing off missiles that you might need later, or
shooting at things on the ground.

> Not according to the facts they
> don't: in fact they're pretty damn marginal (and not cheap either).

Still a contention not proven. Your "facts" so far have been "guns are
useless, so there."

> >We learned that lesson over 30 years ago,
>
> And of course, nothing has changed since then. (Well, the M61 hasn't...)

And neither has the Mauser, or any of the other major guns. Or the
problems they can be used to solve.

> Once the missiles have demonstrated ~80% lethality in actual combat
> against real enemies doing their best to survive, then perhaps there's
> more evidence to support the analysis. Oh, I forget - they did that
> twenty-one years ago.

What major war did we fight in 1982?

Maybe you're thinking *31* years ago, in which case you yourself noted
that the Sidewinder only manage a bit less than 50%, and the
radar-guided missiles didn't manage near that much.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Alan Minyard]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 19:34:41 +0000, Greg Hennessy > wrote:

>On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:40 -0600, Alan Minyard >
>wrote:
>
>
>>>Tony Williams
>>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>>
>>Of course the fact that the Mauser is produced by an enemy country, which
>>is totally unreliable as a source of spares, is also a consideration.
>>
>
>Oh christ, you really are that thick. I suggest you figure out where and
>who were going to be producing the BK27 variant for the JSF.
>
>
>greg

The "improved" BK-27 was to be produced at the Alliant Techsystems
plant in Mesa Arizona. This plant was previously owned by Boing. This gun,
originally designed about 30 years ago was to be significantly modified
and the new design was unproven. In addition, the cased ammunition
requires internal spent case stowage.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 19:34:41 +0000, Greg Hennessy > wrote:

>On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:41 -0600, Alan Minyard >
>wrote:
>
>>On 11 Dec 2003 23:50:31 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>The case rests...
>>>
>>>Tony Williams
>>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>>
>>Writing a book, and writing an accurate book, are two totally different propositions.
>>You have succeeded in the first instance, let us know when you intend to start
>>on the second.
>>
>
>Coming from a self documenting f8ckwit who couldnt figure out that the BK27
>variant as fitted to the JSF was american made, your notion of accuracy is
>ever so slightly suspect.
>
>
>greg

The BK-27 was an inferior weapon, nominally "produced" by a US
corporation. Your choice of language belies any claim to veracity
on your part.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 12 Dec 2003 19:49:49 GMT, (Ron) wrote:

>>
>>But that's going opposite of the trend towards *less* types of
>>airframes. That's why we've only got two near-future fighters in the US
>>(long range fighter/attack and short-range fighter/attack), and why the
>>Europeans are trying to go with *one* plane to do all jobs.
>
>The navy is going even further, to the point where it only plans on having
>F-18E/Fs and SH-60s on board carriers.
>
>
>Ron
>Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

And the F-35.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 12 Dec 2003 12:51:59 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
>> In article >,
>> (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>
>> > We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
>> > for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
>> > that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
>> > about the GAU-12/U then.
>>
>> Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
>> structure that fell through on closer examination.
>
>Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
>work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

The Mouser was to be a completely new system, using linkless ammunition.
It has never been demonstrated, much less placed in service.

Al Minyard

[Paul F Austin]

"Bertil Jonell" wrote
> Paul J. Adam wrote:
> >UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
> >them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
> >to need so many rounds per target.
>
> Against so small targets a proximity fuzed shell, or a timed-fuzed
> cannister round would be much more effective. The size means that you
> don't need direct impacts of 20mm+ to bring it down, and the increased
> probability of getting a hit with preformed fragments/subprojectiles
> might[1] compensate for the small size.
>
> [1] Well, I think so at least:) But you'd need to run tests on it to

Cannister will likely never be fired from an aircraft for the same reason
that A-10s fire AP rather than APDS ammunition: the sabot or cannister
casing are an unacceptable FOD hazard to the firing aircraft. Something like
AHEAD or proximity fuzed ammunition might play a role.

[Paul F Austin]

"Chad Irby" wrote
> "Paul J. Adam" wrote:
>
> > UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
> > them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
> > to need so many rounds per target.
>
> There are a lot of "plane sized" UAVs, and if you think anaircraft the
> size of a Predator is a hard gun target, well, you need to compare it to
> how hard it is to hit with a cheap missile (low IR signature, low radar
> signature).
>
> The "little bitty" UAVs out there are in the "fly past really quick and
> turbulence does the job" category...

There really aren't "a lot" of large UAVs. They (and their payloads) are
quite expensive and the number look limited for the foreseeable future. The
Little Bitty UAVs on the other hand look to be ubiquitous. Turbulence might
do the job or maybe not. These aren't ultralights with nil control
authority. If they're flying low enough to prevent recovery, then the
fighter doing the buzz pass is in fair danger of CFIT, especially in combat.

[Greg Hennessy]

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 17:06:33 GMT, Ed Rasimus > wrote:

>
>Dale Brown will probably install swiveling M-61s in the swing-wing for
>his next fictional foray. "Flight of the Young Pup."
>

ROFLMAO!!!!!


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

[Greg Hennessy]

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 12:27:26 -0500, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:

>

>Cannister will likely never be fired from an aircraft for the same reason
>that A-10s fire AP rather than APDS ammunition: the sabot or cannister
>casing are an unacceptable FOD hazard to the firing aircraft. Something like
>AHEAD or proximity fuzed ammunition might play a role.
>

Range gated fuzing like the bofors 3P has would be interesting.


greg


--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

[Greg Hennessy]

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 11:21:41 -0600, Alan Minyard >
wrote:


> Your choice of language belies any claim to veracity
>on your part.
>

So tell us about this cannon made by an 'enemy nation' (sic) again. The one
you claimed would be impossible to get spare parts for.

Your inability to make any resembling a cogent argument is noted. Have you
been taking lessons from Tarver ?


greg

--
Once you try my burger baby,you'll grow a new thyroid gland.
I said just eat my burger, baby,make you smart as Charlie Chan.
You say the hot sauce can't be beat. Sit back and open wide.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> Absolutely correct, and a remarkable effort. But, the discussion was
> regarding the call for strafe. The image that conjures up of a Bone
> rolling in and lining up for a blast of maybe eight internal
> wing-mounted 20mm Vulcans delivered at 1800 feet slant range.....

Well, if you're looking at serious ground-attack work, why not just put
in some GAU-8s in the mix?

Or if you're really going to be mean, fly a C-5 over at 40,000 feet and
drop a few hundred pallets of lawn darts out the back...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Tony Williams]

"Brett" > wrote in message >...
>
> The RAF dropped the BK27 cannon from their Typhoon's because it was
> supposedly "too expensive". The defense budget may be large it isn't
> bottomless.

But that wasn't 'too expensive' compared with another gun: that was
'too expensive' to have a gun at all - a very different conclusion.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Lyle]

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 17:06:33 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

>On 13 Dec 2003 00:21:53 -0800, (Michael E. Kelly)
>wrote:
>
>>Ed Rasimus > wrote in message
>>>
>>> It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
>>> Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
>>> Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
>>> extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
>>> for immediate on-call CAS was not available.
>>
>>Ed,
>>
>>I take issue with your last statement, unless you're limiting the
>>scope of your answer to tacair only. My wing flew 300 sorties during
>>Anaconda and dropped 845 JDAM's and 24 Mk84's providing excellent on
>>call air power. Granted we're a heavy bomber and could fly 1000 miles
>>and then loiter for a few hours, which the fighter guys couldn't do.
>>I'm sure BUFDRVR can chime in with the BUFF's contribution to CAS in
>>Afghanistan. It only goes to back up what you've been saying, methods
>>of delivering CAS are changing.
>>
>>Cheers,
>>Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer
>
>Absolutely correct, and a remarkable effort. But, the discussion was
>regarding the call for strafe. The image that conjures up of a Bone
>rolling in and lining up for a blast of maybe eight internal
>wing-mounted 20mm Vulcans delivered at 1800 feet slant range.....
>
>Dale Brown will probably install swiveling M-61s in the swing-wing for
>his next fictional foray. "Flight of the Young Pup."
>
Ed,

What is the difference between direct close airsupport, and close
airsupport, or is it just all lumped together and called close air
support.

[Tony Williams]

(Bertil Jonell) wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> Paul J. Adam > wrote:
> >UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
> >them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
> >to need so many rounds per target.
>
> Against so small targets a proximity fuzed shell, or a timed-fuzed
> cannister round would be much more effective. The size means that you
> don't need direct impacts of 20mm+ to bring it down, and the increased
> probability of getting a hit with preformed fragments/subprojectiles
> might[1] compensate for the small size.
>
> [1] Well, I think so at least:) But you'd need to run tests on it to
> be sure

Airburst ammo has been available for a long time for Russian 30mm
aircraft guns: it is effectively shrapnel, releasing a cone of
tungsten-alloy subprojectiles once the time fuze detonates, and is
intended for ground attack so the time fuze has a fixed setting. OTOH,
current US airburst experiments in 30x173 involve setting a fuze at
the muzzle, like the Oerlikon AHEAD 35mm round. There would be
technical problems in adapting this to firing from a moving aircraft
at another moving target, but it's basically a matter of FCS
programming. This could be deadly against UAVs (and troops on the
ground, as well).

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

> "Chad Irby" wrote
>
> > The "little bitty" UAVs out there are in the "fly past really quick and
> > turbulence does the job" category...
>
> There really aren't "a lot" of large UAVs. They (and their payloads) are
> quite expensive and the number look limited for the foreseeable future.

Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.

A lot of modern UAVs are in the 1000+ lb weight class, which certainly
makes them big enough to shoot down.

> The Little Bitty UAVs on the other hand look to be ubiquitous.
> Turbulence might do the job or maybe not. These aren't ultralights
> with nil control authority. If they're flying low enough to prevent
> recovery, then the fighter doing the buzz pass is in fair danger of
> CFIT, especially in combat.

Just fly around it and get it in trail. If a 727 can knock a Piper Cub
out of the air at a mile or so lead range, an F-22 should be able to
wipe a small UAV out at a couple of hundred yards or so.

And anything that's too small to shoot down with a gun is *certainly*
too small to shoot down with a modern aircraft missile.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Brett]

"Tony Williams" > wrote:
| "Brett" > wrote in message
>...
| >
| > The RAF dropped the BK27 cannon from their Typhoon's because it was
| > supposedly "too expensive". The defense budget may be large it isn't
| > bottomless.
|
| But that wasn't 'too expensive' compared with another gun: that was
| 'too expensive' to have a gun at all - a very different conclusion.

Well that would depend on when during the development process you
determined the cannon you had allocated space for and development effort
on was "too expensive". The conclusion you actually come to with the RAF
Typhoon's is that the RAF did not have an alternative "cheaper" weapon
that would fit in the space formerly occupied by the BK27 without any
airframe development effort and associated increased cost.

[Alan Minyard]

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 12:47:55 -0500, "Paul F Austin" > wrote:

>
>"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
>> On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 20:39:51 +0000, Greg Hennessy > wrote:
>>
>> >On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 13:21:39 -0600, Alan Minyard >
>> >wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >>>Tony Williams
>> >>>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>> >>>Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
>> >>>http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>> >>
>> >>You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.
>> >>
>> >>Al Minyard
>> >
>> >
>> >ROFLMAO! How did you draw that stunning conclusion.
>> >
>> >
>> >greg
>>
>>
>> Well, if you signature is and indication, you are involved in the use
>> of serious drugs, not someone that I would assume could make
>> rational judgements. The fact that the US chose a different system pretty
>> much tells me that the Mauser was (and is) an inferior system.
>
>Al, I'm as patriotic as any, but...
>
>One of the illuminating moments in my engineering career was when I listened
>to five companies worth of very imminent engineering teams bidding to the
>same set of requirements, each proving catagorically that their wildly
>different offerings were each the_only_solution to the customer's problem,
>with utter sincerety and honesty. Then the customer elected to buld
>internally rather than buy.
>
>Most selections are_very_closely balanced and most of the offerings will do
>the job. The difference between winner and also ran will turn on
>features_other than_technical performance. In fact, it's the rare
>procurement these days that offers any evaluation points at all for
>performance above the "goal" level. Instead heaviest weighting is usually
>given to Cost, delivery, cost and oh, yes cost. Did I mention cost?
>
I would certainly agree, however the Mauser offering was significantly
different from the M-61 derivative. Different design philosophy (revolver
vs "gatling" gun). The ammunition is also significantly different. If both
weapons were designed to a definitive solution (rate of fire, same
ammunition, etc) then your contention would be more accurate.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 12 Dec 2003 19:27:40 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
>> (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>
>> > Chad Irby > wrote:
>>
>> > > Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
>> > > structure that fell through on closer examination.
>> >
>> > Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
>> > work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
>>
>> This talks about the cost issue:
>>
>> <http://stage.defensedaily.com/VIP/ddi/previous/ddi0927.htm#A1>
>>
>> "We had a cost-growth problem that forced a recompetition," he said.
>> "Affordability is a prime concern of the program. Based on that we were
>> forced to recompete the gun system integration. We selected our
>> supplier on a best-value case."
>
>Thanks for that link. I had to smile at: "GD had initially offered its
>GAU-12 25mm gatling cannon for the JSF in July 1999, but withdrew its
>proposal in February 2000." since that was only after L-M had selected
>the BK 27 - in the UK, we call that 'spin' :)
>
>> A "cost-growth problem" for an established weapon like the Mauser means
>> "they tried to stick us for some more cash after they got the contract."
>
>The usual response in that case is to tell the supplier to keep the
>price down or lose the contract. With a potentially huge market for
>the F-35, Mauser would have to have been mad to throw it away. There
>is no inherent reason that I am aware of that the BK 27 should have
>been more expensive to make than the GAU-12/U, particularly since both
>would have been made in the USA (unless they're planning to save money
>on the initial batch by re-using guns from the AV8-B). I remain
>suspicious that GD was both the gun integrator and the supplier of the
>GAU-12/U; they weren't exactly innocent bystanders.
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

The BK-27 that was under consideration for use in the F-35 was a completely
new system. The gun from an AV8 would not work. Linked vs
linkless ammo, etc.

Al Minyard

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...

> In message >, Kevin
> Brooks > writes
> >"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
> >> certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
> >> capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
> >> seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
> >> training burden)
> >
> >The training burden? For gosh sakes, you already have to have armorers,
>
> Trained gun-fitters and repair teams, and the logistic pipeline to
> support them, cost money.



But you are claiming we would retain the gun pods--don't they already then
have to maintain these skills?


>
> >and
> >I doubt that including a periodic requirement for the pilots to do some
> >range work would be that great a burden--it is after all what they do
during
> >peacetime.
>
> Try costing up the aircraft,



They have to bore holes in the sky anyway--having them chunk up hours on the
range instead of doing touch-and-go's seems to be of little impact. Keep in
mind that the strafe mission is not their highest priority training event.



> the range,



The range would undoubtedly be a multi-use facility (i.e., unlikely to have
a range dedicated to strafe only), so that is no argument.



the targets (whether air-to-air
> or air-to-ground),



Yeah, putting up a target panel of fabric must be extremely expensive...



the equipment to provide useful feedback and training
> (because 'pulled trigger, gun made loud noise, came home, landed' is not
> useful training) and it adds up with alarming rapidity.



Gee, they have to grade all kinds of exercises already--I'd suspect a bit of
gun camera footage of the strafe pass would be acceptable.


>
> >> How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?
> >
> >Apparently a pretty decent one including F-15E's, F-16's, and A-10's as
> >well, from what I have read of the reports on Anaconda.
>
> I'd heard the A-10s got pulled early due to hot/high problems, and given
> the frequent sniping at the F-16's range I'm surprised to hear it doing
> significant long-range loiter.



The 354th FW *did* do "significant long-range loiter" during that operation
with their F-16's, so that argument is meaningless.


>
> >> How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
> >> judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
> >> in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the
scattered
> >> and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
> >> help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
> >> little result.
> >
> >Actually, one senior US Army commander *did* sort of hammer the CAS
effort
> >after-the-fact, though not specifically directed at the strafe
operations.
> >Some of his comments were valid, and some were likely as not an attempt
to
> >shovel off blame that he should have borne on his own shoulders. As to
> >effect, the reports I read varied, with some indicating that in some
> >instances they ended up having to resort to using PGM's a lot closer than
> >they originally cared to in order to finally destroy the target (and in
at
> >least one case that almost literally "blew up in their face", so to
speak,
> >yielding a quick, "you almost got us with that last bomb" from the CCT).
I
> >recall two reports indicated that the strafes were on target and at least
> >suppressed the bad guys (and sometimes suppression is the best you can
hope
> >for).
>
> According to
>
> http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports/afghanlessons_airwar_exec.pdf
>
> the US flew 17,500 combat sorties over Afghanistan, of which you've
> heard of several failed strafes ('danger close' sorties where the gun
> passes failed to stop the enemy, leading to 'even more dangerously
> close' use of other munitions) and two cases where the enemy was
> 'suppressed'. Guesstimate two aircraft in each case for eight sorties
> with a 50% success rate.



Failed to stop the enemy? How much suppression did they achieve? And here
you go with your McNamaresque number crunching again... war cannot always be
resolved into neat little statistical piles. Witness the recognition lately
of the fact that the old attrition models for simulations are just plain
inaccurate as all get out.


>
> It's not an enormously convincing argument that the existing gun
> armament is a potent and essential CAS tool, is it?



Your strawman. I have said from the beginning that it is a last resort,
only-when-nothing-else-should-be-tried-first tool, and as such preserves
flexibility for the system beyond that which exists sans guns. But hey, you
tell me what the groundpounder who finds himself with a nasty situation
located in that 25-to-500 meter danger-close gap in CAS coverage that
results when no gun is available is supposed to do.



Either the gun needs
> to be made significantly more effective in order to increase its
> lethality and utilisation... or it needs replacing with something better
> able to provide _effective_ close fire to troops in combat.



But this is, by my own admission, a "niche" capability that probably does
not merit much more resource dedication than it has already received. A
nice-to-have capability for use when none of the other tools are initially
suitable or acceptable.


>
> Burdening most of your tactical air fleet with a thousand pounds of
> ballast that's used on 0.05% of combat sorties is



I guess the USAF is utterly clueless then, as they seem to disagree with
you. I'd note that a fair portion of your own RAF was apparently not happy
with the loss of the gun from the Typhoon. Do you know something none of
these folks do?


>
> >> As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
> >> fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
> >> effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
> >> aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
> >> out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)
> >
> >Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem,
is
> >it?
>
> And you describe above how in at least one case, strafing failed to
> deter the enemy and heavier weapons had to be resorted to.



You are really having a problem with the idea that the ground commander
would prefer to work *up* the risk ladder, don't you? Not jumping in and
placing his ground troops at maximum risk from the outset? Odd, since you
were so risk adverse when it came to allowing the CAS assets down into the
weeds to make these sort of attacks.


>
> Similarly, one drag on developing a weapon for danger-close CAS is the
> airy claim that "that's what the gun is for" when its effectiveness is
> patchy (some reports of 'suppression' when it was used, but others where
> the enemy declined to be deterred)



Gee, if it really sucked so much, why did those CCT's keep calling for
strafe as opposed to bombs in the first place?


>
> >Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
> >get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
> >interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the
Anaconda
> >participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
> >AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
> >those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. Imagine a scenario
> >where the bad guy has a better MANPADS capability and you are stuck in a
> >similar (daytime) situation--which would you rather commit to making
> >strafing runs to suppress the bad guys, fast-movers or that AC-130? If
you
> >are as concerned about risk as you claim, you know what the answer to
that
> >one is.
>
> Sounds like there's a need for a similar weight and accuracy of fire as
> the AC-130 can deliver, but with the survivability of a fast jet.
>
> In your scenario, neither aircraft is particularly suitable: if the
> AC-130 can't survive the SAM threat, repeated passes by fast movers will
> also get them speared by those improved MANPADS (especially since
> they're delivering a lot less firepower and so *need* to make multiple
> passes through the weapon envelope of an alerted enemy... this is what
> is technically known as a Really Bad Idea).



Really Worse Idea is not being able to deliver support when the risk is
assessed and accepted.


>
> >> Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
> >> available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
> >> necessary" is a shaky proposition.
> >
> >Better than, "This was not available, so it could not be used, and we
lost a
> >lot of guys", IMO.
>
> So where's the evidence for that?



The same place as your evidence that the gun is worthless--a product of the
argument. If you don't have a gun, and the bad guys are in so tight that you
*can't* resort to a bomb, then you are effectively saying CAS is out of the
picture, so any increased losses could be attributed to that, at least in
part.


>
> >> Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
> >> "really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
> >> and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make
a
> >> low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
> >> on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon
system
> >> is now and forever a fixture.
> >
> >OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from
a
> >participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
> >*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close
to
> >*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of
fratricide
> >available to be tried first? I wouldn't.
>
> And the only options are 20mm cannon or 2000lb bombs? Think again. If
> this is a genuine and frequent need, neither weapon is appropriate.



Nobody said "frequent". I have noted before that you seem ready to place
combat into the "nice neat box" category, where all things happen according
to plan, and there is a playbook for handling the proceedings. That just is
not the way it happens. Which is why flexibility is important. And I hate to
say it, but I think your empathy is a bit lacking--if it *were* you hugging
the dirt up close and personal and well within the danger close margin for
bombs, and you had the option of starting with guns and then working up
through higher risk alternatives, I suspect you'd do that as opposed to
starting with the more risky "big bang". It is a bit easier to say you
wouldn't when you are not facing that dilemma.


>
> >> What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
> >> Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about
a
> >> different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
> >> option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?
> >
> >For gosh sakes, Paul, we are talking a real world example where the M61
was
> >their best hope, at least initially.
>
> No, we're talking about current and future procurement.



We have been using Anaconda as the point of discussion-the M61 was used in
that role by both USAF and (IIRC) USN aircraft during that operation.


>
> Unless you plan your only combat to be action replays, then you need to
> learn what worked and what didn't; decide what lessons are valid and
> which were special cases; and then plan for the future so you do more of
> what worked, less of what didn't work and learn from the Lessons
> Identified.



Well, since it looks like the 25mm is going to be our next major gun caliber
for the fast movers, maybe that will satisfy some of your concern.


>
> >> Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
> >> existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
> >> procure in the future.
> >
> >So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as
well
> >as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere
that
> >will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and
find
> >itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons
and
> >STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?
>
> About as acceptable as declaring that there's no particular problem that
> a few strafing passes won't completely solve.



Why would you claim that? I did not say any such thing. What I have been
saying is that when the ground guys find themselves in such a knife fight
and CAS is available, it is sure nice for that CAS to be able to contribute
to the fight. If it is successful in suppressing the bad guys (and I imagine
that it usually will at least be able to achieve short-term suppression), it
affords the troops a chance to either break contact or to maneuver into a
better situation. If it fails, then you have to do what SSG Brown did and
call in the heavier ordnance, accepting that you are placing your troops at
greater risk. I can't understand what you find disagreeable about allowing
those ground troops to escalate the risk level as needed, as opposed to
having to accept that greater risk of fratricide from the outset if you have
no gun capability.


>
> >> What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
> >> serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
> >> unless someone's willing to take some risks.
> >
> >Taking risks is inherent to military operations. METT-T rules, and the
> >commanders get paid to weigh those risks versus gains. If you are
claiming
> >otherwise, then thank goodness our fathers who fought in WWII did not
take
> >that view.
>
> I'm not the one claiming four situations in 17,500 sorties demonstrates
> a completely untouchable situation, Kevin.



Neither am I; I shy away from such meaningless statistics. I recognize that
strafe is the least preferable manner of delivering effective CAS. I also
recognize that there is a lot of ground radiating out from between 25 meters
and (let's assume for the SDB which will shortly be in the inventory) maybe
20 meters, and retaining the ability to conduct immediate CAS requests
against such targets may very well mean the difference between
success/failure for the mission or life/death for the troops. Finally, I
recognize that the best laid plans can go to hell before you even cross the
LD, so "Semper Gumby" can be said to be the epitome of military slogans, and
the gun contributes to that.


>
> Taking out an aircraft's gun is a risk (that somewhere in the future,
> horrible things will happen for the lack of a strafing pass) but also an
> opportunity (that's a thousand pounds more disposable load to use, and
> training time freed up - now how to best use it?)
>
> If there's a marginal capability (like danger-close CAS), does the gun
> actually add much to it? Does it happen often enough to justify the very
> real costs? Is there a better solution available or capable of
> development?
>
> Is it an unacceptable risk? Well, according to some... but then you get
> into the mutual contradictions of "guns are essential weapons" and "it's
> not worth developing anything better".
>
>
> And it was my grandfather who fought in WW2, only his war started even
> earlier than usual: he got a two-day head start on British and French
> troops.
>
> >> The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
> >> possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
> >> They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
> >> straight-line path... like a strafing run.
> >
> >No, they are even more lethal to that guy flying the AC-130,
>
> Who has the option of operating above the light AAA, though MANPADS are
> a problem there too.



It does not matter how high he is operating-we don't like using the gunships
for daylight operations. Khafji put paid to that approach.


>
> >or to those
> >guys flying the cargo helos in to haul all those mortar and arty rounds
that
> >you would prefer we use exclusively.
>
> Given that the mortars should be one to two miles back at least (for
> 81mm tubes, more for 120s) and artillery five to ten miles, that is one
> _hell_ of a light AA gun or man-portable SAM that can detect and hit a
> cargo flight at that distance while in contact with friendly troops and
> under artillery fire. It's a *lot* easier to acquire and shoot at the
> Big Loud Plane that just flew overhead.



Here is where your "should be" falls apart on the rocks of reality. During
Anaconda the troops found themselves engaged a lot earlier, and a lot more
heavily, than they predicted-that is war, with all of its uncertainty. So, I
'd assume (though I have not read anything to corroborate this) that the
plan was to have the mortars set up somewhere near the initial LZ's to cover
the troops movement to contact. By making contact a lot earlier than
anticipated, that put the mortars up near the close fight, and made the
resupply mission rather hazardous. Tube arty in this case was another
matter-Hagenbach, the MG in charge, has to shoulder the load for failing to
have a firebase set up within range, but he apparently did not anticipate
getting into a knifefight that precluded the use of the usual CAS delivered
bombs from the outset. Which is why those CCT's ended up begging for
strafing runs, again and again.


> If the enemy air defences are _that_ good, you're definitely not wanting
> to fly strafing passes.
>
> >> Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
> >> a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is
perhaps
> >> not the best solution to the problem.
> >
> >I'd imagine had you been with those guys from the 10th LID who were so
happy
> >to get those strafing runs you'd have a slightly different view of the
value
> >of retaining that capability, as distasteful as having to resort to its
use
> >may be.
>
> >> But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
> >> line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
> >> Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
> >> a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
> >> themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
> >> significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
> >> load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with
more
> >> of their main armament?
> >
> >Not if their main armamnet was incapable of handling the situation that
> >arose. That is the difference, when viewed against the Anaconda model.
>
> In at least one case the main armament had to be used anyway,
> danger-close be damned.



ONLY as a last resort. Common sense dictates that you don't start off
treating a simple puncture wound to your hand by amputating the arm at the
elbow, though that option may be exercised later if the mere cleaning and
bandaging of the wound does not prevent blood poisoning. Likewise, those CCT
's did not jump directly to the risky use of bombs in a danger close
situation until they had exhausted their other less risky options.
>
> >Had
> >you taken up that M61 space and crammed a few new radios, or another few
> >pounds of fuel onboard, it would still not have allowed those CAS
aircraft
> >to do what they were *there* to do, which was support the troops engaged,
no
> >matter how close the separation of the two combatants. With the M61's
they
> >did that.
>
> In four cases, with patchy results at best.



They DID it, which is more than they could have done had they lacked
those guns. Fratricide is a nasty thing, and we apparently came rather close
to a disastrous frat incident with one of those bombs-that is why those CCT'
s wanted to use the strafe first.


>
> How about improving ground-to-air comms to shorten the targeting cycle?
> More fuel, meaning more loiter time per aircraft, for more responsive
> support? Both reduce the time needed from call-for-fire to delivery;
> meaning instead of 'suppressing' the enemy with strafing passes, they
> can be engaged with destructive weapons because they've had less time to
> close. Or more payload, for a new munition that's got both short
> danger-close and high lethality on target



Huh? They "closed" almost instantaneously in this event, from what I
have read. There was no detection of the bad guys in strength at 1000 meters
followed by maneuver to within danger-close limits-for gosh sakes, they
would have just pasted the guys with CAS delivered PGM's at the outset if
they had known they were there.
>
> Again, you're not talking "a few pounds", you're talking about half a
> ton: some wags would have you believe you could double an F-16's payload
> that way. ("Wall-to-wall bombs today, boys, I'm carrying BOTH Mark
> 82s!")
>
> >> The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
> >> five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
> >> was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
> >> hot-and-high conditions.
> >
> >Those AH-64's were indeed getting hammered--but because they hung around
and
> >continued to press home repeated gun runs against the critical targets.
How
> >many AH-64 crews were lost? None.
>
> How many missions did they fly the next day? None. How much ordnance did
> they deliver? None.



And they hung around because the guys on the ground were in deep do-do
and needed that support right then, not tomorrow. Tomorrow is meaningless if
you are likely to die today.


>
> >How many lives did they save on the
> >ground? We'll never know.
>
> And how many helicopters were available to fly sorties the next day, and
> the day after, and how many men could have died as a result? Or, what
> was cancelled because the air support they needed for backup suddenly
> wasn't there?



They were able to bring in replacement helos: IIRC some USMC AH-1W's
showed up to handle the attack helo role subsequent to having those Apaches
get shot up.


>
> Losing a half-squadron of AH-64s in a single incident suggests that
> there's a serious capability gap, not that the existing systems are just
> fine.
>
> Similarly, 88% attrition is _not_ sustainable.



Any source for that number? ISTR reading that most of those helos were
back up within the week (I only recall one being a write off at the time)?


>
> >> The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
> >> fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.
> >
> >They wanted fire that would not also kill them in the bargain, which is
why
> >they repeatedly *requested* strafe, again and again. In some cases they
> >later resorted to using LGB's, with the curious methos of walking them in
as
> >if they were conventional rounds, from what I could decypher. And yet
they
> >still continued to request gun runs...wonder why?
>
> Because those were the only two options available to them, and neither
> sound satisfactory: the LGBs worryingly lethal over too large an area,
> the gun runs inadequately lethal.



And they requested the gun runs in preference to the bombs-case
closed.


>
> >> I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
> >> coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
> >> available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
> >> without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..
> >
> >Yep, and what was available that day (or days, as IIRC this lasted well
into
> >the next day) was CAS, and what those soldiers kept asking for from the
CAS
> >was guns, at least in the early stages. Tells me they liked the guns.
>
> Tells me they need another option available to them.



That may be, but I know of no other option that we can count on always
being onboard the loadout of the CAS packages. Even if APKWS was adopted by
the USAF it would not be an integral weapon. As it stands now we can get
some kind of CAS support at the 25 meters-from- friendlies- range from every
fast mover CAS aircraft we have-that is called flexibility.


>
> >> Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
> >> tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
> >> Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but
an
> >> emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one
built
> >> into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?
> >
> >It is not that important an issue. The fact is that all of the incoming
> >aircraft we will be fighting with in the foreseeable future, minus the
STOVL
> >version of the F-35, have guns included in their armament suites. I say
> >great, keep 'em and keep that flexibility they give us.
>
> It must be wonderful having that much budget.



It is. And as we discussed earlier, the gun is a marginal part of the
total program cost. Which is maybe why most air forces still have them, and
why most, if not all, new aircraft orders, excepting that curious RAF
Typhoon situation, include them.


>
> >> Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
> >> internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.
> >
> >From what I gather that was dictated by the addition of the STOVL
> >capability, which necessitates making room for the lift fan, etc.
>
> But the STOVL version is more, not less, likely to be performing CAS.
> How then can the gun be optional, if it's so effective and essential.



I did not say it was the most effective weapon-that is you twisting my
words (again). I said it affords a greater degree of flexibility, especially
in the very close fight, that you lose without the gun, and I believe that
flexibility is very important.


>
> >> If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
> >> I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.
> >>
> >> And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
> >> breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
> >> more time between those absences.
> >
> >Those absences are kind of meaningless if the alternative is another
couple
> >of circuits with an arament suite that does not allow you to serve the
> >customers down below, aren't they?
>
> Yet again, armament suites are not fixed forever.



Ever try to specify what loadout you want from the air force side?


>
> >I doubt the groundpounder down below who
> >is in a situation where his options are such that he wants a strafe/can't
> >risk even a PGM is going to be very relieved by the knowledge that his
CAS
> >stack can do a few more circles without being able to actually handle his
> >request.
>
> Having the enemy "suppressed" for a pass or two is not a great return on
> investment either.



It is if it allows you to disengage, or if it allows you to maneuver
to a position offering better cover, or if it allows you to conduct an
assault to dislodge the bad guys. I believe if you asked the average ground
guy which he'd prefer to have, the ability to achieve short-term
suppression, or the inability to suppress at all, he'd take the former



>
> Neither is having to use those PGMs even closer than the original "too
> close" because the gun runs didn't do the job.
>
> >> How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
> >> stack'?
> >
> >It does NOT matter if that CAS asset can't conduct the kind of attack you
> >need!
>
> So you don't have the right weapons for the job? (20mm lacks
> effectiveness, current PGMs too generous in their danger zones)
>
> Bear in mind you're making force-wide assertions on the basis of 0.05%
> of the offensive air sorties here.



Paging Mr. McNamara.


>
> >> I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
> >> so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
> >> you've also got something badly wrong.
> >
> >You just don't get it, do you? "**** happens" in combat, and flexibility
is
> >what allows you to adjust. having that aerial gun option is a tool for
> >flexibility



<snip what is undoubtedly the largest citation I have ever
encountered>



Glad to see you found the article, Paul. Too bad you can't understand
the basic fact that those ground guys kept asking for strafing attacks
because they did not want to escalate their own risk until/unless they had
to.



Brooks
>

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 12:33:04 -0800, Lyle > wrote:


>Ed,
>
>What is the difference between direct close airsupport, and close
>airsupport, or is it just all lumped together and called close air
>support.

Sounds like some sort of semantic argument. I never heard the term
"direct close air support" used in any official context. Close Air
Support is the employment of tac air assets in direct support of
ground units. It would, by its very nature be "direct".

With regard to fire support of ground units, there is the distinction
between direct and indirect fire. That's the difference between aimed
large-bore guns such as tank cannon and parabolic lobbed shells such
as artillery and mortar.

Maybe someone more current than I am in the latest nomenclature can
contribute to the discussion.

[Scott Ferrin]

>I don't think that's right. We know that two A-10s nailed helos in
>'91, so the possibility of helo-A-10 combat has to be considered.
>If an A-10 can get a helo kill with a gun designed for air-to-ground,
>then a helo with such a gun can do the same thing to the A-10.

The A-10 is pretty tough and between that and the helicopter's gun's
low rate of fire and relative inaccuracy would make it pretty
difficult for a helicoper to get a *gun* kill on an aircraft. A
missile kill is a WHOLE 'nother ball game. Back in the 80's they did
some tests of helicopter gunships defending themselves from fighters
with Sidewinder missiles and they did pretty good.




>
>Restricting armament to its advertised role is silly. Just ask the
>Argentineans in that ship that the Royal Marines pasted with their
>Carl Gustavs. Or the F-15 that nailed the helo with the 500-lb dumb
>bomb. Having seen those happen, the idea of an A-10 going up against
>an enemy aircraft doesn't seem so far-fetched.

I believe it was in the book "Warthog" in which a pilot discribes how
a Mig-29 was headed their was and him and his wingman were getting
ready with their Sidwinders and guns but some F-15s came in and took
care of them before there was an opportunity. I imagine if a pair of
Mig-29s got shot down by two A-10s we'd still be hearing the laughter
though.

[Mary Shafer]

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 20:46:54 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

> Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
> Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
> basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.

Darkstar wasn't that big. I used to see it out on the ramp all the
time. It was definitely is T-37 size class at the most. That's
pretty small.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Mary Shafer]

On Mon, 8 Dec 2003 13:06:31 -0500, "Hog Driver"
> wrote:

> Superior avionics do not make a superior pilot.

But crummy avionics can make things difficult enough to have an
effect. Look at the original F-16 LCOS, that often caused a PIO.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Paul F Austin]

"Chad Irby" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote:
>
> > "Chad Irby" wrote
> >
> > > The "little bitty" UAVs out there are in the "fly past really quick
and
> > > turbulence does the job" category...
> >
> > There really aren't "a lot" of large UAVs. They (and their payloads) are
> > quite expensive and the number look limited for the foreseeable future.
>
> Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
> Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
> basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.

You keep finding_types_of large ones. Take a look at the number of G-Hawks
produced and planned. The payloads (never mind the airframe) are so
expensive that the Air Force treats it as a "high demand-low availability"
resource like Rivet Joint or JSTARS. For cost reasons, it's unlikely to
change. The same seems to be true of Predator. The UAVs that look to be
procured in large numbers are the Pioneer-class machines.

[Paul F Austin]

"Alan Minyard" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote:

> >
> >Most selections are_very_closely balanced and most of the offerings will
do
> >the job. The difference between winner and also ran will turn on
> >features_other than_technical performance. In fact, it's the rare
> >procurement these days that offers any evaluation points at all for
> >performance above the "goal" level. Instead heaviest weighting is usually
> >given to Cost, delivery, cost and oh, yes cost. Did I mention cost?
> >
> I would certainly agree, however the Mauser offering was significantly
> different from the M-61 derivative. Different design philosophy (revolver
> vs "gatling" gun). The ammunition is also significantly different. If both
> weapons were designed to a definitive solution (rate of fire, same
> ammunition, etc) then your contention would be more accurate.

Lately, many procurements have had requirements based on end-effects rather
than e.g. specifying ROF and ammunition natures. In fact the whole JSF
procurement has been specified on a end effect basis.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mary Shafer > wrote:

> On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 20:46:54 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> > Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
> > Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
> > basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.
>
> Darkstar wasn't that big. I used to see it out on the ramp all the
> time. It was definitely is T-37 size class at the most. That's
> pretty small.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/darkstar.htm>

The Darkstar has a 69 foot wingspan, about twice that of the T-37, and
about 50 percent wider than the F-22. I consider that big. Certainly
big enough to hit with cannon fire.

Maybe you saw a sub-scale prototype?

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

> "Chad Irby" wrote
>
> > Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
> > Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
> > basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.
>
> You keep finding_types_of large ones.

Which, incidentally, are the ones they're actually using. And since
they're also expensive, they're worth shooting down. Just about
everyone who's making UAVs are making large ones.

> Take a look at the number of G-Hawks produced and planned. The
> payloads (never mind the airframe) are so expensive that the Air
> Force treats it as a "high demand-low availability" resource like
> Rivet Joint or JSTARS. For cost reasons, it's unlikely to change. The
> same seems to be true of Predator. The UAVs that look to be procured
> in large numbers are the Pioneer-class machines.

Which means, on cost terms, shooting down a big drone with a gun is
*very* cost-effective (a million-dollar airframe for a couple of hundred
bucks worth of ammo).

That "Pioneer-class" machine has a fifteen foot wingspan, which puts it
into the "light plane" size category, and certainly makes it big enough
to see and shoot down. If a jet can't do it, they can call in a
helicopter (every combat copter we have in the inventory could easily
catch one of the "little" drones).

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[John Keeney]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Magnus Redin
> > writes
> >Hi!
> >
> >"Paul F Austin" > writes:
> >> So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more
than
> >> "it might be useful and you never know"..
> >
> >A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets
> >like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers
> >forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles.
>
> UAVs are going to be really tough gun targets: just look at the size of
> them. Aircraft guns aren't a good option, if only because you're going
> to need so many rounds per target.

To judge by the one looking us over earlier this week, I'ld suggest
a 12 gauge with full choke. That and lots of practice.

[Tony Williams]

Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
> On 12 Dec 2003 12:51:59 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>
> >Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> >> In article >,
> >> (Tony Williams) wrote:
> >>
> >> > We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
> >> > for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
> >> > that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
> >> > about the GAU-12/U then.
> >>
> >> Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
> >> structure that fell through on closer examination.
> >
> >Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
> >work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
> >
> >Tony Williams
> >Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
> >Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>
> The Mouser was to be a completely new system, using linkless ammunition.
> It has never been demonstrated, much less placed in service.

The linkless feed was developed years ago and is used in the
Eurofighter Typhoon installation, so is just about to enter service.

So what have we determined?

1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most cost-effective
gun for the JSF (documented fact).

2. The cost of the gun rose well over budget (documented fact)
probably because Mauser's US partners spent far too much on adapting
it to US use (reasonable assumption).

3. GD, in their position of gun armament integrator, took advantage of
the situation to slip in a lower bid for the GAU-12/U, which was
accepted by L-M (clear conclusion from press statement).

So to sum up, the F-35 will be getting the second-best gun because
Mauser's US partners couldn't keep their costs down.

Incidentally, you seem to equate preferring a non-US gun with an
'anti-American bias'. You should have words with the US armed forces.
The US Army's standard 5.56mm MG is the (Belgian) FN Minimi, its
standard 7.62mm GPMG is the (Belgian) FN MAG, and its standard 9mm
pistol is the (Italian) Beretta. The M16 rifle family is expected to
be replaced soon by the XM8, based on the (German) Heckler & Koch G36.
The advanced XM29 5.56+20mm weapon is also having its hardware
developed by HK. The M1A2 Abrams tank is armed with a (German) 120mm
gun, replacing the (British) 105mm in the M1A1. The USN has made
extensive use of the (Italian) 76mm OTO, and the US Coastguard has
selected the (Swedish) 57mm Bofors as the main gun for its new class
of ships. The USMC has selected the (British) RO 155mm as its next
howitzer. Of course, the USMC also operates the AV-8B aircraft, based
on the (British) BAe Harrier, and the USN uses the T-45 Goshawk
trainer, a version of the (British) BAe Hawk.

Evidently these services are riven with anti-American bias. Or perhaps
they're just sensible enough to buy the best weapons available from
the western world?

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

> The linkless feed was developed years ago and is used in the
> Eurofighter Typhoon installation, so is just about to enter service.
>
> So what have we determined?
>
> 1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
> Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most cost-effective
> gun for the JSF (documented fact).

You misspelled "cheaper." The Mauser was "good enough," for the
original price, which they didn't stick with.

> 2. The cost of the gun rose well over budget (documented fact)
> probably because Mauser's US partners spent far too much on adapting
> it to US use (reasonable assumption).

Unreasonable assumption.

More reasonable? They low-balled the bid, and didn't get the price
increase they wanted. Integrating the gun into the airframe? If they
had to spend *that* much doing it, they screwed something up in the
original design.

> 3. GD, in their position of gun armament integrator, took advantage of
> the situation to slip in a lower bid for the GAU-12/U, which was
> accepted by L-M (clear conclusion from press statement).

....or they came back in after the Mauser folks didn't get the price
increase they wanted - the actual comment *in* the press statement.

> So to sum up, the F-35 will be getting the second-best gun because
> Mauser's US partners couldn't keep their costs down.

No, the F-35 will be getting a gun that's at least as good, because the
"cheap" gun wasn't nearly as cheap as we'd been led to believe.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Thomas Schoene]

Chad Irby wrote:
> In article >,
> Mary Shafer > wrote:

>> Darkstar wasn't that big. I used to see it out on the ramp all the
>> time. It was definitely is T-37 size class at the most. That's
>> pretty small.
>
> <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/darkstar.htm>
>
> The Darkstar has a 69 foot wingspan, about twice that of the T-37, and
> about 50 percent wider than the F-22. I consider that big.

Sure, the span is twice that of a T-37. But Darkstar was only 15 feet long,
which is quite short for a plane of its span, and about half the length of a
Tweet. Between those two dimensions, I could certainly understand
describing it as "T-37-class."

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Thomas Schoene]

Alan Minyard wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 19:34:41 +0000, Greg Hennessy >
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 11:50:40 -0600, Alan Minyard
>> > wrote:
>>
>>
>>>> Tony Williams
>>>> Military gun and ammunition website:
>>>> http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Military gun and ammunition
>>>> discussion forum: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>>>
>>> Of course the fact that the Mauser is produced by an enemy country,
>>> which is totally unreliable as a source of spares, is also a
>>> consideration.
>>>
>>
>> Oh christ, you really are that thick. I suggest you figure out where
>> and who were going to be producing the BK27 variant for the JSF.
>>
>>
>> greg
>
> The "improved" BK-27 was to be produced at the Alliant Techsystems
> plant in Mesa Arizona. This plant was previously owned by Boing.

One interesting point is that Lockheed Martin selected a Boeing-made gun
even while it was competing against Boeing for the overall JSF contract.

This
> gun, originally designed about 30 years ago was to be significantly
> modified and the new design was unproven.

The linkess feed system was being done by Western Design (another US firm),
which has extensive experience in the field. You';d have had to design a new
system for any gun, given the differnet installation systems planned for
JSF.

> In addition, the cased
> ammunition requires internal spent case stowage.

This would be true of any gun firing cased ammo, including the GAU-12/U that
was ultimately selected and the M-61 used in all current US fighters.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Paul F Austin]

"Chad Irby" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote:
>
> > "Chad Irby" wrote
> >
> > > Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
> > > Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
> > > basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.
> >
> > You keep finding_types_of large ones.
>
> Which, incidentally, are the ones they're actually using. And since
> they're also expensive, they're worth shooting down. Just about
> everyone who's making UAVs are making large ones.
>
> > Take a look at the number of G-Hawks produced and planned. The
> > payloads (never mind the airframe) are so expensive that the Air
> > Force treats it as a "high demand-low availability" resource like
> > Rivet Joint or JSTARS. For cost reasons, it's unlikely to change. The
> > same seems to be true of Predator. The UAVs that look to be procured
> > in large numbers are the Pioneer-class machines.
>
> Which means, on cost terms, shooting down a big drone with a gun is
> *very* cost-effective (a million-dollar airframe for a couple of hundred
> bucks worth of ammo).

Which makes using UAVs as justification for a gun, daft. By that argument,
let's ditch all the expensive AAMs. UAVs are no more a justification for
designing in a gun than is a handwave of "you never know..." which is a good
description of the gun justifications seen here. Mind there's a big
difference between not putting a gun on the next fighter and saying "rip all
the guns out of the current fleet". One is a proper system trade. The other
is a strawman.

[Brett]

"Tony Williams" > wrote:
| Alan Minyard > wrote in message
>...
| > On 12 Dec 2003 12:51:59 -0800,
(Tony Williams) wrote:
| >
| > >Chad Irby > wrote in message
>...
| > >> In article >,
| > >> (Tony Williams) wrote:
| > >>
| > >> > We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large
numbers
| > >> > for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team
concluded
| > >> > that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they
knew all
| > >> > about the GAU-12/U then.
| > >>
| > >> Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball
pricing
| > >> structure that fell through on closer examination.
| > >
| > >Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like
to
| > >work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
| > >
| > >Tony Williams
| > >Military gun and ammunition website:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
| > >Discussion forum at:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
| >
| > The Mouser was to be a completely new system, using linkless
ammunition.
| > It has never been demonstrated, much less placed in service.
|
| The linkless feed was developed years ago and is used in the
| Eurofighter Typhoon installation, so is just about to enter service.
|
| So what have we determined?
|
| 1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
| Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most cost-effective
| gun for the JSF (documented fact).

That isn't a documented fact. The documented fact is that the GAU-12/U
has just been selected as the best and most cost-effective gun for the
JSF in open competition with the BK 27 (the original selection of the BK
27 in 2000 was not an open competition) by LMT.

[Alan Minyard]

On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 21:19:04 -0500, "Paul F Austin" > wrote:

>
>"Alan Minyard" wrote
>> "Paul F Austin" wrote:
>
>> >
>> >Most selections are_very_closely balanced and most of the offerings will
>do
>> >the job. The difference between winner and also ran will turn on
>> >features_other than_technical performance. In fact, it's the rare
>> >procurement these days that offers any evaluation points at all for
>> >performance above the "goal" level. Instead heaviest weighting is usually
>> >given to Cost, delivery, cost and oh, yes cost. Did I mention cost?
>> >
>> I would certainly agree, however the Mauser offering was significantly
>> different from the M-61 derivative. Different design philosophy (revolver
>> vs "gatling" gun). The ammunition is also significantly different. If both
>> weapons were designed to a definitive solution (rate of fire, same
>> ammunition, etc) then your contention would be more accurate.
>
>Lately, many procurements have had requirements based on end-effects rather
>than e.g. specifying ROF and ammunition natures. In fact the whole JSF
>procurement has been specified on a end effect basis.
>
We tried that method with ships, ONCE. The LHA's were built on an "end
performance" contract. Unfortunately Ingals took this to mean "if it floats
its good enough". The PSAs for the LHAs were equivalent to major
overhauls, and the lawyers got rich.

I thought that we had learned from that experience, but perhaps not :-((

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 13 Dec 2003 22:16:54 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

>Alan Minyard > wrote in message >...
>> On 12 Dec 2003 12:51:59 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:
>>
>> >Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
>> >> In article >,
>> >> (Tony Williams) wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
>> >> > for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
>> >> > that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
>> >> > about the GAU-12/U then.
>> >>
>> >> Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
>> >> structure that fell through on closer examination.
>> >
>> >Do you have a source to support that? You may be right, but I like to
>> >work on hard info rather than forum gossip.
>> >
>> >Tony Williams
>> >Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>> >Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/
>>
>> The Mouser was to be a completely new system, using linkless ammunition.
>> It has never been demonstrated, much less placed in service.
>
>The linkless feed was developed years ago and is used in the
>Eurofighter Typhoon installation, so is just about to enter service.
>
>So what have we determined?
>
>1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
>Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most cost-effective
>gun for the JSF (documented fact).

No, it was dumped for NOT being cost effective.
>
>2. The cost of the gun rose well over budget (documented fact)
>probably because Mauser's US partners spent far too much on adapting
>it to US use (reasonable assumption).

If it was "in service" why did it need such "adaption"

>
>3. GD, in their position of gun armament integrator, took advantage of
>the situation to slip in a lower bid for the GAU-12/U, which was
>accepted by L-M (clear conclusion from press statement).

They (with approval from the Pentagon) selected the most
cost effective system
>
>So to sum up, the F-35 will be getting the second-best gun because
>Mauser's US partners couldn't keep their costs down.

The Mauser was clearly second-best.

>
>Incidentally, you seem to equate preferring a non-US gun with an
>'anti-American bias'. You should have words with the US armed forces.
>The US Army's standard 5.56mm MG is the (Belgian) FN Minimi, its
>standard 7.62mm GPMG is the (Belgian) FN MAG, and its standard 9mm
>pistol is the (Italian) Beretta.

Adopted solely because NATO did not like the far more effective (and
more expensive) .45 Colt.

> The M16 rifle family is expected to
>be replaced soon by the XM8, based on the (German) Heckler & Koch G36.

"Expected" by whom ??

>The advanced XM29 5.56+20mm weapon is also having its hardware
>developed by HK. The M1A2 Abrams tank is armed with a (German) 120mm
>gun, replacing the (British) 105mm in the M1A1.

No problem.

> The USN has made
>extensive use of the (Italian) 76mm OTO,

Only a few FFs are still in commission. That was the only y class
built with the OTO, and it was a maintenance hog.

> and the US Coastguard has
>selected the (Swedish) 57mm Bofors as the main gun for its new class
>of ships.

Bofors is a US company. They are owned by United Defense.

> The USMC has selected the (British) RO 155mm as its next
>howitzer.

>Of course, the USMC also operates the AV-8B aircraft, based
>on the (British) BAe Harrier,

Now obsolete and being replaced with the F-35. It was, in its
time, a fine aircraft.

> and the USN uses the T-45 Goshawk
>trainer, a version of the (British) BAe Hawk.

The hawk was a political decision. It was not wanted by the USN, required
complete redesign, and took many years to get into service,
>
>Evidently these services are riven with anti-American bias. Or perhaps
>they're just sensible enough to buy the best weapons available from
>the western world?
>
>Tony Williams
>Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
>Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

No, they are occasionally blind-sided by the politicians (Hawk, Beretta) and
occasionally make bad procurement decisions. But US corporations
own almost all of the companies that do significant business with the
Pentagon.

Al Minyard

[Chad Irby]

In article t>,
"Thomas Schoene" > wrote:

> Chad Irby wrote:
> > In article >,
> > Mary Shafer > wrote:
>
> >> Darkstar wasn't that big. I used to see it out on the ramp all the
> >> time. It was definitely is T-37 size class at the most. That's
> >> pretty small.
> >
> > <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/darkstar.htm>
> >
> > The Darkstar has a 69 foot wingspan, about twice that of the T-37, and
> > about 50 percent wider than the F-22. I consider that big.
>
> Sure, the span is twice that of a T-37. But Darkstar was only 15 feet long,
> which is quite short for a plane of its span, and about half the length of a
> Tweet. Between those two dimensions, I could certainly understand
> describing it as "T-37-class."

But that certainly does *not* make it too small to shoot down with
aerial guns, or everyone would be using T-37s as "gunproof planes."

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

> "Chad Irby" wrote

> > Which means, on cost terms, shooting down a big drone with a gun is
> > *very* cost-effective (a million-dollar airframe for a couple of hundred
> > bucks worth of ammo).
>
> Which makes using UAVs as justification for a gun, daft.

Not "as justification," just "one more type of target."

> By that argument, let's ditch all the expensive AAMs. UAVs are no
> more a justification for designing in a gun than is a handwave of
> "you never know..." which is a good description of the gun
> justifications seen here.

So far, we have several different reasons for having guns in planes,
versus "we only need missiles to shoot down other planes."

The argument for not having guns is, overall, pretty thin.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chris Manteuffel]

Scott Ferrin > wrote in message >...

> Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.

Everything is a tradeoff. For a gun you bring along quite a bit of
weight (~100kg+ weight of ammo). What if that mass was fuel? What if
it were extra decoys? What if it were more avionics? What if it were
more engines? What if that mass was completely dropped to get a more
manueverable fighter?

Which of those choices allow you to complete the mission most
effectively? When making engineering trade-offs, you have to remember
that you can have A and not need it, but what about B? If you need B
and instead you put all that mass into A and you don't end up needing
it, that's bad engineering.

Chris Manteuffel

[Mary Shafer]

On Sun, 14 Dec 2003 03:22:08 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

> In article >,
> Mary Shafer > wrote:
>
> > On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 20:46:54 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
> >
> > > Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
> > > Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
> > > basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.
> >
> > Darkstar wasn't that big. I used to see it out on the ramp all the
> > time. It was definitely is T-37 size class at the most. That's
> > pretty small.
>
> <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/darkstar.htm>
>
> The Darkstar has a 69 foot wingspan, about twice that of the T-37, and
> about 50 percent wider than the F-22. I consider that big. Certainly
> big enough to hit with cannon fire.

You wouldn't be comparing it to the F-22 if you'd ever seen it.
DarkSpot was really short and thin. Gliders have wing spans bigger
than the F-22, too, but no one really compares them.

Actually, the DarkStar-glider comparison isn't a bad one, now that I
think about it. About the same volume and bulk. Same kind of
materials for the airframe, too.

Of course you can hit it with cannon fire. You can hit a cruise
missile with cannon fire, too. You just have to work at it.

I am reminded of the story about the time an ALCM escaped control at
EDW. It went into some sort of holding pattern and AFFTC whistled up
some armed F-4s from George. They came over and chased it around the
sky, as it flew a predictable path without any sort of evasive
maneuvering, for about a half an hour. They took a fair number of
shots against it and missed it every time. The ALCM finally ran out
of fuel and fell out of the sky.

This may or may not be true, and accuracy was probably sacrificed for
laughs by the third time someone told it, but it was widely accepted
at EDW as being a reasonable representation of the events.

> Maybe you saw a sub-scale prototype?

Nope.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Mary Shafer]

On Sun, 14 Dec 2003 17:02:23 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

> In article t>,
> "Thomas Schoene" > wrote:
>
> > Chad Irby wrote:
> > > In article >,
> > > Mary Shafer > wrote:
> >
> > >> Darkstar wasn't that big. I used to see it out on the ramp all the
> > >> time. It was definitely is T-37 size class at the most. That's
> > >> pretty small.
> > >
> > > <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/darkstar.htm>
> > >
> > > The Darkstar has a 69 foot wingspan, about twice that of the T-37, and
> > > about 50 percent wider than the F-22. I consider that big.
> >
> > Sure, the span is twice that of a T-37. But Darkstar was only 15 feet long,
> > which is quite short for a plane of its span, and about half the length of a
> > Tweet. Between those two dimensions, I could certainly understand
> > describing it as "T-37-class."
>
> But that certainly does *not* make it too small to shoot down with
> aerial guns, or everyone would be using T-37s as "gunproof planes."

First you have to find it, though. You can't get a guns kill on an
airplane you can't find in the sky. Guns kills are close-up kills.

The T-37 isn't a low-observables airplane and DarkSpot most certainly
was. Actually, it looked like a cross between the B-2 and the U-2;
the project team got tired of hearing it called the UB-2 fairly
quickly. The Tweet shows up on radar just fine; DarkSpot didn't.

You knew, didn't you, that DarkSpot flew out of Dryden? It was housed
in the building I worked in and it spent a fair amount of time out on
the ramp. I saw it fairly often.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
(Chris Manteuffel) wrote:

> Scott Ferrin > wrote in message
> >...
>
> > Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.
>
> Everything is a tradeoff. For a gun you bring along quite a bit of
> weight (~100kg+ weight of ammo). What if that mass was fuel?

With weight of tankage, that's about 150 kilograms of fuel (gun, ammo,
et cetera versus tankage, pipes and fuel control stuff). An extra five
percent, maybe . Not a good tradeoff, overall.

> What if it were extra decoys?

The dispensing system on the F-4 was small enough to be held in your
arms. There's not a lot of need for five times that much, and the gain
versus having an extra weapon isn't obvious.

> What if it were more avionics?

The plane is pretty full of avionics right now, there's not a lot more
you could put in and still have something a pilot could use.

> What if it were more engines?

It's got "more engine" than pretty much anything else, and you'd need a
lot more than a coupl of hundred kilos to do anything more with it.

> What if that mass was completely dropped to get a more
> manueverable fighter?

A more maneuverable fighter that doesn't need as much maneuverability,
since it's going to have to stay the hell away from actual dogfighting.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mary Shafer > wrote:

> On Sun, 14 Dec 2003 03:22:08 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> > In article >,
> > Mary Shafer > wrote:
> >
> > > On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 20:46:54 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Funny, I keep finding quite large ones. Like the Predator, the
> > > > Darkstar, the Global Hawk, or one of several Russian designs that are
> > > > basically reworked large cruise missiles or former target drones.
> > >
> > > Darkstar wasn't that big. I used to see it out on the ramp all the
> > > time. It was definitely is T-37 size class at the most. That's
> > > pretty small.
> >
> > <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/darkstar.htm>
> >
> > The Darkstar has a 69 foot wingspan, about twice that of the T-37, and
> > about 50 percent wider than the F-22. I consider that big. Certainly
> > big enough to hit with cannon fire.
>
> You wouldn't be comparing it to the F-22 if you'd ever seen it.

Actually, I have, and it's still really obviously big enough to shoot
down with a gun.

> Of course you can hit it with cannon fire. You can hit a cruise
> missile with cannon fire, too. You just have to work at it.

In visual size, the DarkStar (and most of the other "big" UAVs) are
several times the size of a cruise missile, not to mention one-quarter
the speed.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mary Shafer > wrote:

> On Sun, 14 Dec 2003 17:02:23 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> > But that certainly does *not* make it too small to shoot down with
> > aerial guns, or everyone would be using T-37s as "gunproof planes."
>
> First you have to find it, though. You can't get a guns kill on an
> airplane you can't find in the sky. Guns kills are close-up kills.

Since the whole point of this thread was on missiles versus guns, how in
the heck does that help the "missiles only" camp?

If you can't find the thing with radar or with your eyes, how are you
going to shoot it with a missile?

If it's findable with either, then shooting it with a cannon is just
gunnery practice... and with that nice big wingspan and slow airspeed,
it's going to be easy as hell to shoot.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Mary Shafer]

On Sun, 14 Dec 2003 19:06:28 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

> In article >,
> Mary Shafer > wrote:

> > First you have to find it, though. You can't get a guns kill on an
> > airplane you can't find in the sky. Guns kills are close-up kills.
>
> Since the whole point of this thread was on missiles versus guns, how in
> the heck does that help the "missiles only" camp?
>
> If you can't find the thing with radar or with your eyes, how are you
> going to shoot it with a missile?

That's the point I was making. Little, LO aircraft are maybe not the
best example to use in such a comparison.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Tony Williams]

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 12:33:04 -0800, Lyle > wrote:
>
>
> >Ed,
> >
> >What is the difference between direct close airsupport, and close
> >airsupport, or is it just all lumped together and called close air
> >support.
>
> Sounds like some sort of semantic argument. I never heard the term
> "direct close air support" used in any official context. Close Air
> Support is the employment of tac air assets in direct support of
> ground units. It would, by its very nature be "direct".

The only distinctions I am aware of are between CAS (i.e. hitting the
enemy's front line) and BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction) which is
hitting the enemy's assets slightly behind their front line to get
supplies, units moving up etc.

Of course, since some elements of 'CAS' are now delivered from bombers
cruising at altitude, perhaps they've added to the nomenclature!

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

"Brett" > wrote in message >...
> "Tony Williams" > wrote:
> |
> | 1. The German Mauser BK 27 was selected by both Boeing and
> | Lockheed-Martin over the GAU-12/U as the best and most cost-effective
> | gun for the JSF (documented fact).
>
> That isn't a documented fact. The documented fact is that the GAU-12/U
> has just been selected as the best and most cost-effective gun for the
> JSF in open competition with the BK 27 (the original selection of the BK
> 27 in 2000 was not an open competition) by LMT.

It's as well documented as the decision to use the GAU-12/U: the
source for both being official press statements, placed on the web.
You seem to be very selective in the press statements you're prepared
to credit.

What makes you say that the original decision in favour of the BK 27
wasn't 'in open competition'? It was clear that when Boeing decided in
favour of the BK 27 in 1999, the GAU-12/U WAS in the frame, because GD
withdrew it from the JSF competition in 2000, just before L-M selected
the BK 27 as well (which looks very much like a case of 'resign before
you're sacked').

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Tony Williams]

Chad Irby > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (Tony Williams) wrote:
> >
> > So to sum up, the F-35 will be getting the second-best gun because
> > Mauser's US partners couldn't keep their costs down.
>
> No, the F-35 will be getting a gun that's at least as good, because the
> "cheap" gun wasn't nearly as cheap as we'd been led to believe.

This from the Boeing press release in 1999:

'Citing lower costs, greater lethality and improved supportability,
The Boeing Company has selected the Advanced 27mm Aircraft Cannon for
its next generation JSF combat aircraft.....The gun is also a
candidate for the Lockheed Martin version of the JSF...."It's the
lightest, most accurate and reliable gun based on our initial studies"
said Dennis Muilenburg, JSF weapon system director for Boeing. "Our
comparative assessment found the 27mm cannon to be more affordable,
more lethal and more supportable than any of its competitors".'

Note that cost is only one of the factors mentioned. Words like 'more
lethal', 'lightest', 'most accurate and reliable' are in there too.
That provides no evidence for claiming that the GAU-12/U is 'at least
as good'.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Kevin Brooks]

"Tony Williams" > wrote in message
...
> Ed Rasimus > wrote in message
>...
> > On Sat, 13 Dec 2003 12:33:04 -0800, Lyle > wrote:
> >
> >
> > >Ed,
> > >
> > >What is the difference between direct close airsupport, and close
> > >airsupport, or is it just all lumped together and called close air
> > >support.
> >
> > Sounds like some sort of semantic argument. I never heard the term
> > "direct close air support" used in any official context. Close Air
> > Support is the employment of tac air assets in direct support of
> > ground units. It would, by its very nature be "direct".
>
> The only distinctions I am aware of are between CAS (i.e. hitting the
> enemy's front line) and BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction) which is
> hitting the enemy's assets slightly behind their front line to get
> supplies, units moving up etc.

There are two types of CAS--immediate and preplanned. Preplanned icludes CAS
sorties integrated into the ground maneuver plan and submitted IAW the ATO.
Immediate CAS is not included in the ATO (at least not specifically; CAS
sorties can be included in the ATO without specifications, from what I
gather, sort of a "CAS reserve") and addresses those situations not foreseen
in the planning process. According to CGSC ST 100-3 (1996 edition),
immediate CAS provides the commander with flexibility, and can be used to
exploit success, reinforce or retain momentum, deal with enemy
counterattacks, and provide security.

Either Buffdriver or the resident Strike eagle Driver might be able to shed
light on any doctrinal changes in the CAS arena that have occurred since the
publication of that text.

Brooks

>
> Of course, since some elements of 'CAS' are now delivered from bombers
> cruising at altitude, perhaps they've added to the nomenclature!
>
> Tony Williams
> Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
> Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/